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The Principle of Equality in Diverse States – Reconciling Autonomy with 
Equal Rights and Opportunities is the fruit of an initiative launched by the 
International Association of Centers for Federal Studies (iacfs) in collabo-
ration with the Institute of Federalism of Fribourg (iff). This contribution 
to the brill- series Studies in Territorial and Cultural Diversity Governance 
brought together scholars from different disciplines from both established fed-
eral states as well as newly federalising, regionalising or decentralising states 
from around the world. These researchers all gathered around the following 
complex question: How can states which are characterised by internal diver-
sity and which guarantee autonomy to their regions or communities deal with 
this diversity while at the same time respecting and protecting the principle 
of equality throughout the country? In short: How can diversity and equality 
coexist?
The objective of this volume is to address the various challenges diverse 
states face when accommodating diversity while simultaneously guarantee-
ing equality, and thus to generate new insights into the intricacies of power- 
sharing. Each contributor investigated the difficulties and the opportunities 
of combining subnational autonomy with both national and international 
commitments to equality and explored pathways for the reconciliation of the 
two clashing principles, whether implicitly or explicitly, and whether hypo-
thetically or concretely. The book offers researchers, as well as policy makers 
and practitioners a wealth of new knowledge, both about the multifaceted 
relationships between federalism, decentralisation and other forms of dealing 
with diversity, and about the respect and implementation of the principle of 
equality.
We are convinced that this volume constitutes a useful contribution to the 
brill- series Studies in Territorial and Cultural Diversity Governance, and a 
unique contribution to the scientific discourse on federalism, decentralisation, 
conflict resolution and on the implementation of the principle of equality in 
diverse states. With its comparative and interdisciplinary approach, this book 
investigates the effects and interactions between power- sharing and equality 
from legal, political, economic, social and cultural perspectives, addressing the 
challenges and solutions from a number of established federal or newly fed-
eralising, regionalising or decentralising states. It also aims to build bridges 
between scholars working on equality and human rights and those firmly 
anchored in federal studies. We thus hope to open up new avenues for research.
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Introduction
Eva Maria Belser and Lawrence Zünd
While unitary states find it easy – at least in theory – to pledge equal rights to 
all geographic entities and all citizens of the country, the principle of equal-
ity raises several complex issues in states which guarantee autonomy rights to 
one, several or all constituent entities or which provide for specific regimes for 
distinct groups, such as national minorities or indigenous groups. As the guar-
antee of self- rule is fundamental to all federal systems, their subnational units, 
regions or communities are empowered to autonomously adopt and apply 
their own rules. Autonomy implies that the rules can differ from one unit to 
another, which is why it necessarily impacts on equality; different rules apply 
to the citizens of the same state. It comes as no surprise that proponents of the 
principle of equality and equal citizenship often oppose federalism in all its 
forms or attempt to limit self- rule whenever it clashes with equality. Different 
rules are often blamed for leading to – or increasing – inequalities within one 
and the same state, for challenging unity, and for questioning solidarity.
Why would we then publish a book that points out the challenges federal 
countries face with regard to the principle of equality, a book that would poten-
tially unveil problems intrinsically linked to autonomy, a book that focuses on 
challenges federal systems struggle to overcome and that might give arguments 
to its adversaries? It might be easier and seem more rewarding to present the 
successes countries encounter along their journey, rather than highlighting 
the many conceptualisation and implementation issues faced when putting 
into practice federalism, decentralisation or any other power- sharing regime. 
However, addressing such challenges and difficulties, as well as the strategies 
employed to eventually overcome them, is more worthwhile. On the one hand, 
it is intellectually stimulating to explore the many facets of autonomy and of 
equality and to discover both common ground and contradictions. On the 
other hand, tackling the controversial issues of diversity, autonomy, unity and 
solidarity at its roots offers a fascinating opportunity to unpack deep reluc-
tance towards power- sharing and investigate its relevance. Taking this kind of 
hesitancy and opposition seriously and openly questioning its justification or 
groundlessness seems to be the best way to open new ways of thinking about 
both federalism and diversity as well as unity and equality, and to add inspira-
tional shades of grey to the still commonly bleak, black- and- white approach.
Respecting the principle of equality and reconciling it with equality is 
undoubtedly no easy task in the context of countries which have adopted 
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federal or decentralised systems or any other arrangement allowing for the 
accommodation of groups or territories with a distinct identity. How much 
equality does state unity require? How much inequality is acceptable in order 
to respect diversity? There is an important but largely unexplored theoretical 
and conceptual difference in the understanding of the principle of equality 
in federal and decentralised states which grant autonomy to regions and, on 
the other hand, unitary states which provide for homogenous rules applied 
uniformly throughout the country. Furthermore, there are challenges with 
regard to the protection of minorities on the federal level and the protection 
of minorities within minorities in autonomous regions. The equal or unequal 
representation of regional units in the institutions of the central governments 
as well as the distribution or non- distribution of resources can constitute a 
serious difficulty. How is such difficulty dealt with? What experiments have 
been undertaken with rather unconventional solutions and what new solu-
tions could be suggested with regard to particular problems?
The answers to these questions are not merely of a legal nature, but need to 
be tackled from a political, economic, social and cultural perspective as well. 
Such is the ambition of this volume. Its  purpose is not so much to cover a 
maximum of countries with individual case studies, but rather to develop a 
reflection on concepts and issues that might challenge other federal states, as 
well as centralised systems. Hence, the following volume addresses a variety 
of topics with a well- balanced geographic representation of case studies, and 
brings together authors from varied disciplines, all of them experts in their 
own field of research, yet all connected through their interest in federalism 
and decentralisation, ensuring a multifaceted view on the issues at stake. In 
addressing these questions, this volume tries to provide deep insight into the 
different case studies and comparative analyses and hopes to pave the path for 
future studies on the relation between equality, autonomy and diversity.
Looking at the principle of equality in diverse states is an important under-
taking for many reasons. All states subscribe to the principle of equality, view 
equal rights and opportunities for all as a fundamental aspect of justice, 
and have committed to guaranteeing equal rights and freedoms to all with-
out discrimination. At the same time, all states deal with diversity and most 
have adopted special regimes or autonomy arrangements for some regions or 
groups, such as islands, unpopulated territories, capitals, metropolitan areas, 
national minorities or indigenous groups. This is true for federations but 
equally so for most unitary states. Although the concept of ‘one language, one 
culture, one people, one nation’ still survives in some states, diversity is increas-
ing overall. If it is not ethnic and cultural diversity which forcefully comes to 
the fore, it is geographic, social, economic or political diversity or, most often, 
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a combination of these elements. In fact, only very few countries still have – or 
hope for – an omnipotent centre making decisions that apply equally to every-
one in the entire country. Even emblematic centralised states deal with diver-
sity: France by regionalising and accommodating overseas territories, Finland 
by granting autonomy to the Sami people and accepting a special regime for 
the Aland Islands, or China by tolerating a special status for Hong Kong and 
Macau and special rules for ethnic minorities.
Vertical separation of powers has been the global trend for some time. 
Federalism, decentralisation and other autonomy arrangements usually come 
with the expectation of solving problems encountered between majority and 
minority groups and helping to combine democratic majority rule with the 
existence of minority groups. Federal systems are also perceived as defusing 
tensions, bringing the state closer to the people, improving service delivery 
and making the state more democratic and accountable. When faced with 
separatism, sharing power is usually the only way to sooth tension and avoid 
confrontation, outbreaks of violence or frozen conflicts. In times of internal 
conflicts opposing regions or communities, sharing power is usually the only 
possible road to peace.
However, since the relationship between power- sharing and equality is 
unclear, the fear of sacrificing equality in favour of autonomy and the anxiety 
this produces among the majority in terms of losing its grip over its minorities 
(and its resources), often prevents a peaceful balance between majorities and 
minorities and the different regions and communities of a country. In addi-
tion, defenders of human rights often articulate their criticism towards federal 
and decentralised states around the following arguments: How can the prin-
ciple of equality be reconciled with that of autonomy, when the latter accom-
modates regions and communities by providing them with privileges others do 
not have? And how can equality prevail in a country in which different regions 
or communities apply different rules to the citizens of the same state? Is it 
acceptable that citizens of the same country enjoy different rights and carry 
different burdens? Can a system be fair when citizens of the same state do 
not all have access to the same public services and contribute equally to their 
costs? Critical questions are also raised in the field of democracy. Does imple-
menting federalism and decentralisation necessarily mean that the demo-
cratic principle of one person one vote is hampered by balancing voting rights 
or by reserving seats for specific groups and not for others?
This book tackles these questions and explores the similarities and dif-
ferences that might exist between the concepts and practices of federal sys-
tems and the principle of equality and its implementation. It understands 
federalism very broadly. For the purpose of this book, federal systems include 
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established and new federations, regional and decentralised states, and other 
states providing specific regions or communities with extra rights, privileges 
or obligations. But the diversity of diverse states should not lead us to forget 
that the notion of equality is even more disconcerting. In fact, equality can 
be viewed as being either individual or collective, de jure or de facto, formal 
or substantive. It can thus refer to the equality of regions and communities 
within the same country or to the individuals constituting them. It can focus 
on the obligation to treat everyone equally by law or on the duty to equalise de 
facto differences and promote equality of chances. When the duty to guarantee 
equality is not looked at as a static but rather as a dynamic state task, it can also 
be seen as a mechanism to overcome vulnerabilities or to deal with wrongs of 
the past, including inequalities.
Some federal states guarantee equal rights and equal responsibilities to all 
subnational units and ensure proportionate representation of all groups in 
parliament. Such de jure symmetrical relationships may or may not be best to 
implement the principle of equality. After all, subnational units usually differ 
greatly in terms of geographical size, population, economic and social develop-
ment, resources, ethnic composition, as well as culture and history. They may 
be the dominant unit or the formerly or currently marginalised, neglected or 
disenfranchised part of the country. Formal equality can thus lead to unequal 
representation of citizens and variations in power and influence of the units. 
In other states, the institutional setup provides for differentiation between 
regional units and asymmetric relationships, e.g. for unequal (but equalising) 
representation at the centre, for special rights and privileges in favour of one or 
more regions or groups or other forms of imposed or negotiated compromises 
on the division of power. All these intricacies contribute to the fact that ana-
lysing the autonomy- equality relation is not an easy task, but a highly reward-
ing one.
Diverse states guaranteeing autonomy must also respond to questions 
related to the ownership and management of natural resources – which are 
typically very unequally distributed amongst the units – and design a system 
of fiscal federalism. Most have developed financial schemes to balance eco-
nomic, social and other disparities between regions and communities. While 
some of these fiscal arrangements focus on the equality of the regional units 
and on the balance of their rights and responsibilities, others are designed 
to guarantee equal rights and opportunities to all citizens living in different 
regions. Asymmetric arrangements, which nowadays have become common 
in federal systems, are designed to recognise and accommodate different kinds 
of diversity and power relationships in order to react to separatist claims, their 
needs, priorities and bargaining powers and in an overall attempt to promote 
Introduction 5
internal cohesion and stability. However, such unequal relationships among 
regional units raise a number of questions. How can special arrangements 
that privilege some regional units or groups over the others be justified? Does 
the principle of equality require that extra- rights are compensated by extra- 
duties? How and to what extent is it acceptable that the use of asymmetric 
powers leads to inequality between citizens of different regions in terms of 
representation, access to power, veto rights, human rights, and access to ser-
vices? These institutional questions are at the core of the discussion this book 
attempts to articulate.
Furthermore, equality in states characterised by diversity can be exam-
ined from an individual perspective. While constitutions and international 
human rights conventions guarantee all persons a right to equality and non- 
discrimination, diverse states often simultaneously provide for specific rights 
accommodating minorities or other groups. The constitutional or legal guaran-
tee of territorial self- rule in fields such as language, culture policies, education, 
health, social services and infrastructure, opens a space for regional variations 
of policies, laws and services, potentially creating tensions with the principle 
of equality. Both federal and decentralised states have opted for different ways 
of reconciling the guarantee of equal rights and opportunities to all citizens 
with the collective rights to autonomy. For some, autonomy is limited by the 
principle of equality. According to this approach, all citizens, independent of 
their residence and group belonging, enjoy the guarantee of equality before 
the law and equal access to public services. In such a system, the autonomy of 
regional units or groups in the field of legislation or service delivery is largely 
reduced and there is either no fiscal federalism or full fiscal equalisation. The 
autonomy of subnational actors is then reduced to the implementation of 
centrally decided and financed strategies and targets. Even in such a central-
ised system, service delivery is not necessarily the same in all regions. As with 
unitary states, highly centralised federal systems often fail to deliver on their 
promise of ensuring equal citizenship and providing equal access to essential 
services.
In order to improve governance and better respect the autonomy of sub-
national units, some states are thus willing to accept a certain degree of de 
jure and de facto inequality between citizens of different regional units or even 
within a unit. Such political systems only provide for national minimal stand-
ards and allow regional units or groups to adopt their own legislative regimes 
and to offer special services. Despite their effects on equality, such systems 
might be acceptable in a country if all individuals enjoy minimum standards 
and all units have a fair chance to improve on these. It is true that this kind 
of decentralised federal system can threaten the cohesion and unity of the 
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state when some regions or communities do not function optimally, fall below 
minimum standards, or disadvantage certain groups or minorities within the 
minority. In these situations, however, the threats do not come from the fed-
eral system as such. It is rather the failure of regional powers to perform their 
tasks and to respect the principle of non- discrimination as well as the failure 
of central powers to ensure the respect of the minimum standards and to guar-
antee minority rights, which are at the source of inequality. Re- decentralising 
is rarely an effective response to such governance failures; empowering regions 
and communities and establishing and using supportive and supervisory 
mechanisms seem to be more promising reactions.
In all diverse states, balancing equality and autonomy is a controversial, 
challenging and continuous task. On the one hand, a comprehensive imple-
mentation of equal rights and opportunities throughout the country can-
not easily be reconciled with the guarantee of meaningful autonomy. If the 
principle of equality is fully applied, regional units tend to be reduced to the 
status of implementation agencies. The national guarantee of equal services 
in all regions also limits the incentives of regional governments to function 
efficiently and to mobilise resources in order to better respond to the specific 
regional needs and to offer better services. On the other hand, the use of auton-
omy rights can be considered a risk to equality. It can lead to unfair treatment 
of minorities within minorities, of women or other groups; the very idea of 
some citizens of the same country enjoying more rights and better services 
than others can be seen as an unbearable violation of the principle of equality 
and thus as a threat to the unity and stability of the country.
Part 1 of the book, Conceptual Determination, aims at determining the con-
cept of the principle of equality in diverse states. The three chapters elaborate 
on how equality and autonomy can be conceptualised and aim at uncovering 
avenues for the reconciliation of the two principles.
In  chapter 1, Anna Gamper starts by acknowledging the fact that federalism 
and equality are often described as principles with opposed purposes. In fact, 
while the first aims at ensuring diversity management, the second is invoked to 
establish homogeneity. However, the author demonstrates that both principles 
share a common narrative, the idea of suum cuique tribuere – to give each their 
own. This narrative is essential for understanding the ways in which federalism 
legitimises, depending on circumstances, needs, and priorities, the equal or 
unequal treatment of regions or person.
In  chapter 2, Maja Sahadžić uses indicators of constitutional asymmetry in 
order to offer a comprehensive evaluation of the concepts of constitutional 
asymmetry and equality from a legal perspective. Her chapter also addresses 




legitimacy and stability in multinational systems with federal arrangements. 
Symmetrisation not being a suitable solution for heterogeneous states, the 
author takes a closer look at the question of how far asymmetry can go before 
is destabilises or delegitimises a multi- tiered system.
In  chapter 3, Eva Maria Belser investigates the balance between autonomy 
and its centrifugal impetus, on the one hand, and the centripetal aspirations 
of human rights, on the other. By referring to the case of Switzerland, the 
author illustrates the frictions and synergies between autonomy and human 
rights standards, and attempts to sketch a conceptual framework for multilevel 
human rights protection and promotion.
Part 2 of the book deals with Institutional Equality. A great variety of models 
and situations can be distinguished in this field. In some states, all regional 
units enjoy equal rights and assume equal responsibilities but these de jure 
symmetries can easily result in de facto asymmetries – and vice versa. This part 
of the book discusses the way in which institutional equality can or ought to 
be achieved or the way in which institutional inequality can or ought to be 
justified.
In  chapter 4, Erika Arban explores the way solidarity is construed as an 
aspirational principle fostering equality, particularly in its relationship with 
regionalism, through the interpretative lens offered by the Italian constitu-
tional court. The author aims at showing how the principle of solidarity plays a 
crucial role in the Italian legal and constitutional architecture.
In  chapter 5, Andrea Filippetti presents a comparative analysis based on 42 
European countries and their 167 subsequent regions and analyses the rela-
tionship between diversity, access to local public services and regional auton-
omy. While he starts by showing that citizens are less satisfied with public ser-
vices in regions characterised by higher diversity, he then examines whether 
regional autonomy can mediate this problem or not.
In  chapter 6, Jayampathy Wickramaratne addresses Sri Lanka’s current con-
stitutional reform process and its historical evolution characterised by 29 years 
of limited devolution with successive governments taking back devolved pow-
ers. He highlights the challenge of this process, which is to forge a settlement 
that guarantees equality as well as genuine autonomy and that would ensure 
the cohesion of the country.
While Parts 1 and 2 predominantly focus on the institutional aspects of 
equality, the other chapters dealing with specific aspects of equality often 
come back to institutional issues. In fact, federalism and other power- sharing 
arrangements cannot be fully understood by separately analysing their legal, 
political, economic, cultural or social dimensions. As a consequence, the issues 
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divided into ‘institutional’, ‘economic’, ‘political’ and other aspects. To under-
stand one of those dimensions, the other dimensions need to be included 
and thus further reflections on institutional equality will follow in the next 
chapters.
Part 3 presents case studies on Economic Equality and elaborates on how 
asymmetry, de facto and de jure, can lead to inequalities on the economic level. 
These may arise between both the citizens and the subnational entities. While 
some of the mechanisms adopted to balance economic, social and other dis-
parities focus on the equality of the regional units, others are designed to guar-
antee equal rights and opportunities to all citizens living in different regions.
In  chapter 7, Nico Steytler recalls that the motives of power- sharing are often 
grounded in practices and perceptions of racial, ethnic, linguistic and cultural 
discrimination and marginalisation. As centralised government often serves a 
narrow partisan group, federalism and decentralisation is seen as the best way 
forward. The constitutional processes in Solomon Islands, and Trinidad and 
Tobago, however, illustrate that marginalised groups often claim preferential 
access to resources hereby creating new risks for equality and development.
In  chapter 8, Miguel Angel Asensio analyses the Argentinian case and the 
process aiming at reaching ‘equivalent development’. The author unveils some 
of the major obstacles this process has encountered in the past, highlights 
some of the crucial challenges and limits faced by the federal fiscal system and 
examines options to overcome uneven development.
In  chapter 9, Peter Hänni presents the considerable autonomy the Swiss 
Federal Constitution leaves to the cantons and to the communes with respect 
to the determination of direct tax rates. The chapter shows the consequences 
on the financial burdens of taxpayers and discusses the federal mechanisms of 
equalisation of financial resources and burdens.
In  chapter 10, Giulia Maria Napolitano and Gabriella Saputelli refer to the 
situation in Italy in order to draw attention to the increasing tensions between 
the central state and regions in the field of social care policy. They examine to 
what extent these tensions are sourced by the effects of social care policy on 
the respect and implementation of the principle of equality.
In Part 4, the focus lies on Political Equality. As both symmetric as well as 
asymmetric federal systems can lead to unequal representation of citizens and 
variations in power and influence of the units at the federal level, the following 
chapters take a closer look at the premise of ‘one person one vote’ and address 
the different ways federal systems try to ensure a balance between equal and 
fair representation.
In  chapter 11, Sérgio Ferrari addresses representation issues in the Brazilian 







it comes to the political representation of citizens from the different units. 
Stating that federalism may clash with democracy, the author presents these 
tensions in relation to Brazil’s first chamber.
In  chapter 12, Soeren Keil discusses constitutional equality in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by analysing a judgement by the European Court of Human Rights 
challenging ethnic aspects of the constitution. The author demonstrates that 
the judgement, which is still not implemented, questions one of the key ele-
ments ensuring peace in post- war Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In  chapter 13, Dejan Vanjek states that Bosnia and Herzegovina, constituting 
a hybrid federal model with a multileveled- asymmetrical structure, cannot be 
analysed based on classical federal theory. He claims that in countries where 
groups are explicit actors of the federal order, unconventional mechanisms are 
required to achieve a balance of autonomy and co- decision making across the 
political system and institutional structure.
In  chapter 14, Yonatan Tesfaye Fessha addresses the empowerment of ethnic 
communities in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and discusses 
the status and treatment of individuals belonging to different peoples, nations 
and nationalities. He argues that, despite the constitutional commitment to 
uphold both individual and collective rights, the constitutional practice gives 
more weight to collective rights and frustrates claims based on the individual 
right to equal treatment.
The concluding chapter recapitulates the key findings of the book and clar-
ifies the tensions which might exist between autonomy and diversity, on the 
one hand, and unity and equality on the other. It summarises the many ways 
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 chapter 1
Suum Cuique Tribuere – A Common Narrative of 
Federalism and Equality?
Anna Gamper
1 Suum Cuique Tribuere – from Ulpian to Kelsen and Beyond1
Suum cuique tribuere – to give each his own, ascribed to Ulpian in Justinian’s 
Digest2 – is one of the three components of law and justice to which the relevant 
chapter ‘de iustitia et iure’ is dedicated. According to the programmatic beginning, 
justice is the constant and perpetual will of ius suum cuique tribuendi.3 The legal 
precepts are as follows: to live honestly, to injure no one and to give each his own.4
The enigma of this ancient formula has enthralled legions of legal scholars 
over centuries. However, the idea of suum cuique tribuere has an even older 
origin: it can definitely be traced back to Plato’s5 and Aristotle’s6 discourses 
on equality, and, according to some, to the Seven Sages,7 Hesiod8 and even to 
Babylonian law.9 Notwithstanding its exact origins, there is no doubt that the 
principle it expresses has been recognised as an essential component of law 
and justice since ages.
In spite of how inspiring the principle has been, not all legal scholars have 
appreciated it. Within the domain of public legal theory, Hans Kelsen sharply 
criticised it, calling it a ‘completely empty’ and ‘totally worthless’ phrase.10 
 1 I am grateful to MMag. Dr. Mathias Eller for his help in editing the footnotes.
 2 Dig. 1.1.10.1.
 3 Dig. 1.1.10pr.
 4 Dig. 1.1.10.1: ‘Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique 
tribuere.’
 5 See the nearly identical sentence (‘to have and do one’s own would be recognized as jus-
tice’) in Plato, Politeia, 433e. Two different equalities are identified by Plato, Nomoi, 757b.
 6 Aristotle, Politika, 1302; Aristotle, Ethika Nikomacheia, 1130– 1131.
 7 Hans Kelsen, Was ist Gerechtigkeit? (Vienna: Deuticke, 1953), 23.
 8 Wolfgang Waldstein, “Zu Ulpians Definition der Gerechtigkeit,” in FS Werner Flume, eds. 
Horst H. Jakobs et al. (Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt kg, 1978), 218.
 9 Waldstein, “Definition,” 218.
 10 Kelsen, Gerechtigkeit, 23– 24; Hans Kelsen, Die Illusion der Gerechtigkeit (Vienna: Manz 
Verlag, 1985), 221. Critically on Kelsen’s assessment of suum cuique, Wolfgang Waldstein, 
“Ist das ‘Suum cuique’ eine Leerformel?,” in FS Alfred Verdross, eds. Herbert Miehsler et al. 
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From the perspective of legal positivism, Kelsen was right in arguing that there 
was no absolute or general notion of suum, so that the question of what the 
suum is depends on each concrete legal system.11 He was, however, incorrect 
in neglecting the cuique: the substance of the phrase does not exhaust itself 
in the suum, but it also postulates that each and every one, and not just some, 
should be treated according to this rule. Clearly, it depends on the respective 
suum – and the respective legal system that decides on the suum – whether 
this amounts to equal or unequal treatment, but at least the rule as such is 
applicable to everyone and not only to some. Moreover, the rule is also based 
on an individualist approach. It presumes differences between individuals, 
since there would otherwise be no need to speak of suum, and thus suggests 
proportionality. Thus, even though the rule does not define the exact meaning 
of suum, it nevertheless provides two basic hypotheses that are neither empty 
nor worthless: (1) If a legal system defines the suum by certain criteria, all those 
that meet these criteria must be treated equally among themselves. (2) There 
is a necessity for law to consider individual positions and to reflect these 
through different provisions: the suum – which is neither everything nor any-
thing – suggests some proportionality between the individual and their legal 
treatment. Putting suum cuique tribuere into the context of the two preceding 
statements, namely honeste vivere and neminem laedere, there are, moreover, 
two substantive indicators of justice that also suggest a truth- oriented, rational 
and proportionate approach.12
Little attention seems to have been paid to the subtle distinction between 
suum cuique tribuere and the preceding preamble according to which iustitia 
est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi. It is thus not only 
‘to give each his own’, but also ‘to give each his law’. Putting both sentences in 
context, justice is a constant and perpetual will to give each their law, and the 
law itself needs to give each their own. This does not imply that law will never 
change – according to factual changes, it would possibly need to – but that 
there can be no justice without a continuous consideration of an individual’s 
position in law.
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1980), 285– 320 (with further references); Anna Gamper, 
“ ‘Arithmetische’ und ‘geometrische’ Gleichheit im Bundesstaat,” in Vom Verfassungsstaat 
am Scheideweg – FS Peter Pernthaler, eds. Karl Weber and Norbert Wimmer (Vienna, 
New York: Springer, 2005), 145– 146.
 11 Kelsen, Gerechtigkeit, 23– 24; Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (Vienna: Verlag Österreich, 
2000), 366– 367.
 12 A modern transplant of the neminem laedere- principle into the federal context is the prin-
ciple of mutual consideration; see, on its relation to the equality principle, Peter Bußjäger, 
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This chapter will examine the suum cuique- principle in the context of fed-
eralism. At first glance, this seems to be a rather unfamiliar environment for 
the application of this rule. Surely, Ulpian did not elaborate his rule with fed-
eralism in view. A close reading, however, reveals that the rule is very closely 
related to what Plato and Aristotle called ‘arithmetic’ and ‘geometric’ justice.13 
Later, both terms were used to describe what is more commonly referred to as 
symmetric or asymmetric, formal or substantive, absolute or relative equal-
ity.14 This chapter seeks to argue that federalism and equality cannot be simply 
conceived as opposing principles – the one seeking to ensure diversity man-
agement, the other to establish homogeneity.15 We can neither regard absolute 
equality as the one and only type of equality, nor can we contend that relative 
equality means everything or anything. Relative equality therefore requires the 
yardstick of proportionality and reasonable justification. Whatever the suum 
is, and even if it differs from the suum of others, it must be proportional and 
reasonably justified by facts. If we apply these requirements in the context of 
federal states, i.e. use the suum cuique- principle as a test, asymmetries would 
need to be justified by factual differences, such as, inter alia, territorial size or 
number of inhabitants. But do these factors offer a sufficient justification in all 
cases? And how can federalism legitimise the unequal treatment of persons 
living in different regions? Is there a ‘true’ federalism, and is this the symmetric 
federalism firstly conceived by the Federalist Papers?
2 Federalism and Formal Equality
Formal equality means absolute equality: equality that entails a strictly iden-
tical legal treatment. It is symmetric and, in terms of the ancient world, arith-
metic, since it neither considers nor establishes differences.16 Liberal consti-
tutional theory regards formal equality as one side of a Janus- faced principle 
that, on the other side, allows for different legal treatment if this is propor-
tional and reasonably justified by factual differences.17
 13 Plato, Gorgias, 508a; Aristotle, Politika, 1302; Aristotle, Ethika Nikomacheia, 1131. See also 
Kelsen, Illusion, 220– 221.
 14 Peter Pernthaler, Der differenzierte Bundesstaat (Vienna: Braumüller, 1992), 4; Gamper, 
“Gleichheit,” 144, both with further references.
 15 Peter Bußjäger, Homogenität und Differenz (Vienna: Braumüller, 2006), 48.
 16 Gamper, “Gleichheit,” 146.
 17 Susanne Baer, “Equality,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, eds. 
Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 986 and 994– 













Federalism is a principle that combines diversity and unity.18 In constitu-
tional terms, it provides for at least two tiers that are vested with legislative and 
executive powers, including constitution- making power, for representation of 
the component units at federal level, for fiscal autonomy and/ or equalisation 
as well as instruments and measures that ensure cooperation and coordina-
tion between the tiers.19 At first glance, absolute equality is indeed not com-
patible with federalism, since it would be constitutionally impossible to treat 
the federal level identically with the component units. The allocation of pow-
ers necessarily implies differences between the powers of the federation and 
those of the component units. In this sense, federalism and equality are indeed 
opposing principles: firstly, it is inherent in federalism to distinguish between 
the federal level and the component units. Secondly, the very fact that there is 
more than one component unit entails that the powers allocated at compo-
nent level may be used differently or only by some, while others abstain.20 The 
legal diversity stemming from these different legal regimes implies that, within 
certain fields, federal citizens may be treated differently from region to region. 
As the Austrian Constitutional Court put it: ‘It lies in the nature of a federal 
state to regulate similar state tasks differently within the framework of those 
powers that are constitutionally attributed to the Länder.’21 Accordingly, ‘the 
principle of federalism excludes that the equality principle is applied to the 
relation between the laws enacted by different legislatures’.22 This is, however, 
only applicable with respect to the interrelationship between the federal and 
the component tiers or the component tiers among themselves. The equality 
principle remains, of course, applicable to the law enacted at each level,23 and 
individuals may enjoy equality rights accordingly.
Absolute equality is, however, not incompatible with federalism inasmuch 
as it demands structural parity between the federal and the component levels 
Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law, eds. Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner and Cheryl 
Saunders (London, New York: Routledge, 2013), 288.
 18 Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (Montreal, Kingston: McGill- Queen’s 
University Press, 2008), 8; Gamper, “Gleichheit,” 143.
 19 Watts, Systems, 9; Anna Gamper, Staat und Verfassung (Vienna: Facultas, 2014), 86– 108; 
with more detail, John Kincaid, “Comparative Observations,” in A Global Dialogue on 
Federalism, Vol. 1: Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries, eds. 
John Kincaid and Alan Tarr (Montreal: McGill- Queen’s University Press, 2005), 419.
 20 Gamper, “Gleichheit,” 151.
 21 Cf., e.g., VfSlg 19.964/ 2015, 14.783/ 1997, 14.644/ 1996 and 12.949/ 1991.
 22 Cf., e.g., VfSlg 19.964/ 2015, 19.202/ 2010, 18.338/ 2008, 16.843/ 2003, 14.846/ 1997 and 13.235/ 
1992. See also Bußjäger, “Bundesstaat,” 292– 294.
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and among the latter,24 even though this parity may be limited (e.g., suprem-
acy of federal law or, at least, of the federal constitution over component law).
Moreover, absolute equality is compatible with federalism inasmuch as the 
position of the component units vis- à- vis other units are concerned. While the 
component units will usually exercise their powers differently, federalism does 
not necessarily require that their respective status or powers as such need to 
be different. Absolute equality between the component units seems to be sug-
gested by the US American prototype of a federal system: the same powers 
for every component unit and their equal representation in the Senate. Over 
the last decades, however, scholars of federalism have increasingly debated 
whether symmetry between states was essential to federalism.25 While they 
have not, as yet, challenged symmetrical federalism as such, they neverthe-
less challenge the idea that symmetrical federalism is the only ‘true’ federal-
ism. Instead, they argue that a majority of modern federal systems (that could 
be classified as such in accordance with certain substantive criteria) are, to 
some extent, asymmetric and that the US model as a historical prototype – 
of both coming- together and symmetrical federalism – should not be abso-
lutised.26 In Orwellian terms, there remains the fear that ‘all states are equal, 
but some states are more equal than others’. Perhaps this fear is also a reason 
why asymmetric federalism has traditionally been more in need of justifica-
tion than symmetric federalism and why asymmetry- friendly theory focuses 
 24 Bußjäger, “Bundesstaat,” 290; Peter Pernthaler, “Differenzierter Föderalismus,” in Auf dem 
Weg zu asymmetrischem Föderalismus?, eds. Francesco Palermo et al. (Bozen: Nomos, 
2007), 24.
 25 See, e.g., Charles D. Tarlton, “Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A 
Theoretical Speculation,” The Journal of Politics 27, no. 4 (1965): 861– 874; Francesco Palermo, 
Carolin Zwilling and Karl Kössler, eds. Asymmetries in Constitutional Law (Bozen: eurac, 
2009); Francesco Palermo et al., eds., Auf dem Weg zu asymmetrischem Föderalismus? 
(Bozen: Nomos, 2007); Robert Agranoff, ed., Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in 
Federal States (Baden- Baden: Nomos, 1999); Watts, Systems, 125– 130; Michael Burgess, 
Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2006), 209– 225; Lidija 
R. Basta Fleiner and Jean- François Gaudreault- DesBiens, “Federalism and Autonomy,” in 
Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law, eds. Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner and Cheryl 
Saunders (London, New York: Routledge, 2013), 151– 152.
 26 Cf. e.g. Francesco Palermo, “Asymmetries in Constitutional Law – An Introduction,” 
in Asymmetries in Constitutional Law, eds. Francesco Palermo, Carolin Zwilling 
and Karl Kössler (Bozen: eurac, 2009), 12– 13; Francesco Palermo, “Asymmetrie als 
Ordnungsmodell des modernen Föderalismus, Eine vergleichende Analyse,” in Auf dem 
Weg zu asymmetrischem Föderalismus?, eds. Francesco Palermo et al. (Bozen: Nomos, 








on legitimising asymmetric federalism rather than symmetric federalism.27 
Accordingly, de iure asymmetries tend to be explained by the existence of de 
facto asymmetries, while symmetries are commonly accepted despite de facto 
asymmetries, even though the latter are a reality in all federal systems to a 
greater or lesser extent.28
3 Federalism and Substantive Equality
3.1 Which Kind of Asymmetry?
Substantive equality reflects factual inequality: it legitimises or even requires 
legal differentiation (including positive discrimination), but this needs to be 
based on a proportional and reasonable rationale.29
In various contexts of federalism, substantive equality comes prominently 
into play. The first context is the difference between the federal tier on the 
one side and the component units on the other.30 For obvious reasons, fed-
eral constitutions do not treat these levels equally. Constitutional differences 
between the federal and component levels emerge from the allocation of 
powers, but they may also be found with regard to institutions, democracy 
or republicanism.31 The crucial argument is that each level should be given 
‘its own’, corresponding to factual circumstances. In fact, the principle of sub-
sidiarity, according to which a lower tier should be responsible for all tasks 
that are in the particular interest of this tier and can be efficiently managed 
by it, is but the suum cuique- test32 transplanted into a multi- level context.33 It 
is precisely because there are factual differences between tiers, because their 
requirements, conditions and means are different, that it is necessary to take 
 27 Palermo rightly criticises the longstanding view of symmetrical federalism as the 
‘rule’ and asymmetrical federalism as the ‘exception’; Palermo, “Asymmetrie als 
Ordnungsmodell,” 10.
 28 Palermo, “Asymmetries in Constitutional Law,” 11; Palermo, “Asymmetrie als 
Ordnungsmodell,” 10.
 29 Gamper, “Gleichheit,” 146– 166.
 30 Gamper, “Gleichheit,” 143.
 31 Federal constitutions may allow for different parliamentary and governmental systems, 
different forms of representative or direct democracy or even provide crowned heads 
of state vis- à- vis republican counterparts at regional level (see e.g. Belgium, Malaysia, 
Canada, Australia; vice versa the United Arab Emirates).
 32 Especially, as suggested by Ulpian’s variant ‘ius suum cuique tribuendi’ (Dig. 1.1.10pr.), to 
give each his or her own law, which could be understood as an allocation of law- making 
powers at each level.
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them into account and to give each level its due. Accordingly, there is not just 
one level that is best suited to manage everything, but a need for the law to 
recognise and adequately treat different levels. Both subsidiarity and the suum 
cuique- test do not demand differentiation merely for ideological reasons, but 
rather consider the characteristics and specificities of each level; they presup-
pose reasonableness and proportionality.
The second context concerns asymmetries in the relationship between the 
component units themselves. These asymmetries may be, as Ronald L. Watts 
called them, ‘political asymmetries’34 or de facto asymmetries, but they may 
also be asymmetries entrenched by law (first and foremost, the federal con-
stitution, hence Watts’ category of ‘constitutional asymmetries’35).36 Three 
main ‘constitutional asymmetries’ shall be examined here: different systems 
of power allocation, asymmetric representation in federal second chambers, 
and financial equalisation. These are sometimes accompanied by other asym-
metries, e.g. whether the component units are classified under different cate-
gories with varying designations and position37 or whether the federal consti-
tution provides for differences in their institutional architecture.38
3.2 Asymmetries in the Allocation of Powers
Classical federal constitutions usually allocate powers coherently: one part of 
the constitution is dedicated to the entrenchment of the allocation of powers. 
Incoherent or ‘piecemeal’ allocation occurs only in exceptional cases, e.g. if 
 34 Watts, Systems, 125– 127; Ronald L. Watts, “Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and 
Federations,” Annual Review of Political Science 1 (1998): 123. See also the overview by Peter 
Bußjäger, Föderale Systeme (Vienna: Jan Sramek, 2016), 63– 73.
 35 Watts, Systems, 127– 130; Watts, “Federalism,” 123. Sometimes, these matters are regulated 
not (only) by federal constitutional law (see e.g. with examples Anna Gamper, “Föderale 
Kompetenzverteilung in Europa: Vergleich und Analyse aus verfassungsrechtlicher 
Sicht,” in Föderale Kompetenzverteilung in Europa, eds. Anna Gamper et al. (Baden- 
Baden: Nomos, 2016), 764– 765), so that de iure asymmetry is the more comprehensive 
term. The importance of differentiating in terms of law – and not just facts – is already 
suggested by Ulpian’s variant ‘ius suum cuique tribuendi’ (Dig. 1.1.10pr.).
 36 On the terminology, see also Louise Tillin, “United Diversity? Asymmetry in Indian 
Federalism,” Publius 37, no. 1 (2006): 48– 52; Wilfried Swenden, “Asymmetric Federalism 
and Coalition- Making in Belgium,” Publius 32, no. 3 (2002): 67– 68; Klaus von Beyme, 
“Asymmetric Federalism between Globalization and Regionalization,” Journal of European 
Public Policy 12, no. 3 (2005): 437– 443; Michael Burgess, “The Paradox of Diversity – 
Asymmetrical Federalism in Comparative Perspective,” in Asymmetries in Constitutional 
Law, eds. Francesco Palermo, Carolin Zwilling and Karl Kössler (Bozen: eurac, 
2009), 24– 25.
 37 Watts, Systems, 74– 76 and 127.












specific powers, such as constituent constitutional autonomy, are allocated. 
A much more excessive use of ‘piecemeal’ allocation has been made in the 
Austrian context: even though the main body of the distribution scheme is 
accommodated in a distinct part of the Federal Constitutional Act, other parts 
of this Act include many more of these rules and, moreover, there are sundry 
other allocation provisions outside this Act that also have the rank of federal 
constitutional law.39 But although this allocation is fragmented, it is not asym-
metric in the sense that the component Länder would receive different kinds of 
powers. Still, fragmented allocations of powers often indicate asymmetries.40 
This is particularly so in the case of asymmetric quasi- federal states41 such as 
Italy and Spain: in the Italian case, the competences of the five special regions 
are entrenched in individual constitutional laws, while the fifteen ordinary 
regions receive their powers from Art. 117 and 118 of the Italian Constitution. 
In contrast, the Spanish Constitution itself entrenches only a rudimentary 
allocation of powers that further delegates the task to the autonomy statutes, 
which are organic laws, and moreover allows for an individual and progressive 
increase of powers. A similar situation applies in the UK, which is, if not a 
quasi- federal system, a very much decentralised state: the Scotland Act 1998, 
Government of Wales Act 2006 and Northern Ireland Act 1998 contain very 
different allocations of powers.42 In full- fledged federal systems, asymmetries 
between the component units are less frequent,43 but Belgium, in which dif-
ferent powers are given to the linguistic communities on the one hand, and to 
the regions on the other, constitutes an important exception as well as Canada 
with regard to Quebec or India with regard to Jammu and Kashmir.44 An even 
more complex example is Russia45 with six different types of component units 
 39 Peter Bußjäger, “Die bundesstaatliche Kompetenzverteilung in Österreich,” in Föderale 
Kompetenzverteilung in Europa, eds. Anna Gamper et al. (Baden- Baden: Nomos, 2016), 
527– 567.
 40 Gamper, “Kompetenzverteilung,” 766.
 41 See Michael Keating, “Asymmetrical Government: Multinational States in an Integrating 
Europe,” Publius 29, no. 1 (1999): 77– 82.
 42 See e.g. Peter Leyland, “The Multifaceted Constitutional Dynamics of U.K. Devolution,” 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 9, no. 1 (2011): 251– 273.
 43 Ronald L. Watts, “Comparative Conclusions,” in A Global Dialogue on Federalism, Vol. 
2: Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, eds. Akhtar Majeed, 
Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown (Montreal: McGill- Queen’s University Press, 
2006), 336; Gamper, “Kompetenzverteilung,” 766.
 44 Art. 370 of the Indian Constitution; see, however, the more cautious approach by Tillin, 
“Diversity,” 52– 55.
 45 See Giovanni Poggeschi, “Federalism in Russia: Ethnic and Asymmetrical,” in Asymmetries 
in Constitutional Law, eds. Francesco Palermo, Carolin Zwilling and Karl Kössler 
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or Bosnia and Herzegovina whose entities have different substructures. The 
most striking asymmetries are to be found in centralised unitary states in 
which just one particular region – often islands – enjoys a quasi- federal status 
and is allocated powers accordingly.46
There are more subtle ways, however, to create asymmetric allocation 
regimes than just different laws with different lists of enumerated subject 
matters. Many federal constitutions allow for asymmetries in tighter compart-
ments, such as single subject- matters, with ensuing discrepancies between 
the powers of the component units vis- à- vis the federal level:47 one example 
is the possibility for federal laws to be enacted vis- à- vis certain component 
units, while others remain free to enact their own rules,48 or for component 
units to assume powers in accordance with flexible opt in- and opt out- rules.49 
This is usually done because of certain needs and expediencies that arise in 
one unit, but not in another. Such a ‘particular legislation on need’ could also, 
according to some federal constitutions, be used by individual component 
units when they wish to deviate from uniform federal laws. In these cases, the 
federal constitution does not explicitly or directly privilege some component 
units against others, but asymmetric options may occur whenever and wher-
ever ‘needs’ arise.50
Full- fledged, coming- together federal states tend to allocate powers sym-
metrically,51 whereas the opposite seems to be true for holding- together and 
quasi- federal states.52 Most of these states were originally designed as unitary 
states. Their transformation into federal or quasi- federal systems was based 
on a ‘piecemeal’ process in which some regions – with strong historical, polit-
ical, cultural, geographic or ethnic identities – pioneered. Even where other 
regions have profited from decentralisation at later stages, one can still detect 
individual or even privileged constitutional positions of pioneer regions. In 
 46 See also Watts, “Federalism,” 123; Gamper, “Kompetenzverteilung,” 767.
 47 Watts, Systems, 127– 128.
 48 Cf. e.g. Art. 252 of the Indian Constitution or Sec 95 of the Canadian Constitution Act 
1867. A similar situation arises when a federal law regulates the same matter, but with dif-
ferent rules applicable in different regions (see e.g. recently the Austrian Constitutional 
Court’s decision VfSlg 20.179/ 2017, in which the Court held a federal law that had enacted 
different rules for the respective Austrian Länder to be reasonably justified).
 49 Watts, Systems, 128– 129; Peter Pernthaler, “Asymmetrischer Föderalismus als systemüber-
greifender Ordnungsrahmen der Regionalautonomie,” in Die Verfassung der Südtiroler 
Autonomie, eds. Joseph Marko et al. (Bozen: Nomos, 2005), 107; Palermo, “Asymmetrie als 
Ordnungsmodell,” 18– 19.
 50 Gamper, “Gleichheit,” 151– 152.
 51 Watts, Systems, 127; Von Beyme, “Federalism,” 433.
















these cases, the allocations of powers normally feature two characteristics: on 
the one hand, some component units are vested with more powers than others 
which constitutes a quantitative difference. On the other hand, many regions 
enjoy specific powers that are particular to their own history and identity: this 
is the case, e.g., when the Scotland Act 1998 allocates Scots criminal and Scots 
private law to Scotland; when the Catalonian Statute or the Statute of Trentino- 
Alto Adige/ South Tyrol establishes linguistic rights of the respective region or 
provinces, or the Belgian Constitution for the Belgian linguistic communities 
as ‘personalised’ component entities of the federal system, or when historical 
‘foral’ law is recognised with regard to Navarra and the Basque country.53
Surely, not each and every competence that can be found in these special 
allocation systems is a perfect mirror of rationality and genuine distinctive-
ness. But quantitative and qualitative particularities are still clearly recognis-
able, and at least roughly pass the suum cuique- test. There still remains, how-
ever, a considerable margin of appreciation of how much and how far factual 
differences between component units should be recognised and implemented 
through differing allocation regimes. When allocation systems are static, con-
stitutional amendments may, from time to time, be necessary in order to adapt 
them to new ‘factual’ symmetries or asymmetries.54 However, it is also remark-
able that the particular situation in Italy’s five special regions would have 
been maintained even by the failed constitutional reform draft of 2016.55 The 
Scotland Act 2016, by which further powers were devolved to Scotland, was a 
direct answer to the Scottish independence movement, and even if the Act 
could not anticipate new demands after the Brexit referendum, it nonetheless 
responded to Scotland’s strong identity and the very particular history of its 
union with England.
3.3 Asymmetries in Federal Second Chambers
The second context examined here has traditionally been a focus of discus-
sions on asymmetric federalism. In fact, it is as old as federalism itself, as old 
as the US Constitution of 1787/ 88, and it was already intensely discussed in the 
Federalist Papers: it relates to the federal second chamber, namely the question 
of whether the component units should be represented equally or unequally 
 53 See also the examples given by Palermo, “Asymmetrie als Ordnungsmodell,” 17.
 54 Gamper, “Kompetenzverteilung,” 778– 780.
 55 ‘Disposizioni per il superamento del bicameralismo paritario, la riduzione del numero 
dei parlamentari, il contenimento dei costi di funzionamento delle istituzioni, la sop-
pressione del cnel e la revisione del titolo v della parte ii della Costituzione’, Gazzetta 
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(including weighted voting).56 According to the US Senate model, the states are 
represented equally, i.e. irrespective of their size, number of people, wealth or 
other factual indicators. Federalist No. 62 explains this solution to be ‘the result 
of compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small 
States’, between the ‘national’ and the ‘federal’ principle, ‘founded on a mixture 
of the principles of proportional and equal representation’. Considering that 
the first chamber consists of representatives elected on an asymmetric basis, 
the component states should be equally represented in the second chamber. 
The ‘equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of 
the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instru-
ment for preserving that residuary sovereignty’.57 On the other hand, it is 
argued in Federalist No. 22 that the ‘right of equal suffrage among the States is 
another exceptionable part of the Confederation’; this is regarded as an ‘impro-
priety of an equal vote between States of the most unequal dimensions and 
populousness’ so that a minority (of the people) could rule over the majority 
(of the people), given that a majority of the states ‘contain[s] less than a major-
ity of the people’.58 What is found objectionable in the confederation, is thus 
accepted in the federation, but only because of the bicameral system which 
guarantees a balance between symmetric and asymmetric representation. 
Still, the discussion about symmetric or asymmetric representation confuses 
different issues: on the one hand, the external dimension, i.e. how the second 
chamber may interact vis- à- vis the first chamber, and, on the other hand, how 
the second chamber operates from its internal perspective.
Whether the component units still preserve a ‘residuary sovereignty’ in this 
first external dimension is less a matter of equal representation in the second 
chamber than a question of what powers the second chamber, as a whole, can 
exercise. If we imagine a weak second chamber whose decisions, even though 
based on equal representation, could be overturned by the first chamber, this 
will not be a striking token of a ‘residuary sovereignty’. It is certainly true that 
the symmetric composition of the second chamber preserves the confed-
eral idea59 of equal representation: the component units thus exercise equal 
 56 A similar dilemma arises where the component units directly participate in federal leg-
islative processes in accordance with weighted voting or where regions are represented 
asymmetrically in unicameral parliaments (see, with examples, Palermo, “Asymmetrie als 
Ordnungsmodell,” 17 fn. 17; Gamper, “Gleichheit,” 154 fn. 53).
 57 James Madison, “Federalist No. 62,” The Federalist Papers, no. 62 (1788).
 58 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No. 22,” The Federalist Papers, no. 22 (1787).
 59 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1925), 217. On the equality of 










suffrage within the internal decision- making process. However, this does not 
say anything about whether these decisions will have any particular weight 
in the parliamentary process as a whole and whether these are a token of a 
‘residuary sovereignty’.
Secondly, equal representation does not guarantee each component unit a 
right to enforce its own will upon the others.60 It would be paradoxical indeed 
to assume such a right for each and every component unit which would, of 
course, entail conflicting and irresolvable situations. Even where the una-
nimity principle prevailed – which is not usual for federal second chambers 
worldwide – one component unit cannot, not even by boycotting the deci-
sion made by others, enforce its own preferred decision. Normally, however, 
decision- making in federal second chambers relies on simple or qualified 
majorities. Equal representation would, therefore, not protect individual units 
from being overruled by the representatives of other units. The only difference 
is that, under symmetric representation, a majority of the votes cast would 
always demand a majority of the component units themselves (provided that 
their representatives were present), whereas, under asymmetric representa-
tion, a majority of the votes cast could possibly be reached by a minority of 
component units (through their representatives). As a corollary, symmetric 
representation cannot protect individual units (their representatives) from 
being overruled by the others, as long as decisions are made by whatever kind 
of majority instead of unanimity. Asymmetric representation, therefore, does 
not particularly threaten individual component units, but rather constitutes 
a challenge between competing majorities – majorities of the component 
units and majorities of their representatives. Accordingly, decisions may turn 
out to be counter- majoritarian and hegemonic61 when perceived from either 
perspective.
Turning to the possible indicators underlying asymmetric representation, 
we do not only find that a majority of federal constitutions have decided 
against the US Senate model,62 but also that they mostly use the number of 
people – rather than mere territorial size or economic criteria – as a base 
value.63 There are exceptions, though, such as the six Swiss half- cantons that 
that emerge from confederations, see also Hans Huber, “Die Gleichheit der Gliedstaaten 
im Bundesstaat,” Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, no. 18 (1968): 247.
 60 Gamper, “Gleichheit,” 164.
 61 Kelsen, Staatslehre, 219.
 62 See Gamper, “Gleichheit,” 155– 156. Absolutely equal representation is a requisite for the 
composition of the second chambers of Russia, South Africa and Indonesia.
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are represented in the federal second chamber with just one representative 
each; this is not due to their population size, when compared to the other can-
tons, but to their history as ‘separated’ cantons.64 In those cases, where rep-
resentation is adjusted in accordance with demographic asymmetries, many 
federal constitutions only provide fixed numbers, irrespective of demographic 
changes, while others, more dynamically, require adaptations according to the 
national census; alternatively, they use an arithmetic system as a basis, but 
allow for geometric deviations of the number of representatives.65 Moreover, 
federal constitutions vary as to whether they consider the number of regional 
inhabitants, of regional citizens, or of regional citizens with the right to vote 
(regarding the first chamber); they often deviate from their own systems 
through means of over- or under- proportional representation, by prescribing 
minimum and/ or maximum numbers of delegates or generalise proportions 
in accordance with fixed classes.66 Over- or under- proportional representation 
is used to counterbalance extreme factual asymmetries which has a slightly 
‘confederalising’ effect: regions with a very low number of people that would, 
under a strictly proportional model, hardly be represented at all are thus guar-
anteed some minimum representation, whereas a maximum number ensures 
that regions with the largest number of people are not represented by a com-
paratively exorbitant number of representatives; this ‘positive discrimination’ 
measure may be used to favour smaller units.67 In several cases, further asym-
metries are constituted by the inclusion of members appointed for other rea-
sons than federalism,68 by the different treatment of different categories of 
component units69 or by specific minority protection- oriented representation 
targeted at positive discrimination;70 sometimes certain representatives are 
selected for combined purposes.71 A two- fold asymmetry could be created in 
cases with an asymmetric allocation of powers if representatives of compo-
nent units with stronger powers were not allowed to vote in certain legisla-
tive procedures at the federal level: accordingly, where federal laws are to be 
enacted only for some component units, in areas not falling within their power, 
 64 Giovanni Biaggini, “Asymmetrien im schweizerischen Bundesstaat?,” in Auf dem Weg zu 
asymmetrischem Föderalismus?, eds. Francesco Palermo et al. (Bozen: Nomos, 2007), 58.
 65 Gamper, “Gleichheit,” 156.
 66 See, with examples, Watts, Systems, 147– 153; Gamper, “Gleichheit,” 155– 158.
 67 Watts, Systems, 152– 153; Palermo, “Asymmetrie als Ordnungsmodell,” 17.
 68 See, most recently, Art. 86 para 2 subpara b of the Constitution of Nepal.
 69 See e.g. Sec 22 of the Canadian Constitution Act 1867.
 70 See, most recently, Art. 86 para 2 subpara a of the Constitution of Nepal.
 71 The most recent example is Art. 86 para 2 subpara a of the Constitution of Nepal. See also 


















whereas stronger component units can enact their own laws in the same field 
autonomously, the representatives of the latter would abstain from voting.72
Although the Federalist’s political explanation of the ‘compromise’ is per-
fectly plausible in the context of US American federalism, its implications 
may be overestimated in other contexts. The fact that most federal systems 
provide for imperfect rather than perfect bicameralism further lessens the sig-
nificance of the second chamber and its composition. Moreover, asymmetric 
representation may be smoothed out if majorities need to be built on specific 
approval by the component units (their delegations) rather than the simple 
majority of votes cast. Art. 35 para 4 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional 
Act73 offers an interesting example here: certain constitutional amendments 
not only require a majority of the votes cast in the Federal Council, but require 
a further majority, namely a majority of the representatives of at least four (out 
of nine) Länder. As a consequence, these amendments would not pass unless 
approved by a ‘double majority’. Even if a minority of the Länder (due to their 
large number of people and thus representatives in the Federal Council) com-
mand a sufficient majority of the votes cast, they still would not be success-
ful if the majority of representatives of at least six Länder voted against. The 
second ‘majority’ does not, of course, refer to a majority of Länder (four are 
sufficient), but refers to having a majority in each Land’s delegation. However, 
the provision ensures that a small minority of up to three Länder (through 
their representatives in the Federal Council) will not be able to enforce such a 
decision, even though they represent a majority of the people and, accordingly, 
representatives in the Federal Council. This example shows that it depends on 
the type of majority whether asymmetric representation truly privileges com-
ponent units with larger numbers of people.74
When federal constitutions provide for the asymmetric composition of sec-
ond chambers, the rationale mainly lies with democratic purposes.75 Whereas 
 72 Similarly – with regard to the lack of an English Parliament and to ‘only England’ laws 
enacted by the Westminster Parliament – the ‘West Lothian Question’ has been dis-
cussed, although not resolved in the United Kingdom; see Watts, Systems, 130; Leyland, 
“Dynamics,” 265– 267.
 73 See Gamper, “Gleichheit,” 158; Anna Gamper, “Artikel 35 B- vg,” in Österreichisches 
Bundesverfassungsrecht, eds. Karl Korinek et al. (Vienna: Verlag Österreich, 2017), mar-
ginal nos. 49– 52.
 74 Another interesting example is Art. iv § 3 subparas d- f of the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, according to which special double majorities of territorial representatives 
are needed; or special laws in accordance with Art. 4 para 3 of the Belgian Constitution 
which require special majorities of the representatives of the linguistic groups.
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most systems of asymmetric representation are roughly guided by the numer-
ical proportions between the ‘component peoples’, this is also an attempt to 
guarantee equal representation of all federal citizens. In fact, there is some 
structural similarity to the distribution of mandates between electoral dis-
tricts in first- chamber elections.76 Must we conclude, therefore, that equal rep-
resentation in federal second chambers, as in the US Senate, is undemocratic? 
The authors of the Federalist Papers deliver an ambivalent assessment. They 
do indeed condemn equal representation in the confederal context, while 
accepting it for the federal Senate. Their first argument is rather less concerned 
with equality theory but reason of state, when they frankly admit: ‘A govern-
ment founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger States, 
is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States [… The] advice of prudence 
must be to embrace the lesser evil’.77 But, secondly, they argue that equal rep-
resentation preserves the residuary sovereignty of the states.78 To stretch this 
argument further: does it constitute a reasonable justification to compensate 
states for the loss of their sovereignty by granting them equal representation 
in the Senate? Or, rather, does their equal representation mirror the tiny rest 
of their former sovereignty exactly as the suum cuique- test would demand? 
When states lose their sovereignty because they agree on a federal system, but 
nevertheless retain some part of it,79 is their equal representation just a proper 
and reasonable claim emanating from ‘residuary sovereignty’? If the answer 
is yes, the justification, made from a comparison between different historical 
perspectives, will be diachronic. In constitutional reality, however, justification 
for asymmetric representation is mainly synchronic inasmuch as certain cir-
cumstances of the present are considered by the federal constitution. If we 
regard the suum as something dynamic, that needs to adapt itself according 
to circumstances, it will fall into the second category; if the suum, however, 
is contextualised with the past, equal representation might turn out to be the 
adequate compensation for states that lost their full sovereignty. Similarly, 
the Swiss half- cantons enjoy only half- representation, since they were not 
originally units in their own right. Still, the diachronic argument is valid only 
for original or coming- together federations, and the Federalist Papers knew 
only those. Holding- together federations that lack a constitutional compact 
 76 Gamper, “Gleichheit,” 155.
 77 Madison, “Federalist No. 62.”
 78 Madison, “Federalist No. 62.”
 79 Frank Delmartino, “New Dimensions of Asymmetry in (Quasi- ) Federal States and in the 
European Union,” in Asymmetries in Constitutional Law, eds. Francesco Palermo, Carolin 










between formerly independent units cannot argue that they need to protect 
the ‘residuary sovereignty’ of their regions.
As Ronald L. Watts80 rightly argued, federalism enriches the democratic 
landscape – when regional institutions are elected or when instruments of 
regional direct democracy are exercised. This is, however, not a particular fea-
ture of federal systems with equal representation in the federal second cham-
ber, but common to all federal systems. Still, the argument can be deployed 
also for equal representation cases: even though deficits in federal democracy 
cannot be ‘compensated’ by component democracy, the latter nevertheless 
improves the democratic nature of the overall system.
3.4 Asymmetries in Fiscal Equalisation
Fiscal equalisation is perhaps the most striking element found in most federal 
systems in which the equality dilemma between the component units is revis-
ited.81 Despite the great variety and complexity of equalisation mechanisms, 
their common idea is to distribute financial resources or revenues between 
and among the different tiers in order to allow them to perform their tasks.82 
Particular attention is drawn to factual differences between tiers or different 
units belonging to the same tier, also with a view to balance these differences 
and adapt the financial situation to factual needs. One way to do this is by allot-
ting financial revenues from one level to the other or, at the same level, from 
one or more units at that level to the other(s). If this is done in a vertical way, 
it is mostly the federal government that allots financial revenues that derive 
from the federal tax yield to the component units.83 Horizontal equalisation, 
in contrast, requires a transfer of financial revenues between units of the same 
level, i.e. between regions or, respectively, between local governments.84 In a 
wider sense, fiscal equalisation entails transfers on a more specific and irreg-
ular basis; they refer to particular situations of need or respond to tasks that 
are particularly challenging so that specific resources are required. Whether 
the number of inhabitants is taken as a proportional key or whether it is used 
for over- or under- proportional classification or whether other keys are used, 
varies from system to system.
 80 Watts, Systems, 155.
 81 Watts, Systems, 129– 130; Kincaid, “Observations,” 426.
 82 Watts, Systems, 103– 112 and 130; Watts, “Conclusions,” 334– 335.
 83 Watts, Systems, 103. See also Anwar Shah, “Comparative Conclusions on Fiscal Federalism,” 
in A Global Dialogue on Federalism, Vol. 4: The Practice of Fiscal Federalism: Comparative 
Perspectives, ed. Anwar Shah (Montreal: McGill- Queen’s University Press, 2007), 387.












‘Suum Cuique Tribuere’ 29
Fiscal equalisation is incompatible with formal equality, since it is targeted 
at compensating and balancing inequalities between and among tiers. It is 
thus necessary not to treat all component units equally, but distinctly – not 
in an arbitrary way, of course, but according to actual needs due to number 
of inhabitants, structural problems, minority protection, emergencies or 
other particularities that require financing, as well as according to the tasks 
to be performed by each level. As § 4 of the Austrian Fiscal Constitutional Act, 
which is said to enshrine a particular fiscal equality principle,85 states: fiscal 
equalisation ‘has to be in line with the distribution of encumbrances stem-
ming from public administration and has to take into consideration that the 
capacity of the concerned territorial entities is not exceeded.’ The criteria are 
thus twofold: on the one hand, fiscal equalisation has to consider the tasks that 
are to be performed by the territorial entities, which refers to the allocation of 
powers; on the other hand, it is also their individual capacity and efficiency 
which itself derives from certain conditions.86
It would thus appear that the suum cuique- test serves as the very basis for fis-
cal equalisation. There are, however, a number of objections to be made: firstly, 
no system of fiscal equalisation can avoid generalisation or a certain rigidity of 
figures and quotas. Moreover, fiscal equalisation at least partly relies on fixed 
parameters whether valid for a couple of years or even longer; structural adap-
tations of fiscal equalisation systems usually depend on complex procedures 
that often require intergovernmental commissions, negotiations and compro-
mises.87 A particular problem is, moreover, posed regarding horizontal equal-
isation, as this requires financial solidarity between regions.88 Accordingly, 
richer regions are asked to share financial resources with poorer regions which 
may increase tensions between them. Secessionist tendencies are not infre-
quently triggered by economic and financial discrepancies between regions 
and their different approaches towards financial solidarity.89 Even the well- 
known Länderfinanzausgleich in Germany has now been replaced by a system 
 85 See, with more detail, Hans Georg Ruppe, “§ 4 F- vg,” in Österreichisches 
Bundesverfassungsrecht, eds. Karl Korinek et al. (Vienna: Verlag Österreich, 2016).
 86 See also Pernthaler, “Asymmetrischer Föderalismus,” 110; Bußjäger, “Bundesstaat,” 
295– 296.
 87 Watts, Systems, 112– 116.
 88 See, with more detail, Shah, “Conclusions,” 389– 390.
 89 Charles D. Tarlton’s controversial formula that ‘[w] hen diversity predominates, the 
‘secession- potential’ of the system is high’ (Tarlton, “Symmetry,” 873) is acceptable inas-
much as he speaks of a ‘potential’ and not of an inevitability; see also Burgess, “Paradox,” 
34. The question, however, is if de facto or de iure asymmetries are meant: while de facto 
asymmetries may increase the potential, de iure asymmetries normally intend the opposite, 












according to which the federal level, instead of the richer Länder, is mainly 
responsible for subsidising the poorer Länder.90 On the whole, fiscal equali-
sation realises the Aristotelian concept of redistributive justice inasmuch as 
poorer regions are given ‘their own’ not in accordance with their capacity, but 
in accordance with their tasks and needs91 – in a way, this is a positive discrim-
ination measure.
But is it in line with the suum cuique- test to request adequate resources for 
poorer regions while at the same time requiring richer regions to pay? Does 
it correspond to factual differences to pay or to receive respectively, or could 
richer regions, for instance, claim to keep their ‘own’ money or to demand struc-
tural reforms for poorer regions in order to improve their financial situation? 
Neither approach, as such, would seem to be irrational or disproportionate. 
This is probably one of the reasons why solidarity rules or strong equalisation 
measures are often entrenched in federal constitutional law; as a consequence, 
the respective provisions will not be subject to judicial review or examined 
against the yardstick of the equality principle.
4 Conclusions
When we regard the suum cuique- test from the viewpoint of its judicial 
enforcement and justiciability, a significant difference between individual and 
collective equality appears. Individuals can normally complain against viola-
tions of their equality rights before courts, including, where provided, a spe-
cialised constitutional court. These violations arise from unconstitutional laws 
or other unconstitutional legal acts that are accordingly repealed, not applied 
or declared to be void. Conversely, asymmetries in federal systems are often 
non- justiciable, since they are rooted in federal constitutional law. When, for 
instance, a federal constitution provides for asymmetric representation in the 
federal second chamber, these provisions form constitutional leges speciales 
that cannot be measured against the yardstick of the equality principle, which 
is entrenched in the same federal constitution. The same is true for federal 
constitutional norms that provide for different classes of subnational units, for 
asymmetric allocations of powers or fiscal equalisation. From this perspective, 
 90 See, in particular, the new Art. 107 para 2 of the German Basic Law; Anna Gamper, “Tausch 
und Reform: Die Änderung des Grundgesetzes 2017,” in Jahrbuch für Föderalismus 2017, 
ed. Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus- Forschung Tübingen (Baden- Baden: Nomos, 
2017).
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the question of whether the respective asymmetry passes the suum cuique- test 
is, indeed, irrelevant.92
As a consequence, the asymmetric treatment of federal citizens, which ema-
nates from differing laws on account of an asymmetric allocation of powers, 
is not justiciable either; a possible claim to submit the resulting inequalities 
under equality review will fail. The justiciability of individual equality cases 
entails – at least under strong- form judicial review – 93 that independent courts 
will have the ultimate say on the suum cuique. It is up to them to assess the cri-
teria of proportionality and reasonableness. As long as the constitution- maker 
does not critically respond by amending the constitution, these decisions will 
be final. In contrast, the aforementioned inequalities in federal systems will 
not routinely be for the judiciary to decide. The federal constitution- maker 
establishes them, and this is, first and foremost, a political decision.
As this chapter has sought to point out, however, asymmetries in federalism 
are hardly ever born from unreasonable and arbitrary political decisions, even 
if this were possible (on a federal constitutional basis). Empirically, constitu-
tional asymmetries normally are grounded on a rationale such as the specific 
historical, ethnic or cultural identity, geographical indicators or economic and 
financial resources.94 Admittedly, not all constitutional asymmetries are per-
fectly compatible with the suum cuique- test, since they usually cannot avoid 
generalisation, rigidity, as well as a certain proneness to political compromise. 
But their strongest motivation still is a legal reflection of individual positions – 
so that de iure asymmetry at least roughly mirrors de facto asymmetry. While 
it would be wrong to hold only formal equality as ‘true’ equality, it would be 
wrong as well to hold only symmetric federal states as strongholds of ‘true’ fed-
eralism; it would be strange indeed that a principle which stands for diversity 
in unity should cherish unconditional symmetry.95 Even the Federalist Papers 
bluntly describe the rationale behind equal representation of the component 
units as a political deal between the larger and smaller states rather than as a 
theoretical essential of federalism – and why should symmetry be an essen-
tial, where federalism does not even emerge from an agreement between inde-
pendent states?96
 92 Gamper, “Gleichheit,” 166.
 93 See, paradigmatically, Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and 
Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008).
 94 Pernthaler, “Asymmetrischer Föderalismus,” 106; Palermo, “Asymmetrie als 
Ordnungsmodell,” 13– 14; Gamper, “Kompetenzverteilung,” 767.
 95 Similarly, Palermo, “Asymmetries in Constitutional Law,” 11.












However, not every type of asymmetry between territorial units can qual-
ify them as components of a federal (and not any decentralised) system, and 
this demands what Peter Pernthaler called ‘bündische Gleichheit’97 between 
the federal and the component levels.98 If asymmetric federalism allowed for 
everything or anything on an open scale between centralisation and decen-
tralisation, every asymmetrically decentralised state in the world could claim 
to be a federal state.99
Suum cuiqe tribuere is a Janus- faced principle, as are equality and federalism. 
So far, it serves as a common narrative to both. Neither is there just one suum, 
nor is there just one equality,100 or one federalism.101 However, federalism is 
more than just an attribution of any suum to a number of tiers and units.102 It 
is based on the conditions of self- rule and shared- rule that, where necessary, 
would allow overruling even individual equality. The suum is embedded in, 
and not beyond these conditions.
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 chapter 2
Constitutional Asymmetry and Equality 




Constitutional asymmetry is an important part of federal and regional studies, 
given the constant dynamics in this field. One dominant theoretical issue is 
the argument that constitutional asymmetries in contemporary systems with 
federal arrangements result from the challenges of diversity.2 A marked asso-
ciation between multinationalism3 and a system with federal arrangements 
leads us to expect that constitutional asymmetry will be the rule in these sys-
tems.4 This may be explained by the fact that multinational systems with fed-
eral arrangements5 rely on asymmetric solutions to preserve the unity of the 
system while addressing diversity.
Nevertheless, this has certain disadvantages. Contemporary federal theory is 
not alone in suggesting that constitutional asymmetry may put constitutional 
 1 This chapter is part of a research project funded by the Fundamental Research Foundation 
Flanders (Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek – fwo).
 2 Robert Agranoff, “Power Shifts, Diversity and Asymmetry,” in Accommodating Diversity: 
Asymmetry in Federal States, ed. Robert Agranoff (Baden- Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
1999), 11– 12.
 3 The discussion of multinationalism is based on the definition of the multinational state 
offered by Stepan who refers to a state as multinational ‘if (1) it has territorially based dif-
ferences (often compounding) based on linguistic, religious, cultural, and ethnic iden-
tities and (2) there are significant political groups that would like to build political sov-
ereignties, or an independent state or states, around these territorially based differences’. 
Alfred Stepan, “Towards a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, Multinationalism, and 
Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism,” in Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, ed. 
Edward L. Gibson (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 39.
 4 Rainer Bauböck, “United in Misunderstanding? Asymmetry in Multinational Federations,” 
ice Working Paper Series, no. 26 (2001): 14, https:// eif.univie.ac.at/ downloads/ workingpa-
pers/ IWE- Papers/ WP26.pdf.
 5 This chapter uses the term multinational systems with federal arrangements rather than the 
term multinational federal systems. The reasons for this are explained in the section that 
addresses the inapplicability of traditional federal theory to contemporary federal systems.
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values and principles at risk, especially in multinational systems with federal 
arrangements. In particular, constitutional asymmetry may threaten the con-
cept of equality and therefore influence the legitimacy and stability of the 
system. As a response, symmetrisation is encouraged. However, it can hardly 
constitute a definitive solution.
In view of what has been mentioned, this chapter was designed to explore 
first, the relationship between constitutional asymmetry and equality; and 
second, how constitutional asymmetry impacts on equality and therefore on 
legitimacy and stability in multinational systems with federal arrangements. 
The framework of the chapter emphasises the importance of federal dynamics 
and relies on the indicators of constitutional asymmetry. As an outcome, the 
chapter offers a comprehensive evaluation of the two concepts of constitu-
tional asymmetry and equality from a legal perspective.
2 Constitutional Asymmetry: Positioning the Concept
In examining the relationship between constitutional asymmetry and equal-
ity in multinational systems with federal arrangements, we can pinpoint two 
prerequisites: first, placing constitutional asymmetry in a contemporary fed-
eral framework; and second, linking constitutional asymmetries to equality in 
particular. With this in mind, these two issues are used as a starting point for 
further pondering the relationship.
The first prerequisite concerns contemporary studies in federalism. These 
imply that constitutional asymmetry is immanent in federalism.6 Moreover, 
they recognise that constitutional asymmetry is no longer limited to federal- 
type systems only7 but may also arise in unitary and even in transnational 
systems.8 Apart from this, contemporary scholarship acknowledges that many 
 6 Francesco Palermo, “Asymmetries in Constitutional Law, An Introduction,” in Asymmetries 
in Constitutional Law, Recent Developments in Federal and Regional Systems, eds. Francesco 
Palermo, Carolin Zwilling, and Karl Kössler (Bozen/ Bolzano: Europäische Akademie Bozen/ 
Accademia Europea Bolzano, 2009), 15.
 7 Frank Delmartino, “New Dimensions of Asymmetry in (Quasi- ) Federal States and in the 
European Union,” in Asymmetries in Constitutional Law, Recent Developments in Federal 
and Regional Systems, eds. Francesco Palermo, Carolin Zwilling, and Karl Kössler (Bozen/ 
Bolzano: Europäische Akademie Bozen/ Accademia Europea Bolzano, 2009), 38.
 8 John McGarry, “Asymmetric Autonomy in the United Kingdom,” in Asymmetric Autonomy 
and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts, eds. Mark Weller and Katherine Nobs (Philadelphia, 
Oxford: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 148. That is, unitary systems such as China 
and Indonesia, devolving systems such as Italy and the United Kingdom, and transnational 









contemporary federal systems are essentially multinational.9 It has been 
established that variations in status originate from multiple identities overlap-
ping with economic, social, and political differences among sub- national enti-
ties.10 In other words, it has been argued that constitutional asymmetries are 
linked to differences in identity markers. It has therefore been assumed that 
new- fangled federal dynamics do not necessarily imply an equal positioning 
of different sub- national entities under the law.11 Contemporary sub- national 
entities challenge the internal structure of the system by creating tiers of gov-
ernment through the application of asymmetrical constitutional formulas.12 
This is due to diversity in the national composition that has played a key role 
in the processes of fragmentation.13
The second prerequisite leads us to focus on the way constitutional asym-
metries are articulated for equality. In fact, one of the issues in federalism stud-
ies is associated with challenges that constitutional asymmetry poses for the 
legitimacy and stability of the constitutional system. Recent scholarship has 
pointed out two important aspects of this issue. On the one hand, three con-
cepts substantiate the legitimacy and stability of the system: equality, cohe-
sion, and transparency.14 In other words, equality, cohesion, and transparency 
 9 Patricia Popelier, “Subnational Multilevel Constitutionalism,” Perspectives on Federalism 
6, no. 2 (2014): 4.
 10 Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Law and National Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 9; McGarry, “Asymetric Autonomy,” 148; Michael Burgess, “The Paradox of 
Diversity – Asymmetrical Federalism in Comparative Perspective,” in Asymmetries in 
Constitutional Law, Recent Developments in Federal and Regional Systems, eds. Francesco 
Palermo, Carolin Zwilling, and Karl Kössler (Bozen/ Bolzano: Europäische Akademie 
Bozen/ Accademia Europea Bolzano, 2009), 24; Michael Burgess, Comparative Federalism, 
Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2006), 215; Michael Burgess and Franz Gress, 
“Symmetry and Asymmetry Revisited,” in Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal 
States, ed. Robert Agranoff (Baden- Baden: Nomos, 1999), 48.
 11 Geys and Konrad suggest that traditional federal theory has neglected the fact that fed-
eral relations are dynamic and vibrant, due to the very nature of federalism, in addition 
to neglecting the fact that such relations take effect at several levels within the federal 
arrangement. Benny Geys and Kai A. Konrad, “Federalism and Optimal Allocation across 
Levels of Governance,” in Handbook on Multi- Level Governance, eds. Henrik Enderlein, 
Sonja Wälti, and Michael Zürn (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), 32– 33.
 12 Raoul Blindenbacher and Ronald Watts, “Federalism in a Changing World, A Conceptual 
Framework for the Conference,” in Federalism in a Changing World, Learning from Each 
Other, Scientific Background, Proceedings and Plenary Speeches of the International 
Conference on Federalism, eds. Raoul Blindenbacher and Arnold Koller (Montreal, 
Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill’s Queen’s University Press, 2002), 9.
 13 Carl Joachim Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York, Washington 
and London: Praeger, 1968), 27, 30.
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are considered safeguards of legitimacy and stability. On the other hand, con-
stitutional asymmetries may have a considerable impact on constitutional val-
ues in multinational systems with federal arrangements.15 To put it another 
way, the assumption is that constitutional asymmetry may put at risk equality, 
cohesion, and transparency and therefore undermine the legitimacy and sta-
bility of a system. This leads us to a valid research objective, which is to provide 
a legal analysis of whether constitutional asymmetry is a condition for or a 
threat to equality in contemporary federal systems.
3 Equality: Issues, Challenges, Difficulties
In order to examine the relationship between constitutional asymmetries and 
equality more closely, the present chapter’s main claim is that there is a need 
for an approach that would include the indicators of constitutional asym-
metries. However, one anticipated finding is that equality still appears as a 
debatable concept.16 Since this reflects not only on the general understanding 
of the concept but also on its application and effects in contemporary multina-
tional systems with federal arrangements, it is important to first question the 
concept of equality. In order to do so, we will first discuss the major issues with 
the concept of equality; this will pave the way for us to discuss some major 
challenges concerning the concept of equality in the contemporary theoreti-
cal framework; and finally we will address some of the major difficulties that 
complicate a balance between equality and diversity.
First, some of these major issues with the concept of equality emerge from 
the impediment mentioned above and can be explained through several inter-
connected theoretical tendencies. These are mostly caused by insufficient the-
oretical elaboration of group rights.17 It appears that due to the narrow theo-
retical framework, diverse groups were compelled to make maximal claims, 
such as self- determination claims.18 Traditionally, groups with distinct identity 
markers are viewed as nations and therefore, they were expected to follow the 
 15 Burgess and Gress, “Symmetry and Asymmetry Revisited,” 54.
 16 Susanne Baer, “Equality,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, eds. 
Michael Rosenfeld and András Sajó (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 983– 1002.
 17 Wayne Norman, “Justice and Stability in Multinational Societies,” in Multinational 
Democracies, eds. Alain- G. Gagnon and James Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 94.











self- determination path.19 By the same theoretical token, the concept of equal-
ity has been typically linked to the notion of justice that is at the very core of 
every discussion about equality.20 In other words, equality has been a concept 
that has had to portray fairness and rightfulness. This is because traditional 
liberal democratic theories perceive equality as a mirror of justice21 and justice 
is a normative concept.22 As a result, when this approach is applied in multi-
national systems with federal arrangements, it raises considerable concerns 
about equality. Nevertheless, what these conceptualisations about equality 
have in common is that they leave accommodation claims out of scope, thus 
making their application in multinational systems with federal arrangements 
inadequate.23
Second, regarding major challenges in the contemporary theoretical frame-
work, the main challenge that contemporary federal theory faces is linked to 
how the concept of equality can be positioned in order for it to match a justified 
accommodation of differences, and not necessarily fairness and rightfulness. 
Since asymmetrical constitutional solutions generate different categories that 
are not necessarily evenly positioned within the system, the concept of equal-
ity becomes plural as it needs to provide accommodation for differences.24 The 
challenge is then to change the view of the concept of equality. The second 
challenge is related to the previous one. Multinational systems with federal 
arrangements blend features of territorial and multinational federalism as they 
lean towards adjustment through asymmetrical constitutional features. As the 
concept of equality becomes more plural, it bridges to a difference or varia-
tion.25 To that end, distinctive groups will push for a justified accommodation 
of differences, not for fairness and rightfulness.26 All this suggests that equality 
also means that different categories should be treated differently. The chal-
lenge is then how to alter the constitutional design in order to accommodate 
 19 See Eric Taylor Woods, “Beyond Multination Federalism: Reflections on Nations and 
Nationalism in Canada,” Ethnicities 12, no. 3 (2012): 272.
 20 Baer, “Equality,” 983; Bauböck, “United in Misunderstanding?,” 2; Enric Fossas, “National 
Plurality and Equality,” in Democracy and National Pluralism, ed. Ferran Requejo (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2001), 65.
 21 Ferran Requejo, “Federalism and the Quality of Democracy in Multinational Contexts: 
Present Shortcomings and Possible Improvements,” in Federalism and Territorial 
Cleavages, eds. Ugo M. Amoretti and Nancy Gina Bermeo (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2004), 263.
 22 Norman, “Justice and Stability,“ 94.
 23 Norman, “Justice and Stability,“ 94.
 24 Requejo, “Federalism and the Quality of Democracy,” 263.
 25 Requejo, “Federalism and the Quality of Democracy,” 263.
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differences.27 Contemporary federal theory illustrates these points clearly. 
In traditional mono- national federal systems, it is expected that the federal 
system will serve as a promise of brotherhood within the scope of integrative 
territorial federalism. On the contrary, this cannot be expected in contempo-
rary multinational systems with federal arrangements. This is due to the fact 
that a claim for accommodation of differences may challenge the existence of 
the system.28 Hence, it could conceivably be argued that a discussion centred 
on equality related to multinational systems with federal arrangements with 
asymmetrical features shall be more closely analysed because these systems 
must address a balance between equality and diversity.29
And finally, as we address some of the major difficulties that complicate 
a balance between equality and diversity in contemporary multinational sys-
tems with federal arrangements, we can, in the first place, highlight that equal-
ity should be analysed in these systems with regards to sub- national entities, 
not groups. This is because, understood as a reflection of individual yardsticks, 
various groups appear to manifest a belonging to a distinct identity30 along 
with a sentiment of territorial belonging.31 To clarify, distinct groups should be 
able to raise autonomy claims only if organised as a sub- level of government 
with law- making power. In the second place, it is possible to argue that con-
temporary multinational systems with federal arrangements have an ability 
to accommodate any type of diversity. However, there might not be enough 
inclination from the central level to support the constitutional recognition of 
all the diverse identities organised in a sub- national entity,32 therefore pro-
ducing asymmetrical constitutional solutions. This might be associated with 
the fact that a right to be different is often understood as opposing the princi-
ple of equality.33 In the third place, constitutional asymmetry circumvents the 
 27 Baer, “Equality,” 988– 989.
 28 Fossas, “National Plurality and Equality,” 63.
 29 Anne Mullins and Cheryl Saunders, “Different Strokes for Differet Folks? Some Thoughts 
on Symmetry and Difference in Federal Systems,” in Evaluating Federal Systems, ed. Bertus 
De Villiers (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), 44.
 30 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, New Perspectives on the Past (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1993), 1. In addition, see the number of terms Tierney uses to refer to groups, Tierney, 
Constitutional Law, 5.
 31 This argument is open for discussion. While Livingston claims that this is absolutely the 
rule, Burgess argues that interests may be pronounced by territorial and non- territorial 
actors, William S. Livingston, “A Note on the Nature of Federalism,” Political Science 
Quarterly 67, no. 1 (1952): 85; Burgess, Comparative Federalism, Theory and Practice, 143.
 32 Fossas, “National Plurality and Equality,” 70.
















principle of the same treatment of sub- national entities.34 Even though equal-
ity in multinational systems with federal arrangements shall not be understood 
as an inflexible concept,35 the concept still merely requires comparable situa-
tions to be treated equally and different situations to be treated differently.36
Taken together, these difficulties provoke a debate on how an association 
between constitutional asymmetry and multinationalism in systems with fed-
eral arrangements affects equality in these systems. Two matters are crucial 
in addressing the debate. On the one hand, the favourable and detrimental 
factors of constitutional asymmetry provoke questions about the extent to 
which multinational systems with federal arrangements favour constitutional 
asymmetry and to which degree constitutional systems can tolerate it. On the 
other hand, the answer depends on two interrelated matters: (1) determining 
when constitutional asymmetry threatens equality; and (2) looking for the 
safeguards of equality in multinational federal arrangements. To develop a 
fuller picture, the next sections move on to discuss these concerns using the 
indicators of constitutional asymmetry.
4 Defining the Three Indicators of Constitutional Asymmetry
To address the questions raised in the last section, we will mobilise a set of 
three indicators of constitutional asymmetry to trace inequalities in multina-
tional systems with federal arrangements. There are two reasons to use this 
approach: first, because this approach makes it easy to trace (in)equalities that 
emerge as an effect of constitutional asymmetries and second, it gives a struc-
tured way to detect inequalities. Under such circumstances, this approach 
minimises potential shortcomings in research. However, before further detail-
ing our approach, we need to define the three indicators37 of constitutional 
 34 Fossas, “National Plurality and Equality,” 69, 71.
 35 Fossas, “National Plurality and Equality,” 70.
 36 Baer, “Equality,” 987; Mark Weller, “Conclusion,” in Asymmetric Autonomy and the 
Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts, eds. Mark Weller and Katherine Nobbs (Philadelphia, 
Oxford: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 304.
 37 ‘An indicator is a named collection of rank- ordered data that purports to represent 
the past or projected performance of different units. The data are generated through a 
process that simplifies raw data about complex social phenomenon. The data, in that 
simplified and processed form, are capable of being used to compare particular units 
of analysis (such as countries or institutions or corporations), synchronically or over 
time, and to evaluate their performance by reference to one or more standards’; Kevin 
E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry, “Introduction: The Local- Global Life 
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asymmetries. Defining the indicators is important not only because they ena-
ble one to connect the two concepts in contemporary federal systems, but also 
because they facilitate an exploration of their mutual relationship. As a matter 
of fact, the objective here is to use the indicators of constitutional asymme-
try to identify potential (in)equalities in contemporary federal systems. As an 
outcome, this will open a possibility for further research on this topic beyond 
the contents of this chapter. We will therefore start by laying out in this sec-
tion the indicators of constitutional asymmetry based on the previously estab-
lished theoretical framework.38 The theoretical framework points out three 
main implications. First, constitutional asymmetries emerge as variations 
in the status of different sub- national entities; second, constitutional asym-
metries appear as variations in shaping the distribution of power and com-
petences; and third, constitutional asymmetries come to light as variations 
in fiscal autonomy. Each one of these indicators can be fine- tuned in several 
sub- indicators.
The first indicator measures the differential status of one or more sub- 
national entities in contemporary federal systems and is envisaged through 
the existence of its legally embedded distinctiveness. The main purpose of 
this indicator is to show how the distinct status of the sub- national entity is 
projected in the multi- tiered multinational system. This means measuring the 
power of the sub- national entity to define its specific position at the central 
level. The sub- classification of this indicator includes several sub- indicators 
that refer to: (1) whether the status of sub- national entity is recognised in con-
stitutional or legal acts at the central level; (2) whether a specific sub- national 
entity has institutional autonomy; (3) whether a specific sub- national entity 
enjoys the guarantees of representation in central level institutions that put 
them in a different position; (4) whether a specific sub- national entity is 
favoured with a specific scheme of involvement in constitutional reform pro-
cedures and (5) decision- making in central level institutions; (6) whether a 
specific sub- national entity was granted a benefit of veto powers in central 
level institutions; (7) whether a specific sub- national entity enjoys specific 
locks for the protection of autonomy at the central level; and (8) whether the 
central government has the power to overlook the content of decisions made 
by a distinct sub- national entity. It is important to emphasise that assessing 
sub- national entities is different from the approach that treats national states 
Governance, Corruption, and Rule of Law, eds. Sally Engle Merry, Kevin E. Davis and 
Benedict Kingsbury (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 4.
 38 Maja Sahadžić, “New Federal Systems: Multi- Tiered, Multinational, Asymmetrical,” 




as the main and lowest comparison unit.39 This is because the chapter has set 
out an aim to assess variations between sub- national entities within one state, 
and therefore, the main comparison unit is the sub- national entity. The scope 
of assessment includes variations between sub- national entities at the hori-
zontal level. However, to determine horizontal differences, a vertical relation-
ship between the sub- national entity and central level needs to be addressed 
as well.
The second indicator measures the distribution of power and competences 
in multi- tiered multinational systems. This indicator taps into differences in 
the extent, type, and nature of assigned powers and allocated competences to 
the distinct sub- national entity and among sub- national entities in general. 
This indicator can be further fine- tuned through a set of sub- indicators that 
question: (1) whether a specific sub- national entity enjoys a broader or nar-
rower set of competences; (2) whether differences exist in techniques of allo-
cation of competences for a specific sub- national entity; (3) whether there is a 
distinction between different sets of competences granted to the sub- national 
entities (language, culture, education, and tax); (4) whether a specific sub- 
national entity is allowed to ‘opt- in’ or ‘opt- out’ with regards to specific com-
petences; (5) whether a specific sub- national entity has the power to exercise 
its competences at a different speed; and (6) whether a specific sub- national 
entity has the power to apply and/ or execute measures enacted at the cen-
tral level.
The third indicator measures the extent and level of fiscal autonomy of 
a specific sub- national entity. The main purpose of this indicator is to point 
out the extent to which a distinct sub- national entity can exercise its own 
fiscal autonomy. More precisely, this indicator draws attention to whether 
tax- raising and expenditure autonomy of the distinct sub- national entity is 
restricted, substantial, or the same compared to other sub- national entities. 
This is because fiscal autonomy helps sub- national entities to shape their rela-
tive power and autonomy in multi- tiered multinational systems. This indicator 
can be developed through a group of sub- indicators that reveal: (1) whether a 
specific sub- national entity has the power to raise its own taxes; (2) whether a 
specific sub- national entity has the discretion to set bases and rates for major 
taxing powers (customs, excises, corporate taxes, sales and consumption 
taxes, and personal income taxes); (3) whether a specific sub- national entity 
has the power to raise revenues; (4) whether a specific sub- national entity is 
 39 Liesbeth Hooghe, Gary Marks and Arjan H. Schakel, The Rise of Regional Authority, 
A Comparative Study of 42 Democracies (New York: Routledge, 2010), 2.
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responsible for spending capacity (5) whether a specific sub- national entity 
relies on transfers or not; (6) whether a specific sub- national entity undergoes 
budgetary control over borrowing or not.
For a clear- cut overview, the indicators described above are translated in the 
following index (Table 2.1):
5 Numerous Relationships: Introducing Constitutional Asymmetry 
to Equality and the Other Way Around
The contemporary federal scholarship is less sophisticated in addressing 
(in)equalities linked to constitutional asymmetries. In general, scholars sug-
gest that there are at least two forms of differences among sub- national enti-
ties that may be caused by constitutional asymmetries: (1) differences in the 
constitutional powers among sub- national entities, and (2) differences in the 
extent of power shared between the central level and sub- national entities.40 
In particular, these two forms of differences are mostly addressed through the 
delineation of sub- national entities, the representation in the central level gov-
ernment, and the distribution of power and competences. However, they do 
not comprehensively address the effects of these differences on the concept 
of equality. Additionally, much uncertainty still exists about the influence of 
table 2.1 The indicators of constitutional asymmetry
Indicator Measure
The distinct status of the 
sub- national entity.
The power of the sub- national entity to define its 
specific position at the central level.
The distribution of 
powers and competences.
The extent, type, and nature of distribution of 
powers and competences in a sub- national entity.
Fiscal autonomy. The extent to which a sub- national entity can 
exercise its fiscal autonomy and the level of fiscal 
autonomy.
 40 Brendan O’Leary, “Thinking About Asymmetry and Symmetry in the Remaking of 
Iraq,” in Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts, eds. Mark Weller 
and Katherine Nobs (Philadelphia, Oxford: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 184. 







fiscal autonomy of certain sub- national entities on the concept of equality in 
multinational systems with federal arrangements.
To respond to these challenges, as explained above, this chapter uses the 
indicators of constitutional asymmetry to trace differences pointing to poten-
tial (in)equalities. The following sections will provide a rationale for consti-
tutional asymmetries and evaluate whether and when the principle of equal-
ity in multinational systems with federal arrangements is compromised. In 
addition to evaluating the power of a sub- national entity to define its specific 
position at the central level and the extent, type and nature of distribution of 
powers and competences in a sub- national entity, we address the extent and 
level to which a sub- national entity can exercise its fiscal autonomy. We will 
not address every sub- indicator of constitutional asymmetry in detail. We will, 
however, take into account the sub- indicators that can offer a vivid and com-
prehensive analysis of the relationship between constitutional asymmetry and 
equality.
5.1 The First Indicator: The Distinct Status of a Sub- National Entity
Even though some scholars suggest that all states with federal arrangements 
have a bicameral legislature,41 this is not necessarily always true, as can be seen 
in the case of Micronesia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Venezuela. Nonetheless, 
where the states with federal arrangements do have the bicameral legislature, 
the representation of sub- national entities in the central level institutions may 
display asymmetrical features. Most often, the first chamber represents the 
population and the second chamber represents a sub- national entity. The case 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina proves to be different in an important way. The 
second chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina represents three constituent/ con-
stitutive42 peoples based on their territorial affiliation.43 The question boils 
down to ‘who or what is being represented’.44
 41 Bauböck, “United in Misunderstanding?,” 20.
 42 In Bosnia and Herzegovina these two terms are often discussed without a clear theoretical 
and practical position on their meaning. The first is used to express three ethnic- national 
communities (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) as component parts of the state, while the 
second is used to point at three ethnic- national communities as creators of the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The first one is in more frequent use in foreign languages. The second 
one is in more frequent use in official languages in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Throughout 
the text I will use the first version.
 43 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), in particular, Article iv of the Constitution 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Although representation in the central level institutions in states with fed-
eral arrangements may display more than a few forms of constitutional asym-
metries, we tackle here two issues: firstly, the composition of the central level 
legislature; and secondly, voting. It should be noted that there is a growing body 
of literature that recognises the importance of several other issues with regard 
to representation in the central level institutions. In addition to the guaran-
tees of representation, the following come to mind: veto powers and specific 
locks for the protection of autonomy at the central level that differ among sub- 
national entities; specific formulas of involvement in constitutional amend-
ment procedures and decision- making processes at the central level that put a 
particular sub- national entity in a different position etc.
The first thing to remember is that the composition of the central level legis-
lature in systems with federal arrangements is usually based on the representa-
tion of citizens in the first chamber and sub- national entities in the second 
chamber. Some authors imply that the power and influence of larger and more 
populated sub- national entities in the first chamber originate from a higher 
number of seats, compared to smaller sub- national entities.45 The example of 
Canada shows how the combined populations of Ontario and Quebec enjoy 
the representation of more than half of the seats in the first chamber of the 
Parliament of Canada.46 A less extreme example includes the relative influence 
of North Rhine- Westphalia, Bavaria, Baden- Wurttemberg, and Lower Saxony 
in Germany.47 As for the second chamber, the representation will depend on 
internal vertical and horizontal relations within the system. Connected to 
this, studies in constitutional asymmetries point to two factors that may lead 
to asymmetrical constitutional features: first, the weight of citizen’s votes in 
 45 Ronald L. Watts, “The Theoretical and Practical Implications of Asymmetrical Federalism,” 
in Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States, ed. Robert Agranoff (Baden- 
Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), 34.
 46 Burgess gives a comprehensive explanation of the issue through presenting position of 
Quebec in practice: ‘In Canada the combined population of the two provinces of Ontario 
and Quebec enjoy a de facto asymmetrical representation of 178 seats out of a total of 301 
in the House of Commons, but the ‘regional’ principle in the non- elected Senate has had 
the effect of counterbalancing their combined dominance in the first chamber. In the 
Senate, Quebec and Ontario each have 24 seats as regions rather than as provinces. Yet 
this de facto asymmetrical representation obscures the vulnerable position of Quebec in 
the federation. In reality, Quebec’s 75 seats in the House of Commons pits its predomi-
nantly francophone population against a nominal 226 Anglophone representatives from 
the ‘rest of Canada’ (roc), while its 24 seats in the Senate mean that it is easily outnum-
bered by the remaining 81 nominally Anglophone representatives’; Burgess, Comparative 
Federalism, Theory and Practice, 219– 220.








sub- national units of different sizes, and second, (over)representation of sub- 
national units of different sizes.48 The first suggested factor, which involves 
proportionate representation of citizens in the first chamber, does not in fact 
provide an institutional link with the sub- national entities, as an unequal 
number of seats is accompanied with an equal relative weight.49 The second 
factor that involves equivalent representation of sub- national entities in the 
second chamber implies what Watts calls ‘not the same symmetry’. It involves 
a weighted system of the representation of states in the second chamber tak-
ing into account differences in population. Examples include Austria, Canada, 
Germany, and India.50 To illustrate, in Germany each Land has at least three 
votes, but Länder with more than two million inhabitants have four, those with 
more than six million inhabitants five, and Länder with more than seven mil-
lion inhabitants have six votes.51 In Canada, provinces are grouped into Senate 
divisions represented as follows: Ontario by 24 senators; Quebec by 24 sena-
tors; the Maritimes by 24 senators, with Nova Scotia represented by ten, New 
Brunswick by ten, and Prince Edwards Islands by four senators; the Western 
Provinces by 24 senators, with Manitoba represented by six, British Columbia 
by six, Saskatchewan by six, and Alberta by six; Newfoundland by six senators; 
and the Yukon Territory, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut by one senator 
each.52
Another issue connected to constitutional asymmetries in representation 
can be tracked down in the emerging question of whether representatives 
from more autonomous sub- national entities should be restricted from voting 
in the central level institutions on matters over which the central level does 
not have powers and competences in that distinct entity.53 This question has 
been raised in Canada, but also in the United Kingdom in the light of Scottish 
devolution where it is now already solved through adding a new stage in the 
 48 Bauböck, “United in Misunderstanding?,” 20.
 49 Bauböck, “United in Misunderstanding?,”20. ‘Indeed, some political theorists have 
defended the argument that asymmetry can be reconciled with liberal democracy, as 
quality for individual citizens does not necessarily require that all regions have equal 
powers’; Wilfried Swenden, Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe, A Comparative 
and Thematic Analysis (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 265.
 50 Watts, “Theoretical and Practical Implications,” 38– 39.
 51 Edin Šarčević, Ustavno Uređenje Savezne Republike Njemačke: Osnove Njemačkog 
Državnog Prava (Sarajevo: Kult/ B, 2005), 169– 262. In particular, Article 51 of The Basic 
Law (Grundgesetz).
 52 The Constitution of Canada. available at https:// www.constituteproject.org/ constitution/ 
Canada_ 2011?lang=en. In particular, Article iv. 22.
 53 Ronald L. Watts, “Contemporary Views on Federalism,” in Evaluating Federal Systems, ed. 
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law- making process that enable only representatives from English constituen-
cies to vote on matters that affect only England.
5.2 The Second Indicator: The Distribution of Power and Competences
Before proceeding to examine constitutional asymmetry in the domain of dis-
tribution of power and competences, it is important to make a few theoretical 
remarks on this issue. In the first place, there are various ways to shape the 
distribution of competences. Competences are usually distributed as exclu-
sive, shared, and/ or concurrent. Even though a standard distribution of com-
petences in systems with federal arrangements presumes that the distribution 
of competences is symmetrical for all sub- national entities, there are ways in 
which constitutional asymmetries may differ in one or a few sub- national enti-
ties. In addition, depending on the way they are distributed, there might be 
differences in institutional functioning among them. Second, the theory puts 
forward that in systems with federal features, there are three levels where con-
stitutional asymmetry may appear: firstly, on the horizontal level or among 
sub- national entities; secondly, vertically or between the central level and the 
sub- national entity; and thirdly, in the power- sharing order between institu-
tions at the central level.54 Although studies have demonstrated that constitu-
tional asymmetries seek a balance between the horizontal and vertical level,55 
the prevailing opinion is that their greatest influence is at the horizontal level.56
The literature indicates that the forms and representative cases where 
the constitutional provisions lay out the asymmetrical distribution of power 
and competences in states with federal arrangements can be addressed as 
follows: firstly, as reducing the power and competences in one or more sub- 
national entities; secondly, as increasing the power and competences in one 
or more sub- national entities; thirdly, as allowing some sub- national entities 
to ‘opt- in’ or ‘opt- out’ with regards to specific competences; and fourthly, as 
allowing certain sub- national entities to take the exercise of autonomy at a 
different speed.57
The first form of constitutional asymmetry in the distribution of power 
and competences was evident in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
 54 Bauböck, “United in Misunderstanding?,” 3.
 55 James A. Gardner and Antoni Abad I. Ninet, “Sustainable Decentralization: Power, 
Extraconstitutional Influence, and Subnational Symmetry in the United States and 
Spain,” Legal Studies Research Paper Series, no. 12 (2009): 3, 4.
 56 Bauböck, “United in Misunderstanding?,” 3.
 57 Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (Montreal, Kingston, London, Ithaca: Institute 











that existed for only ten years, where disparities in the size and wealth of 
sub- national entities induced experiments with reducing autonomy for some 
regional governments.58
The second form is visible in several states. In Canada, the second form of 
constitutional asymmetry in the distribution of power and competences is 
displayed in the linguistic advantages of Quebec, exercised in education, leg-
islature, courts, and the civil law application.59 Even though the central level 
constitution in Bosnia and Herzegovina enumerates competences assigned 
to the central level and sub- national entities, the territorial and institutional 
structure embedded in sub- national entities’ constitutions made the distri-
bution of competences differently prescribed and exercised. For example, 
the local competences are different between the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska, and even among the cantons in the 
Federation when it comes to communal services, material costs of schools, 
etc.60 In Belgium, the German- speaking community does not have the same 
powers as the Dutch- speaking and the French- speaking communities as it 
cannot exercise language competences, with the exception of the use of lan-
guage in education, but it exercises some regional competences owing to the 
fact that the German- speaking community is allowed, in agreement with the 
Walloon Region, to exercise these competences within its territory.61 Similarly, 
the French- speaking community can choose to transfer the exercise of its pow-
ers to the Walloon Region and the French- speaking Community Commission 
in Brussels. However, constitutional provisions do not grant the same pow-
ers to the Flemings who have merged their institutions.62 Yet, even though 
 58 Ronald L. Watts, “Federalism, Regionalism, and Political Integration,” in Regionalism and 
Supranationalism: Challenges and Alternatives to the Nation- State in Canada and Europe, 
ed. David M. Cameron (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1981), 16.
 59 Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 130; Swenden, Federalism and Regionalism in Western 
Europe, 221. This position might be regarded as similar to Scotland in the United Kingdom.
 60 Halko Basarić, “Pregled Finansija Lokalne Samouprave U Bih,” ed. Zoran Ivančić (Sarajevo 
2015), 12, https:// www.cpi.ba/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2015/ 03/ Pregled- finansija- lokalne- 
samouprave.pdf.
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in Federal Countries, eds. Akhtar Majeed, Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown (Montreal, 
Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill- Queen’s University Press, 2005), 48, 49; Jan Wouters, 
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Switzerland Compared,” Working Paper, no. 138 (April 2014), https:// ghum.kuleuven.be/ 
ggs/ publications/ working_ papers/ new_ series/ wp131- 140/ wp138- wouters- vankerckhoven- 
vidal.pdf.
 62 Patricia Popelier and Koen Lemmens, The Constitution of Belgium, A Contextual Analysis 











Asymmetry and Equality in Multinational Systems 51
competences are distributed symmetrically between two types of sub- national 
entities, the constitution allows all or some entities to blend competences by 
transferring some or all powers from the region to the community and vice 
versa. This places Belgium under the third form as well.
The third form is best explained by the Spanish example. The Spanish con-
stitution provides two main routes to regional autonomy, a fast- track route for 
historic regions, and a slow- track route for other regions,63 thus creating an 
optional autonomy system64 for regions. It is, however, important to emphasise 
that even though these opting mechanisms have created an initial asymme-
try between the regions,65 they do not disable regions from gaining the same 
level of autonomy at some point. Nevertheless, the constitutional text enables 
another type of asymmetry. For certain autonomous communities, such as 
the Basque Country and Navarre, the constitution has allowed different fiscal 
agreements.66 Also, the Spanish example reveals a connection to the fourth 
form of constitutional asymmetry in the distribution of power and compe-
tences as it points at a relationship between ‘opting- in’ and ‘opting- out’ and the 
exercise of autonomy at a different speed. It is implied that sub- national enti-
ties that ‘opt- in’ or ‘opt- out’ will exercise their autonomy at a different speed.
The fourth form of constitutional asymmetry in the distribution of power 
and competences can be observed in several systems. In Italy, regions with 
special status negotiated their competences and finance bilaterally with the 
central level and have therefore consumed different dynamics in the distribu-
tion of power and competences.67 In the United Kingdom, the allocation of 
competences varies for Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales. For instance, 
even though tax regulations are under central control, Scotland can change the 
basic income tax. Northern Ireland can, for instance, legislate on employment. 
Finally, Wales has executive powers to address the use of the Welsh language.68
5.3 The Third Indicator: Fiscal Autonomy
A fiscal framework in systems with federal arrangements is a common condi-
tion that has a considerable impact on how these systems behave in respect 
 63 Swenden, Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe, 63.
 64 Luis López Guerra, “El Modelo Autonómico,” Revista Catalana de Derecho Público, 
Autonomies, no. 20 (1995).
 65 Agranoff, “Intergovernmental Relations and the Management of Asymmetry in Federal 
Spain,” 98.
 66 Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 130.
 67 Francesco Palermo and Alex Wilson, “The Multi- Level Dynamics of State Decentralization 
in Italy,” Comparative European Politics 12, no. 4 (2014): 511.















of economy and politics.69 Generally speaking, the fiscal power of the sub- 
national entity may point to its ability to display a level of autonomy.70 By 
drawing on variations in the population and territory size, contemporary 
scholarship suggests that larger and wealthier sub- national entities have the 
capacity to use their resources to support their autonomy.71 In particular, 
these sub- national entities may have the power to raise taxes and revenues, 
and the power of the purse. With more resources, they depend less on federal 
transfers,72 such as California in the United States of America.73 Also, in Spain, 
certain autonomous communities, such as the Basque Country and Navarre, 
have been allowed fiscal agreements different from other autonomous com-
munities.74 For example, while the central level government in Spain manages 
the most important taxes for regions, the Basque Country and Navarre collect 
all taxes except for tobacco, petroleum, and customs duties.75 This also over-
laps with the second form of constitutional asymmetries in the distribution of 
power and competences as it corresponds to increasing autonomy for some 
sub- national entities.
These examples give rise to the assumption that larger and wealthier sub- 
national entities may easily put into play their fiscal autonomy, while smaller 
and less wealthy sub- national entities are dependent on their fiscal status. 
Yet, this does not necessarily mean that smaller and less wealthy entities are 
entirely powerless, let alone that they depend on the allocation of finances 
and fiscal policies to be able to exercise their power.76 This link is very hard 
to prove, especially because problems of fiscal imbalances occur regardless of 
territory and population size.77 Moreover, Mill argued that equality of taxation 
is equality of sacrifice.78
 69 Burgess, Comparative Federalism, Theory and Practice, 149.
 70 Watts, “The Theoretical and Practical Implications of Asymmetrical Federalism,” 33.
 71 Burgess, Comparative Federalism, Theory and Practice, 218– 219; on this topic also The Swiss 
Tax System – Between Equality and Diversity by Peter Hänni ( chapter 9).
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Practical Implications of Asymmetrical Federalism,” 33.
 78 John Stuart Mill and Stephen Nathanson, Principles of Political Economy (Abridged): With 





















Asymmetry and Equality in Multinational Systems 53
5.4 Effects on Equality
Given the points above, several implications come to mind. On the one hand, 
in multinational systems with federal arrangements, a bicameral legislature 
leaves space for discussion about equality, especially with regards to the sec-
ond chamber. Nevertheless, to present a weighted system of the representation 
of states in the second chamber taking into account differences in population 
as inequality is shown to be misleading. In like manner, as long as the ‘one 
person, one vote’ standard is applied in the first chamber,79 the principle of 
equal representation does not violate democratic equality in the second cham-
ber.80 This is because equality of individual citizens does not demand that all 
sub- national entities possess equal powers.81 In addition, the second cham-
ber may, to some extent, counteract the first chamber. In fact, in many federal 
systems, the second chamber is designed to counterbalance the influence of 
sub- national entities.82 Finally, the main problem is that ‘[t] here is no single 
standard of equality in federal representation against which we could measure 
the extent of asymmetry’.83 On the other hand, inequality may be implicated 
in the concept of representation in which representatives from sub- national 
entities are allowed to vote on matters that are of no concern to the entity and/ 
or are also able to dissuade others from voting on matters that only concern 
their particular entity. This is due to the fact that their voting has a greater 
weight in the central level decision- making.84 It must be remembered that, 
in both cases, a varied treatment can ‘breed strong resentment and distrust’85 
and therefore challenge the existence of the system. This is especially true with 
 79 On this topic also Federal States and Equality in Political Representation: Federalism 
Susperseding Democracy? by Sérgio Ferrari ( chapter 11).
 80 ‘Indeed, some political theorists have defended the argument that asymmetry can be 
reconciled with liberal democracy, as quality for individual citizens does not necessar-
ily require that all regions have equal powers’; Swenden, Federalism and Regionalism in 
Western Europe, 265.
 81 Wilfried Swenden and Jan Erk, New Directions in Federalism Studies, Routledge/ Ecpr 
Studies in European Political Science no. 65 (London: Routledge, 2010), 265; Swenden, 
Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe.
 82 Ronald L. Watts, “A Comparative Perspective on Asymmetry in Federations,” Asymmetry 
Series, no. 4 (2005): 5.
 83 Bauböck, “United in Misunderstanding?,” 20.
 84 John McGarry, “Asymmetry in Federations, Federacies and Unitary States,” Ethnopolitics 6, 
no. 1 (2007): 112– 113. As this puts these entities in a privileged position, two solutions are 
suggested: that votes of subnational entities with a special status shall carry less weight 
in the central level institutions; and that these entities shall not have power to decide on 
matters that are of no concern to them; Fossas, “National Plurality and Equality,” 73– 74.


















regard to the elicit counter- demands from under- empowered regions. In par-
ticular, less empowered sub- national entities will in many cases either try to 
catch up with more empowered ones or oppose the very principle of asym-
metry due to the fact that their position is subject to unfair discrimination, 
producing critical repercussions for the system.86
Equally important, the previous sections show that unlike in traditional 
federal states in which equal distribution of powers and competences among 
sub- national entities is expected by default,87 in contemporary multina-
tional systems with federal arrangements that display asymmetrical features 
this is not necessarily the case. The reason can be sought in the powers of 
self- organisation which are closely connected to the first set of indicators. 
In all federal arrangements, sub- national entities must have powers of self- 
organisation to be able to implement their attributed competences and pow-
ers.88 Nonetheless, in multinational systems differences in their application 
may be sometimes understood as a threat to equality. In any case, a different 
application of the powers of self- organisation among sub- national entities 
does not stand against the fact that all sub- national entities receive the pow-
ers of self- organisation.89 Instead, it raises an expectation of differences, for 
example, in procedures. However, the final outcome, in legal terms, should be 
the same.
Finally, it can be argued that the uneven distribution of fiscal resources may 
cause uneasy relations between sub- national entities.90 On one side, resource- 
rich sub- national entities are more likely to advocate the return of revenues 
to the entity from which they originate from. On the other side, resource- poor 
entities are likely to argue for proportional revenue sharing.91 Then again, 
there is evidence that some systems have adopted asymmetrical fiscal poli-
cies to match the differences among sub- national entities in their responsibil-
ities.92 The outcome is that the wealthiest sub- national entities discern that 
 86 Angustias Hombrado, “Learning to Catch the Wave? Regional Demands for Constitutional 
Change in Contexts of Asymmetrical Arrangements,” Regional & Federal Studies 21, no. 4/ 
5 (2011): 480.
 87 Palermo, “Asymmetries in Constitutional Law,” 14.
 88 Gardner and Ninet, “Sustainable Decentralization,” 6.
 89 Fossas, “National Plurality and Equality,” 70. For instance, Fossas gives an example of 
granting the capacity to regulate the extent to which Spanish Autonomous Communities 
languages may be official within their own territory.
 90 Fossas, “National Plurality and Equality,” 76.
 91 Donald L. Horowitz, “The Many Uses of Federalism,” Drake Law Review 55 (2007): 960, 
https:// scholarship.law.duke.edu/ faculty_ scholarship/ 1855/ .
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they suffer from the asymmetrical design. To illustrate, the case of Catalonia’s 
recent constitutional amendment reflects the intention of the central level to 
not allow altering of previously determined contributions by each sub- national 
entity.93 It has been observed that fiscal arrangements need to be adjusted over 
time in order to provide correction of inequalities for the purpose of balance 
between diversity and uniformity of the system.94
5.5 Implications for Legitimacy and Stability
The previous sections have revealed three important aspects with regards to 
equality in multinational systems with federal arrangements. First, they made 
it possible to spell out the aspects of the unequal burden that, so far, have 
not come across conceptual objections. In fact, these aspects are recognised 
as elements that make the federal system more responsive.95 Second, they 
uncovered the aspects of equal treatment of unequals. Correspondingly, equal 
treatment of unequals infringes the principle of distributive fairness and pro-
vokes asymmetrical pressures.96 Thirdly, the previous sections pointed to the 
aspects of unequal treatment of unequals. These aspects display options that 
include equalisation of unequals. The two latter aspects potentially produce 
diverse consequences in the relationships among sub- national entities. This 
is especially thought- provoking as it contains questions about the effects of 
these aspects on legitimacy and stability in multinational systems with federal 
arrangements. There are several reasons for this.
On the one side, the concept of legitimacy in multinational systems with 
federal arrangements depends on a multi- fold basis. To put it differently, it 
originates not only from the central level but also from a sub- national entity 
level.97 Then, when constitutional asymmetries are involved, the concept of 
legitimacy is complicated by several issues. Firstly, the central level struggles to 
maintain equilibrium among sub- national entities, while sub- national entities 
spare no effort to differentiate their position.98 Secondly, the distribution of 
 93 Esther Seijas Villadangos, “Answers to Spanish Centrifugal Federalism: Asymmetrical 
Federalism Versus Coercive Federalism,” Perspectives on Federalism 6, no. 2 (2014): E- 176.
 94 Bertus De Villiers, Evaluating Federal Systems (Juta & Company, 1994), xiii.
 95 Burgess, Comparative Federalism, Theory and Practice, 124.
 96 Brian Galligan and Richard Mulgan, “Asymmetric Political Association: The Australasian 
Experiment,” in Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States, ed. Robert 
Agranoff (Baden- Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), 57.
 97 Gráinne de Búrca, “The Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union,” The Modern Law 
Review 59, no. 3 (1996): 353.
 98 Patricia Popelier, “Governance and Better Regulation: Dealing with the Legitimacy 















power and competences between tiers of government is such that it requires 
mutual consent.99 Thirdly, greater fiscal autonomy poses a predicament for dif-
ferentiation in policy decisions.100 On the other side, the concept of stability 
in multinational systems with federal arrangements is not easily stipulated.101 
This is linked to two types of processes, institutional changes and relation-
ships among sub- national entities.102 That is to say that these two process-
es stimulate various ways to shape the concept of stability. This is because 
 federal dynamics in multinational systems with federal arrangements create 
adaptiveness by creating volatile circumstances. And, by transforming these 
circumstances into aspects that include unequal treatment of unequals and 
equalisation of unequals, the concept of stability becomes ‘a ‘relatively’ peace-
ful, constitutional, and democratic adaptation of a political system to chang-
ing circumstances’.103 Finally, these observations confirm two things: that the 
legitimacy and stability in multinational systems with federal arrangements 
should be analysed under the scope of prevalent federal dynamics; and, in line 
with this, that equality in these systems should be addressed as the concept 
that features dynamic equality.
6 Conclusions
Following contemporary scholarship in federalism that suggests that consti-
tutional asymmetry undermines equality, the main research objective of this 
chapter was to explore a relationship between constitutional asymmetry and 
constitutional values. For that purpose, the chapter focused on equality as a 
distinctive value that is said to undermine the legitimacy and stability of sys-
tems where constitutional asymmetries are established. The applied method-
ology consisted of conventional methods that combine legal analysis with 
 99 Martin Papillon, “Is the Secret to Have a Good Dentist? Canadian Contributions to the 
Study of Federalism in Divided Societies,” in The Comparative Turn in Canadian Political 
Science, eds. Linda A. White et al. (Vancouver: ubc Press, 2008), 126.
 100 Philipp Trein, Giuliano Bonoli and Marcello Natili, “A Federalist’s Dilemma: Tradeoffs 
between Legitimacy and Budget Responsibility in Multitiered Welfare States,” Journal of 
European Social Policy 29, no. 1 (February 2019) https:// doi.org/ 10.1177/ 0958928718781294.
 101 Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova, Designing Federalism: A Theory 
of Self- Sustainable Federal Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 11– 12; Norman, 
“Justice and Stability,“ 97.
 102 Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova, Designing Federalism, 11– 13.
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political science. However, to achieve more structured and detailed analysis, 
the chapter relied on the indicators of constitutional asymmetry.
A first cornerstone in using this strategy was to reflect on theoretical issues, 
challenges and difficulties linked to both constitutional asymmetry and the 
concept of equality. Having argued that multinational systems with asymmet-
rical features are inclined to constitutional asymmetries, the chapter explored 
pathways in which constitutional asymmetries relate to equality as a specific 
constitutional value. A second cornerstone was to test constitutional asym-
metries against the concept of equality in order to evaluate effects of equality 
and implications for legitimacy and stability. This was done by using the indi-
cators of constitutional asymmetry.
In conclusion, this chapter has two important outcomes. First, it enhances 
our understanding of a complex interaction between constitutional asymme-
try, multinationalism, federal arrangements and an impact of constitutional 
asymmetry on equality in multinational systems with federal arrangements. 
Second, it opens a discussion about the type of equality that needs to be 
applied in multinational systems with federal arrangements. Future research 
should, therefore, concentrate on the investigation of dynamic equality.
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 chapter 3
Why the Affection of Federalism for Human Rights 
Is Unrequited and How the Relationship Could Be 
Improved
Eva Maria Belser
1 Introduction: A Story of Unrequited Affection1
Autonomy and human rights are in an uneasy relationship. Proponents of fed-
eral power- sharing usually work on the assumption that territorial autonomy 
allows actors of different tiers of government to better respect and protect 
human rights. They are convinced that federalism backs constitutionalism, 
democracy and good governance and see autonomy rights not as a hindrance 
to the fulfilment of individual rights and freedoms but as a useful contribution 
to it. However, human rights organisations and advocates rarely respond pos-
itively to the advances made by federalists. As they associate collective auton-
omy with different human rights standards for citizens of the same state, pro-
ponents of human rights generally look sceptically at autonomy arrangements. 
The federal affection for human rights is thus unrequited. Federal scholars – 
and international organisations promoting decentralisation and other forms 
of power- sharing – keep praising federalism as a mechanism able to increase 
the state’s legitimacy and efficiency, as well as to strengthen its capacity to 
implement minority and human rights. Human rights experts – and interna-
tional organisations mandated to support human rights implementation – 
however, are immune to such seduction and advocate for uniform approaches. 
They insist on the obligation to respect and protect all human beings equally, 
irrespective of their group affiliation or territory of residence.
This chapter does not question the fact that unequal human rights stand-
ards within one country occur when a power- sharing regime is fully imple-
mented. Federalism may in fact cause citizens of a country to be treated differ-
ently depending on which subnational and local jurisdiction is applicable to 
them. Such a situation prima facie clashes with the principle of equality and 
 1 I am very grateful to MLaw Simon Mazidi for his valuable help in the preparation and the 
editing of this text.
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the fundamental requirements of justice for which it stands. However, equal-
ity must be understood differently in federal states. The subnational and local 
units are not inescapably bound to treat their citizens equally to the citizens 
of other units; they are instead encouraged to improve on international and 
national standards applicable to all. The major claim of the chapter is thus 
that inequality, even in the sensitive field of human rights, is not a problem 
to overcome per se but a situation to handle within the framework of national 
and international human rights obligations.
The chapter first documents the rebuff of federal arrangements by the 
human rights community. The tendency of human rights bodies to blame 
and shame federalism for insufficient human rights implementation will be 
explored by looking at the recommendations the United Nations human rights 
treaty bodies2 have issued towards Switzerland and other federal states. I will 
then attempt to classify these recommendations into three different groups 
(section 2) and endeavour to identify some of the sources of tensions and 
reasons for mistrust between the potential partners (section 3). The chapter 
will then explore avenues for improving the relationship between federalism 
and human rights and the respective communities. It will first recall the fact 
that some human rights obligations require the respect of collective rights 
and oblige state actors to accept and promote diversity (section 4). It will then 
more generally turn to multilevel human rights implementation and to the 
assets federalism and other forms of autonomy have to offer and suggest that 
the complexities of the relationship between autonomy and human rights are 
underexplored and many crucial questions have yet to be answered convinc-
ingly. While it is easy to conclude that we can and must accept unequal human 
rights standards in federal states, the question of how far inequality can go 
remains open. By using various examples, the chapter will show that the con-
ventional answer – all actors must respect minimal standard and may improve 
on them – is not satisfactory (section 5). Finally, the chapter will, therefore, 
hint at avenues for further research (section 6).
2 The Rejection of Federalism by Human Rights Treaty Bodies
The Swiss Centre of Expertise in Human Rights (schr), a pilot project of the 
federal government in view of the establishment of an independent national 
 2 Cf. for a comprehensive study of the UN human rights treaty bodies, Helen Keller and Geir 











human rights institution, recently analysed the recommendations the United 
Nations and the Council of Europe had made regarding human rights imple-
mentation and implementation deficits in Switzerland during the last years.3 
The comprehensive study, published in six volumes, gives a detailed overview 
of the evaluation of Swiss human rights efforts and shortcomings by interna-
tional human rights organisations and their implementation bodies.
When reacting to Switzerland’s country and shadow reports, international 
bodies quite reliably welcome the adaption of new national laws, the establish-
ment or strengthening of national institutions and the making and implemen-
tation of national action plans, e.g. the National Strategy to Combat Poverty 
or the National Action Plan to Fight Human Trafficking.4 When the country 
does not report on new federal initiatives but refers to cantonal and municipal 
competences, international bodies usually frown and call for more national 
action.5
The very numerous recommendations referring to vertical power- sharing 
can be classified into three categories:
 – In the first category, federalism- blind recommendations, we find comments 
and advice reminding Switzerland of its duty to implement human rights 
obligations throughout the country, irrespective of its internal organisation. 
Countless recommendations repeat that international treaties are binding 
on the entire country and that cantonal and municipal competences cannot 
serve as excuses for implementation deficits.
 – The recommendations of the second category, federalism- adverse recom-
mendations, refer to federalism as a particular challenge for human rights 
implementation and suggest that Switzerland harmonises its efforts, in 
particular by establishing national action plans, providing blueprints and 
frameworks for actors of all tiers, setting national priorities, coordinating 
and harmonising actions, and tracking progress nationally.
 – In the third category, finally, we find federalism- hostile recommendations. 
These recommendations refer to federalism as a serious problem for human 
rights implementation and openly criticise subnational competences. 
 3 Schweizerischen Kompetenzzentrums für Menschenrechte, Umsetzung der Menschenrechte 
in der Schweiz, Schriftenreihe skmr (Bern: Editions Weblaw, 2013– 2014).
 4 Cf. e.g., Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report 
of Switzerland, ccpr/ C/ che/ co/ 4 (2017), para. 3 or Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourth and Fifth 
Periodic Reports of Switzerland: cedaw/ C/ che/ co/ 4– 5 (2016), para. 5.
 5 Judith Wyttenbach, Umsetzung von Menschenrechtsübereinkommen in Bundesstaaten: 
Gleichzeitig ein Beitrag zur grundrechtlichen Ordnung im Föderalismus (Baden- Baden, Zürich, 







The Relationship Between Federalism and Human Rights 65
Federalism- hostile recommendations demand unified and unifying actions, 
for instance, by the adoption of a national law or other uniform rules or 
by national actions eliminating different human rights standards in the 
country.
The three categories of recommendations affect federalism and human rights 
in very different ways. While the first group states a matter of course, the sec-
ond and the third groups question the conduciveness of federalism to human 
rights implementation.
2.1 Federalism- Blind Recommendations
Federalism- blind recommendations are very frequently issued when evaluat-
ing Switzerland and other federations.6 Typical recommendations summon 
Switzerland to ‘ensure that the authorities in all cantons and municipalities 
are aware of the Committee’s recommendations and guarantee their proper 
implementation’7 or ‘to work to promote equal representation of women in 
political life at all levels’.8 In rare cases, international treaty bodies express con-
cern about the situation in one or more cantons, e.g. regarding the overcrowd-
ing of prisons in the Canton of Geneva or the detention of unaccompanied 
minors unseparated from adults in some cantonal institutions.9
Federalism- blind human rights recommendations are unproblematic from 
both a federal and an international human rights viewpoint. From a federal 
perspective, it is uncontroversial that autonomy arrangements allow for 
diversity only within the binding framework of superior law.10 Vertical power- 
sharing between actors of different government tiers constitutes no blank 
check to violate the country’s international obligations. Subnational units are 
obliged to use their competences in the field of culture, education, religion, 
health or economic development in a way that does not fall behind any of 
 6 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations 
of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Canada, cedaw/ 
C/ can/ co/ 7 (2008), para. 11; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Eighth and Ninth Periodic Reports 
of Canada, cedaw/ C/ can/ co/ 8– 9 (2016), para. 11; Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Belgium, cedaw/ C/ bel/ co/ 6 (2008), para. 
12; see for a further assessment on the unequal implementation of the UN Conventions 
rights in a federal state Wyttenbach, Umsetzung von Menschenrechtsübereinkommen in 
Bundesstaaten, 135 et seqq.
 7 ccpr, Concluding Observations, / C/ che/ co/ 4 (2017), para. 9.
 8 ccpr, Concluding Observations, / C/ che/ co/ 4 (2017), para. 19.
 9 Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of 
Switzerland, cat/ C/ che/ co/ 7 (2015), para. 17 and 19.













the national or international, justiciable or programmatic, human rights obli-
gations. Diversity, as protected by the constitution, is contained by unity, as 
defined namely by international and constitutional human rights. Exclusive, 
concurrent or parallel competences of subnational units are limited by over-
riding international and national law and all subnational law must give in in 
case of conflict.11
From an international human rights perspective, federalism- blind human 
rights recommendations are equally self- evident. Under the notion of ‘pacta 
sunt servanda’ the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties famously states 
that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be per-
formed by them in good faith.12 The Convention adds that ‘a party may not 
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform 
a treaty’.13 The unitary, decentral, regional or federal character of a state party 
has no impact on the country’s international obligations and is rightly of little 
or no concern to international organisations and treaty bodies.14 The country 
as such is responsible for treaty implementation, irrespective of its internal 
power- sharing arrangement.15
Federalism is thus obviously no excuse to fall behind on international 
human rights obligations. While internally, the federal tier may find it difficult 
to ensure full and speedy compliance with international duties because it lacks 
(comprehensive) competences, externally such difficulties are irrelevant.16 If 
one canton or municipality disrespects human rights, the state falls short of its 
international obligations. All multi- tier states must hence find mechanisms to 
apply international and national laws to the entire territory and enforce their 
primacy over all conflicting subnational laws and acts. If a state is unwilling or 
 11 Francesco Palermo and Karl Kössler, Comparative Federalism: Constitutional Arrangements 
and Case Law (Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2017), 130 et seqq.
 12 Art. 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
 13 Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; see Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 9: The Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, E/ C.12/ 1998/ 24 (1998).
 14 Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee Against Torture, 
Switzerland, cat/ C/ che/ co/ 6 (2010), para. 6.
 15 Florian Weber, “Die Umsetzung völkerrechtlicher Verträge im Bundesstaat,” in 
Föderalismus 2.0 – Denkanstösse und Ausblicke, eds. Bernhard Waldmann, Peter Hänni 
and Eva Maria Belser (Bern: Stämpfli, 2011), 222.
 16 Christoph Spenlé and Jan Skalski, “Das Staatenberichtsverfahren vor dem uno- Ausschuss 
gegen die Diskriminierung der Frau: Das unterschätzte Instrument: Zur Funktion und 
Struktur der uno- Staatenberichtsverfahren und ihrer Bedeutung für die Schweiz,” 
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unsuccessful in using these mechanisms, international bodies rightly insist on 
the respect and protection of human rights by all state actors, be they federal, 
cantonal or municipal.
2.2 Federalism- Adverse Recommendations
Federalism- adverse recommendations refer to federalism and other autonomy 
arrangements as particular challenges for the proper implementation of human 
rights. The Human Rights Committee, for example, stated that it ‘takes note of 
the federal structure of the Swiss State and the division of powers between the 
authorities at the federal, cantonal and municipal levels. It remains concerned, 
however, about information suggesting that the commitment on the part of 
the cantonal and municipal authorities to the implementation of its recom-
mendations is limited.’17 In order to make up for the situation, the Committees 
usually suggest that the federal tier should interfere and recommend strength-
ening national actors or adopting national action plans. The Human Rights 
Committee, for instance, invited Switzerland to ‘redouble its efforts to combat 
the commission of or incitement to commit acts of racial or religious hatred, 
notably by strengthening the mandate of the Federal Commission against 
Racism and by envisaging the adoption of a national plan of action against 
racism’.18 In the same report, it also suggested that in order to better protect 
persons leading a nomadic way of life, Switzerland ‘should establish with the 
cantons a coordinated action plan to ensure that sufficient stopping areas are 
made available to Travellers’.19 Similarly, the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights called for the adoption of a ‘national action plan for the 
prevention of suicide’.20 In addition to such a specific measure, the harmo-
nisation of human rights measures at federal level is frequently proposed. 
The country should, for instance, ‘establish expeditiously’ universal and inde-
pendent mechanisms with powers to receive all complaints concerning police 
violence and to maintain centralised statistics.21 Similarly, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights encouraged Switzerland to promote the 
harmonisation of standards for access to preschool and childcare, ‘so as to 
 17 ccpr, Concluding Observations, / C/ che/ co/ 4 (2017), para. 8.
 18 ccpr, Concluding Observations, / C/ che/ co/ 4 (2017), para. 21.
 19 ccpr, Concluding Observations, / C/ che/ co/ 4 (2017), para. 51.
 20 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Consideration of Reports Submitted 
by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Switzerland, E/ C.12/ che/ co/ 2– 3 
(2010), para. 19.













ensure that all children living in the territory of the State party have the same 
opportunities to benefit’.22 It also asked to set ‘common standards for access 
and entitlement to social aid’.23
Federalism- adverse recommendations, calling for targeted national inter-
ventions or comprehensive national strategies and frameworks,24 are ques-
tionable from a federal point of view. They often recommend measures, which 
the national constitution does not allow the federal tier to take. Such inter-
national invitations to disrespect entrenched national power- sharing arrange-
ments are problematic. If one or several subnational units use their internal 
competences in a way which is incompatible with the country’s international 
obligations, the state party is undoubtedly bound to remedy the situation. The 
means used to do so, however, are up to the state to identify. States should not 
make their best efforts to fully implement international human rights at the 
price of constitutionalism and the rule of law, but must ensure implementa-
tion methods which are constitutional and, in federal systems, respectful of 
autonomy rights. Federal governments are equipped with mechanisms, such as 
judicial review, supervisory and intervention powers, allowing them to impose 
the supremacy of international over subnational law and practice. Therefore, 
when a subnational unit violates international human rights, the application 
of these mechanisms to enforce the relevant right in that unit should be the 
first consequence. While international bodies tend to see even unconstitu-
tional unification and harmonisation as the only way forward, federal state 
parties should rather be summoned to use their constitutional powers to bring 
subnational outliers in line. Such targeted interventions are often more effec-
tive than the adaption of national plans and frameworks, which tend to codify 
a national minimum and, in the absence of implementation mechanisms, run 
the risk of being disrespected by the very same subnational actors violating 
international obligations in the first place. Hence the real issue at stake is the 
proper design and use of supervisory and intervention powers to deal with 
human rights violations, wherever they may occur. Often, the increase of infor-
mation and human rights awareness, the strengthening of the judicial system 
 22 cescr, Concluding Observations, E/ C.12/ che/ co/ 2– 3 (2010), para. 22.
 23 cescr, Concluding Observations, E/ C.12/ che/ co/ 2– 3 (2010), para. 12.
 24 cescr, Concluding Observations, E/ C.12/ che/ co/ 2– 3 (2010), para. 19; ccpr, Concluding 
Observations, / C/ che/ co/ 4 (2017), para. 41; Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
Concluding Observations on the Combined Second to Fourth Periodic Reports of 
Switzerland, crc/ C/ che/ co/ 2– 4 (2015), para 9, 11, and 13; Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Switzerland, cedaw/ C/ 
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and initiatives to improve access to courts, in particular for vulnerable persons, 
are the most promising ways forward, rather than the national proliferation of 
human rights commitments.25
Federalism- adverse recommendations are debatable from a human rights 
perspective, too. They implicitly start from the assumption that unified and 
harmonised human rights standards will automatically guarantee better 
human rights implementation. This assumption is, however, erroneous as will 
be further demonstrated below. Uniform standards can just as well lead to a 
minimal national agreement and prevent progressive units from excelling. 
Instead of forcing all federal actors to uniform standards, it appears as more 
promising to oblige actors who are not fulfilling their duties to improve.26
2.3 Federalism- Hostile Recommendations
Federalism- hostile recommendations refer to federalism as an obstacle to 
human rights implementation and criticise subnational competences and 
the inequalities resulting from them. They suggest the limitation or sup-
pression of subnational autonomy and the adoption of uniform actions. The 
aim of federalism- hostile recommendations is to eliminate different human 
rights standards in a country, irrespective of the country’s internal organi-
sation. Federalism- hostile recommendations, for instance, express serious 
concerns about ‘the fact that the cantons lack a common procedure’27 and 
ask Switzerland ‘to see to it that the cantons establish a uniform and coor-
dinated procedure for identifying trafficking victims’.28 The Committee also 
recommends ‘that the State party considers adopting a comprehensive anti- 
discrimination law enforced uniformly throughout the confederation’.29 
Regarding the implementation of the UN Covenant on economic, social and 
cultural rights, the Committee recommends that Switzerland ‘take steps to 
agree upon comprehensive legislation giving effect to all economic, social and 
cultural rights uniformly between the federal Government and the cantons’. It 
also encourages the country ‘to pursue its efforts of harmonizing cantonal laws 
 25 Cf. Solomon Ebobrah and Felix Eboibi, “Federalism and the Challenge of Applying 
International Human Rights Law Against Child Marriage in Africa,” Journal of African Law 
61, no. 3 (2017).
 26 Eva Maria Belser, “Kantonale Grundrechte und ihre Bedeutung für die Verwirklichung der 
Menschenrechte im mehrstufigen Staat,” in Die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention 
und die Kantone, eds. Samantha Besson and Eva Maria Belser (Geneva, Zurich, 
Basel: Schulthess 2014), 81 et seq.
 27 ccpr, Concluding Observations, / C/ che/ co/ 4 (2017), para. 40.
 28 ccpr, Concluding Observations, / C/ che/ co/ 4 (2017), para. 41.













and practices to ensure equal enjoyment of Covenant rights throughout the 
confederation’.30
Federalism- adverse recommendations are problematic from a federal, con-
stitutional and a human rights point of view. They encourage states to disre-
spect their own constitutions and the power- sharing regime that they have 
established. By imposing uniform solutions, they also forego the opportunity of 
creating a competitive atmosphere of progressive human rights improvement 
within the state and run the risk of impairing efficient and comprehensive 
human rights implementation by the joined forces of all tiers of government. 
The above- mentioned danger that national bodies settle on minimum stand-
ards and race these standards to the bottom, and not to the top, is real. Just 
as it is easier for individual states to agree on higher standards than what has 
been achieved between the very diverse international actors in global arenas, 
it is more likely for small and often more homogenous subnational units and 
local entities, such as cities, to strive for human rights standards that exceed 
the international minimum than for country as a whole. The more diverse the 
actors sitting around the decision- making table are, the more likely it is that 
they settle on a minimal agreement. Once uniform solutions have been estab-
lished, they hinder regional and local innovation in human rights and prevent 
state actors – who are closest to the people, their needs and priorities – to 
experiment with new rights and freedoms as well as innovative implementa-
tion instruments. Comprehensive national legislation typically leaves either 
no legal space or no incentive for subnational units and local governments to 
improve standards above nationwide and international consensus.
3 Some Causes for the Unhappy Relationship
The UN treaty bodies’ practice concerning Switzerland shows a rather scep-
tical approach to the federal system of the country. Federalism- adverse or 
federalism- hostile recommendations issued by the UN treaty bodies hint at 
the fact that from an international law perspective, federalism and multilevel 
governance are perceived as preventing the effective implementation of inter-
national human rights obligations. Before recalling to what extent numer-
ous overlaps between federalism and human rights exist and reiterating the 
opportunities offered by multilevel human rights implementation, I will try to 
explore some of the reasons for the unhappy relationship. Why indeed does 
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the federal affection for human rights, despite the theoretical and often very 
practical advantages power- sharing has to offer, remain unrequited? What are 
the reasons for the international human rights community showing such a 
high level of mistrust towards power- sharing arrangements and cantonal and 
municipal competencies? As in most unhappy relationships, the reasons are 
manifold and linked to the different backgrounds and upbringings of the part-
ners, the negative experiences the companions have had in the past and expect 
for the future, and the lack of open and regular communication that would 
help to overcome misunderstandings and bridge differences.
3.1 The Different Backgrounds of the Partners
One source of misunderstanding concerns the different approaches federal 
and human rights communities apply towards human rights implementation. 
While proponents of power- sharing arrangements tend to look at regionally 
and locally found and owned solutions and show a preference for bottom- up 
approaches to human rights implementation, advocates of human rights start 
from universal standards and are inclined towards top- down improvements.
The different approaches can be seen as part of the more general contro-
versies about the universality or cultural relativity of human rights, but very 
often have just as much to do with the different trajectories and career paths 
of the respective actors. Experts of federalism, on the one hand, are often 
overwhelmed by the complexities of internal power- sharing and by the intri-
cacies of establishing counter- majoritarian mechanisms entrenching auton-
omy for smaller and vulnerable groups; their focus lies on the protection and 
promotion of internal diversity, sometimes to the neglect of international law. 
Experts of human rights, on the other hand, frequently emphasise interna-
tional obligations and show limited interest in domestic law. The respective 
neglect of other disciplines often has its source in different training paths and 
the separation of international and constitutional law at universities and in 
research. Experts in both communities have various educational backgrounds 
and often lack sensitivity and sometimes knowledge about the concepts and 
rules of the other field. There are presumably few federal scholars thoroughly 
following their countries’ international obligations and the concerns of inter-
national treaty bodies, and there are probably even fewer human rights actors 
examining domestic constitutions beyond the human rights catalogue. While 
federalists work nationally and subnationally, human rights experts are active 
on the national and international level. The former are part of internal power 
struggles, the latter cooperate globally. The human rights community, linked 
with powerful international human rights organisation, are active in submit-
ting shadow reports and presumably have a crucial impact on international 
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recommendations; the federalism community does not have similar networks 
and does not generally take part in the reporting and follow- up processes of 
human rights treaties. Overall, the two communities rarely meet.
3.2 Negative Experiences
Another source of mistrust between proponents of federalism and human 
rights stems from past and current experiences with bottom- up and top- down 
approaches to human rights. In the past and present, subnational actors have 
attempted to refer to self- rule as a justification for not respecting and protect-
ing the rights and freedoms of all their citizens.31 Famously, the southern states 
of the USA did not implement equal rights for black citizens until constitu-
tional amendments, decisions of the Federal Supreme Court and the deploy-
ment of the National Guard forced them to do so.32 Notoriously, the Swiss can-
ton of Appenzell Innerrhoden refused to accept women’s voting rights until it 
was obliged to do so by a judgement of the Federal Supreme Court in 1990.33 
Such experiences seem to teach us that national authorities are the only reli-
able guarantor of universal human rights.
This is especially true for new and fragile federations introducing federal-
ism to overcome internal conflicts and deal with legacies of marginalisation 
and oppression. Federalism is often planted in conflict- ridden ground where 
trust between groups and regions is lacking. In such a fragile context, subna-
tional autonomy can be perceived as a proxy to regional nationalism, or as a 
blank cheque for power abuse. It thus does not come as a surprise that in states 
negotiating or implementing federal systems, fears of human rights violations 
by subnational actors often loom. Will subnational actors organise themselves 
democratically or be captured by regional elites? Will they turn against minor-
ities within minorities and serve smaller groups (including members of the 
majority groups residing on their territory) with the treatment they are escap-
ing from? Will traditional groups use self- rule to break free from more liberal or 
progressive national rules and policies? Will the self- determination of groups 
come at the price of gender equality and lgbt rights?
Such fears, as justified as they might be in a specific context, disregard the 
fact that international and national human rights are binding on all state 
actors on all tiers of government. It is a characteristic of federal systems that 
 31 Nico Steytler, “The Constitutional Conversation Between the Federal Structure and a Bill 
of Rights,” iff Working Paper Online No. 2, 7.
 32 Oliver Brown, et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka, et al., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
 33 Decision of the Swiss Federal Court, bge 116 Ia 359; Eva Maria Belser, “Kantonale 
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international and national law, most importantly human rights, take prece-
dence over conflicting subnational laws and decisions. Federalism thus does 
not come with an inherent risk of human rights violations. Federal diversity 
unfolds in unity, and ends where overriding values, in particular human rights, 
are at stake. In no federal system does regional and local autonomy include the 
possibility of autonomous actors to opt out of binding international human 
rights obligations. It is rather a characteristic of federations that national con-
stitutions, including their human rights catalogue, are enforced by neutral 
umpires, supreme or constitutional courts, and that all laws and decisions vio-
lating the constitution – whether of national, subnational or local origin – are 
invalid.34 Hence, the real concern is an overall legal and political commitment 
to human rights, constitutionalism and an independent judiciary – often lack-
ing in federal as well as unitary states.
It is true that human rights violations often occur in conflict- prone and 
fragile states characterised by deep inequalities between groups and regions. 
This risk, however, exists independently from the state’s internal organisation 
and must be mitigated by giving priority to human rights implementation. If 
national actors (and international actors such as donors) fail to do so, human 
rights violations will persist in some or all regions of the state no matter 
whether vertical power sharing has been put in place or not. Blaming feder-
alism for human rights violations thus is often like kicking the dog instead of 
its master. The tremendous discrepancies between international norms on the 
one hand, and local realities on the other, should rather be tackled for what 
they are: enforcement gaps. It is hard to see how these could be overcome 
without strengthening (instead of weakening) local institutions for the protec-
tion of human rights.35
3.3 The Lack of Communication
Another source of difficulty seems to come from the lack of appropriate 
communication between the international human rights bodies and federal 
states. Even in the national sphere, conversations between federalism and 
human rights are slow to develop. In research and practice, the two commu-
nities perceive themselves as foes rather than friends. The human rights focus 
 34 Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd ed. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill- 
Queen’s University Press, 2008), 157 et seqq.; Palermo and Kössler, Comparative Federalism, 
130 et seqq.
 35 See Axel Marx et al., Multilevel Protection of the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights: The 
Role of Local and Regional Authorities and of the Committee of the Regions (European 







usually lies on the tensions created by guarantees seeking to protect universal 
human rights norms and subnational autonomy, creating an obstacle to such 
an aim.36 In contrast, the federal approach aims at a balanced combination of 
self- rule and shared rule and tends to perceive sweeping universal standards 
as a potential threat to diversity.37 By guaranteeing rights and freedoms for all 
and empowering international treaty bodies and national authorities to mon-
itor their implementation, human rights obligations are seen as mechanisms 
transferring decision- making powers to national and international actors and 
allowing them to develop and consolidate single standards applicable through-
out the country.38
Canadian history is particularly telling in this regard. When the Canadian 
Bill of Rights was enacted in 1960 as an ordinary law, it was made applicable 
only to federal laws and did not cover provincial violations of civil liberties. It 
was only in 1982 that the Charter of Rights became part of Canadian constitu-
tional law and applicable to federal as well as provincial acts of government. 
Ever since ‘the Charter Revolution’,39 human rights are said to have a centralis-
ing effect on Canadian federalism. As in other federations, the constitutional 
human rights guarantees do not confer any additional powers on the federal 
tier but limit the powers of both federal and provincial governments. By set-
ting a uniform national standard for the protection of civil liberties in formerly 
exclusive provincial jurisdictions, its centralising effect is subtler than other 
centralising efforts. The Charter is a unifying instrument as it intrudes into pro-
vincial competences by nationalising debates on controversial matters such 
as school prayers, the funding of denominational schools, Sunday closing and 
other religious rights, minority language education and other linguistic rights, 
the right to strike, police powers, pornography and hate speech, abortion, 
and same- sex marriage. Irrespective of the federal power- sharing arrange-
ments and provincial competences, the Supreme Court of Canada – like other 
 36 See for historic debates in Canada and the United States Jamie Cameron, “Federalism, 
Treaties, and International Human Rights Under the Canadian Constitution,” Wayne 
Law Review 48, no.1 (2002), 1 et seqq.; Koren L. Bell, “From Laggard to Leader: Canadian 
Lessons on a Role for U.S. States in Making and Implementing Human Rights Treaties,” 
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 5, no. 1 (2002), 255 et seqq.
 37 Steytler, “The Constitutional Conversation Between the Federal Structure and a Bill 
of Rights”, 3; cf. also Wyttenbach, Umsetzung von Menschenrechtsübereinkommen in 
Bundesstaaten, 251.
 38 Céline Fercot, “Perspectives on Federalism: Diversity of Constitutional Rights in Federal 
Systems,” European Constitutional Law Review 4, no. 2 (2008), 320.
 39 Frederick L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party 
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Federal or Supreme Courts – has the final say in all matters involving chartered 
rights.40
Most federal scholars assume that national human rights actors such as 
constitutional or supreme federal courts have shown as little consideration for 
autonomy rights as international treaty bodies. The history of most established 
federations, they claim, tells stories of shrinking subnational policy space due 
to nationalised and international rights and freedoms.41 In most countries, 
subnational actors continuously see their room for manoeuvre limited by 
national developments, which are not infrequently triggered by international 
recommendations and international soft law. Regional and local authorities 
often feel that their constitutional competences in the field of education, 
health and social assistance give way to uniform service delivery standards 
established to strengthen equal citizenship at the expense of autonomy.42 In 
contrast, national human rights actors often see federalism as nothing else 
than a burden of history that should best be overcome and replaced by effi-
cient and uniform human rights strategies.
The fact that advocates of federalism fear the centralising effect of human 
rights and courts which enforce them, and that national and international 
human rights bodies are unimpressed by vertical power- sharing and unwilling 
to respond to references to autonomy rights is caused, at least in part, by a lack 
of communication. The different focal points of human rights and federalism 
generate misunderstandings often making necessary dialogues inert. Some of 
the early reports of Switzerland to human rights treaty bodies, for instance, 
were full of gaps and voids when the country reported on the implementation 
of human rights by cantons and municipalities. While the reports gave detailed 
account of national measures in the fields of federal competences, they limited 
themselves to passing references to cantonal and municipal competences in 
 40 See Peter W. Hogg, “Federalism Fights the Charter of Rights,” in Federal and Political 
Community: Essays in Honour of Donald Smiley, eds. David P. Shugarman and Reginald 
Whitaker (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1989), 249 et seqq.
 41 Cf. for the United States John Kincaid, “Values and Value Tradeoffs in Federalism,” in 
Federalism: Volume 1: Historical and Theoretical Foundations of Federalism, ed. John 
Kincaid, Sage library of political science (Los Angeles: sage, 2011), 251 and William 
J. Brennan, JR., “The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as 
Guardians of Individual Rights,” New York University Law Review 61, no. 4 (1986), 540 et 
seqq.; cf. for Canada Roger Gibbins, Rainer Knopff, and Frederick L. Morton, “Canadian 
Federalism, the Charter of Rights, and the 1984 Election,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 
15, no. 3 (1985); cf. for South Africa Steytler, “The Constitutional Conversation Between the 
Federal Structure and a Bill of Rights”.
 42 Steytler, “The Constitutional Conversation Between the Federal Structure and a Bill of 








all others. When reacting to international human rights recommendations (on 
matters relating to education, health or policing), some official documents of 
the federal government would limit themselves to pointing to cantonal com-
petences, basically requesting that the treaty bodies not blame the national 
drafters of the report for the shortcomings of other actors over which they 
do not exercise any influence. Even today, numerous country reports are very 
extensive and even loquacious when it comes to presenting national initiatives 
taken and federal laws made and, conversely, sketchy or silent when it comes 
to subnational activities. Unfortunately, insufficient efforts are being made 
to comprehensively document human rights improvements and innovations 
made by cantons and municipalities, even though these could be inspirational 
for international bodies, feed into reports and recommendations, and create 
multilevel and transnational feedback and learning loops.
In our analysis for the Swiss Centre of Expertise in Human Rights, we stud-
ied the mechanisms used in Switzerland to react to international human rights 
recommendations and to organise follow- up procedures, and were obliged to 
recognise that the relations between the federal and cantonal tier were full 
of tensions in the field. To prepare the very numerous country reports, differ-
ent federal actors would send questionnaires to various cantonal actors, often 
requiring considerable amounts of data, documents and information, some-
times on short notice and sometimes asking for completion of forms, classifi-
cations and categories, which the cantons (or the municipalities) were not able 
to provide.43 Consequently, a vicious circle developed. Cantons did not report 
to the federal government or only handed in rather summary information. 
Therefore, the reports made by Switzerland documented only very partially 
the numerous cantonal initiatives in human rights fields. This led to the inter-
national treaty bodies issuing federalism- adverse or - hostile recommendations 
which, when forwarded to the cantons, further alienated them from the inter-
national human rights mechanisms. As complying to manifold international 
reporting duties and implementing numerous recommendations constitutes a 
real challenge for multilevel systems with multiple power centres, we presume 
that the difficulties we documented are not unique to Switzerland.44
 43 Schweizerisches Kompetenzzentrum für Menschenrechte, Die Umsetzung internatio-
naler Menschenrechtsempfehlungen im föderalistischen Staat: Perspektiven für das Follow- 
up zu den “Abschliessenden Bemerkungen” der uno- Vertragsorgane in der Schweiz (Bern, 
2012), 22 et seq.
 44 See e.g. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing 
as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non- 
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While some improvements have been made and coordinating bodies set 
up, it seems obvious that the reporting systems within federal countries must 
be further developed in order to produce productive feedback loops. There is 
an urgent need to establish and strengthen mechanisms to document local 
human rights initiatives properly and to feed this information into interna-
tional review mechanisms. Such multilevel reporting will improve the under-
standing between federal and uniform approaches to human rights and inform 
international actors about human rights successes, difficulties and failures on 
the ground, a necessity for international learning from each other.45
4 Avenues for Advances
At first sight, it seems like there are structural limits regarding the compati-
bility of human rights and federalism as both are trying to promote different 
agendas.46 While international human rights bodies are dedicated to protect-
ing and promoting universal human rights norms, the federal spirit embodies a 
desire to enhance subnational autonomy.47 At second glance, however, numer-
ous commonalities and chances for cooperation appear.
First, human rights and federalism aim at compatible and mutually rein-
forcing objectives. Both intend to improve governance and to protect diver-
sity. Insofar as federal arrangements constrain power by establishing vertical 
checks and balances, they contribute to preventing power abuses and thus, 
similar to human rights, serve to limit state power and to strengthen rights and 
freedoms.48 Constrained power is more likely to respect and protect human 
rights – in particular, civil and political rights – than uncontrolled power.
Second, in states characterised by ethnic, religious or linguistic diversity, 
sharing power between groups and regions can be a requirement of inter-
national law. To recommend limiting or abandoning federal systems in such 
 45 Eva Maria Belser and Simon Mazidi, “Das Zusammenwirken von Bund und Kantonen 
bei der Einhaltung völkerrechtlicher Menschenrechtsverpflichtungen der Schweiz,” 
in Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2018: Föderalismus, Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa, 
ed. Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus- Forschung Tübingen (ezff) 19 (Baden- 
Baden: Nomos, 2018), 257.
 46 Cf. Wyttenbach, Umsetzung von Menschenrechtsübereinkommen in Bundesstaaten, 250 
et seq.
 47 Steytler, “The Constitutional Conversation Between the Federal Structure and a Bill of 
Rights”, 3; cf. also Kincaid, “Values and Value Tradeoffs in Federalism”, who draws a similar 
line between individual and communitarian liberty, 250.











a context, therefore, makes no sense, either from a federal or from a human 
rights perspective. Given the generally negative approach of international 
human rights bodies towards federalism and the various reasons for misun-
derstandings and distrust, it seems appropriate to recall that the full imple-
mentation of human rights often requires domestic power- sharing arrange-
ments. In such situations, federalism and human rights are clearly friends 
rather than foes.
4.1 The Right to Self- Determination
As far as federal systems serve to implement the right to self- determination 
of nations or peoples, multi- tier governance follows a human rights agenda. 
The right to self- determination of peoples is an aim of the United Nations49 
and the only human right guaranteed in both UN human rights covenants. 
Peoples have an internationally guaranteed right ‘to freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment’.50 According to the High Commission for Human Rights, the right of self- 
determination ‘is of particular importance because its realization is an essen-
tial condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human 
rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those rights’.51 Insofar as 
the right to self- determination is implemented internally (and not externally, 
through secession namely), it requires some form of power- sharing between 
the different peoples of the same state.52
As establishing a federal system is one way of implementing the right to self- 
determination, it is surprising that UN Treaty Bodies – by recommending uni-
fied laws and uniform implementation – suggest limiting or abandoning such 
a regime. There can be no doubt that federal systems are a privileged mecha-
nism for multinational states to respect the right to internal self- determination 
and to prevent separatists from turning into secessionist claims for external 
self- determination. At least for states hosting diverse peoples, federalism- 
adverse or even hostile recommendations go against the spirit of Article 1 of 
the Covenants and thus against the mandate of the UN treaty bodies.
 49 Art. 1 and Art. 55 UN Charter.
 50 Art. 1 of both UN Covenants.
 51 Human Rights Committee, ccpr General Comment No. 12: Article 1 (Right to Self- 
Determination), the Right to Self- Determination of Peoples (1984), No. 1.
 52 See e.g. Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “The International Law of Secession and the Protection 
of the Human Rights of Oppressed Substate Groups: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,” in 
Nigerian Yearbook of International Law 2017, eds. Chile Eboe- Osuji and Engobo Emeseh 
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4.2 The Rights of Minorities
The same is true for recommendations questioning minority rights arrange-
ments. The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights obliges states with ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities to respect their right ‘to enjoy their own cul-
ture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language’ 
in community with the other members of their group.53 One way of protect-
ing the interests of minorities and respecting their rights is to transfer powers 
to the respective regions or groups.54 Minorities concentrated in one or more 
regions of the country then do not depend on central authorities to enjoy their 
culture, religion and language but autonomously establish their own institu-
tions and policies. The will to fully implement these minority rights can thus 
lead states characterised by diversity to preserve or to establish power- sharing 
regimes designed to accommodate the members of minority groups. In the 
case of minority groups, the strong link between human rights and autonomy 
becomes evident as self- rule and autonomy in some policy areas ultimately 
contribute to the fulfilment of human rights. The aim of such arrangements 
is not to create groups more privileged than others. It is rather to guarantee 
conditions in which minorities are able to enjoy human rights equally with 
other groups, to effectively prevent assimilation and to offer smaller groups 
entrenched mechanisms protecting them from being overruled by the major-
ity in policy fields linked to their language, religion, culture and ways of life.55
This is in line with the UN Declaration of 199256 requesting states to protect 
minorities, to promote their identities, and to adopt appropriate legislative 
and other measures (Article 1). The Declaration makes it clear that persons 
belonging to minorities have a right to enjoy and develop their culture, reli-
gion and language, the right to maintain their own associations and ‘the right 
to participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where appropriate, 
regional level’. Although there are many ways to fulfil these obligations, fed-
eral states – which combine minority self- rule and participation in the estab-
lishment of shared rule – are certainly in line with the wording and spirit of 
the Declaration. When human rights bodies, in such contexts, recommend 
 53 Cf. art. 27 ccpr.
 54 James A. Gardner, “In Search of Sub- National Constitutionalism,” EuConst 4 (2008), 
334; cf. also Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 165 et seqq; Steytler, “The Constitutional 
Conversation Between the Federal Structure and a Bill of Rights”, 7.
 55 Cf. Surendra Bhandari, Self- Determination & Constitution Making in Nepal: Constituent 
Assembly, Inclusion, & Ethnic Federalism (Singapore: Springer, 2014).
 56 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 











establishing national laws, frameworks and actions plans, they risk encourag-
ing states to impinge on the rights of minorities. This being said, it is undoubt-
edly true that the effective protection of all minorities, including small and 
scattered groups, requires additional measures as well as mechanisms ensur-
ing that all subnational actors respect and promote the minority rights of all 
groups living on their territory.
4.3 The Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Finally, the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights can push states to estab-
lish and develop autonomy arrangements.57 Indigenous peoples, often simul-
taneously qualifying as both peoples and minorities, enjoy specific protection 
by ilo Conventions58 and a UN Declaration (undrip). Indigenous and tribal 
peoples have the right to the respect and protection of their identity,59 to 
special actions compatible with their aspirations and ways of life,60 ‘special 
measures for safeguarding the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures 
and environment of the peoples concerned’61 and a right to consultation and 
participation.62 The ilo Convention also states that indigenous peoples have 
‘the right to decide their own priorities for the process of development as it 
affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well- being and the lands 
they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible, 
over their own economic, social and cultural development’.63 In addition, ‘they 
shall participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans 
and programmes for national and regional development which may affect 
them directly’.64
In short, the respect of indigenous rights requires states hosting such groups 
to establish a system of self- rule and shared rule – i.e. to create or maintain 
some sort of a federal system. Here again, the purpose of a specific power- 
sharing arrangement responding to the needs of indigenous peoples does not 
promote political fragmentation but rather strengthens political unity by e.g. 
 57 See e.g. Mauro Barelli, “The Interplay Between Global and Regional Human Rights 
Systems in the Construction of the Indigenous Rights Regimes,” Human Rights Quarterly 
32, no. 4 (2010), 959 et seqq.
 58 International Labour Organisation (ilo), Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169, 
27 June 1989.
 59 Art. 1 ilo- Convention 169.
 60 Art. 2 ilo- Convention 169.
 61 Art. 4 ilo- Convention 169.
 62 Art. 6 ilo- Convention 169.
 63 Art. 7 ilo- Convention 169.
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ensuring equal citizen rights to indigenous peoples (Article 6 undrip). When 
it comes to respecting the rights of autochthonous peoples, human rights 
are the starting point and the endpoint of any power- sharing arrangements. 
Firstly, this is because local autonomy and self- rule is construed as a means to 
realise human rights effectively. Secondly, indigenous peoples’ rights cannot 
be invoked discriminatorily against human rights of other people. Article 46(2) 
undrip highlights that the exercise of indigenous peoples’ rights is limited by 
the primacy of human rights of all people.65 In the context of indigenous peo-
ples, federalism- adverse or - hostile recommendations of human rights bodies 
are nonsensical.
5 Chances for Reciprocal Affection
The respect and protection of the right to self- determination of peoples and 
minorities as well as indigenous peoples’ rights often oblige states to establish 
a power- sharing regime or to make other arrangements to allow for diversity. 
The interlinkages and synergies between federalism and human rights, how-
ever, are far more general and deeper. After all, human rights can easily be pro-
claimed internationally, but they must always be lived locally. Universal rights 
remain very abstract and lifeless if they are not brought into action where peo-
ple live, work, grow up and raise their children. Free and fair elections, fair 
trials, human treatment in prisons, decent labour conditions, and access to 
education and adequate health services are either guaranteed day after day 
locally – or do not reach most people. In many ways, multilevel governance, 
designed and implemented to bring government closer to the people and to 
make it more legitimate and effective, and multilevel human rights obliga-
tions, are predestined for long and lasting relationships.
Regional and local autonomy contributes to peaceful diversity manage-
ment and has the potential to deepen democracy, to strengthen government 
accountability and to implement human rights responsively to regional and 
local priorities. It is thus worth advocating for subnational space in human 
rights even beyond the respect of the people’s rights to self- determination and 
the protection of minority rights. Without the right to be different, autonomy 
and everything it stands for is not meaningful. If subnational actors are respon-
sible for education, health, environment, police and social assistance, policies 
and laws will necessarily be different, and these differences will often affect the 





right to education, health, security and decent living conditions, giving them 
regional and local characteristics. Diversity in human rights protection, how-
ever, does not question the principle of equality. Equality just plays out differ-
ently in federations and other states based on regional and local autonomy.
While equality is often the ultimate guideline in unitary states, the respect 
for diversity and its constitutional protection are just as important in federal 
systems. The baseline of the duality of the objectives is that the concept of 
equality is understood and conceptualised differently. Federal constitutions 
and national laws are limited to establishing the minimum floor subnational 
units must respect but are invited to exceed. Regional as well as local actors are 
free to go beyond whatever overriding law obliges them to do; they are empow-
ered to produce inequality as long as they improve standards and do not fall 
behind them. Just like international treaties, federal human rights catalogues 
thus refrain from providing comprehensive national human rights building 
in which all citizens are guaranteed equal conditions as they are only setting 
a minimum threshold. All citizens, irrespective of where they live, can claim 
these minimum standards. In addition, some but not necessarily all citizens 
may benefit from the extra efforts their region or municipality has made. This 
conventional wisdom of the minimum floor makes sense in international as 
well as in national multilevel systems. It must, however, be challenged as it 
does not convincingly answer all questions linked to multilevel human rights 
implementation. It can easily apply to the progressive implementation of 
human rights, in particular socio- economic rights (as long as there is agree-
ment on definitions of progress versus steps backwards). It is conversely not 
apt to respond to more complex human rights controversies, in particular 
those involving several human rights dimensions and different conflicting 
human rights.
5.1 Respect of the Minimum Floor as a Guarantee to All
The paradigm of the minimum floor has always been part of international 
human rights law. International human rights treaties define minimum stand-
ards which contracting parties have to comply with but are allowed to exceed. 
Most international human rights treaties explicitly or implicitly contain rules 
prescribing such interpretation, making it clear that international standards 
cannot be understood as limiting rights and freedoms a person would other-
wise enjoy.66 International human rights standards thus entrench and com-
plement domestic rights and freedoms by adding a minimum floor – not a 
 66 See e.g. article 60 of European Convention of Human Rights: “Nothing in this Convention 
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ceiling. States bound by international human rights law thus have to respect 
the treaty but are under no obligation to apply uniform human rights stand-
ards. The internationally guaranteed rights and freedoms must be regarded as 
minimum standards with the aim of harmonising, not unifying, human rights 
practices. In no way should international guarantees hinder or crush domestic 
laws guaranteeing more rights and freedoms or protecting and implementing 
them more effectively.
Federal states reiterate the international human rights system internally. 
They add their own national minimum standards, which must necessarily 
respect the international ones but can go beyond it, and the subnational units 
must implement it but are allowed to improve it. In fact, multilevel human 
rights protection takes the shape of a pyramid in the federal system as it 
becomes stronger and broader at the bottom. It is not a column implementing 
the same standards on the local, regional and national level. For this reason, 
human rights operate differently in federations. While unitary states imple-
ment uniform human rights standards applicable throughout the country, fed-
eral states define a minimum standard that all subnational actors must comply 
with but may improve on. The federal protection of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural human right sets a federal floor of rights, which allows for 
‘diversity only above and beyond this federal constitutional floor’.67 Setting a 
minimum floor of rights prohibits subnational units from falling behind the 
standard (which would violate overriding law and transform the column into a 
kind of hopper) but it does not prevent regional and local actors from improv-
ing on such a floor. It rather invites them to do so.68
Two situations often confounded in theory and practice must therefore be 
distinguished. In the first, a subnational actor falls behind the federal consti-
tutional floor or international human rights standards. The unequal treatment 
of citizens, in this case, does not stem from the use of autonomy but rather 
from its misuse; it is not a result of subnational policy and law- making but of 
failing national law implementation. As mentioned above, such a situation, 
which is in breach of overriding law, must be remedied by courts or by the use 
freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under 
any other agreement to which it is a Party.”
 67 Brennan, JR., “The Bill of Rights and the States”, 550.
 68 Kincaid, “Values and Value Tradeoffs in Federalism”, 252; similar also Kristin Henrard, 
“Equality Considerations and Their Relation to Minority Protections, State Constitutional 
Law, and Federalism,” in Federalism, Subnational Constitutions, and Minority Rights, eds. 







of supervisory and intervention powers. In the second situation, diversity – 
and thus inequality – results from the fact that a subnational actor has acted 
beyond the minimum floor. Such inequality is as acceptable within a state as it 
is between states. No human rights actor should frown at it but rather appreci-
ate the innovation and effort coming from regional and local actors.
5.2 The Right to Go beyond the Minimum
Subnational constitutions regularly have their own human rights catalogues, 
which cannot fall behind international and national ones but may go beyond. 
In these constitutions and also in law and practice, subnational governments 
can perform their famous role as ‘laboratories for innovation and experimen-
tation’ in which new ideas can be tested at the regional level and, if successful, 
be copied by others and inspire national and international innovation.69 There 
is abundant evidence of the successful use of this role.70 The constitution of 
the state of Córdoba, for instance, granted women’s rights in 1927, long before 
the federal constitution did the same. While it is well known that the Swiss 
Cantons of Appenzell Innerhoden unconstitutionally refused to introduce 
female suffrage, it is also true that numerous cantons introduced it long before 
the federal constitution did.
There is also evidence that national actors enforcing unified human rights 
concepts have sometimes prevented subnational governments from progress-
ing. There is no doubt that national actors are crucial actors in enforcing (min-
imum) human rights standards and preventing subnational governments from 
violating binding standards. It would however be erroneous to conclude that 
they are necessarily the source of human rights innovation. As they can also 
operate as breaks and slow down human rights progress, checks and balances 
and multiple power centres are important devices to make human rights evo-
lution more resilient. Famously, the Supreme Court of the United States held 
in the Dred Scott case of 1857 that a federal law purporting to ban slavery from 
 69 Kincaid, “Values and Value Tradeoffs in Federalism”, 253; Wyttenbach, Umsetzung von 
Menschenrechtsübereinkommen in Bundesstaaten, 145 et seqq; Subnational human rights 
catalogues are not only laboratories for innovation, but also establish a (competing) 
legal protection system at the subnational level, which is of particular importance when 
national and international levels of human rights protection fail to meet their respective 
obligations. See Gardner, “In Search of Sub- National Constitutionalism”, 341.
 70 Cf. e.g., Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada student ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2009), 
705 et seqq.; Andrew Wolman, “The Relationship Between National and Sub- national 
Human Rights Institutions in Federal States,” The International Journal of Human Rights 
17, no. 4 (2013); Mahendra P. Singh, “Federalism, Democracy and Human Rights: Some 
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certain parts of the United States could not have the effect of freeing slaves 
brought into those states, because that would constitute a deprivation of the 
slave owner’s property rights.71 The due process clause of the American Bill of 
Rights thus became an obstacle to the emancipation of slaves, which was only 
removed by a constitutional amendment after the civil war. Another notori-
ous case, decided by the same court in 1905, is Lochner in which the Supreme 
Court struck down a New York law limiting working hours in a bakery to 60 per 
week and 10 per day. The court held that the state law violated the due process 
clause by denying the liberty of the employer to contract with his workers on 
the terms of his choice.72 The Lochner case is just one of hundreds of cases in 
which the Supreme Court applied a broad notion of property, liberty and due 
process to strike down state laws adapted to protect the right to liberty of all, 
the health and wages of workers, and the right of assembly of unionists. Only 
after President Roosevelt announced his plan to pack the court with more jus-
tices, did the court start to change its mind and allow the New Deal to improve 
socio- economic rights.73
Like most constitutional courts, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court has 
consistently held that cantonal fundamental rights might have independent 
significance if they provide protection going beyond the fundamental rights 
provided by the Federal Constitution or if they guarantee a right that is not 
enshrined in the Federal Constitution.74 While some cantons are content with 
referring to the human rights protected by federal and international law75 and 
show little interest in improving on it, others cantons have opted for a human 
rights catalogue that goes beyond what is guaranteed on the upper level.76 
Nine cantons guarantee the right to choose freely any form of living together 
in partnership.77 Other cantons decided to extend the scope of political rights 
on the cantonal level. While on a federal level, Swiss citizens have to be 18 years 
 71 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
 72 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
 73 See Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 731.
 74 Cf. e.g., Decision of the Swiss Federal Court, bge 121 i 267, 269.
 75 Cf. e.g., para. 10(2) Constitution of the Canton of Lucerne, para. 10 Constitution of the 
Canton of Schwyz or art. 7 and 8 Constitution of the Canton of Grisons; cf. Andreas Auer, 
Staatsrecht der schweizerischen Kantone (Bern: Stämpfli Verlag, 2016), No. 1448.
 76 Gardner, “In Search of Sub- National Constitutionalism”, 335.
 77 Art. 13 Constitution of the Canton of Zurich; art. 13(2) Constitution of the Canton of Berne; 
art. 14(2) Constitution of the Canton of Fribourg; para. 11(1i) Constitution of the Canton of 
Basel- Stadt; art. 12(1c) Constitution of the Canton of Schaffhausen; art. 10(2) Constitution 
of the Canton of Appenzell Ausserrhoden; art. 14(2) Constitution of the Canton of Vaud; 
art. 12(2) Constitution of the Canton of Neuchâtel and art. 22 Constitution of the Canton 
















or older to vote,78 the Canton of Glarus already allow 16- and 17- year- olds to 
vote on cantonal and communal matters.79 Similarly, some – mostly franco-
phone – cantons grant the right to vote to non- Swiss citizens in cantonal and 
communal ballots.80 In the United States, the subject of same- sex marriage 
became prominent when the Hawaii Supreme Court decided in 1993 that the 
state’s prohibition of same- sex marriage might be unconstitutional.81 In 2004, 
the mayor of San Francisco issued the first marriage licence to a same- sex cou-
ple; the same year Massachusetts became the first state to legalise same- sex 
marriage.82 The consequence of extra efforts by subnational actors is inequal-
ity: in some cantons, non- Swiss nationals are allowed to participate in elec-
tions, whereas in others, such rights are strictly limited to Swiss nationals. In 
some cantons, same- sex couples or elderly people enjoy extra protection; in 
others, their rights are limited to what the federal constitution has to offer.83 
In all these situations, imposing equality throughout the country would lower 
the overall human rights achievements of the country and raise human rights 
standards to the bottom, not the top. Most of these innovations and expansion 
of rights are subnational exactly because there is no sufficient consensus in the 
country (yet) to adopt them on the national level. For the time being, voting 
rights for non- nationals are unlikely to be introduced nationally. The same can 
be said for voting rights from the age of 16 years, the recognition of all forms of 
family lives, special human rights mandates to respect the autonomy of elderly 
people, to cite a few examples. In all these situations, the existence of uniform 
standards prevents more progressive cantons from making a step forward and 
inspiring others.
Cantonal innovations reach beyond special guarantees and affect human 
rights implementation mechanisms as well: some governments have estab-
lished human rights ombudspersons or new mechanisms to strengthen human 
 78 Art. 136(1) Swiss Federal Constitution; cf. also art. 25 ccpr which states that political 
rights can only be exercised under the condition of being a citizen of the state.
 79 Art. 56(1) Constitution of the Canton of Glarus.
 80 Cf. e.g., art. 37(1b and c) Constitution of the Canton of Neuchâtel and art. 2(c) and 3(c) of 
the cantonal Act on Political Rights; art. 73 Constitution of the Canton of Jura and art. 3 of 
the cantonal Act on Political Rights.
 81 Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
 82 The legalisation was a reaction to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision of 
the same year: Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
 83 Cf. for protecting same- sex couples above and beyond the national layer of human rights 
protection, Fn. 65; special fundamental rights protecting the rights of elderly people can 
be found in art. 35 Constitution of the Canton of Fribourg and para. 16(2) Constitution of 
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rights mainstreaming, they have made extra efforts to support civil society and 
other crucial actors, or have come up with special reporting systems, round 
tables, participatory projects and the like.84 Obviously, all these innovations 
have the particularity of being limited to only one or a few cantons, at least at 
the beginning, and bring territorial inequality into the human rights system.
Subnational constitutions may also experiment with new or more strictly 
enforced social and economic rights.85 In Switzerland and Germany for 
instance, some cantons and Länder have included socio- economic rights 
imposing positive obligations beyond the national consensus. They have guar-
anteed rights to free education, for instance in the field of early childcare, 
tertiary education, continuous education or catch- up training. Some have 
also been more progressive than the national government in guaranteeing 
standards in the field of the right to housing, health care, social assistance, or 
the right to decent and sufficient work.86 Recently, the canton of Neuchâtel 
decided to introduce a minimum wage for its population and to undertake 
actions against poverty amongst workers.87 A similar plan, proposed by a pop-
ular initiative on the federal level, failed in 2014.88 In 2017, the Federal Supreme 
Court decided on appeal that the failure of the ‘Minimum Wage Initiative’ on 
the national level did not prevent a canton from taking similar initiatives on its 
own.89 It thereby accepted the idea that the population of one canton benefits 
from labour rights not guaranteed in other cantons.
Numerous countries guaranteeing local autonomy witness a multitude of 
human rights innovation on the city level. Since 2000, the number of Human 
Rights Cities has increased and numerous initiatives, especially in the field 
of economic, social and cultural rights, have emerged from them.90 Human 
Rights Cities and other local initiatives may create inequality between citizens 
of different local entities within the same state, but also offer the great chance 
 84 Cf. e.g., the Canton of Berne which has created an ombudswoman’s office for issues 
related to age, care and institutions in 2003, the Canton of Geneva has had a Cantonal 
Human Rights Commission since 2000 or the Canton of Zurich which introduced a round 
table against human trafficking in 2001.
 85 Auer, Staatsrecht der schweizerischen Kantone, No. 1484 et seqq.
 86 Cf. Fercot, “Perspectives on Federalism”, 314; cf. also for Switzerland, Auer, Staatsrecht der 
schweizerischen Kantone, No. 1489.
 87 The Federal Assembly validated art. 34(a) Constitution of the Canton of Neuchâtel by 
Federal Decree on 11 March 2013. By doing so, it confirmed that the cantonal constitu-
tional provision is in accordance with federal law, cf. BBl 2013 2617, 2618.
 88 Federal Decree on the result of the referendum of 18 May 2014, BBl 2014 6349, 6350.
 89 Decision of the Swiss Federal Court, bge 143 i 403.
 90 Cf. the activities of the World Organisation of United Cities and Local Governments 
















of improving the life of residents and creating good and better practices which 
can serve as sources of innovation for others.
Some subnational governments have even experimented with third- 
generation human rights. While countries such as Austria, Canada, Germany 
and the United States have provisionally closed the door to constitutionalis-
ing substantive environmental rights, some regions in these countries have 
decided otherwise and included the right to a healthy environment in their 
constitutions.91 Others have recognised a right to peace and intercultural dia-
logue.92 In recent years, some subnational actors have also shown more will-
ingness to deal with human rights violations of the past and have come up 
with institutions, processes and ideas of how to make up for historic wrongs, 
such as administrative custody for poor and marginalised people, forced ster-
ilisations and adoptions. Some regional governments have, before the federal 
one, opted for official apologies, mandated research, supported victims and 
taken commemorative and preventive measures.93 If federal countries would 
follow the federalism- adverse and - hostile recommendations and adopt uni-
form standards, such initiatives would no longer be possible.
5.3 The Need to Revisit the Paradigm of the Minimum Floor
While it is easy to conclude that it can be beneficial to accept unequal human 
rights standards in federal states, the question of how far inequality can go 
remains open.94 Is it acceptable to allow for the death penalty in some regions 
but not in others? Is it possible that the right to die is guaranteed in some parts 
of the country but not in others? Is it conceivable that same- sex couples can 
marry and adopt children in some regions but not in others and do we have to 
 91 Subnational units in Brazil, Canada, Germany, and the United States explicitly guarantee 
a right to a quality environment. Cf. James R. May and Erin Daly, Global Environmental 
Constitutionalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 71 et seqq. See for an 
example Art. 19 Constitution of the Canton of Geneva.
 92 Art. 7 Constitution of the Canton of Zurich.
 93 The Governor of California for instance apologised to the more than 20,000 peo-
ple who were involuntarily sterilised under a eugenics program which operated until 
1964, and the provincial government of British Columbia apologised to all Canadians 
who had suffered severe emotional and sexual abuse while in homes for develop-
mentally disabled. Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn, “Group Apology as an Ethical 
Imperative”, in Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation, eds. Elazar Barkan, 
Alexander Karn (Standford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 6. Cf. also Ronald Rudin, 
Kouchibouguac: Removal, Resistance, and Remembrance at a Canadian National Park 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016).
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accept the idea that standards in education and health are different and equal 
citizenship not fully enforced?
The paradigm of the minimum floor is surely helpful in answering some 
of these questions. In the field of progressive duties, each competent actor 
has to take all appropriate measures to work for the full implementation of 
all economic, social and cultural rights. Differences will automatically result 
and are acceptable as long as all actors fulfil the minimum standards provided 
by international and national law. There is no reason to prevent a region from 
exceeding these and fulfilling its obligations more rapidly and more fully. The 
same can be said for regional and local political rights, such as regional and 
local consultations and referenda, and procedural rights, such as child- friendly 
justice or free simultaneous translation for foreigners.
Quite often, however, matters are more complex. This is the case whenever 
there is disagreement on the minimum floor and how it is to be interpreted 
(statically or dynamically) and by whom and whether it allows for exceptions 
(for cultural or other reasons). It is also the case when there are controversies 
over the question of whether a regional initiative is to be considered a human 
rights progress or regress. Whenever more than one human right is involved, 
the classic theory of the national minimum standard which can be exceeded by 
subnational actors is incapable of solving these disputes. In fact, the paradigm 
of the minimum floor has severe shortcomings and is not helpful in managing 
multilevel human rights implementation whenever there is a conflict between 
different human rights, for instance when religious freedoms clash with free 
speech, the right to privacy or the right to equality. Does a subnational actor 
introducing a burka ban (as the cantons of Ticino and St Gallen have recently 
done) improve gender equality, as they claim, or rather violate religious free-
doms and discriminate against Muslim women?95 Does a subnational actor 
forcing bakers to sell wedding cakes to same- sex couples improve the right to 
non- discrimination or violate religious freedoms?96 Does a subnational entity 
regulating political financing improve political rights or impinge on the free-
doms of political and economic activity?97 Does a canton prohibiting sexist 
advertising promote gender equality more effectively than other cantons do or 
does it violate the right of enterprises to speak and act freely?98
 95 Cf. Stephan Zlabinger, “Schleierhafte Gesetzgebung? – Das St. Galler 
Gesichtsverhüllungsverbot unter dem Aspekt der Rechtsgleichheit in der Rechtsetzung,” 
ZBl 119 (2018), 584 and 590 et seqq.
 96 Cf. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. (2018).
 97 Decision of the Swiss Federal Court, bge 125 i 441.
 98 Cf. the Parliament of the Canton of Vaud which adopted unanimously – with one absten-










In addition, the minimum floor theory also fails when there is a tension 
between different human rights duties, such as the duty to respect, protect and 
fulfil rights and freedoms. If a subnational unit guarantees the right to die does 
it then improve human rights standards by respecting a person’s personal free-
dom to decide on the time or way of their own death or does it instead neglect 
the duty to protect the right to life of all by creating the risk that people rush 
into assisted suicide or are pushed into it by self- interested family members? 
If a region prohibits abortion, does it improve the protection of the right to life 
or does it fall behind the minimum floor of respect due to the freedom rights 
of the pregnant woman?99
All these examples demonstrate that the minimum floor theory falls short 
of the mark. First, the different dimensions of each human right all have dif-
ferent minimum floors. The duties to respect individual rights and freedoms 
and not to interfere, to actively protect from dangers and to progressively fulfil 
human rights fully and for all have their own minimum requirements and all 
these floors continually evolve. The duty to respect privacy is probably more 
easily standardised than the duty to protect privacy in the private sphere. But 
the duties to protect can still more easily be harmonised than the duties to 
progressively fulfil it throughout the legal system and to adapt it to new societal 
and technological challenges. Second, most human rights conflicts are com-
plex and involve more than one human right. The identification of the floor 
and the decision whether a regional law or decision builds on it or violates it, 
are then even more controversial.
In sum, the conventional answer – subnational actors can go beyond inter-
national and national human rights standards but are not allowed to fall 
behind – is not sufficient. The mediation between local, regional, national 
and international approaches to human rights is far more complex. In order 
to improve the relations between federalism and other forms of multilevel 
governance and human rights, we need to increase our understanding of mul-
tilevel human rights governance.100 Surely, some inspiration can be derived 
from the way constitutional or federal courts use their adjudication power. 
information: humanrights.ch, “Der Kanton Waadt verbietet sexistische Werbung im 
öffentlichen Raum”, https:// www.humanrights.ch/ de/ menschenrechte- schweiz/ inneres/ 
frau- mann/ gleichstellung/ sexistische- werbung, (accessed 7 July 2019).
 99 Cf. e.g., the developments on the state level in Mexico and Australia, Reed Boland and 
Laura Katzive, “Developments in Laws on Induced Abortion:1998– 2007,” International 
Family Planning Perspectives 34, no. 3 (2008), 113 and 114.
 100 Samantha Besson, “Droits de l’homme et fédéralisme: une introduction thématique”, in 
Die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention und die Kantone, eds. Samantha Besson and 
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What threshold do they apply? And how much margin of appreciation do 
they leave to subordinate actors? Do they unify or harmonise human rights 
and in what field and why do they opt for the former and the latter? On the 
international level, the European Court of Human Rights must answer the 
very same questions, although based on the limited catalogue of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, which only guarantees civil and political, but 
not economic, social or cultural rights. Based on its limited mandate of imple-
menting minimum human rights standards, it has developed a practice on the 
intensity of its scrutiny that is as controversial as it is sophisticated.101 The mar-
gin of appreciation is dependent on the human right involved and is stricter 
in the field of inhuman treatment, procedural rights, free speech and non- 
discrimination than it is in the field of religion and family law where cultural 
differences play a more prominent role.102 It also depends on the human right 
dimensions involved; as a rule, the duty to respect requiring non- interference 
is more uniformly applied than is the duty to protect which demands that 
states take all appropriate measures to prevent human rights interferences by 
a private actor. Most importantly, the level of scrutiny depends on the exist-
ence or absence of a European consensus.103 It is on this consensus that the 
dynamic evolution of the European human rights catalogue is based. What 
a member state is bound to comply with thus also depends on what other 
member states are doing and what progress they are making. For the living 
tree document to live and flourish, inputs must hence come from its national 
sources. Uniform standards imposed from above would cripple these sources 
and impede further bottom- up human rights evolutions.104 The same logic of 
 101 Andreas Follesdal and Nino Tsereteli, “The Margin of Appreciation in Europe and 
Beyond,” The International Journal of Human Rights 20, no. 8 (2016), 1055 (with further ref-
erences) or Samantha Besson, “Subsidiarity in International Human Rights Law – What Is 
Subsidiary About Human Rights?,” The American Journal of Jurisprudence 61, no. 1 (2016), 
73 (with further references).
 102 Cf. Eva Maria Belser, “Kantonale Grundrechte,” 87; see also the findings of Luzius 
Wildhaber, Arnaldur Hjartarson, and Stephen Donnelly, “No Consensus on Consensus? 
The Practice of the European Court of Human Rights,” Human Rights Law Journal 33 
(2013), 259 et seqq.
 103 Cf. e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, “Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards,” 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 31, no. 4 (1999) or Wildhaber, 
Hjartarson and Donnelly, “No Consensus on Consensus?”
 104 Cf. Amrei Müller, “Domestic Authorities’ Obligations to Co- Develop the Rights of the 
European Convention on Human Rights,” The International Journal of Human Rights 20, 
no. 8 (2016), 1059 or Besson, “Subsidiarity in International Human Rights Law – What is 










multilevel dialogues between innovative (and sometimes failing) states and 
controlling supranational entities must apply within federal states.
6 Conclusions: A Promising Partnership
Various reports and recommendations issued by UN treaty bodies emphasise 
that the national government, in the case of Switzerland the Confederation, 
has the primary responsibility to ensure the domestic implementation of the 
conventions.105 Undoubtedly, solely the federal tier has the duty to report and 
follow- up on international recommendations.106 Whether one can conclude 
that the federal tier carries the ‘primary responsibility’ is however doubtful. 
Externally, the federal government, representing the Swiss Confederation in 
its entirety, is obviously the guarantor for the fulfilment of international law. 
Internally, the federal government is, however, often not, or not exclusively, 
competent to realise treaty obligations. In the field of human rights in par-
ticular, international obligations often affect cantonal and municipal com-
petences. Such is, for instance, the case in the field of the right to education, 
housing, health services, social aid, police and prisons or integration policies. 
Other human rights obligations, such as the right to information or the full 
and comprehensive implementation of gender equality, require efforts from 
all state actors on all tiers.107
In its general comment No. 3 (1990) to the Covenant on economic, social 
and cultural rights, the Committee rightly states that it is its role to ultimately 
determine whether a state has taken all appropriate measures to implement 
the obligations of the Covenant. Just as importantly, it states that ‘each State 
party must decide for itself which means are the most appropriate under the 
circumstances with respect to each of the rights’.108 Unfortunately, most treaty 
 105 cescr, Concluding Observations, E/ C.12/ che/ co/ 2– 3 (2010), para. 5; cedaw, Concluding 
Observations, cedaw/ C/ che/ co/ 3 (2009), para. 10 and 20; Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 
9 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination, Switzerland, cerd/ C/ che/ co/ 6 (2008), para. 8.
 106 Cf. Art. 54 and 184 Swiss Federal Constitution.
 107 Schweizerischen Kompetenzzentrums für Menschenrechte, Die periodische Überprüfung 
der Menschenrechtslage der Schweiz (UPR): Eine Zwischenbilanz nach drei Zyklen 
(Bern: 2018), 12; Belser and Mazidi, “Das Zusammenwirken von Bund und Kantonen bei 
der Einhaltung völkerrechtlicher Menschenrechtsverpflichtungen der Schweiz”, 245.
 108 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature 
of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant): E/ 1991/ 23 (1990), No. 4; cf. 
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bodies tend to disregard the general comment. As far as and as long as states 
take all appropriate measures, international bodies have no reason to interfere 
with the country’s internal organisation.
Human rights obligations mandating the respect of diversity – and implic-
itly requiring some form of autonomy – make it evident that approaches focus-
ing on multi- level government, on the one hand, and approaches concerned 
with human rights for all, on the other hand, are not following contradictory 
aims, which must be mitigated. They rather share common concerns and inter-
ests. Conventional wisdom suggesting that promoting self- determination for 
peoples and minority rights and protecting human rights of individuals are 
competing priorities is thus erroneous. It is also inappropriate to propose bal-
ancing the two. Such proposals imply that securing individuals in their human 
rights requires special limits on the rights of their peoples or the groups they 
belong to, and vice versa. In contrast, federalism and human rights, as has been 
shown above, are often in a win- win- relation, in which the strengthening of 
one approach does not come at the price of weakening the other.
Diversity, even in the sensitive field of human rights, is not per se a problem 
to overcome but a situation to handle within the framework of national and 
international human rights obligations. Different human rights standards can 
be acceptable, desirable or even required by human rights. On the one hand, 
human rights implementation can call for the respect of collective autonomy; 
on the other hand, the combination of self- and shared rule can be condu-
cive to human rights implementation and create productive multilevel feed-
back loops.
There is, however, a need for more differentiation. It may be in line with 
international human rights obligations to accept or promote different linguis-
tic or cultural rights for different regions and to allow autonomous regions 
to go beyond minimum standards in the field of social and economic rights. 
The same does not necessarily apply to certain civil rights and liberties, such 
as the right to a fair trial or the right to non- discrimination, where uniform 
standards may be required. Different rules for different human rights and dif-
ferent human rights obligations are thus needed and the leeway of subnational 
actors and their margin of appreciations must be clarified in a differentiated 
and dynamic way.
method by which Covenant rights are given effect in national law is a matter for each 
State party to decide, the means used should be appropriate in the sense of producing 
results which are consistent with the full discharge of its obligations by the State party. 
The means chosen are also subject to review as part of the Committee’s examination of 
the State party’s compliance with its obligations under the Covenant.’
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The potential partnership between federalism and human rights, often 
characterised by scepticism and distrust, would surely improve if communi-
cation were more open and intense. International treaty bodies typically only 
take an interest in internal power- sharing when one or several subnational 
or local actors fail to respect human rights. A limited focus on shortcomings, 
however, disregards the great potential of bottom- up solutions and oversees 
the numerous examples of special regional and municipal achievements. The 
assessment of the effects of federalism on human rights should thus be more 
comprehensive and look at violations as well as improvements. These are the 
progresses which source international consensus and eventually enable the 
rise of minimum standards. Tracking regional and local progress, appreciating 
it nationally and valorising it internationally are also prerequisites for trans-
national learning. Good and best practices are made available to other subna-
tional and local actors, feed into international reports and recommendations 
and enter into recommendations made to other states. A more comprehensive 
assessment thus allows multilevel learning and feedback loops, necessary for 
the participatory, inclusive, and local implementation of universal rights. Even 
though the relations between constitutional guarantees of regional and local 
autonomy and human rights have been uneasy in the past, it seems worth try-
ing again in the future.
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As an aspirational principle and all- encompassing concept, solidarity infuses – 
more or less extensively – several federal and federal- like systems as a concept 
that tends to promote equality, social rights, well- being, and friendship among 
and between the various players of a compound polity, even when it is not 
clearly spelled out in the articled parts of a constitutional text. Italy represents 
a clear example in this sense: in fact, solidarity is firmly entrenched in article 
2 of the Constitution among the fundamental principles of the Republic, but 
it also infuses several other constitutional provisions, thus occupying a promi-
nent role in the constitutional architecture of the state. In particular, solidarity 
deeply informs the relationship between the central state and regional govern-
ments, uniquely shaping Italian regionalism.
The purpose of this chapter is to chart the meaning and scope of solidar-
ity in the Italian context in all its various understandings, but with particu-
lar attention to its relationship with regionalism. This chapter is divided in 
three parts. Section 1 sets the framework for the discussion, illustrating why 
Italy is a diverse and asymmetrical regional state where its constituent units 
(e.g. regions) enjoy mild forms of autonomy; section 2 describes solidarity 
and equality as aspirational values that deeply inform the socio- economic 
and political relationships among and between individuals and public insti-
tutions in Italy, while section 3 focuses on solidarity in the specific context 
of Italian regionalism, particularly after the constitutional reform of 2001. In 
the conclusion, I argue that the principle of solidarity as entrenched in the 
Italian Constitution can be construed as an aspirational value fostering equal-
ity and unity in a rather diverse country. However, despite the noble intentions 
of this principle, its constitutional entrenchment has not fully succeeded in 
 1 This research was fully funded by the Australian Government through the Australian 
Research Council (arc) Laureate Program ‘Balancing Diversity and Social Cohesion in 
Democratic Constitutions’.
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preventing the consolidation of inequalities that might jeopardise equality in 
a state that has been historically characterised by deep socio- economic and 
political asymmetries: a return to the very meaning of solidarity should thus 
be encouraged.
In terms of methodology, the chapter will offer an extensive textual/ ana-
lytical analysis of solidarity as embedded in the Italian Constitution, by 
also taking into account the readings of this principle offered by the Italian 
Constitutional Court (ItCC),2 considering that judges have the task of identify-
ing, among other things, the values of the constitution. The goal of this chapter 
is not to be prescriptive or normative, nor to use a single case study to make 
general claims: as noted, its less ambitious purpose is to offer an analytical and 
descriptive account of solidarity as a principle of equality to better understand 
its value and meaning in Italy, also considering the challenging times and ten-
sions that the country is facing at the time we are writing. Finally, while the 
chapter shows the interconnections between the twin principles of solidar-
ity and equality, it extensively elaborates on the intellectual meaning of the 
former, without expounding the various understandings of the latter, whose 
meaning is thus implied.
2 Autonomy and Diversity in Italy
2.1 De Facto Asymmetries
Italy is a profoundly diverse country both de facto and de iure. From a factual 
standpoint, Italy has been traditionally characterised by a deep natural, his-
torical, cultural, socio- economic, and linguistic fragmentation. Its natural 
diversity is reflected in the significant physical, geographical and climatic dif-
ferences crossing the peninsula from the Alps to the Mediterranean, but Italy 
has also been historically characterised by other forms of asymmetries. As Eva 
explains, over the last 2800 years, Italy has had only a few centuries of unified 
history, mostly under the Roman Republic and Empire (from approximately 89 
 2 I ran a keyword search on the website of the ItCC (http:// www.cortecostituzionale.it/ action-
Pronuncia.do) using the term solidarietà and covering the 2002 to 2017 period: this specific 
timeframe is justified as I wanted to specifically take into consideration the reading of sol-
idarity in relation to regionalism after the constitutional reform of 2001, considering the 
debate on federalism and solidarity that animated the political and constitutional discourse 
at the time. This keyword search returned about 379 results: however, only a smaller number 
of decisions were studied in preparation for this chapter, since a cursory reading of the deci-
sions showed that in most cases solidarity was used in other contexts or mentioned in the 
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b.c. to the fall of the Empire in 476 a.d.) and the period since unification (1861– 
1870).3 In the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna of 1815, the Italian penin-
sula was still divided into eight different states: the Kingdom of Piemonte and 
Sardegna (under the rule of the House of Savoy); Lombardo- Veneto (a province 
of the Austrian Empire); the Dukedom of Modena and Reggio Emilia (under 
the rule of Frances iv); the Dukedom of Parma and Piacenza (administered by 
Mary Louise – daughter of the Austrian Emperor and Napoleon’s widow); the 
Grand- Duchy of Toscana (governed by Leopold ii of Lorraine – nephew of the 
Austrian Emperor); the Princedom of Lucca (governed by the Bourbons); the 
Papal State (which included part of Emilia, the Romagna, Marche, Umbria, and 
Lazio); and finally, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (under the Bourbons’ rule, 
who were also linked to Austria). The fact that Italy was such a compound of 
non- homogeneous political structures (e.g. dukedoms, absolute monarchies, 
and theocracies – each of them with its own laws and institutional apparatus) 
had as a direct consequence the presence of substantial political and socio- 
economic differences among the various geographical areas: in this scenario, 
Northern territories such as Piemonte, Lombardia and Veneto have historically 
been amongst the most economically developed areas. Italy’s diversity is also 
reflected in the linguistic richness of the country, with hundreds of different 
dialects spoken across the peninsula,4 and linguistic minority groups living in 
specific parts of the territory. All these asymmetries have inevitably impacted 
and shaped the way the country functions and operates even today.
2.2 De Iure Asymmetries
But Italy is also de iure asymmetrical: mindful of the diverse fabric of the state, 
the Italian Constitution implemented in 1948 did not create a federal state, but 
 3 Fabrizio Eva, “Deconstructing Italy: (Northern) Italians and their new perception of territori-
ality,” GeoJournal 48, no. 2 (1999): 102.
 4 Eva also explains how, at the time of unification, ‘less than 3 % of Italians spoke the Tuscan 
dialect – the basis of modern Italian – and many noble families preferred French as their 
main language. By 1955 still only some 30 % of the population spoke Italian habitually or 
often. And even in 1987, 28 % of Italians still used some dialect as their everyday language, 
although with an acceptable level of proficiency in Italian’: Eva, “Deconstructing Italy,” 102. 
Maiden points out that what is known as Italian was just one of the many dialects spoken 
in Italy (a Florentine variety of the Tuscan dialect). Therefore, Italian dialects are not vari-
ants of Italian, but of Latin, the latter thus being the ‘mother’ of all dialects spoken in the 
peninsula, including Italian. And because the ‘common ancestor’ is old, enormous differ-
ences exist between the various dialects (the greater the geographic distance, the greater 
the difference): Martin Maiden, “The Definition of Multilingualism in Historical Perspective,” 
in Multilingualism in Italy, Past and Present, eds. Anna Laura Lepschy and Arturo Tosi 







nonetheless committed itself to the promotion of local self- government and to 
the broadest administrative decentralisation of services. In this regard, article 
5 Const. postulates that
The Republic is one and indivisible. It recognises and promotes local 
autonomies and implements the fullest measure of administrative decen-
tralisation in those services which depend on the State. The Republic 
adapts the principles and methods of its legislation to the requirements 
of autonomy and decentralisation.
Most importantly, the Constitution divides the territory into twenty regions,5 
five of them vested with special status: Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardegna, Sicilia, 
Trentino- Alto Adige and Valle d’Aosta.6 The rationale for this special status 
is a combination of geographical, linguistic and autonomist reasons: all five 
regions were very peripheral and thus disadvantaged at the time of their crea-
tion (with Sicilia and Sardegna being major islands), all of them were (and to 
a certain extent still are) characterised by the presence of more or less active 
movements fostering more autonomy and even independence, and the three 
regions in the North also present linguistic minorities in the territory.7 The spe-
cial or autonomous status basically means that these five regions enjoy special 
forms and conditions of autonomy, implying more extensive – and thus asym-
metric – powers than ordinary regions, especially in fiscal matters.8
The constitutional model created in 1948 was significantly revised in 2001 
with the amendment of Title v of the Constitution (pertaining to the relation-
ships between central and peripheral governments): among other things, this 
constitutional reform strengthened the legislative and administrative powers 
of ordinary regions, while leaving the powers of autonomous regions substan-
tially untouched. This reform was the culminating point of a political mobilisa-
tion which began in the late 1980s, particularly in the North, where the wealth-
ier and more industrialised regions sought to acquire more financial or fiscal 
autonomy, through increased decentralisation and even federalism: in other 
words, they sought to acquire more powers over the economy, infrastructure 
 5 See article 131 Const.
 6 See article 116(1) Const. As further specified by article 116(2) Const., in Trentino- Alto Adige 
the two provinces of Trento and Bolzano also enjoy autonomous status.
 7 French speaking minorities are present in Valle d’Aosta, German minorities exist in Trentino- 
Alto Adige, while Slovenian minorities live in Friuli Venezia Giulia.
 8 According to article 116(1) Const. these five regions enjoy ‘special forms and conditions of 
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and other services so as not to depend on decisions coming from the central 
government, perceived as distant from the needs of these territories.9
In addition to confirming the binary division between autonomous and 
ordinary regions, the 2001 reform introduced another element of de iure asym-
metry in article 116(3) Const., which now allows ordinary regions to negotiate, 
with the central government, particular forms and conditions of autonomy in 
specific subject matters.10 This provision has been dubbed ‘differential region-
alism’11 or ‘regionalism having a variable geometry’12 or even ‘asymmetric fed-
eralism.’13 I will revert to this provision later in the chapter.
Although (asymmetrically) decentralised, Italy is not a federal state in 
classical terms. Yet, at the time of the constitutional reform of 2001 there 
 9 It is not the goal of this chapter to retrace the history of the Italian decentralisation process 
and the facts, issues and political actors involved, as an abundant literature already exists on 
the topic. While not claiming to be exhaustive, the following is a short bibliography on the 
subject: Ugo Amoretti, “A new look at federalism: Italy decentralizes,” Journal of Democracy 
13, no. 2 (April 2002): 126; Gianfranco Baldini and Brunetta Baldi, “Decentralization in 
Italy and the Troubles of Federalization,” Regional and Federal Studies 24, no. 1 (2014): 87; 
Beniamino Caravita, “Italy: Between the Hybrid State and Europe’s Federalizing Process,” 
in Routledge Handbook of Regionalism and Federalism, eds. John Loughlin, John Kinkaid 
and Wilfried Swenden (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 287; Gian Franco Cartei 
and Vincenzo Ferraro, “Reform of the Fifth Title of the Italian Constitution: A First Step 
Towards a Federal System?,” European Public Law 8, no. 4 (2002): 445; Louis Del Duca and 
Patrick Del Duca, “An Italian Federalism? The State, its Institutions and National Culture 
as Rule of Law Guarantor,” American Journal of Comparative Law 54, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 799; 
Sergio Fabbrini and Marco Brunazzo, “Federalizing Italy: The Convergent Effects of 
Europeanization and Domestic Mobilization,” Regional and Federal Studies 13, no. 1 
(Spring 2003): 100; Tania Groppi and Nicoletta Scattone, “Italy: The Subsidiarity Principle,” 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 4, no. 1 (January 2006): 131; Martino Mazzoleni, 
“The Italian Regionalization: A Story of Partisan Logics,” Modern Italy 14, no. 2 (May 
2009): 135; Cesare Pinelli, “The 1948 Italian Constitution and the 2006 Referendum: Food 
for Thought,” European Constitutional Law Review 2, no. 3 (October 2006): 329.
 10 Article 116(3) Const. lists the areas where enhanced autonomy can be negotiated: all mat-
ters of shared jurisdiction between the state and the regions, as specified by article 117(3); 
specific subject matters normally falling within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of 
the central state, such as: organisational requirements of the justice of the peace (article 
117(2)(l)); general norms on education (article 117(2)(n)); and protection of the environ-
ment, eco- system, and cultural heritage (article 117(2)(s)).
 11 Carlo Dapelo, “The Trends towards Federalism in Italy,” St. Thomas Law Review 15, no. 2 
(Winter 2002): 346.
 12 Paolo Caretti and Giovanni Tarli Barbieri, Diritto regionale (Torino: Giappichelli, 2012), 34.
 13 Augusto Barbera, “Da un federalismo ‘insincero’ ad un regionalismo ‘preso sul serio’? 
Una riflessione sull’esperienza regionale,” Forum di Quaderni Costituzionali (October 
2012): 15, http:// www.forumcostituzionale.it/ wordpress/ images/ stories/ pdf/ documenti_ 











was a widespread belief that this amendment represented the first step of a 
more drastic federalisation that would be completed in the years to come.14 
However, this transformation has not yet taken place; federalism debates have 
lost momentum and, at the time we are writing, further federal amendments 
have basically disappeared from the agenda of all political parties, leaving only 
academics to engage in debates on the nature and status of Italian regionalism.
2.3 Federalism and Solidarity in Italy
The 1948 Constitution can be regarded as the product of a compromise 
between unitary and decentralising forces: in fact, the Italian state model is 
usually identified as an example of regional state, although nowhere in the 
Italian Constitution it is so indicated. While it may be difficult to precisely 
distinguish regional from federal states, the former are commonly labelled as 
quasi- federal since they present some federal traits without amounting to pure 
federations, and centralising forces are prevalent. For example, in our specific 
case study, the Italian Constitution entrenches a division of legislative pow-
ers between central and regional governments (this being a classic federal ele-
ment), but it lacks many other important federal traits such as a federal Senate 
or a direct regional involvement in constitutional amendments.
As indicated above, a federal reform in Italy was discussed, initiated in 2001, 
but never completed. There are clear reasons suggesting why a complete reform 
in federal terms has not yet occurred. In fact, among other things, a widespread 
belief exists that a fully- fledged federal reform would irreparably compromise 
the unity of the state and the solidarity- based relationships that inform the 
Italian constitutional architecture, considering the prominent position that 
solidarity occupies among the fundamental principles of the Republic. In 
other words, federalism and solidarity are seen as hostile and competing val-
ues, in view of the risk that a federal solution would divide, rather than unite, 
the various territories of the country, thus compromising the idea of territorial 
solidarity among regions.15 Consequently, a fully- fledged federal state would 
 14 Ex multis, see Cartei and Ferraro, “Reform of the Fifth Title of the Italian Constitution,” 
445; Siegfried Wiessner, “The Movement Toward Federalism in Italy: A Policy- Oriented 
Perspective,” St. Thomas Law Review 15, no. 2 (Winter 2002): 301; Del Duca and Del 
Duca, “An Italian Federalism?,” 799, who talk about a ‘nascent federalism combining 
Regionalization and Supranationalism’.
 15 Andrea Patroni Griffi, “Federalismo, Mezzogiorno e sviluppo solidale,” Forum di Quaderni 
Costituzionali: 3, http:// www.forumcostituzionale.it/ wordpress/ images/ stories/ pdf/ doc-
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deepen, rather than limit, the socio- economic inequalities among the twenty 
regions.
This tension between solidarity and federalism can be partially explained 
by the fact that the constitutional reform of 2001 was the result of years of 
intense political debate carried out under the aegis of federalism and ini-
tially led by the Northern League (ln), a political party rooted in the wealthier 
regions of the North that achieved electoral success and national visibility by 
critically questioning established behaviours of the elite class (e.g. excessive 
state spending, poor performance of public services, waste, corruption). The 
ln voiced the discontent of Northern Italy over the political attitude of the 
central government, which seemed to neglect the interests and needs of the 
most industrialised, fast- paced, and richer areas of the country to the advan-
tage of the South. However, because these requests for increased autonomy 
were made by a political party firmly rooted in the richest area of the country, 
and thus embedded in the economic disparity existing between the wealth-
ier North and the poorer South, one of the strongest censures made to the ln 
was that its federalism program merely aimed at furthering the economic and 
financial greed and selfishness of certain regions, while overlooking the needs 
of the poorer areas of the country. In other words, that part of the country 
that was seeking federal solutions was believed to want more powers without 
obligations towards the rest of the country (specifically, the South): for this 
reason, federalism was ostracised because of the conviction that it would dis-
courage solidarity among the various areas of the territory.16 Consequently, 
while solidarity is a fundamental constitutional principle that significantly 
informs the constitutional framework of the state, a discussion on solidarity 
would not be complete without reference to regional autonomy and issues of 
socio- economic inequality, as will be better illustrated in section 3.
3 The Principle of Solidarity as an Aspirational Principle
3.1 Aspirational Principles in General
Constitutions are usually intended to endure several generations and are 
commonly seen as the place to design the institutional architecture of a state. 
Building upon Stone and Arcioni, this chapter shares the view that constitu-
tions are not only meant to last for a long time and to outline the main features 
 16 André Lecours and Erika Arban, “Why Federalism Does Not Always Take Shape: the Cases 







of the polity in question, but they can also be construed as the repositories 
of shared values, as they often contain fundamental principles to which cit-
izens aspire.17 In this regard, solidarity can be considered a shared value for 
citizens, as being a principle that helps define their identity (solidarity in its 
private understanding), the functioning of the state (solidarity in its public 
understanding), as well as other fundamental values (e.g. the preservation 
of human life, the protection of human dignity, rights provisions and social 
goals): this is particularly true in the case of post- conflict constitutions or con-
stitutions that have emerged out of dictatorship, as was the case with many 
constitutions enacted after wwii.18 For this reason, the aspirational value of 
solidarity infuses several federal and quasi- federal systems as a principle that 
fosters equality, social rights, well- being, and friendship among and between 
the various actors – public and private – of a polity; and this is true even when 
it is not expressly spelled out in the constitution.19
Aspirational concepts such as solidarity thus help to define the overall ideals 
to which a given legal system ultimately strives for; but aspirational concepts 
risk remaining empty paradigms if not matched by some concrete mechanism 
that breathes life into them. It is thus important to understand the real mean-
ing of solidarity to grasp how it can be construed as a principle of equality, 
both in general terms and in the specific case of Italy. When entrenched in a 
constitution, solidarity becomes aspirational in the sense that it directs certain 
policies to foster equality and eliminate obstacles; it also directs state policies 
to address certain issues based on equality.
3.2 The Different Meanings of Legal Solidarity
It is not the purpose of this chapter to thoroughly retrace the meaning 
of the solidarity principle as a philosophical concept, as an abundant lit-
erature already exists on the subject.20 As I have extensively explained 
 17 Elisa Arcioni and Adrienne Stone, “The Small Brown Bird: Values and Aspirations in the 
Australian Constitution,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 14, no. 1 (January 
2016): 1 and 4.
 18 Arcioni and Stone, “The Small Brown Bird,” 2– 3.
 19 Erika Arban, “Exploring the Principle of (Federal) Solidarity,” Review of Constitutional 
Studies 22, no. 2 (September 2017): 242.
 20 Ex multis, see Arban, “Federal solidarity,” 243; Lorenza Carlassare, “Solidarietà: un pro-
getto politico,” Costituzionalismo.it, no. 1 (May 2016): 45, http:// www.costituzionalismo.
it/ download/ Costituzionalismo_ 201601_ 559.pdf; Charles D. Gonthier, “Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity: the Forgotten Leg of the Trilogy, or Fraternity: the Unspoken Third Pillar of 
Democracy,” McGill Law Journal 45, no. 3 (June 2000): 567; Juliane Ottmann, “The Concept 
of Solidarity in National and European Law: The Welfare State and the European Social 
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elsewhere,21 however, there is a conceptual distinction between moral and 
legal solidarity: in fact, while the former can be understood as a voluntary 
charitable act premised on mutual assistance or philanthropy,22 legal solidar-
ity shall be understood as an ‘obligatory act based on legal rights and duties’ 
although some sentiments of mutual assistance might always come into play.23
Another important classification that should be made is that legal solidar-
ity can acquire different meanings depending on whether it is entrenched in 
international or domestic law, in private or public law, or in federal theory.24 
In private law, solidarity is linked to the concept of obligatio in solidum of 
Roman origins or, in the words of Black’s law dictionary, ‘[t] he state of being 
jointly and severally liable (as for a debt)’.25 Solidarity in international law 
can be traced back to the French term fraternité which, along with liberté 
and égalité, was one of the three linchpins animating the French Revolution, 
later passed on to the French Constitution and, from there, to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.26 According to some scholars, solidarity 
can in fact be understood as the legalisation or juridicalisation of the term 
fraternité.27
Within the ambit of public law, the spirit of solidarity can find expression 
in at least three different ways: the first relates to socio- economic rights and, 
more generally, welfare provisions, such as programs providing for health and 
social services.28 Second, solidarity can permeate provisions dealing with dras-
tic emergencies such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters, usually binding 
actors at the local, national and even international levels.29 Third, solidarity 
in its public law understanding may refer to the general responsibility of the 
individual towards the community at large: in this sense, political solidarity 
commonly includes duties performed by subjects such as voting, homeland 
Vincenzo Tondi delle Mura, “La solidarietà tra etica ed estetica, Tracce per una ricerca,” 
Rivista dell’Associatione Italiana dei Costitutionalisti, no. 00 (July 2010): 1, https:// www.
rivistaaic.it/ images/ rivista/ pdf/ TondidellaMura01.pdf.
 21 Arban, “Federal solidarity,” 243 et seq.
 22 Ottmann, “The Concept of Solidarity,” 40; Willem T Eijsbouts and David Nederlof, 
“Editorial: Rethinking Solidarity in the EU, from Fact to Social Contact,” European 
Constitutional Law Review 7, no. 2 (June 2011): 172; Arban, “Federal solidarity,” 243.
 23 Ottmann, “The Concept of Solidarity,” 39– 40 and 44; Arban, “Federal solidarity,” 243.
 24 Arban, “Federal solidarity,” 243 et seq.
 25 Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed, sub verbo “solidarity”; Arban, “Federal solidarity,” 243.
 26 Gonthier, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” 572.
 27 Carlassare, “Solidarietà,” 47, fn. 8.
 28 Ottmann, “The Concept of Solidarity,” 39; Arban, “Federal solidarity,” 244.




















defence or military service, whilst socio- economic solidarity comprises the 
duty to obtain proper education, to work, or to contribute to public expenses.30
Finally, solidarity may assume yet another specific meaning within the 
ambit of federal theory. Here, solidarity infuses provisions on equalisation 
payments, found in federal and quasi- federal states alike, whose purpose is to 
reduce the socio- economic imbalances or inequalities that may characterise 
the various regions and territories of the federation. Furthermore, federal sol-
idarity is often linked to the doctrine of federal loyalty, whose roots can be 
traced back to the German notion of Bundestreue whose literal meaning can 
be rendered as fidelity, loyalty or faithfulness to the federal compact.31 As we 
will see in the remainder of the chapter, all these different nuances of the prin-
ciple of solidarity can be found in the Italian constitutional text.
3.3 Solidarity in the Italian Constitution: A Fundamental Principle and 
an Aspirational Value
The 1948 Italian Constitution had immense practical and symbolic value at the 
time it was enacted. In fact, it was the first constitution that Italy had ever had, if 
we consider that the document previously in force – the Statuto Albertino – was 
a bill that King Carlo Alberto had granted in 1848 to the Kingdom of Piemonte 
and Sardegna: the Statuto was later extended to the whole peninsula after uni-
fication, and it remained in force also during the Fascist dictatorship, although 
it was mainly disregarded.
The 1948 Constitution was penned by the Constituent Assembly (Assemblea 
Costituente), whose members were democratically elected in June 1946 by 
universal suffrage with the specific task of drafting a new Constitution. 
Considering the time and circumstances in which it came into being, the 1948 
Constitution represented, at the time, one of the most advanced examples of 
a post- war, post- dictatorship fundamental document, imbued with the high-
est and most elevated democratic values. Within this framework, the principle 
of solidarity immediately acquired a prominent place among the fundamen-
tal principles of the Constitution, an aspirational value informing the entire 
 30 Giovanna Razzano, “La materia concorrente della produzione, trasporto e distribuzione 
nazionale dell’energia nella recente giurisprudenza costituzionale, fra leale collabora-




laborazione+e+doveri+di+solidariet%C3%AO+- +stato+- +dottrina+- +, with references; 
Arban, “Federal solidarity,” 245.
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constitutional architecture. According to Tondi delle Mura, before represent-
ing a legal innovation, the constitutional entrenchment of solidarity marked 
a historical and cultural turn, at least compared to the previous legal system, 
thus transforming Italy into one of the most innovative and complete systems 
of the post- war era.32
Technically speaking, the principle of solidarity is explicitly spelled out only 
in two articles of the Constitution: article 2 (as one of the fundamental princi-
ples of the Italian Republic) and article 119 (with regards to fiscal federalism). 
However, both the ItCC and most constitutional scholars acknowledge that the 
spirit of solidarity in its broadest sense infuses several other provisions of the 
constitutional text. In fact, being based on the ‘centrality of the human being’, 
solidarity influences the dynamics of public and private powers, as well as of 
individual freedoms,33 and is the ‘founding paradigm’ upon which the unity of 
the state is premised.34
Article 2 Const. spells out solidarity in the following terms:
The Republic shall recognise and protect the inviolable rights of the per-
son, both as an individual and in the social groups where human person-
ality is expressed. The Republic expects that the fundamental duties of 
political, economic and social solidarity be fulfilled.
First, this article categorises two types of solidarity, political and socio- economic. 
As indicated supra, these duties generally refer to the responsibilities of the 
individual towards the community to which they belong, and include duties 
such as voting, accessing proper education, and working.35
Yet, this study of solidarity as a fundamental principle and aspirational 
value would not be complete without considering article 3 Const., as implicit 
in the principle of solidarity is the principle of equality.36
 32 Tondi delle Mura, “La solidarietà fra etica ed estetica,” 1– 2.
 33 Tondi delle Mura, “La solidarietà fra etica ed estetica,” 2.
 34 Alessandro Morelli, “I principi costituzionali relativi ai doveri inderogabili di solidarietà,” 
Forum di Quaderni Costituzionali, (April 2015): 3, http:// www.forumcostituzionale.it/ 
wordpress/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2015/ 04/ morelli.pdf.
 35 Razzano, “Materia concorrente,” 12.
 36 Article 3 Const. mandates that ‘[a] ll citizens shall have equal social dignity and shall be 
equal before the law, without distinction of gender, race, language, religion, political opin-
ion, personal and social conditions. It shall be the duty of the Republic to remove those 
obstacles of an economic or social nature which constrain the freedom and equality of 
citizens, thereby impeding the full development of the human person and the effective 













Read together, articles 2 and 3 Const. are considered an expression of what 
the ItCC termed interpersonal or intergenerational solidarity.37 In this narrative, 
the ‘centrality of the human being’ is confirmed by the prominence that article 
3 Const. gives to the concept of ‘human dignity’. Constitutional scholars have 
defined it as a constitutional value that belongs to all human beings, regardless 
of their personal or social conditions, because the absence of dignity implies 
the ‘negation of the same identity’ of the individual:38 solidarity in this sense 
means the respect of the individuals in their physical being and needs.39
Solidarity and equality (understood also as prohibition of discrimination 
and absence of privileges)40 in this way become indissolubly intertwined con-
sidering that individual and collective inequalities are no longer seen as a rea-
son for social disintegration or personal impediment, but become the incen-
tive to trigger public intervention and private participation, as one scholar has 
indicated.41 Equality is thus the ‘engine’ of solidarity.42 In this framework, sol-
idarity and equality can be seen as principles complementing each other, as 
they contribute to regenerating each other and reciprocally give some concrete 
meaning.43 Furthermore, Morelli explains how solidarity and equality are inti-
mately related in the sense that the constitutional entrenchment of equality 
alone would not be sufficient to ensure the cohesion of the many heteroge-
neous components of the state: this is why solidarity is also needed.44 Social 
and economic inequalities among citizens can be overcome only through an 
active participation of the state through the principle of solidarity.45
With regards to the type and meaning of social solidarity as spelled out 
in article 2 Const., the case law of the ItCC has offered interesting explana-
tions that help better delineate the scope of this principle. In particular, in 
decision 75/ 1992 the ItCC confirmed that solidarity shall be read as a principle 
 37 The concept of interpersonal or intergenerational solidarity was used for the first time by 
the Italian Constitutional Court in decision 203/ 2013, para. 3.4.
 38 Carlassare, “Solidarietà,” 53.
 39 Carlassare, “Solidarietà,” 55.
 40 Carlassare, “Solidarietà,” 52.
 41 Tondi delle Mura, “La solidarietà fra etica ed estetica,” 2.
 42 Carlassare, “Solidarietà,” 57.
 43 Antonio Ruggeri, “Eguaglianza, solidarietà e tecniche decisorie nelle più salienti espe-
rienze della giustizia costituzionale,” Rivista dell’Associazione Italiana dei Costituzionalisti, 
no. 2 (May 2017): 5, https:// www.rivistaaic.it/ images/ rivista/ pdf/ 2_ 2017_ Ruggeri.pdf. The 
intimate link between solidarity and equality, the latter to be understood as a value 
that contributes to infusing the former with some concrete meaning, is also stressed by 
Carlassare, “Solidarietà,” 52.
 44 Morelli, “Principi costituzionali,” 3.
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positioned among the fundamental values of the Italian legal system to the 
point that it is solemnly protected and acknowledged – along with the inalien-
able rights of the individual – as the basis for social cohabitation and norma-
tively canvassed in the constitutional text. This means that solidarity does 
not only have a descriptive meaning but is deeply imbued with a prescriptive 
value: consequently, while both solidarity and equality can be seen as aspira-
tional and elevated principles, they are also prescriptive ones.46
This understanding of solidarity is further elaborated on in decision 500/ 
1993, where the ItCC once again underlines the link existing between equal-
ity and solidarity. Solidarity thus acquires a modern gloss, as it goes beyond 
traditional conceptualisations premised on assistance and charity, or duties 
and obligations imposed by law, to become a way to concur and accomplish 
the substantial equality that allows the development of the personality as 
entrenched in article 3 Const. Its purpose is to reach the necessary collabora-
tion to achieve common goods such as scientific research, cultural and artis-
tic enhancement, and health and wellbeing for all individuals. The court thus 
confirms the public value of the individual and associative expressions of sol-
idarity: I will return to this aspect when discussing solidarity in conjunction 
with subsidiarity.
Although article 2 Const. is the only provision where solidarity as a fun-
damental principle is explicitly spelled out (along with article 119 Const. on 
fiscal federalism), the spirit of solidarity clearly infuses other parts of the 
Constitution, especially those related to socio- economic rights. For example, 
article 4 Const. recognises and protects the right of all citizens to work, where 
work is construed not only as a right but also a duty so that, through their work-
ing activity, each individual can contribute to the ‘material or spiritual progress 
of society’.47 Solidarity in relation to work performance is implicit also in arti-
cle 36(1) Const. providing that workers are entitled to a salary proportional to 
the quantity and quality of the job performed, but in any event sufficient to guar-
antee to the worker and their family a free and decent life. Similarly, article 37 
Const. mandates for equal salary treatment for working men and women for 
the same job and protects the working conditions of women in fulfilling their 
‘essential role in the family’ and in ensuring ‘appropriate protection for the 
mother and child’. The spirit of solidarity also prominently permeates article 38 
Const. in providing for specific welfare and/ or support services to citizens 
 46 Carlassare, “Solidarietà,” 46.
 47 Incidentally, labour also occupies a prominent place in the constitutional text, consider-
ing that it is the foundation upon which the whole Italian Republic is anchored: in fact, 






unable to work and without means of subsistence; accident, illness, disabil-
ity, old age and involuntary unemployment support to workers; and vocational 
training and education to disabled and handicapped persons. This provision is 
not to be read as an expression of the spirit of ‘brotherhood’ but as a clear duty 
of the state.48
Within the ambit of freedom of religion, article 8 Const. mandates that ‘all 
religious denominations shall be equally free before the law’ and this provi-
sion, read together with the prohibition against religious discrimination of 
article 3 Const., shall be construed as another example of solidarity, a value 
that religious intolerance destroys.49
With regards to family matters, article 29 Const. acknowledges and protects 
the rights of the family and the moral and legal equality of spouses, and this 
is usually construed as an example of the interpersonal or intergenerational 
solidarity enunciated above. Article 31(1) Const., provides that ‘[t] he Republic 
shall assist the development of a family and the fulfilment of its duties, with 
particular consideration for large families, through economic measures and 
other benefits’.
Article 32(1) Const. is also construed as entrenching solidarity- based values 
in protecting health as a fundamental right of the individual and as a collec-
tive interest and in guaranteeing free medical care for the indigents (so- called 
‘health solidarity’).
Implicitly, solidarity also infuses article 34 Const. on the right to educa-
tion, by mandating that primary education is compulsory and gratuitous, and 
that all capable and deserving students have the right to pursue their stud-
ies regardless of their economic capacity, as the State implements a system of 
scholarships, allowances and benefits to less advantaged families.
The right to vote enshrined in article 48 Const. is also seen as an expression 
of political solidarity entrenched in article 2 Const. Finally, article 53(1) Const. 
spells out a duty usually referred to as ‘social solidarity’ when it mandates that 
‘[e] very person shall contribute to public expenditure in accordance with their 
capabilities’.50 Social solidarity also permeates article 54 Const. providing for 
a duty to all citizens to ‘be loyal to the Republic and to uphold its Constitution 
and laws’.
This reading of articles 2 and 3 Const. (along with the other provisions on 
socio- economic and fundamental rights listed above) shows that solidarity 
shall be construed both as a right and a duty: on the one hand, by mandating 
 48 Carlassare, “Solidarietà,” 57– 58.
 49 Carlassare, “Solidarietà,” 55.
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that the Italian Republic expects the fulfilment of the fundamental duties 
of political, economic and social solidarity, article 2 Const. goes beyond the 
meaning of mere voluntary or charitable action51 and is rather construed as 
a duty engaging both the state and the individuals to act according to certain 
canons. On the other hand, in the provisions on socio- economic rights, soli-
darity becomes a right for the individual to expect some specific performance 
from public institutions that thus have a duty to act on the basis of solidarity 
and equality.
Issues of interpersonal or intergenerational solidarity and equality ex art. 2 
and 3 Const. have played a prominent role in Italian constitutional case law over 
these past few years, especially with regards to immigration issues in relation 
to fundamental rights. As an example, in ruling 192/ 2006 the ItCC ruled on soli-
darity in its connection to the right to health embedded in article 32 Const. The 
Justice of the Peace of Genova questioned the constitutional legitimacy of a 
specific provision contained in state law 286/ 1998 on immigration, whereby an 
expulsion decree could be executed also towards a (non- EU) foreign national, 
illegally present in the Italian territory, in a relationship with a pregnant Italian 
citizen, thus preventing him from providing adequate moral and material care 
and support to the woman. According to the trial judge, such a decree would 
infringe upon articles 2 and 32 Const. as it would limit or violate, among other 
things, the mandatory duty of solidarity linked to the right to health. In reject-
ing the claim, the ItCC held that the reasons of human solidarity are not in 
contrast with immigration laws enacted to provide for organised migratory 
flows and for the adequate reception and integration of foreign nationals. In 
confirming the above statement, rulings 64/ 2011 and 144/ 2011 further explained 
that solidarity is, however, expressed in the legislative provisions applying also 
to illegal immigrants the norms on refugee aid and international protection 
and in non- criminalising all human aid and assistance given in Italy to foreign 
individuals in such need; decision 250/ 2010 reached similar conclusions.
This overview of solidarity and equality as percolating from articles 2 and 
3 Const. shows that the type of interpersonal or intergenerational solidarity is 
a well- articulated principle in the Italian constitutional framework: in fact, it 
moves vertically from the individual to the community and central institutions 
and vice versa from central institutions to individuals, in a dynamic movement 
that brings reciprocal benefits to the parties involved.
 51 Gianluca Bascherini, “La solidarietà politica nell’esperienza costituzionale repubblicana,” 





4 Solidarity and Federalism
4.1 In General
When discussing solidarity, the focus is usually on fundamental or socio- 
economic rights and duties: in this sense, the study on solidarity and equal-
ity carried out so far in the Italian context is a good example of this common 
approach. However, I explained above that, aside from it being a general and/ 
or aspirational principle with a normative and prescriptive value, solidarity 
as a legal concept may acquire a very distinctive nuance within the ambit of 
federal theory: an analysis of solidarity would thus be incomplete without also 
considering this important facet of the principle.
In section 1, I argued that, while Italy is not a fully- fledged federation, there 
is a longstanding and quite contested relationship between solidarity and fed-
eralism. Among other things, federalism implies a decentralisation of powers, 
including fiscal powers, since the fiscal autonomy of the peripheral units is 
one of the elements that distinguishes a federal state from a unitary one. It is 
exactly this fiscal autonomy of the peripheral units that has created problems 
in Italy in the past. To better understand this, we need to go back to the socio- 
economic asymmetries characterising Italy.
Solidarity has emerged almost as an obsessive concern for Italian deci-
sion makers since unification in the 1860s, particularly because of the socio- 
economic disparities existing between the richer regions in the North and the 
poorer areas in the South, so that solidarity- based mechanisms have persis-
tently been invoked to contain these imbalances. Before the constitutional 
reform of 2001, one of the major worries in political circles was that a trans-
formation of Italy into a fully- fledged federation would amplify, rather than 
reduce, the socio- economic disparities between the North and the South. In 
other words, the fear was that federalism would be against the solidarity- based 
interests linking regions to each other and to the state.52
When in the 1990s the ln53 included federalism in its political agenda, it 
was understood, by non- ln voters, as the expression of a certain economic 
and political interest representative of the wealthier Northern Italy only, to the 
detriment of the rest: this contributed to the lack of popularity of federal ideas 
outside traditional ln strongholds. The ln fed into the North/ South divide in 
claiming that Rome used money coming from taxpayers in the North to subsi-
dise the South without giving back anything to the allegedly most hard- working 
 52 Lecours and Arban, “Italy and Nepal,” 187 et seq.
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part of the country. The ln insisted that each region should be responsible for 
its own money and deal with all local aspects without depending on interven-
tions from the centre. But the consequences of this federal project were seen as 
dire for the South: by vesting individual regions with more powers, especially 
in the fiscal domain, the wealthier areas in the North would risk becoming 
even wealthier to the detriment of the poorer regions in the South, severely 
penalised in such a scenario as they could no longer rely on central transfers. In 
other words, the federal ideas advocated by the ln were understood by many 
as the expression of the Northern selfishness towards the South that would run 
against the spirit of solidarity and equality.54
When in 2001 Title v of the Constitution was amended, it did not trans-
form Italy into a full- fledged federation, but it strengthened the (legislative 
and administrative) powers of regional governments and provided for a mild 
form of fiscal federalism. This is important for our narrative, considering that 
constitutional provisions on fiscal federalism exude solidarity concerns. When 
discussing the principle of solidarity in its specific connection with Italian 
regionalism, the following articles of the Italian Constitution need to be dis-
cussed: article 117 on the division of legislative powers between the regions 
and the central government; article 118 on horizontal and vertical subsidiarity, 
article 119 on fiscal federalism, and article 120 on loyal cooperation.
4.2 Solidarity and Division of Powers (Article 117 Const.)
Article 117 Const. enshrines the division of legislative powers between the two 
levels of government: article 117(2) Const. lists all subject matters falling within 
the exclusive legislative powers of the central government; article 117(3) Const. 
enumerates the subject matters falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of 
central and regional government,55 while article 117(4) Const. reserves all resid-
ual powers (e.g. powers not specifically detailed in the constitutional text) to 
regional governments. General solidarity and equality concerns, however, lurk 
behind some of the choices made by the constitutional legislator in dividing 
powers between central and regional governments. For example, article 117(2)(l) 
Const. provides that the central government has exclusive jurisdiction over 
civil and criminal law and procedure, as well as the administrative judicial sys-
tem; article 117(2)(m) Const. reserves to the exclusive jurisdiction of the central 
government the power to set the basic levels of benefits for the enjoyment of 
 54 Lecours and Arban, “Italy and Nepal,” 187 et seq.
 55 Article 117(3) Const. explains that when powers are concurring, State (or central) legisla-
tion is responsible for laying down fundamental principles, whilst regional governments 







social and civil rights; articles 117(2)(n) and (o) Const. assign to the exclusive 
power of the central state the regulation of general provisions on education 
and social security, respectively; article 117(2)(s) Const. reserves as the exclu-
sive competence of the national Parliament the power to legislate in areas such 
as environmental protection, ecosystem and cultural heritage.56
In the specific context of the division of powers, the principle of solidarity 
has been used by the ItCC as a justification for deviating from the way pow-
ers are distributed between the state and regional governments. For example, 
in ruling 10/ 2010 the ItCC upheld a state intervention that introduced a so- 
called social card in 2008 to help disadvantaged people buy necessary goods, 
in apparent violation with the regional power over services and public assis-
tance. The ItCC justified the state intervention by resorting to the principles of 
solidarity and equality to function as some sort of ‘national interest’ clause.57
4.3 Solidarity and Subsidiarity (Article 118 Const.)
Among the many novelties introduced by the 2001 constitutional reform, there 
was the entrenchment of the principle of subsidiarity in article 118. Article 
118(1) Const. provides that administrative functions belong to the level of gov-
ernment closest to the citizens (e.g. municipalities), unless they are attributed 
to a higher level of government (provinces, metropolitan cities, regions, or the 
State) if there is a need for uniform interpretation in a given subject matter 
pursuant to the principles of subsidiarity, differentiation, and adequacy (or 
proportionality). Article 118(1) Const. thus entrenches subsidiarity in its most 
classic understanding, as a tool where all the administrative functions that are 
best handled locally are assigned to the level of government closest to citizens.
For purposes of our discussion, however, it is article 118(4) Const. that 
acquires an interesting gloss. In fact, this provision mandates that
The State, regions, metropolitan cities, provinces and municipalities shall 
promote the autonomous initiatives of citizens, both as individuals and 
as members of associations, relating to activities of general interest, on 
the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.
 56 This exclusive reservation has been explained by the need to set uniform terms of envi-
ronmental protection across the national territory based on the need to offer and guar-
antee the use of water resources according to solidarity- based criteria (among other 
things): ex multis, see ItCC rulings 93/ 2017 and 246/ 2009.
 57 Angelo Schillaci, “Governo dell’economia e gestione dei conflitti nell’Unione 
Europea: Appunti sul principio di solidarietà,” Costituzionalismo.it, no. 1 (March 2017): 40, 
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This provision enshrines the so- called horizontal aspect of subsidiarity, one 
that relates to the ‘sharing of competences and initiatives between public and 
private actors’58 so that, in this sense, ‘subsidiarity could be conceived like a 
sort of ‘division of labor’ between public sector and civil society (person, fam-
ily, non- profit organization, market)’.59 Consequently, on the basis of subsidi-
arity as enshrined in the Constitution, the State and other local governments 
‘shall promote the autonomous initiatives of citizens, both as individuals 
and as members of associations, relating to activities of general interest’. As 
explained by one scholar, this provision ‘aims to promote general interests’ and 
is addressed to ‘public authorities and private bodies’.60
Subsidiarity implies cooperation, and so it can be seen here as a cooper-
ative principle: in this sense, the principle is linked to solidarity understood 
as cooperation.61 Some theorists confirm this allegation and argue that this 
specific entrenchment of subsidiarity can be conceived as an expression of 
solidarity: in fact, article 118(4) Const. invites public and private actors alike 
to collaborate in the ‘arrangement of services to the individual, while respect-
ing the complexity of the needs of each single beneficiary’.62 Consequently, 
article 118(4) Const. entrenches the idea of solidarity between the individual 
and the community:63 in this sense, it could be understood as an expression of 
article 2 Const. in the part where it provides for the recognition and protection 
of inviolable basic rights of the individual as part of the social groups in which 
one’s personality is expressed.
4.4 Solidarity and Fiscal Federalism (Article 119 Const.)
Because of the specific nature of the constitutional and political debate over 
federalism, it is with regard to article 119 Const. that issues of solidarity and 
equality prominently come into play. Article 119 Const. on fiscal federalism 
was one of the most notable novelties of the 2001 constitutional reform. The 
first two paragraphs of article 119 Const. mandate that regions (along with 
other local self- governments) shall enjoy financial autonomy of revenues and 
 58 Alessandro Colombo, “The ‘Lombardy Model’: Subsidiarity- informed Regional 
Governance,” Social Policy and Administration 42, no. 2 (April 2008): 182; see also Erika 
Arban, “Re- centralizing Subsidiarity, Interpretations by the Italian Constitutional Court,” 
Regional and Federal Studies 25, no. 2 (2015): 129.
 59 Colombo, “The Lombardy Model,” 182; Arban, “Re- centralizing Subsidiarity,” 129.
 60 Claudia Tubertini, “Public Administration in the Light of the New Title V of the Italian 
Constitution,” European Public Law 12, no. 1 (2006): 40.
 61 Schillaci, “Governo dell’economia,” 41.
 62 Tondi delle Mura, “La solidarietà fra etica ed estetica,” 10.















expenses, and shall set and levy taxes and collect revenues of their own, in 
compliance with the Constitution, with tax system principles and with the 
principles of coordination of state finance; furthermore, regions and other 
local entities also share in the tax revenues related to their respective territo-
ries. Article 119(3) Const. introduces equalisation payments, a solidarity- based 
tool that is common to several federal or decentralised systems: the paragraph 
mandates that national legislation shall provide for equalisation funds (with 
no allocation constraints) for territories having a lower per- capita taxable 
capacity. As the constitutional text further provides (article 119(4) Const.), 
and as the same ItCC has explained, all revenues that regions (and other local 
governments) raise in accordance to articles 119(2)(3) Const. exhaust the list 
of resources that allow them to fully finance the public functions attributed 
to them. However, article 119(5) Const. further provides that the central gov-
ernment shall allocate supplementary resources and adopt special measures 
in favour of specific regions or other local governments to promote economic 
development, social cohesion and solidarity, to reduce economic and social 
imbalances, to foster the exercise of individual rights or to achieve goals other 
than those pursued in the ordinary implementation of their functions. I will 
revert to this paragraph in a moment, but to complete the overview of this 
constitutional provision, it shall be recalled that article 119(6) Const. mandates 
that regions and other local governments have their own properties and may 
resort to indebtedness only as a means of funding investments, while state 
guarantees on loans contracted for this purpose are not admissible.
We noted above that article 119 Const. was one of the most important inno-
vations introduced by the 2001 constitutional amendment, but it did not come 
without concerns for solidarity. To better clarify this point, it might be helpful 
to point out how the previous version of article 119 Const. had a rather different 
gloss, as it specifically targeted Southern regions in requiring the national gov-
ernment to statutorily grant special contributions to individual regions, par-
ticularly in order to valorise the Mezzogiorno and the Islands.64 In any event, 
contrary to the interpersonal or intergenerational connotation of solidarity 
enshrined in article 2 Const. and outlined above, article 119 Const. relates to 
a more ‘public’ aspect of the principle, as this provision requires the central 
government to play a pivotal role in assisting disadvantaged regions and con-
taining the imbalances between richer and poorer areas through equalisation 
 64 Patroni Griffi, “Federalismo e Mezzogiorno,” 3.
Mezzogiorno is a term commonly used to refer to the South of Italy, whereas the term 
Islands usually refers to Sicilia, Sardegna, but also to the myriad of smaller islands posi-
tioned in the Mediterranean Sea that are also considered disadvantaged.
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payments. However, it is always the principles of solidarity and equality 
entrenched in articles 2 and 3 Const. that constitute the basis for solidarity 
in article 119 Const. In other words, the exact contours of solidarity are often 
porous, as the fiscal component is never completely separated from the more 
moral nuance of the principle. This means that the various facets of solidarity 
overlap, making it a very fluid value.
As anticipated above, it is the allocation of supplementary resources and 
implementation of special financial interventions in favour of specific local 
governments (article 119(5) Const.) that has raised most concerns, and the 
ItCC has been called into play many times to clarify the scope of this provi-
sion. In fact, regional governments have often lamented that the central state 
has resorted to article 119(5) Const. to control regional or local resources, even 
when this was prohibited by the Constitution. In ruling 16/ 2004, for example, 
Regione Umbria questioned the constitutional validity of a few provisions 
included in the 2002 Budgetary Law, in particular in the part where it cre-
ated a state Fund aimed at financing the adoption of development and ren-
ovation programs for municipal territories. A significant portion of this Fund 
was reserved for smaller municipalities, particularly those located in Southern 
Italy. According to Regione Umbria, the creation of this Fund infringed upon, 
among other things, the fiscal autonomy of regions as the Fund could not be 
traced back to the type of interventions listed in article 119(5) Const. Rather, it 
was destined to unspecified recipients, even if the provision seemed to favour 
smaller municipalities in the South. The ItCC explained that the central gov-
ernment cannot directly finance interventions (with allocation constraints) 
in favour of municipalities, for activities that fall within the jurisdiction of 
the latter and that are outside the subject matters of exclusive national com-
petence; likewise, the state cannot directly finance special interventions in 
favour of certain municipalities as per article 119(5) Const. In particular, it is 
not admissible for the state to provide for such financing in areas belonging to 
the exclusive competence of the regional governments. Furthermore, the types 
of intervention indicated in article 119(5) Const. shall be considered additional 
to the integral financing provided for by article 119(4) Const. of tasks belonging 
to local governments. They shall refer to equalisation goals or goals other than 
the normal performance of their functions and shall be destined to specifically 
identified local governments. In light of the above, the ItCC concluded that the 
challenged state provision did not comply with constitutional requirements, 
it being a mere direct transfer of state funds from the state to municipalities 
for purposes set by state law, and foreign to the constitutional architecture 
painted by article 119 Const. Similar arguments were confirmed in ItCC rulings 
37/ 2004 and 49/ 2004.
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ItCC ruling 222/ 2005 also falls along the same lines: here, the Court 
explained that, within the framework sketched by article 119 Const., the cen-
tral government cannot establish its own financial support in subject matters 
falling entirely within regional (exclusive) legislative jurisdiction; neither can 
it establish sectoral funds to finance regional activities. The only exceptions 
in this regard are those enshrined in article 119(5) Const., allowing the cen-
tral government to finance activities that would normally fall within exclusive 
regional competences, as long as the goal is to promote economic develop-
ment, socio- economic cohesion and social solidarity.
With ruling 451/ 2006, the ItCC upheld a state legislative provision creating a 
fund for special housing rent: the objective of this intervention was to broaden 
the number of beneficiaries of subsidised rate leases and thus remove barriers 
to the enjoyment of housing especially in those territories where rents are par-
ticularly high.
With ruling 45/ 2008, the ItCC upheld as complying with article 119(5) Const. 
a state law providing for the allocation, by the Ministry of Health, of significant 
sums of money to Southern regions to ensure the continuation of special inter-
ventions for the diffusion of oncological screening. The ItCC saw this as an 
example of a special intervention pursuant to article 119(5) Const. as it aimed 
at fostering social solidarity, and the effective exercise of individual rights.
An interesting ruling of the ItCC on solidarity and article 119 Const. is 118/ 
2015: here, the court declared the unconstitutionality of some sections of a 
Regional Law of Veneto calling, among other things, a referendum asking cit-
izens whether they would be in favour of keeping locally at least 80 % of the 
taxes paid every year to the state, and whether the region should keep at least 
80 % of the taxes levied in the regional territory. The ItCC argued that these 
two questions had the effect of significantly altering the balance of public 
finance, thus jeopardising the solidarity- based links between the people living 
in the region and the state. Among other things, the proposals affected some 
structural elements of the national system of financial planning necessary to 
ensure the cohesion and solidarity in the state, as well as its legal and eco-
nomic unity. The two questions implicitly impacted solidarity among regions, 
between the region and the state, and even among individuals because, as the 
court indicated, the referendum proposed to subtract a significant portion of 
public finance to direct it to the exclusive advantage of a single region and its 
inhabitants.
To complete this survey of solidarity- based mechanisms as enshrined in 
article 119 Const., one last question needs to be asked: does article 119 Const. 
extend this type of solidarity duty also horizontally, e.g. among regions? This 
question was addressed by the ItCC in ruling 176/ 2012, when the Court was 
The Principle of Solidarity as a Principle of Equality 123
called upon to decide whether article 119(5) Const. also encompasses a duty 
upon ‘virtuous regions’ to support less advantaged regions, so that the duty to 
support less developed regions falls not only within the jurisdiction of the cen-
tral government but also that of richer regions. The ItCC clarified that equali-
sation and other solidarity- based mechanisms can only come from the central 
government (thus vertically), as the intention of the constitutional legislator 
was to provide only for vertical equalisation payments.
4.5 Solidarity and Loyalty (Loyal Cooperation) (Article 120(2) Const.)
As I have extensively illustrated elsewhere, federal theory often links solidarity 
to the doctrine of federal loyalty or Bundestreue, the latter being a notion devel-
oped in German constitutionalism and reflecting an idea of loyalty or faithful-
ness to the federal compact.65 Bundestreue implies, among other things, some 
form of cooperation in trust and good faith between central and peripheral 
governments, including the duties to support and consult one another and 
coordinate their actions.66 This explains why cooperative federalism is often 
construed as an expression of Bundestreue. Yet, the two are not perfectly iden-
tical: in fact, Bundestreue ‘is not exhausted in the idea of intergovernmental 
relations and overlapping jurisdiction’ between central and peripheral govern-
ments, as it also includes dimensions traceable back to mutual aid and assis-
tance that are well incarnated by the concept of solidarity.67
In article 120(2) Const., as amended in 2001, specific reference is made to 
loyal cooperation in the ambit of ‘substitution powers’ that the central gov-
ernment can use in the event the periphery fails to properly exercise these 
powers.68
According to the ItCC, this article protects the legal and economic unity 
of the state,69 and it can be seen as another example of solidarity promoting 
 65 Arban, “Federal solidarity,” 247.
 66 Dirk Brand, “The South African Constitution – Three Crucial Issues for Future 
Development,” Stellenbosch Law Review 9, no. 2 (1998): 186; Arban, “Federal solidarity,” 247.
 67 Arban, “Federal solidarity,” 252.
 68 More specifically, article 120(2) Const. mandates that ‘[t] he Government can subsume 
the authority of a Region, metropolitan city, province or municipality if it fails to comply 
with international rules and treaties or EU legislation, or in case of grave danger for public 
safety and security, or whenever such action is necessary in order to preserve legal or eco-
nomic unity and in particular to ensure the minimum level of benefits relating to civil and 
social entitlements, regardless of the geographic borders of a local authority. The law shall 
lay down the procedures to ensure that subsidiary powers are exercised in compliance 
with the principles of subsidiarity and loyal co- operation’.













equality, as it requires the state to collaborate with regions on an equal basis: the 
ItCC has explained in ruling 222/ 2005 that loyal cooperation requires a real and 
current agreement between the state and regional governments in order to be 
complied with. In other words, it is not sufficient that the central government 
‘hears’ regional governments, because in such situations the constitutional 
autonomy recognised for regions would be seriously restrained. Without a tra-
ditional federal senate or upper chamber in the Italian legal system, the ideal 
locus for the various levels of government (state and regions) to dialogue and 
find a common understanding is the State- Regions Conference or the Unified 
Conference.70
4.6 Other Solidarity- Based Decisions in State- Regions Controversies
To complete this overview of solidarity, it is useful to briefly discuss two other 
ItCC rulings where solidarity as a principle of equality was called into question 
in state- region controversies.
In the aftermath of the 2008 worldwide economic crisis, driven by the need 
to improve the overall credibility of Italy in the global context, a constitu-
tional law was passed in 2012 to amend some sections of the Constitution: the 
string of amendments mainly dealt with the constitutional entrenchment of 
the principles of balanced budget and debt sustainability for all tiers of gov-
ernment, along with the respect of EU obligations. In ruling 88/ 2014 the ItCC 
made reference to these amendments and argued that the fulfilment of the 
obligation of public debt sustainability should be construed as a responsibil-
ity that, along with the principles of intergenerational solidarity and equal-
ity of articles 2 and 3 Const., belongs not only to public institutions but also 
to each individual citizen when acting towards the others, including future 
generations. As explained by one scholar, the rationale for this constitutional 
change was that, if public debt becomes unsustainable, the responsibility for 
this falls on everyone, private individuals and public bodies alike: for this rea-
son, the twin values of solidarity and equality should inform all behaviours.71 
All citizens thus bear the sacrifice to guarantee the sustainability of public 
debt: this duty is grounded in the constitutional principles of solidarity and 
equality.72
 70 See ex multis ItCC ruling 297/ 2012. The ‘system of conferences’ was introduced in Italy in 
1997, and it includes the permanent state- regions conference (composed by the president 
of each region, of each autonomous province, by the president of the council of ministers 
and by the ministers involved in the specific question) and the state- cities conference; 
the unified conference is composed by the members of both state- cities and state- regions 
conference.
 71 Ruggeri, “Eguaglianza,” 22.
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Another interesting ItCC ruling is 331/ 2010: here, the Italian government 
questioned the constitutionality of a string of provisions contained in various 
regional laws and pertaining to the decision, made by some regional govern-
ments, to exclude regional territories from the installation of nuclear plants 
and storage unless a preliminary agreement was reached between regions and 
the state regarding the specific location of these plants. The ItCC ruled against 
these regional laws on various grounds, but most importantly was the argument 
whereby regions cannot unilaterally avoid the sacrifices that come with the 
enactment of a state law with a national scope (in the specific case, the sector of 
energy production), because this would violate the mandatory duties of socio- 
economic solidarity entrenched in the Constitution. Solidarity was invoked in 
this case to soften the self- centred behaviours of certain regions faced with leg-
islation enforced at the national level in the interest of the whole country.
In conclusion, it is worth noting that scholars like Patroni Griffi harshly crit-
icised many novelties introduced in 2001 that, in his opinion, betray solidarity, 
in particular the new fiscal system introduced by article 119 Const.:73 in fact, he 
contends that asymmetrical federalism, or any form of federalism that puts ter-
ritories in competition with one another, should be rejected as non- responding 
to the spirit of solidarity that animates the constitutional framework.74 The 
only form of federalism acceptable for Italy would be ‘unitary’, in the sense 
of reducing asymmetries and inequalities among the various territories.75 The 
risk of creating territorial asymmetries requires finding a balance between ter-
ritorial pluralism, solidarity, subsidiarity and equality.76 In this sense, scholars 
have explained that the constitutional reform of 2001 was meant to ‘delineate 
some sort of Italian way to a unitary and solidarity- based federalism’.77
5 Conclusion: Solidarity as a Principle of Equality
Prominently entrenched in article 2 Const. among the fundamental principles 
of the Constitution, solidarity crosses the whole constitutional text,78 thus 
 73 Patroni Griffi, “Federalismo e Mezzogiorno,” 6.
 74 Patroni Griffi, “Federalismo e Mezzogiorno,” 6.
 75 Schillaci, “Governo dell’economia,” 42. Although the use of the term ‘unitary’ to define 
federalism might appear contradictory, the author probably refers to a form of ‘symmet-
rical’ or ‘uniform’ federalism.
 76 Schillaci, “Governo dell’economia,” 38.
 77 Gian Candido De Martin, “Riforme autonomistiche incompiute e problemi culturali,” 
Amministrazione in Cammino (May 2013): 2, https:// www.amministrazioneincammino.
luiss.it/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2013/ 01/ GCDeMartin_ studi- onoreN_ Greco.pdf.















informing not only interpersonal and intergenerational relationships, but also 
the relationships between public institutions and individuals and, eventually, 
between the various levels of government, both in the sense of (federal) sol-
idarity and of Bundestreue (or loyal cooperation). This chapter attempted to 
show how the principle of solidarity plays a crucial role in the Italian legal 
and constitutional architecture: as such, solidarity can be construed as an aspi-
rational principle informing not only the constitutional provisions on funda-
mental and socio- economic rights, but also the constitutional provisions on 
autonomy and federalism. In other words, in the intentions of the drafters, 
solidarity was not an abstract or empty value, but an ideal that should acquire 
concrete sense in connection with the twin principle of equality.
In conclusion, this chapter advances the idea that solidarity as an aspira-
tional principle tends to identify two major values: equality and unity. In fact, 
it appears rather clearly that, intrinsic in the notion of solidarity is a sense 
of equality, so that solidarity can be construed as a principle of equality. The 
interpersonal or intergenerational solidarity emerging from the combined 
reading of articles 2 and 3 Const. postulates the ideal of equality of all individ-
uals in the enjoyment of their fundamental individual rights, including socio- 
economic rights. Furthermore, the solidarity- based mechanisms delineated in 
the various paragraphs of article 119 Const. are premised on the assumption 
that all regions should enjoy, as much as possible, the same equal conditions 
in terms of socio- economic and fiscal powers, so that solidarity can be con-
strued as a tool to further fiscal equality and reduce fiscal imbalances. Finally, 
solidarity in the specific understanding of loyal cooperation as enshrined in 
article 120(2) Const. seems to suggest that the central government shall take 
into account the role of regions, almost as if these two levels of government 
were equal in decision- making.
Yet, solidarity is also a principle of unity: in fact, it plays a very important role 
as an aspirational concept that can be used to pursue and foster social cohesion 
in a state such as Italy, characterised by deep socio- economic asymmetries. In 
this sense, solidarity can be read as an aspirational constitutional principle that 
identifies a common value to seek the unity of the people and of the various 
units that compose the state even under conditions of profound diversity.
Unfortunately, however, despite the prominence and elevated moral and 
legal value that the Constitution assigns to solidarity as a principle of equal-
ity, inequalities and obstacles (that the state has a constitutional duty to 
remove) have dramatically increased over these past few decades in Italy.79 
 79 Carlassare, “Solidarietà,” 58. 
 
The Principle of Solidarity as a Principle of Equality 127
The North- South socio- economic cleavage seems without effective solutions, 
and is exacerbated by the role played by corruption in local and national poli-
tics. But inequalities are not a prerogative of Northern vs. Southern regions, as 
they increasingly shape the social sphere, thus jeopardising social cohesion. 
In times of global crisis such as we are currently experiencing, some scholars 
invite us to look back at the Constitution and its aspirational values of soli-
darity and equality as guidance in personal and institutional decisions to be 
made.80
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 chapter 5
Does Regional Autonomy Improve Local Public 
Services in More Diverse Regions?
Andrea Filippetti
1 Introduction
This chapter examines the relationship between diversity, access to local pub-
lic services and regional autonomy. It starts from a common belief that the 
presence of marked diversity in communities might impair the functioning of 
the welfare state. By looking at the satisfaction of citizens about local public 
services – school, health and local policy – in European regions, this chapter 
shows empirically that citizens tend to be less satisfied about public services 
in regions characterised by higher diversity. This can question the access to 
public services in heterogenous places. In a second step, we examine whether 
regional autonomy can mediate this problem by relying on fiscal federalism 
theory, which argues that in the presence of heterogeneity across jurisdictions, 
a decentralised management of public services is more efficient. We find that 
in diverse regions, regional autonomy improves the satisfaction of citizens 
concerning local public services. This suggests that regional autonomy can 
represent a possible solution to guarantee equal access to public services in 
heterogenous societies.
The next ‘Europe of regions’ will profoundly differ from the present one. In 
fact, one of the most pressing challenges in many European countries stems 
from a relentless increase in the heterogeneity of population. This is the result 
of intra- European Union (EU) mobility, and migration from outside the EU. 
While some countries – such as France and the United Kingdom – have already 
experienced such differences within their borders due to their relationships 
with former colonies, and others – such as Germany – have experienced more 
recent flows related to job opportunities, for most European countries and 
regions this will be a new phenomenon for public policy to cope with.1
 1 Gregory B. Christainsen, “Biology, Immigration, and Public Policy,” Kyklos 65, no. 2 (2012), 
164– 178; James Dennison and Andrew Geddes, “Brexit and the Perils of ‘Europeanised’ 
Migration,” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 8 (2018), 1– 17.
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One of the consequences of this process is the increasing pressure on the wel-
fare states, particularly regarding the provision of local basic services, such as 
health, public housing, local policy and education. Alesina and Glaeser argue that 
‘one natural implication of our conclusion that fractionalization reduces redistri-
bution is that if Europe becomes more heterogeneous due to immigration, ethnic 
divisions will be used to challenge the generous welfare state’.2 As such, they raise 
a concern about a trade- off between a generous immigration policy and a gener-
ous welfare state. This is crucial for the European Union, since mobility of people 
represents one of its cornerstones. In the words of Britain’s ambassador to Berlin, 
Sir Sebastian Wood, ‘it is freedom of movement for workers, and not freedom of 
movement for ‘welfare shopping’’.3 This problem has been restated recently in 
a commentary by Branko Milanovic, a leading expert on global inequality, who 
argues that welfare states attract a lot of unskilled migrants.4
Since in most cases local public services are either provided or managed 
at the regional or local level, the regions – and the regional governments – 
are expected to play an increasing role in managing this process. This issue 
has been addressed at the subnational level by research limited to the United 
States, precisely because public spending at the state level is of a different kind 
than at the country level.5 This chapter aims to inform this debate by looking 
at the issue of diversity and the provision of local public services in European 
regions.
Several studies have enquired whether the presence of a highly heteroge-
neous population reduces the quality of local public policies. The answer is 
positive in most cases,6 although much of the research has addressed ethnic 
diversity and has been carried out either in the Unites States or in developing 
countries, in which these ethnic differences are considerable.7
 2 Alberto Alesina and Edward Ludwig Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A 
World of Difference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 11.
 3 Tom Barfield, “UK asks for German help to stop ‘welfare shopping’,” The Local, 18 Febuary 
2016, https:// www.thelocal.de/ 20160218/ uk- asks- german- help- to- stop- welfare- shopping.
 4 Branko Milanovic, “Migration Vs. the Welfare State?,” the Globalist, 16 May 2017, https:// 
www.theglobalist.com/ migration- vs- the- welfare- state/ .
 5 David M. Cutler, Douglas W. Elmendorf and Richard J. Zeckhauser, “Demographic 
Characteristics and the Public Bundle,” National Bureau of Economic Research NBER 
Working Paper, no. 4283 (February 1993), 1– 18, https:// doi.org/ 10.3386/ w4283,.
 6 For a recent review see Holger Stichnoth and Karine van der Straeten, “Ethnic Diversity, 
Public Spending, and Individual Support for The Welfare State: A Review of the Empirical 
Literature,” Journal of Economic Surveys 27, no. 2 (2013), 364– 389, https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ 
j.1467- 6419.2011.00711.x.
 7 See for example Tom Clark, Robert D. Putnam and Edward Fieldhouse, The Age of 














Decentralisation and regional autonomy have often been seen as an effec-
tive institutional setting to provide local public services efficiently and effec-
tively, particularly in the presence of heterogeneity of the population. It is not 
by chance that the United States, Canada and Australia, countries that have 
their roots in migration, are among the most decentralised countries in the 
world, being in fact federal states. This is quite a common fact: countries where 
there are ethnic or linguistic minorities tend to be either federal or highly 
decentralised, such as for instance Canada, India, Nigeria and South Africa, 
to name a few. This is also evident in unitary countries – taking the form of 
asymmetric federalism – where there are minorities whose regional govern-
ments benefit from specific augmented forms of autonomy, as is the case in the 
United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy.8
Federalism, fiscal devolution and political decentralisation have been the 
major institutional reforms that have been carried out with the aim of reducing 
the gap, perceived as increasingly larger by citizens, between the government 
and territories.9 For these reasons, over the past decades, several countries 
have carried out reforms that go in the direction of ‘bringing the government 
closer to the people’.10 We can mention major constitutional reforms in Italy 
and Spain, as well as recent reforms in France; but also a stronger ‘voice’ rising 
from the bottom, through which regions claim greater autonomy, as the cases 
of the referendums in Scotland, Cataluña, and those recently experienced in 
two regions in the North of Italy, suggest.
This chapter brings together these two streams of research, both of which 
have addressed the provision of local public service and public policies, but 
from a different angle. The former has addressed the relationship between 
diversity and local public policies; the latter has dealt with the role of decen-
tralisation and regional authority in the provision of local public services. 
University Press, 2013); Edward Miguel and Mary Kay Gugerty, “Ethnic Diversity, Social 
Sanctions, and Public Goods in Kenya,” Journal of Public Economics 89, no. 11 (2005), 
2325– 2368; Andreas P. Kyriacou, “Ethnic Segregation and the Quality of Government: The 
Importance of Regional Diversity,” Constitutional Political Economy 23, no. 2 (2012), 78– 101.
 8 Roger D. Congleton, Andreas Kyriacou and Jordi Bacaria, “A Theory of Menu 
Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement,” Constitutional Political Economy 14, 
no. 3 (2003), 167– 190.
 9 Jorge Martinez- Vazquez, Santiago Lago- Peñas and Agnese Sacchi, “The Impact of 
Fiscal Decentralization: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Surveys 31, no. 4 (2016), 1095– 
1129, https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ joes.12182; Luis Diaz- Serrano and Andrés Rodríguez- Pose, 
“Decentralization, Subjective Well- Being, and the Perception of Institutions,” Kyklos 65, 
no. 2 (2012), 179– 193, https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ j.1467- 6435.2012.00533.x.
 10 Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe and Arjan H. Schakel, “Measuring Regional Authority,” 
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More particularly, we investigate the relationship between diversity and the 
provision of local public service for European regions, exploring the follow-
ing two research questions: i. Does diversity affect the provision of local public 
services? ii. Is regional autonomy a moderator between diversity and the provi-
sion of local public services? We do not look specifically at ethnic diversity, but 
we rather address the issue of national diversity; this allows us to extend the 
research to a wide sample of regions hence addressing a broader phenomenon 
which is relevant for EU policy.
The empirical analysis is based on 167 European regions. In order to measure 
the provision of local public goods at the regional level we employ the compos-
ite indicator developed by The Quality of Government (QoG Institute based on 
the citizens’ perception about local public services.11 Hence, in this chapter 
the provision of local public services is measured in terms of citizens’ satis-
faction. On the one hand, as a subjective measure it does not assure a perfect 
overlap with the real functioning of public services. On the other hand, when 
it comes to policy, the perception of citizens is relevant, in that it drives their 
decisions. As far as the level of regional autonomy is concerned, we employ the 
Regional Authority Index developed by Hooghe, Gary and Schakel;12 these two 
indicators have a number of strengths and have been increasingly employed in 
this type of studies.13 Finally, a variable taking into account the diverse com-
position of the population – a diversity index – is developed following other 
studies;14 the index is based on the census of 2011 and considers three types of 
residents: native citizens, foreign EU residents, and foreign non- EU residents.
 11 Quality of Government Institute of the University of Gothenborg, “Measuring the 
Quality of Government and Subnational Variation,” Report for the European Commission 
Directorate- General Regional Policy Directorate Policy Development (December 2010), 
1– 48, https:// ec.europa.eu/ regional_ policy/ sources/ docgener/ studies/ pdf/ 2010_ govern-
ment_ 1.pdf; Nicholas Charron and Victor Lapuente, “Why Do Some Regions in Europe 
Have Higher Quality of Government?,” QoG Working Paper Series, no. 1 (January 2011), 
1– 38, https:// www.pol.gu.se/ digitalAssets/ 1357/ 1357846_ 2011_ 1_ charron_ lapuente.pdf.
 12 Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Arjan H. Schakel, “Operationalizing Regional 
Authority: A Coding Scheme for 42 Countries, 1950– 2006,” Regional and Federal Studies 
18, no. 2– 3 (2008), 123– 142.
 13 See for example Nicholas Charron, Lewis Dijkstra, and Victor Lapuente, “Regional 
Governance Matters: Quality of Government within European Union Member States,” 
Regional Studies 48, no. 1 (2014), 68– 90; Roberto Ezcurra and Andrés Rodríguez- Pose, 
“Political Decentralization, Economic Growth and Regional Disparities in the OECD,” 
Regional Studies 47, no. 3 (2012), 1– 14, https:// doi.org/ 10.1080/ 00343404.2012.731046.
 14 Alberto Alesina and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Segregation and the Quality of Government 
in a Cross Section of Countries,” The American Economic Review 101, no. 5 (2011), 1872– 
1911; Kyriacou, “Ethnic Segregation and the Quality of Government,” 166– 180; Ceren 










We find evidence that the presence of a heterogeneous population com-
position in the region is associated to a relatively worse performance in the 
provision of local public goods; regional autonomy can act, only partially, as a 
moderating mechanism between diversity and local public services.
The chapter is organised as follows. In the following section we put forward 
two hypotheses on the grounds of research on diversity and public policies, 
and research on fiscal federalism; section three presents our measures of pub-
lic services, regional authority and diversity. Section four presents the empir-
ical strategy and the results, while section five discusses them and concludes.
2 Local Public Services, Diversity and Regional Autonomy: Two 
Hypotheses to Be Tested
This chapter aims to bridge two different streams of research. The first deals 
with the impact of diversity on the provision of local public services.15 The 
second deals with the role of federalism and regional autonomy, as a desirable 
institutional setting to deliver local public policies in the presence of heteroge-
neous communities. In what follows we derive two hypotheses regarding these 
two strands of research which will be tested in the empirical part.
2.1 Diversity, Local Public Goods and Local Public Policies
The provision of local public policies seems to become more problematic in 
the presence of a heterogeneous population. Alesina and Glaeser, for instance, 
foresee a reduction of the size of the welfare state in Europe as a result of 
increased immigration and fractionalisation.16 Empirical research finds that 
social spending, such as expenditure for public schools, government transfers, 
health spending etc. tend to be all negatively correlated with diversity.17 Several 
studies have addressed the phenomenon of ethnic diversity and the provision 
of public goods provision, particularly in developing countries where this 
phenomenon is more acute, suggesting several theoretical mechanisms and 
Innovation: Evidence from Dutch Micro- Data,” IZA Journal of Migration 2, no. 1 (2013), 
1– 18, https:// doi.org/ 10.1186/ 2193- 9039- 2- 18; Ceren Ozgen et al., “Does Cultural Diversity 
of Migrant Employees Affect Innovation?,” International Migration Review 48, no. 1 
(September 2014), 377– 416, https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ imre.12138.
 15 In the remainder of the chapter the provision of local public services means the citizens’ 
satisfaction about them.
 16 Alesina and Glaeser, Fighting Poverty.
 17 Stichnoth and van der Straeten, “Ethnic Diversity, Public Spending, and Individual 
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finding empirical evidence that ethnic diversity tends to undermine local pub-
lic policies, e.g. education and health.18 Alesina, Baqir and Easterly find that 
the shares of spending on productive public goods in US cities are inversely 
related to the city’s ethnic fragmentation, even after controlling for other 
socio-economic and demographic determinants.19 Cross- country studies tend 
to confirm these results.20
Two main possible arguments have been suggested to explain this finding. 
The first is an economic argument, and it foresees an increase in the demand of 
public welfare as a result of a more heterogeneous population. This is particu-
larly true when migrants are relatively poorer than domestic citizens, which 
brings about an increase in the competition for local public goods. This will 
lead to – ceteris paribus – a deterioration in the provision of public services. 
Further, greater inequalities between groups have been found to undermine 
institutions and reduce government quality.21
The second argument is more sociological in nature. As Stichnoth and van 
der Straeten explain, ‘[i] f citizens are more supportive of redistribution when 
people from their own ethnic group benefit from it, ethnic diversity will reduce 
the support for redistribution, which in turn will tend to decrease the actual 
level of redistribution’.22 Communities comprising of different ethnic or social 
groups can also lead to lower interaction, trust and social cohesion,23 relying 
 18 See for example James Habyarimana et al., “Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public 
Goods Provision?,” American Political Science Review 101, no. 4 (2007), 709– 725, https:// 
doi.org/ 10.1017/ S0003055407070499; Miguel and Gugerty, “Ethnic Diversity,”.
 19 Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir and William Easterly, “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions,” 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, no. 4 (1999), 1243– 1284, https:// doi.org/ 10.1162/ 
003355399556269.
 20 Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara, “Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance,” 
Journal of Economic Literature 43, no. 3 (September 2005), 762– 800, https:// doi.org/ 
10.1257/ 002205105774431243; Stichnoth and van der Straeten, “Ethnic Diversity, Public 
Spending, and Individual Support for The Welfare State,” 364– 389.
 21 Andreas P. Kyriacou, “Ethnic Group Inequalities and Governance: Evidence from 
Developing Countries,” Kyklos 6, no. 1 (2013), 78– 101, https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ kykl.12012.
 22 Stichnoth and van der Straeten, “Ethnic Diversity, Public Spending, and Individual 
Support for The Welfare State,” 370.
 23 See for example Dietlind Stolle, Stuart Soroka and Richard Johnston, “When Does 
Diversity Erode Trust? Neighborhood Diversity, Interpersonal Trust and the Mediating 
Effect of Social Interactions,” Political Studies 56, no. 1 (2008), 57– 75; Melissa J. Marschall 
and Dietlind Stolle, “Race and the City: Neighborhood Context and the Development of 
Generalized Trust,” Political Behavior 26, no. 2 (2004), 125– 153; Silvia Camussi, Anna Laura 
Mancini and Pietro Tommasino, “Does Trust Influence Social Expenditures? Evidence 
from Local Governments,” Kyklos 71, no. 1 (2018), 59– 85, https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ kykl.12162; 














on the idea that an individual’s behaviour and engagement are affected by the 
characteristics of her neighbours:
People (both natives and immigrants) generally prefer to live among peo-
ple with the same background and are less likely to be willing to share 
resources with those who they perceive as different from themselves. 
They prefer to interact socially with others who share the same ethnic 
heritage, the same socioeconomic status, the same lifestyle, and who 
therefore share common interests, experiences and tastes or, put simply, 
people they have more to talk about with.24
This has been recently documented not only in the urban areas of the United 
States, but also in several European countries.25
For the reasons outlined above we derive the following hypothesis #1:
Hip#1: the higher the level of diversity in a region, the lower the perfor-
mance in the provision of local public services.
2.2 Regional Autonomy, Diversity and Public Services
A central mechanism which connects diversity with dysfunctionality in pub-
lic policy is the heterogeneity of preferences, in that heterogeneous tastes 
across ethnic groups are the channel through which diversity affects collec-
tive action.26 In their study on ethnic diversity and public goods in Kenya, 
Miguel and Gugerty discuss the implications of decentralisation of local 
public goods in communities characterised by high heterogeneity, and they 
raise two important arguments against the centralisation of public services in 
these cases.27 Firstly, in many less developed countries, central governments 
underprovide recurrent expenses. Secondly, centralisation of funding could 
lead to more regional and ethnic favouritism in the allocation of national gov-
ernment funds.
Importance of Religion as a Cross- Cutting Dimension,” Kyklos 65, no. 3 (July 2012), 327– 
339, https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ j.1467- 6435.2012.00541.x.
 24 Vassilis Tselios, Philip McCann and Jouke van Dijk, “Understanding the Gap between 
Reality and Expectation: Local Social Engagement and Ethnic Concentration,” Urban 
Studies 54, no. 11 (August 2017), 2592– 2612, https:// doi.org/ 10.1177/ 0042098016650395.
 25 Stichnoth and van der Straeten, “Ethnic Diversity, Public Spending, and Individual 
Support for The Welfare State,” 364– 389.
 26 Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions,” 1243– 1284.










Regional Autonomy and Local Public Services 137
If diversity affects economic choices and the outcome of public policies by 
directly entering individual preferences,28 then decentralisation and regional 
autonomy are natural candidates as effective institutional arrangements which 
can address the provision of local public services in the presence of diversity. 
Theories on fiscal federalism and decentralisation claim that regional auton-
omy improves the quality of local governments, both in terms of the efficiency 
and the level in the provision of public goods,29 accountability to citizens’ pref-
erences,30 and control of the public expenditure.31 By making the government 
closer to the people, regional autonomy is expected to provide local policies 
that are better able to respond to the differentiated needs arising in highly 
diverse regions; hence, regional authority is considered an effective solution 
to cope with the presence of high heterogeneous preferences at the regional/ 
local level.32
When it comes to the rationale for decentralisation and regional autonomy, 
local public services play a prominent role. As Serrano and Rodríguez- Pose put 
it, the primary aim of decentralisation has never been about delivering greater 
economic growth, reducing inequality or increasing social capital; rather, ‘the 
original aim of decentralization is fundamentally to improve the delivering of 
public goods and services to individuals and, consequently, the level of satis-
faction of the population with government’.33
Several counter arguments have been raised. Local governments can be less 
efficient than central governments; the provision of public services can benefit 
from economies of scale in the case of a central provision; issues of capture and 
corruption of local policy makers are easier to observe in a number of coun-
tries.34 Empirical research shows that countries with centralised governments 
 28 Alesina and La Ferrara, “Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance,” 762– 800.
 29 Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” American Political Science 
Review 87, no. 3 (1993), 567– 576; Charles M. Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” 
Journal of Political Economy 64, no. 5 (1956), 416– 424; Andrea Filippetti and Agnese Sacchi, 
“Decentralisation and Economic Growth Reconsidered: The Role of Regional Authority,” 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 34, no. 8 (2016), 1793– 1824.
 30 Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jonanovitch, 1972).
 31 Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax: Analytic Foundations of a 
Fisc al Constitution (Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 1980).
 32 Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” 416– 424.
 33 Luis Diaz- Serrano and Andrés Rodríguez- Pose, “Decentralization, Happiness and the 
Perception of Institutions,” IZA Discussion Paper, no. 5647 (April 2011), 2, 1– 28, http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1812532; emphasis by the author of this 
chapter.
 34 See for example Thushyanthan Baskaran and Lars P. Feld, “Fiscal Decentralization and 
Economic Growth in OECD Countries: Is There a Relationship?,” Public Finance Review 















can also deliver local public services as efficiently as decentralised countries 
do.35 However, these criticisms are not directed towards the claim that regional 
authority works better in heterogeneous population.
Following on these lines of reasoning, we put forward the second hypothesis:
Hip#2: regional autonomy is expected to moderate between diversity and 
the performance of local public services. [Put differently, for any given 
level of diversity, a higher level of regional autonomy is expected to be 
associated to a higher performance of local public services].
3 Data: Measuring the Quality of Local Public Services and the Level 
of Regional Autonomy
3.1 The Provision of Local Public Services
The organisation for the provision of local public services differs across coun-
tries depending primarily upon formal provisions at the level of the consti-
tution. According to these, the type of state can be grouped in three broad 
categories: federal states, regionalised states, and unitary states. Firstly, we 
need to distinguish between exclusive competences attributed to the regional 
and local governments, and competences that are instead shared between the 
central government and the regional and local governments. Secondly, compe-
tences can be divided into legislative and administrative; typically, in unitary 
states the legislative competences belong to the central government, while the 
administrative competences can be attributed to different levels of subnational 
governments. In decentralised settings, such as federal or regionalised coun-
tries, both the legislative competences and the administrative competences 
of some local services can be attributed to the regional (and local) level. The 
revenue system for local public services also varies considerably across coun-
tries: in federal or regionalised states, regional governments often have some 
taxation power; by contrast, in unitary states local services tend to be financed 
through a mechanism of transfers from the central government. As a result, 
one can observe a great deal of heterogeneity when it comes to the regional 
on the Road to Fiscal Decentralization,” Working Papers, no. 19 (April 2001), 1– 41, https:// 
carnegieendowment.org/ files/ 19Tanzi.pdf.
 35 Andrea Filippetti and Giovanni Cerulli, “Are Local Public Services Better Delivered in 
More Autonomous Regions? Evidence from European Regions Using a Dose- Response 
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competences across countries regarding the provision of public services, even 
when they are local services, such as for instance in the cases of education, 
public transport, health or local police.36 There are countries such as Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden where regions have 
no specific competences on their own; federal countries like Belgium, in which 
regional governments have no competences on education, or like Germany, in 
which instead the Länder have competences over a large number of services. 
Similar patterns can be found for other local public services (e.g. health).37
This chapter employs a composite indicator of the performance of local 
public services provided by the Quality of Government Survey based on the 
citizens’ perception of three local public services: education, health and law 
enforcement.38 These are also those public services that are usually investi-
gated in decentralisation studies.39 The indicator is a perception- based indi-
cator built from a 34,000- respondent survey from 172 regions within eighteen 
EU member states; to date, this constitutes one of the most comprehensive 
surveys about the quality of local public goods at the subnational level.40 The 
survey was undertaken between 15 December 2009, and 1 February 2010, and 
consisted of 34 questions to the approximately 200 respondents per region. 
Respondents were asked about three general public services in their regions – 
education, health care and law enforcement. In focusing on these three ser-
vices, respondents were asked to rate their public services with respect to three 
related concepts, namely the quality, impartiality and an inverse measure of 
the level of corruption of these services.41 The Survey also provides a single 
 36 European Institute of Public Administration (eipa), “Division of Powers between the 
European Union, the Member States and Regional and Local Authorities,” December 
2012, https:// cor.europa.eu/ en/ engage/ studies/ Documents/ division_ of_ powers/ division_ 
of_ powers.pdf.
 37 A comprehensive report on this issue can be consulted here: https:// www.ifo.de/ .
 38 Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente, “Regional Governance Matters,”; Quality of Government 
Institute of the University of Gothenborg, “Measuring the Quality of Government and 
Subnational Variation,” 1– 85.
 39 Agnese Sacchi and Simone Salotti, “A Comprehensive Analysis of Expenditure 
Decentralization and of the Composition of Local Public Spending,” Regional Studies 50, 
no. 1 (2014), 1– 17, https:// doi.org/ 10.1080/ 00343404.2014.893387.
 40 Note that the authors call this index ‘quality of government index’ since they use the pro-
vision of local public goods as a proxy for the quality of regional government. Our focus 
here is instead on the quality of local public services themselves, exploiting the hetero-
geneity in their organisational structure across regions.
 41 The complete questionnaire can be found in Quality of Government Institute of the 















QoG index for each region obtained by averaging the three pillars – quality, 
impartiality and (lack of) corruption, each weighted one third. In our analysis 
we will use both the overall qog index performance as well as the three pillars.42 
The data have been standardised such that the EU regional mean is ‘0’ and has 
a standard deviation of ‘1’. A series of extensive sensitivity tests were carried 
out to see whether changes in the model alter the final data. The results show 
that ‘data constructed here are highly robust to multiple changes in weighting 
and aggregation schemes, the removal of individual questions or alterations in 
the demographic make- up of the respondents’.43
The Report suggests the presence of a significant within- country variation 
from country to country. As explained by Charron and Lapuente, the data show 
that the indicator of QoG is either equally or more important than a variation 
between EU countries themselves.44 For example, some regions in Italy and 
Belgium perform like those in the best performing countries, while others rank 
similarly to low- performing regions in Hungary and Greece. This supports the 
case for an analysis at the regional level.
3.2 The Degree of Regional Autonomy
We employ a comprehensive measure of regional autonomy, the Regional 
Authority Index (rai),45 which includes fiscal, political, and administrative 
measures of the authority of a regional government. This index has been 
used in these types of studies replacing measures of fiscal expenditures as 
proxy of decentralisation.46 The rai measures the authority of regional gov-
ernments in 42 democracies or quasi- democracies on an annual basis over 
the period 1950– 2016. The countries included are twenty- nine oecd coun-
tries, the 27 countries that are members of the European Union, as well as 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Russia, and Serbia 
and Montenegro.
 42 In the chapter we will refer to overall performance to refer to the overall index, and to 
quality to refer to the single pillar ‘quality’.
 43 Quality of Government Institute of the University of Gothenborg, “Measuring the Quality 
of Government and Subnational Variation,”.
 44 Charron and Lapuente, “Why Do Some Regions in Europe Have Higher Quality of 
Government?,” 567– 582.
 45 Hooghe, Marks and Schakel, “Operationalizing Regional Authority,” 123– 142; Marks, 
Hooghe and Schakel, “Measuring Regional Authority,” 111– 121.
 46 See for example Ezcurra and Rodríguez- Pose, “Political Decentralization, Economic 
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The rai is composed of two pillars, which respectively capture the degree 
of authority exerted by a regional government over its territory (self- rule) and 
over the whole country (shared- rule). Self- rule regards the degree of inde-
pendence of the regional government from the influence of central authori-
ties and the scope of regional decision- making. In turn, shared- rule measures 
the capacity of the regional government to determine central decision- 
making.47 It is worth stressing that despite the name of the indicator, the 
rai refers not only to administrative decentralisation but also encompasses 
measures of political and fiscal decentralisation. As such, it is possibly the 
most comprehensive indicator of regional autonomy that has been devel-
oped so far.
3.3 A Measure of National Diversity
We calculated our measure of diversity by taking data from the census of 
2011,48 which considers for each region the following categories of citi-
zens: native citizens, foreign EU residents, and foreign non- EU residents 
(including stateless). A typical measure of diversity can be obtained by sub-
tracting the Herfindal index of the variable of interest from 1. In our case, this 
becomes (1 – Herfindal index of nationality shares), an approach also fol-
lowed by others, e.g. Ozgen et al.49 A cursory look at the diversity indicators 
reveals a normal- shaped distribution with a tail on the right side that reflects 
the metropolitan areas of London, Brussels, and Vienna. Data are reported 
in  Table 5.1.
 47 Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, and Arjan H. Schakel, “Patterns of Regional Authority,” 
Regional and Federal Studies 18, no. 2– 3 (2008), 167– 181.
 48 The data can be found here: https:// ec.europa.eu/ CensusHub2/ query.
do?step=selectHyperCube&qhc=false.
 49 Ozgen, Nijkamp and Poot, “The Impact of Cultural Diversity on Firm Innovation,”; Ozgen 










table 5.1 List of the regions and the three indicators








at_ Burgenland 1.274 0.114 18
at_ Lower Austria 1.160 0.134 18
at_ Vienna 0.993 0.362 18
at_ Carinthia 0.880 0.136 18
at_ Styria 0.848 0.132 18
at_ Upper Austria 1.139 0.156 18
at_ Salzburg 0.907 0.228 18
at_ Tyrol 1.015 0.202 18
at_ Vorarlberg 1.069 0.238 18
be_ Brussels- Capital Region - 0.369 0.491 18
be_ Flemish Region 0.942 0.179 20
be_ Walloon Region - 0.008 0.175 18
bg_ Severozapaden - 2.566 0.006 1
bg_ Severen tsentralen - 2.061 0.009 1
bg_ Severoiztochen - 0.915 0.013 1
bg_ Yugoiztochen - 2.141 0.010 1
bg_ Yugozapaden - 1.830 0.014 1
bg_ Yuzhen tsentralen - 1.088 0.008 1
cz_ Prague - 0.903 0.256 7
cz_ Central Bohemian Region - 0.224 0.094 7
cz_ Jihozápad (Southwest) - 0.009 0.076 7
cz_ Severozápad (Northwest) - 0.909 0.091 7
cz_ Severovýchod (Northeast) - 0.110 0.063 7
cz_ Jihovchod (Southeast) - 0.441 0.059 7
cz_ Stední Morava (Central Moravia) - 0.534 0.031 7
cz_ Moravian- Silesian Region - 0.361 0.038 7
dk_ Hovedstaden 1.306 0.176 10
dk_ Sjlland 1.448 0.080 10
dk_ Syddanmark 1.440 0.100 10
dk_ Midtjylland 1.687 0.099 10
dk_ Nordjylland 1.317 0.080 10
de_ Baden- Württemberg 0.981 0.205 21
de_ Bavaria 0.712 0.184 21
de_ Berlin 0.981 0.205 21
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de_ Brandenburg 0.979 0.032 21
de_ Bremen 0.953 0.196 21
de_ Hamburg 0.961 0.219 21
de_ Hessen 0.630 0.202 21
de_ Mecklenburg- Vorpommern 0.937 0.174 21
de_ Lower Saxony 0.949 0.142 21
de_ North Rhine- Westphalia 0.714 0.037 21
de_ Rhineland- Palatinate 0.827 0.037 21
de_ Saarland 1.051 0.141 21
de_ Saxony 1.096 0.141 21
de_ Saxony- Anhalt 0.866 0.141 21
de_ Schleswig- Holstein 1.273 0.059 21
de_ Thuringia 1.336 0.051 21
fr_ Île- de- France 0.547 0.226 8
fr_ Champagne- Ardenne 0.185 0.074 8
fr_ Picardie 0.471 0.064 8
fr_ Haute- Normandie 0.123 0.056 8
fr_ Centre 0.613 0.081 8
fr_ Basse- Normandie 0.502 0.039 8
fr_ Bourgogne 0.485 0.076 8
fr_ Nord- Pas- de- Calais 0.544 0.063 8
fr_ Lorraine 0.244 0.099 8
fr_ Alsace 0.475 0.143 8
fr_ Franche- Comté 0.494 0.086 8
fr_ Pays de la Loire 0.357 0.040 8
fr_ Bretagne 1.043 0.039 8
fr_ Poitou- Charentes 0.768 0.054 8
fr_ Aquitaine 0.820 0.083 8
fr_ Midi- Pyrénées 0.394 0.089 8
fr_ Limousin 0.727 0.085 8
fr_ Rhine- Alpes 0.800 0.122 8
fr_ Auvergne 0.563 0.063 8
fr_ Languedoc- Roussillon 0.536 0.110 8
fr_ Provence- Alpes- Cote d’Azur 0.215 0.119 8
table 5.1 List of the regions and the three indicators (cont.)
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fr_ Corse 0.123 0.159 8
gr_ Voreia Ellada - 1.389 0.118 10
gr_ Kentriki Ellada - 1.069 0.118 10
gr_ Attica - 0.261 0.193 10
gr_ Nisia Aigaiou, Kriti - 0.912 0.208 10
hu_ Central Hungary - 1.018 0.049 10
hu_ Transdanubia - 0.320 0.025 10
hu_ Great Plain and North - 0.439 0.017 10
it_ Piemonte - 0.118 0.154 13
it_ Valle d’Aosta 0.696 0.126 17
it_ Liguria - 0.507 0.133 13
it_ Lombardia - 0.638 0.179 13
it_ Trentino- Alto Adige (Bolzano) 0.832 0.147 17
it_ Trentino- Alto Adige (Trento) 0.538 0.162 15
it_ Veneto - 0.462 0.174 13
it_ Friuli- Venezia Giulia 0.199 0.149 17
it_ Emilia- Romagna - 0.341 0.190 13
it_ Toscana - 0.550 0.163 13
it_ Umbria - 0.190 0.183 13
it_ Marche - 0.460 0.161 13
it_ Lazio - 1.267 0.146 13
it_ Abruzzo - 0.908 0.100 13
it_ Molise - 1.236 0.050 13
it_ Campania - 2.318 0.050 13
it_ Puglia - 1.735 0.040 13
it_ Basilicata - 1.259 0.044 13
it_ Calabria - 2.189 0.065 13
it_ Sicilia - 1.828 0.049 17
it_ Sardegna - 0.887 0.037 17
nl_ Northern Netherlands 1.625 0.075 15
nl_ Eastern Netherlands 1.179 0.036 15
nl_ Western Netherlands 1.273 0.053 15
nl_ Southern Netherlands 1.077 0.123 15
pl_ Lodzkie - 0.846 0.005 8
table 5.1 List of the regions and the three indicators (cont.)
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pl_ Mazowieckie - 0.996 0.010 8
pl_ Malopolskie - 0.875 0.004 8
pl_ Slaskie - 1.115 0.003 8
pl_ Lubelskie - 0.904 0.004 8
pl_ Podkarpackie - 0.852 0.003 8
pl_ Swietokrzyskie - 0.804 0.002 8
pl_ Podlaskie - 0.962 0.006 8
pl_ Wielkopolskie - 0.999 0.003 8
pl_ Zachodniopomorskie - 0.867 0.005 8
pl_ Lubuskie - 0.929 0.006 8
pl_ Dolnoslaskie - 1.116 0.006 8
pl_ Opolskie - 0.611 0.005 8
pl_ Kujawsko- Pomorskie - 0.949 0.003 8
pl_ Warminsko- Mazurskie - 0.668 0.003 8
pl_ Pomorskie - 0.858 0.004 8
pt_ Norte - 0.322 0.028 1
pt_ Algarve 0.208 0.211 1
pt_ Centro - 0.029 0.046 1
pt_ Lisboa 0.141 0.135 1
pt_ Alentejo 0.738 0.061 1
pt_ Azores 0.512 0.027 16
pt_ Madeira 0.280 0.041 16
ro_ North- West - 1.135 0.004 4
ro_ Centru - 1.581 0.002 4
ro_ North- East - 2.014 0.003 4
ro_ South- East - 2.035 0.002 4
ro_ South- Muntenia - 1.774 0.001 4
ro_ Bucharest- Ilfov - 2.964 0.011 4
ro_ South- West Oltenia - 1.478 0.001 4
ro_ West - 2.250 0.005 4
sk_ Bratislava Region - 0.572 0.095 4
sk_ Western Slovakia - 0.863 0.128 4
sk_ Central Slovakia - 0.766 0.166 4
sk_ Eastern Slovakia - 0.769 0.182 4
table 5.1 List of the regions and the three indicators (cont.)
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es_ Galicia 0.574 0.073 15
es_ Asturias 0.512 0.086 15
es_ Basque Community 0.665 0.123 16
es_ Navarre 0.173 0.188 16
es_ La Rioja 0.243 0.246 15
es_ Aragon 0.320 0.223 15
es_ Madrid - 0.098 0.261 15
es_ Castile- Leon - 0.055 0.122 15
es_ Castile- La Mancha 0.208 0.189 15
es_ Extremadura 0.416 0.068 15
es_ Catalonia - 0.464 0.264 15
es_ Valencian Community 0.154 0.268 15
es_ Balearic Islands 0.109 0.342 15
es_ Andalusia 0.284 0.148 15
es_ Region of Murcia - 0.036 0.270 15
es_ Canarias 0.272 0.239 15
se_ East Sweden 1.376 0.185 10
se_ South Sweden 1.453 0.114 10
se_ North Sweden 1.260 0.097 10
UK_ North East. England 0.919 0.045 4
UK_ North West. England 1.040 0.067 4
UK_ Yorkshire and the Humber. Eng. 0.652 0.099 4
UK_ East Midlands. England 1.245 0.131 4
UK_ West Midlands. England 0.800 0.067 4
UK_ East of England 0.763 0.075 4
UK_ London. England 0.484 0.362 9
UK_ South East. England 1.082 0.124 4
UK_ South West. England 1.091 0.117 4
UK_ Wales 0.806 0.067 12
UK_ Scotland 1.277 0.090 17
UK_ Northern Ireland 0.933 0.361 10
table 5.1 List of the regions and the three indicators (cont.)
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4 Analysis and Results
4.1 Estimation Strategy
In order to test our hypotheses, we estimate a cross- section model of 167 
regions in Europe employing ordinary least squares (ols) method, with stand-
ard errors clustered around the region (see  Table 5.2 for pairwise correlations). 
The models look as follows:
Servicesi = α + β1 diversityi +β2 controlsi + εi (1)
Servicesi = α + β1 controlsi +β2 reg_ autonomyi + β3 diversityi + β4 reg_ auton-
omyi*diversityi + εi (2)
Eq. 1 tests the first hypothesis (coefficient β1), while eq. 2, which includes an 
interaction effect between regional autonomy and diversity (coefficient β4), 
tests the second hypothesis.
Several control variables at the region level are included, namely: income 
per capita (here measured in ppp); three dummy variables controlling for 
i)  bilingual region; ii) autonomous region;50 iii) capital region; the (log of) popu-
lation. A customary variable which is taken into account in political economy 
studies is the presence of strong and independent media, since they are consid-
ered an important channel through which citizens can monitor the local policy 
makers. For this reason, we have included the variable ‘independent media’ which 
reflects ‘the strength and effectiveness of the media in the region to expose cor-
ruption’ and is part of the same QoG Survey. We also employ the share of citi-
zens with tertiary education, as an overall proxy of the level of education of the 
people living in the region. Finally, we introduce our measure of diversity – the 
diversity index. Eq. 2 includes the same control variables, but it further includes 
our measure of regional autonomy jointly with the diversity index.
4.2 Local Public Services, Diversity and Regional Autonomy
Table 5.3 reports the results of our estimates of the model above (1). 
Column (1) reports the results for the overall index of local services, while the 
others report the results for each of the indicators: impartiality (2), corruption 
(3) and quality of services (4). The coefficients of the control variables are in 
line with what was expected. Income per capita predicts high scores in the pro-
vision of local services. Autonomous regions seem to be negatively correlated 
with public services, although the coefficients are never significant. Being a 
 50 While this variable is clearly correlated with our measure of regional authority (rate of 
correlation equal to 0.20), autonomous regions often tend to receive considerable trans-
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capital region, along with the size of the region (as measured by population), 
are negatively correlated with services; this might depend on the presence of 
congestion effects. The presence of independent media is positively correlated 
with services, while the level of education is instead negatively correlated with 
the dependent variable (we discuss this further below).
By focussing on the explanatory variable – our measure of diversity – the 
related coefficient is negative and significant for the overall provision of public 
services (significant at 5 %), corruption (significant at 10 %), and their quality 
(significant at 1 %). This supports our hypothesis no. 1.
In this second set of estimates we interact our measure of diversity with two 
variables, namely the presence of independent media and the level of education. 
Table 5.4 reports the same estimates as for Table 5.3, but with the inclusion of 
table 5.3 Impartiality, regional autonomy and diversity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall Impartiality Corruption Quality
Diversity index - 1.615** 1.559 - 1.609* - 3.473***
(0.799) (1.186) (0.929) (0.842)
Income per capita 1.453*** 0.522*** 1.155*** 0.865***
(0.108) (0.159) (0.122) (0.170)
Bilingual region 0.200 0.506 0.481*** 0.326
(0.188) (0.314) (0.170) (0.265)
Autonomous region - 0.266 - 0.149 - 0.233 - 0.121
(0.230) (0.227) (0.177) (0.259)
Capital region - 0.433* - 0.409 - 0.516* - 0.130
(0.220) (0.259) (0.276) (0.187)
Population of the region - 0.414*** - 0.211 - 0.277** - 0.0911
(0.129) (0.157) (0.120) (0.148)
Independent media - 0.0402 0.216*** 0.176*** 0.483***
(0.0602) (0.0690) (0.0662) (0.0661)
Population with tertiary 
education
- 0.409*** - 0.246 - 0.289** - 0.172
(0.126) (0.167) (0.129) (0.147)
Constant - 12.47*** - 4.576** - 10.15*** - 8.096***
(1.154) (1.768) (1.220) (1.842)
Observations 167 167 167 167




the following interaction term: presence of independent media#diversity (col-
umn 1), and the level of education#diversity (column 2). The rationale is that 
both independent media and the level of education should mitigate the pres-
ence of bias in perception, if present. More independent media will provide 
more impartial information for citizens, whilst more educated people should 
be better equipped to process public information objectively. By looking at 
the results, only the presence of independent media seems to moderate the 
negative effect of diversity on services. As the chart in  Figure 5.1 shows, the 
negative effect of diversity on services approaches zero and then turns posi-
tive (although not statistically significant) as long as the variable independent 
media grows. This suggests the presence of some misperception in the func-
tioning of local public services which are attenuated when there are independ-
ent media in the region.
We now turn to our second hypothesis, which states that the presence of 
regional autonomy is expected to moderate between diversity and the perfor-
mance of local public services. In order to test the moderating effect of regional 
authority we include the variable diversity#regional autonomy. Table 5.5 reports 
the estimate of the model as in eq. 2, for the main index of services and the 
three pillars – impartiality, corruption and quality. The coefficient of the joint 
effect of diversity and regional autonomy is positive and significant (at 5 %) 
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limited to the case of the quality of services (column 4). By looking at  Figure 5.2 
reporting the average marginal effect of diversity along the levels of regional 
autonomy, it can be seen that the negative correlation of diversity with the 
quality of local public services moves closer to zero for high levels of regional 
autonomy. In regions in which regional autonomy is quite high (higher than 
18.5), the marginal effect of diversity is still moderately negative but no longer 
significant. This suggests the presence of some moderating effect of regional 
autonomy on the relationship between diversity and the quality of local public 
services, although limited to their quality, in that the only significant coeffi-
cient regards the estimates of quality (column 4 of Table 5.5).
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Dealing with diversity in the European regions has become imperative in 
European and national policy agendas. Internal mobility is a cornerstone of 










Diversity index - 2.699 - 1.786**
(2.766) (0.752)
Independent media - 0.0377 - 0.236**
(0.0604) (0.115)
Population with tertiary education - 0.371** - 0.413***
(0.172) (0.123)
Diversity index # Independent media 1.613**
(0.752)
All controls included as for Table 1









 figure 5.2  The effect of diversity on the provision of local services when regional autonomy 
changes
table 5.5 Testing the moderating effect of regional authority
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overall Impartiality Corruption Quality
Diversity index - 1.620 2.704 - 2.605 - 6.647***
(1.832) (2.457) (2.301) (1.765)
Regional autonomy - 0.00415 0.0785*** - 0.00374 - 0.0637***
(0.0203) (0.0267) (0.0180) (0.0166)
Diversity index # Regional 
autonomy
0.0007 - 0.141 0.0721 0.270**
(0.136) (0.192) (0.140) (0.118)
All controls included as Table 1
Constant - 12.48*** - 2.406 - 10.26*** - 9.872***
(1.196) (1.661) (1.272) (1.751)
Observations 167 167 167 167
R2 0.621 0.446 0.568 0.621
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the EU policy, and the more new members join the EU, the more migration 
within the EU is bound to grow. Additionally, migration from outside the EU 
borders is also expected to grow considerably. Empirical studies carried out 
mostly in the Unites States and in some developing countries have by and large 
found that when ethnic diversity grows, the welfare state, the provision of pub-
lic goods, and income redistribution tend to become more problematic. For 
European countries and regions, this will be one of the most relevant issues to 
deal with in the coming years.
This chapter provides evidence that i) the presence of a heterogeneous 
composition of population in the European regions is associated to a relatively 
worse public perception of the provision of local public goods; and ii) regional 
autonomy (to some extent) can act as a moderating mechanism between 
diversity and local public services.
The first result is in line with theories about diversity and public policy, and 
with several empirical studies that detected a negative correlation between 
diversity and the provision of public goods. As a matter of fact, most of this 
research has been carried out in cities and countries with a high presence of 
ethnic heterogeneity, as for instance in some American cities, and in some 
developing countries; to our knowledge this is the first attempt carried out 
across a large sample of European regions.
Another difference of this study is that our measure of diversity does not 
take into account ethnicity or socio- economic status but is limited to national-
ity. On the one hand this has some clear limitations, in that ethnic diversity is 
a remarkable source of heterogeneity. However, our broader measure of diver-
sity allows us to address one of the cornerstones of European integration, that 
of the internal mobility of the labour force. Internal mobility has often been 
identified by policy makers as a fundamental driver of reciprocal learning, a 
carrier of knowledge, as well as a great means to make the labour market work 
more efficiently, by reducing disparities in the rates of unemployment across 
European countries. As such, the internal mobility of citizens is regarded as a 
pillar of social cohesion in Europe. However, recent debates have redirected 
attention to a number of problems that internal migration can create on the 
sustainability of the welfare states of recipient countries. Within this context, 
our evidence raises an issue for policy makers. This will be further exacerbated 
by the fact that since our data refer to 2011, it is more than likely that diversity 
has increased since, both because of an increase in mobility within Europe 
since the financial crisis in 2008, and due to the recent surge in migration from 
outside the EU. This calls for future research with updated census data.
It is also possible that our data underestimates the pressure of illegal immi-
grants on the welfare state; they are not captured by data on foreign residents, 
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but can, however, benefit from some local public services, particularly public 
health. Finally, we do not take into account within- country mobility which can 
in some cases be an additional source of diversity and pressure on local welfare.
Our second piece of evidence shows that regional authority can have a mod-
erating effect between diversity and the provision of local services. This par-
tially confirms one of the main claims of fiscal federalism theory, according to 
which bringing political authority and administration closer to the people is 
effective, particularly when there are heterogeneous local communities which 
are likely to be reflected in heterogeneous preferences. In these cases, regional 
authority should be more effective than centralisation in making local public 
policies more responsive to the heterogeneous preferences. There are coun-
ter arguments that are worth mentioning. Firstly, local governments can be 
more easily captured, as well as corrupted, by local constituencies. Secondly, 
in times of crisis and budget constraints, regional governments can have fewer 
resources to devote to welfare. Hence, it is possible that central governments 
are more effective than regional governments in dealing with a swift increase 
in the demand for local public services, to the extent that they are able to 
mobilise a larger amount of resources. Further, more centralised governments 
can be better equipped in managing migration flows than more decentralised 
ones, for example by being better able to redistribute immigrants, thus avoid-
ing excessive concentrations in some regions. These are open questions that 
remain to be explored at greater lengths and with more recent data.
 Bibliography
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir and William Easterly. “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions.” 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, no. 4 (1999): 1243– 1284. https:// doi.org/ 
10.1162/ 003355399556269.
Alesina, Alberto, and Eliana La Ferrara. “Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance.” 
Journal of Economic Literature 43, no. 3 (September 2005): 762– 800. https:// doi.org/ 
10.1257/ 002205105774431243.
Alesina, Alberto, and Edward Ludwig Glaeser. Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A 
World of Difference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Alesina, Alberto, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. “Segregation and the Quality of 
Government in a Cross Section of Countries.” The American Economic Review 101, 
no. 5 (2011): 1872– 1911.
Baskaran, Thushyanthan, and Lars P. Feld. “Fiscal Decentralization and Economic 
Growth in OECD Countries: Is There a Relationship?.” Public Finance Review 41, no. 
4 (July 2013): 421– 445. https:// doi.org/ 10.1177/ 1091142112463726.
 
Regional Autonomy and Local Public Services 155
Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan. The Power to Tax: Analytic Foundations of a 
Fiscal Constitution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Camussi, Silvia, Anna Laura Mancini and Pietro Tommasino. “Does Trust Influence 
Social Expenditures? Evidence from Local Governments.” Kyklos 71, no. 1 (2018): 59– 
85. https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ kykl.12162.
Charron, Nicholas, and Victor Lapuente. “Why Do Some Regions in Europe Have 
Higher Quality of Government?.” QoG Working Paper Series, no. 1 (January 2011): 1– 
38. https:// www.pol.gu.se/ digitalAssets/ 1357/ 1357846_ 2011_ 1_ charron_ lapuente.pdf.
Charron, Nicholas, Lewis Dijkstra and Victor Lapuente. “Regional Governance Matters: 
Quality of Government within European Union Member States.” Regional Studies 
48, no. 1 (2014): 68– 90.
Christainsen, Gregory B. “Biology, Immigration, and Public Policy.” Kyklos 65, no. 2 
(2012): 164– 178. https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ j.1467- 6435.2012.00532.x.
Clark, Tom, Robert D. Putnam and Edward Fieldhouse. The Age of Obama: The Changing 
Place of Minorities in British and American Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013.
Congleton, Roger D., Andreas Kyriacou and Jordi Bacaria. “A Theory of Menu Federalism: 
Decentralization by Political Agreement.” Constitutional Political Economy 14, no. 3 
(2003): 167– 190.
Cutler, David M., Douglas W. Elmendorf and Richard J. Zeckhauser. “Demographic 
Characteristics and the Public Bundle.” National Bureau of Economic Research NBER 
Working Paper, no. 4283 (February 1993): 1– 55. https:// doi.org/ 10.3386/ w4283.
Dennison, James, and Andrew Geddes. “Brexit and the Perils of ‘Europeanised’ 
Migration.” Journal of European Public Policy 25, no. 8 (2018): 1137– 1153. https:// doi.
org/ 10.1080/ 13501763.2018.1467953.
Diaz- Serrano, Luis, and Andrés Rodríguez- Pose. “Decentralization, Happiness and the 
Perception of Institutions.” IZA Discussion Paper, no. 5647 (April 2011).: 1– 28. http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1812532.
Diaz- Serrano, Luis, and Andrés Rodríguez- Pose. “Decentralization, Subjective Well- 
Being, and the Perception of Institutions.” Kyklos 65, no. 2 (2012): 179– 193. https:// 
doi.org/ 10.1111/ j.1467- 6435.2012.00533.x.
European Institute of Public Administration (eipa). “Division of Powers between 
the European Union, the Member States and Regional and Local Authorities.” 
December 2012: Page range. https:// cor.europa.eu/ en/ engage/ studies/ Documents/ 
division_ of_ powers/ division_ of_ powers.pdf.
Ezcurra, Roberto, and Andrés Rodríguez- Pose. “Political Decentralization, Economic 
Growth and Regional Disparities in the OECD.” Regional Studies 47, no. 3 (2012): 
388– 401. https:// doi.org/ 10.1080/ 00343404.2012.731046.
Filippetti, Andrea, and Giovanni Cerulli. “Are Local Public Services Better Delivered 
in More Autonomous Regions? Evidence from European Regions Using a 
156 Filippetti
Dose- Response Approach.” Papers in Regional Science 97, no. 3 (January 2017): 801– 
826. https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ pirs.12283.
Filippetti, Andrea and Sacchi, Agnese. “Decentralisation and Economic Growth 
Reconsidered: The Role of Regional Authority.” Environment and Planning 
C: Government and Policy 34, no. 8 (2016): 1793– 1824.
Finseraas, Henning, and Niklas Jakobsson. “Trust and Ethnic Fractionalization: The 
Importance of Religion as a Cross- Cutting Dimension.” Kyklos 65, no. 3 (July 2012): 327– 
39. https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ j.1467- 6435.2012.00541.x.
Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner and Jeremy M. 
Weinstein. “Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?.” 
American Political Science Review 101, no. 4 (2007): 709– 725. https:// doi.org/ 10.1017/ 
S0003055407070499.
Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks and Arjan H. Schakel. “Operationalizing Regional 
Authority: A Coding Scheme for 42 Countries, 1950– 2006.” Regional and Federal 
Studies 18, no. 2– 3 (2008): 123– 142.
Kyriacou, Andreas P. “Ethnic Segregation and the Quality of Government: The Importance 
of Regional Diversity.” Constitutional Political Economy 23, no. 2 (2012): 166– 180.
Kyriacou, Andreas P. “Ethnic Group Inequalities and Governance: Evidence from 
Developing Countries.” Kyklos 6, no. 1 (2013): 78– 101. https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ kykl.12012.
Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe and Arjan H. Schakel. “Measuring Regional Authority.” 
Regional and Federal Studies 18, no. 2– 3 (2008): 111– 121.
Marks, Gary, Liesbet Hooghe and Arjan H. Schakel. “Patterns of Regional Authority.” 
Regional and Federal Studies 18, no. 2– 3 (2008): 167– 181.
Marschall, Melissa J., and Dietlind Stolle. “Race and the City: Neighborhood Context and 
the Development of Generalized Trust.” Political Behavior 26, no. 2 (2004): 125– 153.
Martinez- Vazquez, Jorge, Santiago Lago- Peñas and Agnese Sacchi. “The Impact of 
Fiscal Decentralization: A Survey.” Journal of Economic Surveys 31, no. 4 (2016): 1095– 
1129. https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ joes.12182.
Miguel, Edward, and Mary Kay Gugerty. “Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public 
Goods in Kenya.” Journal of Public Economics 89, no. 11 (2005): 2325– 2368. https:// 
doi.org/ 10.1016/ j.jpubeco.2004.09.004.
Oates, Wallace E. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jonanovitch, 1972.
Olson, Mancur. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political 
Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 567– 576.
Ozgen, Ceren, Peter Nijkamp and Jacques Poot. “The Impact of Cultural Diversity on 
Firm Innovation: Evidence from Dutch Micro- Data.” IZA Journal of Migration 2, no. 
1 (2013): 1– 18. https:// doi.org/ 10.1186/ 2193- 9039- 2- 18.
Ozgen, Ceren, Cornelius Peters, Annekatrin Niebuhr, Peter Nijkamp and Jacques Poot. 
“Does Cultural Diversity of Migrant Employees Affect Innovation?.” International 
Migration Review 48, no. 1 (2014): 377– 416. https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ imre.12138.
Regional Autonomy and Local Public Services 157
Quality of Government Institute of the University of Gothenborg. “Measuring the 
Quality of Government and Subnational Variation.” Report for the European 
Commission Directorate- General Regional Policy Directorate Policy Development 
(December 2010): Page range. https:// ec.europa.eu/ regional_ policy/ sources/ docge-
ner/ studies/ pdf/ 2010_ government_ 1.pdf.
Rodríguez- Pose, Andrés, and Roberto Ezcurra. “Is Fiscal Decentralization Harmful 
for Economic Growth? Evidence from the OECD Countries.” Journal of Economic 
Geography 11, no. 4 (July 2011): 619– 643. https:// doi.org/ 10.1093/ jeg/ lbq025.
Sacchi, Agnese, and Simone Salotti. “A Comprehensive Analysis of Expenditure 
Decentralization and of the Composition of Local Public Spending.” Regional 
Studies 50, no. 1 (2014): 93– 109. https:// doi.org/ 10.1080/ 00343404.2014.893387.
Stichnoth, Holger, and Karine van der Straeten. “Ethnic Diversity, Public Spending, 
and Individual Support for The Welfare State: A Review of the Empirical Literature.” 
Journal of Economic Surveys 27, no. 2 (2013): 364– 389. https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ 
j.1467- 6419.2011.00711.x.
Stolle, Dietlind, Stuart Soroka and Richard Johnston. “When Does Diversity Erode 
Trust? Neighborhood Diversity, Interpersonal Trust and the Mediating Effect of 
Social Interactions.” Political Studies 56, no. 1 (2008): 57– 75.
Tanzi, Vito. “Pitfalls on the Road to Fiscal Decentralization.” Working Papers, no. 19 
(April 2001): 1– 12. https:// carnegieendowment.org/ files/ 19Tanzi.pdf.
Tiebout, Charles M. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.” Journal of Political Economy 
64, no. 5: 416– 424.
Tselios, Vassilis, Philip McCann and Jouke van Dijk. “Understanding the Gap between 
Reality and Expectation: Local Social Engagement and Ethnic Concentration.” 
Urban Studies 54, no. 11 (August 2017): 2592– 2612. https:// doi.org/ 10.1177/ 
0042098016650395.
© Jayampathy Wickramaratne, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004394612_008
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the cc by-nc 4.0 license.
 chapter 6
Assuring Equality, Autonomy and Territorial 
Integrity in Sri Lanka
Jayampathy Wickramaratne
1 Introduction
On 9 March 2016, the Sri Lankan Parliament unanimously passed a resolu-
tion for setting up a Constitutional Assembly consisting of all 225 Members of 
Parliament tasked with preparing a draft of a Constitution Bill for the consid-
eration of Parliament.1 If a two- thirds majority of the Assembly had approved 
the constitutional draft proposal within one month, the same would have 
been submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers. Thereafter, the Cabinet would 
have presented the draft in the form of a Bill to Parliament. Under the present 
Constitution, an amendment of the Constitution ordinarily required a two- 
thirds majority in Parliament.2 Article 83 of the Constitution provided that a 
Bill aiming at amending, repealing or replacing, or that was inconsistent with 
any of the provisions of Articles 1 (The State), 2 (Unitary State), 3 (Sovereignty 
of the People), 6 (National Flag), 7 (National Anthem), 8 (National Day), 9 
(Buddhism), 10 (Freedom of thought, conscience and religion), 11 (Freedom 
from torture), Article 83 itself and also a Bill that sought to extend the term 
of office of the President or the duration of Parliament to over six years, 
would become law only if passed by a two- thirds majority in Parliament and 
approved by the people at a referendum. Thus, it necessarily followed that a 
new Constitution required passage in Parliament by a two- thirds majority fol-
lowed by approval at a referendum.
A twenty- one- member Steering Committee containing all political parties 
represented in Parliament and chaired by the Prime Minister was appointed. 
Six all- party subcommittees were appointed to make proposals on funda-
mental and language rights, judiciary, law and order, public service, pub-
lic finance and centre- periphery relations. Their reports were presented on 
 1 Parliament of Sri Lanka, “Resolution for the Appointment of the Constitutional 
Assembly,” (9 March 2016), https:// parliament.lk/ uploads/ documents/ minutesofparlia-
ment/ 1509078170042858.pdf.
 2 Article 82 (5) of the Constitution.
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19 November 2016. The interim report of the Steering Committee was pre-
sented to the Constitutional Assembly on 21 September 2017.3 It covered the 
following areas: nature of the state, nature of the executive, parliamentary 
electoral process, principles of devolution, religion and state land. While the 
report represented the dominant view in the Steering Committee, observa-
tions and comments by members of the Steering Committee on the principles 
and formulations contained in the report were also included in it.4
The next step should have been a general debate on the reports in the 
Constitutional Assembly. Thereafter, the Steering Committee might have con-
sidered views expressed during the debate and the public discussion that had 
already begun and then presented its final report along with the draft constitu-
tional proposal envisaged in the parliamentary resolution. However, very little 
happened after the Steering Committee submitted its interim report except 
that the panel of experts submitted a ‘legal draft’ based on the interim report 
and the reports of the various sub- committees.
It will be helpful for readers to have some insight into the history of Sri 
Lanka’s ethnic conflict, and the various attempts for a resolution. The Sri 
Lankan story is one of missed opportunities, by both the Sinhalese and Tamils. 
For Sri Lanka, the war is over, but the conflict is not. Only a settlement that 
offers all communities their due share of state power within a democratic 
framework can end the conflict – a truism for most observers but, sadly, not so 
for all Sri Lankans.5
2 Demography
Sri Lanka is a multi- cultural society with four major communities – Sinhalese, 
Tamils, Muslims and Hill Country Tamils. According to the 2012 census,6 the 
 3 Steering Committee, “The Constitutional Assembly of Sri Lanka, The Interim Report of the 
Steering Committee,” http:// constitutionnet.org/ sites/ default/ files/ 2017- 09/ Interim%20
Report%20of%20the%20Steering%20Commmittee%20of%20the%20Constitutional%20
Assembly%20of%20Sri%20Lanka_ 21%20September%202017.pdf, accessed on 12 August 2017.
 4 Ibid 27– 92.
 5 For a detailed discussion see Jayampathy Wickramaratne, “Sri Lanka: Missed Opportunities 
and the Way Forward,” in Towards Democratic Governance in Sri Lanka: A Constitutional 
Miscellany, ed. Jayampathy Wickramaratne (Rajagiriya: Institute for Constitutional Studies, 
2014), 485– 548.
 6 Department of Census and Statistics of Sri Lanka, “Census of Population and Housing of 
Sri Lanka, 2012,” http:// www.statistics.gov.lk/ PopHouSat/ CPH2011/ Pages/ Activities/ Reports/ 











Sinhalese make up 74.9 % of the total population of a little over 20 million. 
They are concentrated in the densely populated south- west as well as the cen-
tral parts of the country.7 Sri Lankan Tamils constitute 11.2 % of the population 
and mainly live geographically concentrated in the Northern Province and 
in parts of the Eastern Province.  Moors, descendants of Arabs who settled 
in Sri Lanka, represent 9.2 % of the total population. They live in substantial 
numbers in the east and are also found in other parts of the country, mostly 
concentrated in urban areas. In recent times, their identity has been more 
as Muslims rather than as Moors.8 Hill Country Tamils are a distinct ethnic 
group and descend from those brought from India by the British in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries to work in the plantations. They are referred 
to as Indian Tamils in official records, but most prefer to call themselves Hill 
Country Tamils. They comprise 4.2 % of the population and live in significant 
numbers in the Central, Uva and Sabaragamuwa Provinces. In the Central 
Province, Hill Country Tamils dominate the Nuwara Eliya District (53.2 %). 
There are also small numbers of Malays, Burghers (descendants of Europeans) 
and indigenous Veddhas. The native language of the Sinhalese is Sinhala while 
that of Tamils, Muslims and Hill Country Tamils is Tamil.
The North and East have been the stage of ethno- political conflict in the 
country. Sri Lankan Tamils constitute almost 95 % of the population of the 
Northern Province. The issue is compounded by the population distribution 
in the Eastern Province. In the Trincomalee district, which is adjacent to the 
Northern Province, all three major communities constitute substantial per-
centages: 27 % Sinhalese, 30.6 % Tamils and 40.4 % Muslims. The Batticaloa 
district, south of Trincomalee, is predominantly Tamil (72.6 %) with 25.5 % 
Muslims, but has no boundary with the North. The Ampara district, further 
to the South, has 43.6 % Muslims, 38.7 % Sinhalese and 1.4 % Tamils. The 
Sinhalese live mainly in the Ampara electoral division, which is adjacent to the 
Sinhala- dominated Uva Province. The other three electoral divisions of the dis-
trict, namely, Kalmunai, Sammanthurai and Pottuvil, together have a Muslim 
population of around 59 % with 27 % Tamils and 14 % Sinhalese.
Religion- wise, 70 % of the country’s population is Buddhist, while Hindus 
represent 15 %, and Christians (the large majority of whom are Roman 
 7 For a political map, see https:// www.mapsofworld.com/ sri- lanka/ sri- lanka- political- map.
html, accessed on 24 June 2019.
 8 For the purpose of Sri Lankan census and statistics, Moors are recognised as an ethnic group. 
Malays and people of Indian origin such as Memons, Bohras and Khojas are Muslims but 
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Catholics) and Muslims 7.5 % each. The large majority of Sinhalese are 
Buddhists, with 6.6 % being Christians; the large majority of Tamils and Hill 
Country Tamils are Hindus, with Christians amongst them being 19.2 % and 
10.1 % respectively.9
The demography of Sri Lanka is thus complex, with both concentrated 
as well as dispersed communities. The challenge in such circumstances is to 
adopt a constitution that gives all communities their due share of state power.
3 Brief History of the Conflict
It was not the Tamils but Solomon W.R.D. Bandaranaike, who was later to form 
the pro- Sinhala Sri Lanka Freedom Party (slfp) and become Prime Minister, 
who first proposed a federal Constitution for Sri Lanka. He did so in six articles 
he wrote for the Ceylon Morning Leader10 and in a public lecture in Jaffna,11 all 
in 1926.
In 1927, when the country was a British colony, a commission chaired 
by the Earl of Donoughmore was appointed to consider the revision of the 
Constitution. When the Donoughmore Commission visited the country, it 
was the Kandyan Sinhalese who proposed a federal arrangement, claiming 
that they were a separate ‘nation’. They proposed a federation of three units 
corresponding to (1) the Sinhala- dominated areas of the maritime provinces 
that were conquered by the Portuguese in 1505 and that later came under 
Dutch and British rule, (2) the Kandyan Kingdom which was finally conquered 
by the British in 1815 and (3) the present Northern and Eastern provinces 
inhabited mainly by Tamils and Muslims. ‘Ours is not a communal claim or 
a claim for the aggrandisement of a few: it is a claim of a nation to live its 
own life and realise its own destiny’, the Kandyan National Assembly stated 
 9 Department of Census and Statistics of Sri Lanka, “Provisional Data from a 5 % Sample of 
the Census of Population and Statistics, 2012,” provided by email (census@statistics.gov.
lk) to the author on 23 December 2013.
 10 Solomon W. R. D. Bandaranaike, Ceylon Morning Leader, 19 May, 27 May, 2 June, 9 June, 
23 June, and 30 June, 1926, reproduced in Power- sharing in Sri Lanka: Constitutional and 
Political Documents, 1926– 2008, eds. Rohan Edrisinha et al. (Colombo: Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, 2008), 28– 53.
 11 Solomon W. R. D. Bandaranaike, Ceylon Morning Leader, 26 July, 1926, reproduced in 
Power- sharing in Sri Lanka: Constitutional and Political Documents, 1926– 2008, eds. Rohan 








in its memorandum.12 While sympathising with the concerns of the Kandyan 
Sinhalese, the Commission rejected the federal arrangement.
Under the ‘Donoughmore’ Constitution,13 which came into effect in 1931, 
communal representation was abolished. Franchise was granted to all men 
and women over 21 years old. The newly established State Council – the uni-
cameral legislature – consisted of 61 members, 50 of whom were elected in 
territorial constituencies. The Chief Secretary, Legal Secretary and Financial 
Secretary were ex officio members but had no voting rights. Eight members 
were nominated by the Governor.
The Board of Ministers consisted of the three officials and seven Ceylonese 
Ministers who were the elected chairpersons of the respective executive com-
mittees. In the State Council elected at the 1931 elections, a Muslim and a Hill 
Country Tamil were represented in the Board of Ministers, the Tamils of the 
North having boycotted the elections.14 After the 1936 elections,15 which the 
Tamils contested, the Sinhalese majority in the State Council (apart from a 
few including N.M. Perera and Philip Gunawardena of the leftist Lanka Sama 
Samaja Party (lssp)) manipulated the election of executive committees to 
ensure that all seven chairs went to the Sinhalese. This was probably the first 
lesson Tamils learned about who would control the state power once the coun-
try would become independent. The experience resulted in Tamils moving 
towards the demand for guaranteed representation.
The first political party in the country to propose Tamils be recognised as 
a distinct nation with the right to self- determination, including the right to 
form an independent state, was not a Tamil party but the Communist Party of 
Ceylon.16 The memorandum submitted in October 1944 on behalf of the Party 
to the Ceylon National Congress, of which it was a constituent, made reference 
 12 Donoughmore Commission, “Report of the Donoughmore Commission,” (1928) ch. VI, 
referred to in Power- sharing in Sri Lanka: Constitutional and Political Documents, 1926– 
2008, eds. Rohan Edrisinha et al. (Colombo: Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2008), 56.
 13 Ceylon (State Council) Order in Council, 1931.
 14 For election results see G.P.S. Harischandra De Silva, A Statistical Survey of Elections to the 
Legislatures of Sri Lanka, 1911– 1977 (Colombo: Marga Institute, 1979), 91.
 15 De Silva, A Statistical Survey, 91.
 16 Resolution adopted by the Communist Party- controlled Ceylon Trade Union Federation 
on September 23, 1944, reproduced in Power- sharing in Sri Lanka: Constitutional and 
Political Documents, 1926– 2008, eds. Rohan Edrisinha et al. (Colombo: Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, 2008), 111; Resolution passed at the Party’s rally in Colombo on October 15, 
1944, reproduced in Power- sharing in Sri Lanka: Constitutional and Political Documents, 
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to a ‘federal Constitution’ in its title but details of the proposed federal struc-
ture were not set out.17
When the Soulbury Commission on constitutional reform appointed by 
the British government visited Ceylon in 1944, no serious proposal was made 
to it by any organisation that the country should have a devolved structure, 
let alone a federal one. The Commission made no recommendations either for 
self- rule of any kind or for balanced representation.18
After the 1947 elections held a few months before independence under the 
British- given ‘Soulbury’ Constitution,19 the Tamil Congress (tc), then the only 
party of the Tamils, joined the conservative United National Party (unp) to 
form a coalition government. Hill Country Tamils won six out of the 95 seats 
and collaborated with the Left to ensure the victory of several leftists. This was 
not to the liking of the leaders of the ruling unp and when the Citizenship 
Act was enacted, a citizen was defined in such a manner that the vast major-
ity of Hill Country Tamils were excluded.20 The law relating to elections was 
amended to provide that only citizens would be entitled to vote.21 Hundreds 
of thousands of Hill Country Tamils who voted at the 1947 elections as British 
subjects were thus disenfranchised.
The adoption of the new laws was a defining moment in Tamil politics, with 
serious political consequences. Tamil leaders in the government were unable 
to prevent the disenfranchisement of their Hill Country Tamil cousins. It was 
at this point that S.J.V. Chelvanayakam broke away to form the Federal Party 
(fp). The lesson was clear, at least to him: the Sinhalese majority wielded state 
 17 Edrisinha et al., Power- sharing in Sri Lanka, 121– 125.
 18 Commission on Constitutional Reform, Ceylon: Report of the Commission on Constitutional 
Reform (London: Cmd 6677, 1945).
 19 Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946.
 20 Section 4, Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948:
 (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Part, a person born in Ceylon before the 
appointed date shall have the status of a citizen of Ceylon by descent, if - 
 (a) his father was born in Ceylon, or
 (b) his paternal grandfather and paternal great grandfather were born in Ceylon.
 (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Part, a person born outside Ceylon before the 
appointed date shall have the status of a citizen of Ceylon by descent, if - 
 (a) his father and paternal grandfather were born in Ceylon, or
 (b) his paternal grandfather and paternal great grandfather were born in Ceylon.
 21 Section 4 of the Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Order- in- Council as amended by sec-
tion 3 of the Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Amendment Act No.48 of 1949, https:// 
aceproject.org/ regions- en/ countries- and- territories/ LK/ case- studies/ the- ceylon- 












power, and Tamils who thought they shared power in Colombo had in fact no 
say. For those who broke away, regional autonomy was the only salvation.
It is also important to note that the fp could only win two seats in the 
subsequent elections that followed in 1952. Chelvanayakam himself lost at 
Kankesanthurai, not to a candidate of the tc but to a candidate of the unp. 
Despite the experiences of the late 1940s, the Tamils of the North and East 
decisively rejected federalism and mandated the tc to go back to Colombo 
and share power with the unp. The year 1952 brought some changes in the 
South, as Bandaranaike, who had left the unp in 1951 to form the slfp, was 
able to become the Leader of Opposition.
In 1955, everything changed. Previously, the two main parties of the South, 
the unp and the slfp, had wanted Sinhala and Tamil to replace English as 
official languages. With another general election close at hand, both changed 
their position to ‘Sinhala only’. This led to enhanced support for the fp and 
in the 1956 elections an slfp- led coalition supported by the Left swept the 
South, while the fp swept the North and East. This time it was the tc’s turn to 
be humiliated with two seats and it never recovered from the defeat. Sinhala 
was made the only official language in 1956. The Tamils and the Left opposed 
the move and Left leader Dr. Colvin R. De Silva prophetically stated – ‘two 
languages – one country; one language – two countries’ meaning that if both 
languages were not recognised as official languages at par, this might lead to 
a demand for separation.22 The warning was not heeded. The majority again 
demonstrated as to who had state power, which further aggravated the conflict.
Prime Minister Bandaranaike soon realised that accommodation was the 
only solution and, in July 1957, entered into an agreement with Chelvanayakam 
to set up Regional Councils in the North and East, with much less power than 
what provincial councils had under the present Constitution. The B- C Pact,23 
as it came to be famously known, was fiercely opposed by extremist Buddhist 
monks and the unp, and the Prime Minster was forced to abrogate it. The situ-
ation worsened, culminating in the 1958 communal riots, moving the two com-
munities further apart.
After the elections of 1965, the unp was again forced to share power with 
the Tamil parties. Premier Dudley Senanayake entered into a pact with 
Chelvanayakam (the ‘D- C Pact’).24 Senanayake agreed to concessions on the 
use of Tamil and limited devolution of power to District Councils. In regard to 
colonisation, he agreed that in future colonisation schemes in the North and 
 22 Hansard (Parliamentary Debates), Vol 24, Col 1917, 1956.
 23 Edrisinha et al., Power- sharing in Sri Lanka, 220.
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East, priority would be given to the landless persons of the two provinces, fol-
lowed by Tamils in the two provinces and then to people from other provinces, 
preference being given to Tamils. When a White Paper on District Councils 
was presented in Parliament in 1968, it was the slfp’s turn to oppose, joined 
by their coalition allies of the Left. The paper was withdrawn in the face of 
opposition and the fp soon left the government.
There were several other factors that worsened relations between the two 
communities in the 1950s and 1960s. It was a period of worldwide national-
ist and anti- imperialist agitation. A number of radical measures were taken, 
such as the takeover of foreign oil companies and assisted schools and agricul-
tural reform. Tamil parties were not enthusiastic about such measures, even 
opposing many of them. They were very conservative on most issues, behaving 
like the ‘cousins’ of the unp. Another factor was the secessionist movement 
in South India at the time. There was talk of a ‘greater Tamil Nadu’ that would 
include the North and East of Sri Lanka.25 This gave rise to deep suspicion and 
distrust. In addition, there was no shortage of communalists on either side, 
fanning hatred for political gain.
But with all these and the failure of the B- C Pact and the D- C Pact, there was 
still no serious talk of a separate state. In fact, even in 1970 the fp called upon 
the Tamil- speaking people in its election manifesto to vote against candidates 
who stood for the bifurcation of the country. This was an apparent reference 
to the first Tamil separatist party, the tiny ‘Eelath Thamilar Otrumai Munnani’ 
(etom) led by C. Suntharalingam.
4 Majoritarian Constitution- Making
1972 was a golden opportunity that was missed. The people of Sri Lanka were 
making their own Constitution through a Constituent Assembly and the entire 
membership of Parliament joined the process, including all the representa-
tives of the Tamils. V. Dharmalingam, speaking for the fp during the discussion 
on the Basic Resolution on the unitary nature of the Constitution, pleaded for 
federalism or at least the recognition of the federal principle in a unitary form 
of government. Stating that the party was only asking the federal principle to 
be accepted, he suggested that, as an interim measure, the ruling coalition of 
the slfp and the Left parties should implement what they had promised in the 
 25 Ganapathy Palanithurai K. Mohanasundaram, Dynamics of Tamil Nadu Politics in Sri 





election manifesto, namely that they would abolish Kachcheris26 and replace 
them with elected bodies. This was rejected by all parties of the South. Tamil 
representatives continued to participate in the Constituent Assembly but only 
until the Basic Resolution declaring Sinhala to be the only official language 
was passed. There was no dramatic walk out. In addition to Sri Lanka being 
declared a unitary state and Sinhala being recognised as the official language, 
the first Republican Constitution also gave Buddhism the foremost place.27
The Tamil mp s nevertheless took their oaths under the new Constitution. 
Later attempts at an understanding proved unsuccessful and the Tamil par-
ties soon united under the banner of the Tamil United Front (tuf) that later 
became the Tamil United Liberation Front (tulf). At the famous Vaddukoddai 
Conference held in 1976, the tulf embraced separatism and adopted a resolu-
tion for a separate state called ‘Tamil Eelam’ in the Northern and Eastern prov-
inces that they claimed to be the historical homeland of the Tamils.28 During 
the 1977 elections, the tulf contested on a separatist platform and swept the 
Tamil areas.
The 1977 elections were significant for another reason. For the first time, one 
of the two major parties of the South, the unp, acknowledged in its manifesto, 
‘A Programme of Action to Create a Just and Free Society’, that Tamils had griev-
ances and that the non- resolution of their problems had driven the Tamils 
towards separatism. It promised to set up a round table conference to address 
Tamil issues. Tamils outside the North and East voted overwhelmingly for the 
unp. The unp obtained an unprecedented five sixth majority but its share of 
the popular vote was 50.9 %. However, no round table conference was ever 
organised.
The 1978 Constitution was another opportunity for a solution. But the 
unp failed to respond and the Tamils refused to participate in making the 
Constitution. For the second time in Sri Lanka’s history, a Constitution was 
adopted without the participation of the representatives of the Tamils, show-
ing clearly that effective state power in Sri Lanka was with the Sinhalese. The 
 26 District administration headed by a government agent. Kachcheri is a Hindi word used 
for the Revenue Collector’s Office during British rule. The system continued after inde-
pendence. See S. S. Wickramanayake, “The Management of Official Records in Public 
Institutions in Sri Lanka: 1802– 1990” (unpublished PhD diss., University of London, 
1992), 28.
 27 For a detailed discussion on the 1972 Constitution, see Jayampathy Wickramaratne, 
“The 1972 Constitution in Retrospect,” in Towards Democratic Governance in Sri 
Lanka: A Constitutional Miscellany, ed. Jayampathy Wickramaratne (Rajagiriya: Institute 
for Constitutional Studies, 2014), 75– 95.
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1978 Constitution entrenched the unitary nature of the Sri Lankan state, as 
well as the foremost place of Buddhism, and provided for a strong presidential 
executive. Entrenchment meant that any change needed a two- thirds majority 
in Parliament and approval by the people at a referendum.
Attacks on Tamils in 1983 forced thousands of Tamils to flee the island and the 
entire conflictual situation became internationalised. The tulf, which was for 
a compromise despite its separatist rhetoric, withdrew from Parliament and, 
not surprisingly, was soon upstaged by the numerous Tamil militant groups 
that had sprung up. A fully- blown separatist war followed.
5 Devolution at Last: 13th Amendment to the Constitution, 1987
Forced by these realities, President Jayewardene entered into an accord with 
India in 1987. This was followed by the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, 
which established provincial councils and provided for limited devolution. 
All Tamil militant groups except the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte) 
accepted the Indo- Lanka Accord in principle. Provincial councils with limited 
legislative and executive powers were set up. Tamil was also made an official 
language. However, literally every comma and full stop in the 13th Amendment 
had been used by the subsequent governments without exception to thwart 
the process of devolution.29
The 13th Amendment established provincial councils with limited legisla-
tive and executive powers within a unitary state. There were three lists of sub-
jects and functions: a reserved list, a provincial council list and a concurrent 
list. A provincial council had no power to make statutes on any matter set out 
in the reserved list. A provincial statute on a matter in the provincial council 
list made a pre- 1987 parliamentary law on the same matter inoperative in the 
Province if the statute states in its long title that the statute was inconsistent 
with such law. However, the legislative power of a provincial council in regard 
to a matter in the provincial council list was not exclusive, as Parliament too 
could legislate on such matters. A parliamentary Bill on a provincial council 
matter had to be referred to all provincial councils for the expression of their 
views. If all agreed, Parliament could pass the Bill with a simple majority. If 
one or more provincial councils did not agree, and the Bill was passed by only 
a simple majority, then the Bill would become law applicable only to those 
 29 Jayampathy Wickramaratne, “Sri Lanka: Missed Opportunities and the Way Forward,” in 
Towards Democratic Governance in Sri Lanka: A Constitutional Miscellany, ed. Jayampathy 





Provinces that agreed. But if the Bill was passed by a two- thirds majority, then 
the law would also apply in the Provinces that did not agree.
As for matters in the concurrent list, Parliament had to consult provincial 
councils before it took up a Bill and, conversely, the same applied to a pro-
vincial council. In the event of inconsistency, the parliamentary law would 
prevail. However, a provincial council statute on such a matter would make a 
pre- 1987 law on the subject inoperative unless Parliament decided otherwise.
A significant feature of the reserved list is its first item: national policy on 
all subjects and functions. This is a provision that was abused by the Centre 
under successive governments. It is reasonable to expect the provision to mean 
that Parliament may lay down national policy even relating to a matter in the 
Provincial list or the concurrent list by a simple majority and provincial coun-
cils should abide by such national policy in making statutes. In view of the 
express provision contained in Article 154G (3) of the Constitution of 1978 that 
a parliamentary law relating to a matter on the provincial list would apply in 
a Province only if that Province had adopted the law by a two- thirds majority, 
there can be little doubt that, on the pretext of establishing national policy, 
Parliament could not legislate by a simple majority on a matter from the pro-
vincial council list without the consent of the provincial council concerned. 
In other words, national policy on matters set out in the provincial council 
list and the concurrent list would be in the nature of framework legislation to 
which provincial councils should conform.
To take one example, under item 8 of the provincial council list, the regula-
tion of road passenger carriage services and carriage of goods by motor vehi-
cles within the Province and the provision of intra- provincial road transport 
services were provincial subjects. This clearly permitted a provincial council to 
set up its own transport services. The Colombo government, however, prohib-
ited provincial councils from providing omnibus services, claiming to declare 
‘government policy’ through the National Transport Commission Act of 1991. 
Although it is clear from a reading of the 13th Amendment that national pol-
icy could only be laid down by an Act of Parliament, successive governments 
purportedly laid down such policy by Cabinet decisions and ministry circulars.
In Kamalawathie v. Provincial Public Service Commission of the North- 
Western Province,30 the petitioners alleged in the Supreme Court that a cir-
cular giving a national teacher transfer policy declared by the Cabinet of 
Ministers as national policy had not been followed by a provincial Public 
 30 Kamalawathie v. Provincial Public Service Commission of the North- Western Province [2001] 
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Service Commission. Judge Mark Fernando, with Judge Wadugodapitiya and 
Judge Ismail agreeing, held that the circular sets out national policy on an 
important aspect of education. ‘While powers in respect of education have 
been devolved to Provincial Councils, those powers must be exercised in con-
formity with national policy. Once national policy has been duly formulated 
in respect of any subject, there cannot be any conflicting provincial policy on 
the same subject.’31
It is submitted that the Supreme Court erred in holding that the Cabinet of 
Ministers’ decision constituted a duly formulated national policy binding on 
the provincial councils. The scheme of the 13th Amendment allows no inter-
pretation other than that national policy can only be determined by law.
In 1995, the Gunawardena Committee, appointed to study the functioning 
of provincial councils, had the following to say on how the national policy pro-
vision had been misused:
There has been a tendency on the part of Government Ministries to inter-
pret National Policy in operational terms, thereby extending their areas of 
administrative action in respect of provincial subjects. […] National Policy 
being a reserved function brings into effect a role differentiation between 
the Government and the Province. Thus, whereas the Government per-
forms a directive role the Province is relegated to an implementational 
role. Hence there is a tendency on the part of the Government to give 
policy directives, marginalizing the Province from the decision- making 
process. This leaves only a residual role which is largely operational. The 
tendency to view the Province in operational terms is reinforced by the 
nature and scope of Government- Province relations currently in place. It 
is a negation of the power sharing basis of devolution and does not con-
stitute a relation for establishing a partnership between the Government 
and the Provinces.32
Under Article 154C of the Constitution, the executive power of a provincial 
council extends to matters with respect to which a provincial council has 
power to make statutes, namely matters in the provincial council list and 
the concurrent list. However, for provincial authorities to exercise executive 
 31 Kamalawathie v. Provincial Public Service Commission of the North- Western Province [2001] 
1 Sri LR 1, 5 (emphasis added).
 32 Committee to Study the Operation of Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka, “Provincial 
Councils: Operational Experience of Devolution,” Report of the Committee to study the 






power, they need statutory authority. In 1987, when the legal basis for the pro-
vincial councils was established, there were at least 300 pieces of legislation 
relating to matters included in the provincial council list and the concurrent 
list. References in such laws to the minister or a particular public officer could 
not be construed as references to the Governor, provincial minister or the cor-
responding provincial public officer unless the 13th Amendment contained an 
express provision to that effect. Provincial councils were thus faced with the 
impossible task of passing statutes corresponding to all such laws if they were 
to exercise executive power. They did not have their own draftsmen and had to 
rely on the central state for this as well. In the absence of a statute, the central 
state would continue to exercise executive power in respect to the subject in 
question.
As a result, provincial councils pressed the government to enact parlia-
mentary legislation providing that all references in existing law with respect 
to matters included in the provincial and concurrent lists be construed as 
references to the corresponding provincial authorities. The government 
reluctantly agreed to make such a provision, which, however, only applies 
to the provincial list and also keeps the powers of the Centre intact. The 
Provincial Councils (Consequential Provisions) Act No. 12 of 1989 was accord-
ingly passed. There remained an estimated 200 laws in respect to matters set 
out in the concurrent list that were not covered by the Act. Even to this day, 
only a few such statutes have been enacted by the various provincial councils, 
mainly due to lack of their own draftsmen, but also due to frustration result-
ing from the Centre’s lack of support. The central government has not moved 
to prepare model statutes that could be used by provincial councils, unlike in 
some other countries. In the absence of their own statutes, provincial author-
ities are unable to exercise executive power, notwithstanding Article 154C of 
the Constitution.
Problems cropped up even regarding matters set out clearly in the provin-
cial list. A pre- 1987 parliamentary law on such a matter would be inoperative 
in a Province only if a statute was made. Although provincial authorities were 
able to exercise powers under a pre- 1987 law to which the provincial councils 
(Consequential Provisions) Act applies, central authorities were also able to 
exercise powers if they wished to do so, unless and until a provincial  statute 
was made. What happened in the case of the Ratnapura and Kegalle Base 
Hospitals that were administered by the Sabaragamuwa provincial council is 
illustrative: the Centre moved to take over the administration of the two hos-
pitals in 1994 and the Attorney General advised the Centre that in the absence 
of a provincial statute which provides for the administration of the two hos-
pitals, ‘the control of these two hospitals legally remains with the Ministry of 
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Health.’33 On being asked for advice on whether the minister at the Centre 
could exercise the power of supervision over local authorities if there was no 
provincial statute on the subject, the Attorney General stated: ‘It should also 
be noted that the Provincial Councils (Consequential Provisions) Act does not 
take away from the Minister of the central government the powers which he 
has under any Act of Parliament, which can continue to be exercised by him as 
well.’34 Clearly, the Centre was making use of the difficulties faced by provin-
cial councils in making their own statutes to encroach on areas devolved on 
the provinces. With regard to interference by the Centre, the Gunawardena 
Committee stated:
Most Government Ministries continue to conduct their operations on 
a pre- devolution basis. Thus Government Ministries routinely address 
guidelines and circular instructions direct to the respective provincial 
heads of departments by- passing the provincial Ministry. Further, there 
has been no restructuring at the centre in terms of roles and functions in 
the context of devolution. It would appear that there has been a failure 
on the part of most Government Ministries to formulate national policies 
in their sectoral subjects in partnership with provincial councils.35
It is instructive to examine in detail one significant case of a clash between the 
centre and provinces. The Agrarian Services (Amendment) Bill of 1991 sought 
to amend several sections of the original act that dealt with matters relating to 
landlords and tenant cultivators. The Bill was challenged in the Supreme Court 
on the ground that it dealt with matters set out in the provincial council list 
as well as the concurrent list and should have been referred to the provincial 
councils. The Bill made no reference, in the preamble or elsewhere, to national 
policy being made. The Centre did not claim even in Court that the Bill sought 
to lay down national policy. However, the Court held that ‘[it] is sufficient 
for present purposes that the matters dealt with in the Bill are all matters of 
national policy in regard to the rights and liabilities of owners and tenant- 
cultivators, and thus fall within [the reserved list]’.36 How national policy could 
 33 Committee to Study the Operation of Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka, Provincial 
Councils, 57.
 34 Committee to Study the Operation of Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka, Provincial 
Councils, 55.
 35 Committee to Study the Operation of Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka, Provincial 
Councils, 7– 8.










be laid down by amending an existing law in a matter of the provincial council 
was not explained.
With the establishment of provincial councils in 1988, agrarian services was 
considered a provincial subject and the councils had their own Departments 
of Agrarian Services; matters relating to landlords and tenant cultivators were 
handled by these departments. After the Supreme Court’s aforesaid determi-
nation, an Additional Solicitor General informed the Centre that in view of 
the decision of the Supreme Court, the matters dealt with in the Bill were all 
matters of national policy in regard to the rights and liabilities of owners and 
tenant cultivators and thus fell within the reserved list; the Centre could pro-
ceed ‘on the basis that Agrarian Services is not a devolved subject’.37 Soon, the 
Centre took over the provincial departments. The advice was clearly wrong. 
Even if the Supreme Court was correct in saying that the matters covered by 
the Bill were all matters of national policy it does not follow that Agrarian 
Services necessarily be a subject in the reserved list. When national policy is 
declared in respect of a subject in either the provincial list or the concurrent 
list, this does not shift the subject to the reserved list.
In 2003, in Madduma Banda v. Assistant Commissioner of Agrarian Services,38 
the Supreme Court held that matters relating to tenant cultivators be included 
in the provincial list. Commenting on the earlier determination, the Court took 
the view that it would not be correct to say that the matters dealt with by the 
Bill were all matters of national policy. The judgment was certainly devolution- 
friendly. However, despite the clarification, the subject of agrarian services was 
not returned to the provincial councils.39
6 Later Attempts for a Constitutional Settlement
Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga became President in 1994. The Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (slfp) had vigorously opposed the 13th Amendment 
under the leadership of her mother, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the world’s first 
 37 Committee to Study the Operation of Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka, Provincial 
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 38 Madduma Banda v. Assistant Commissioner of Agrarian Services [2003] 2 Sri LR 80.
 39 For a fuller discussion on the working of Provincial councils see Lakshman Marasinghe and 
Jayampathy Wickramaratne, 13th Amendment: Essays on Practice (Pannipitiya: Stamford 
Lake, 2010); Ranjith Amarasinghe et al., Thirty Years of Devolution: An Evaluation of 









Equality, Autonomy and Territorial Integrity in Sri Lanka 173
woman Prime Minister. However, under Kumaratunga’s leadership, the slfp 
adopted a pro- devolution platform. Between 1994 and 2000, she led a dynamic 
campaign for a strong power- sharing arrangement as a solution to Sri Lanka’s 
ethnic crisis. Surveys commissioned by her showed that while only 23 % of 
the Sinhala people were for a negotiated settlement in 1996, numbers had 
increased to 68 % by 1999. In August 2000, after several months of discussions 
with the unp, the Kumaratunga Administration presented the Constitution of 
the Republic of Sri Lanka Bill. However, with the dissolution of Parliament for 
General Elections only a few weeks away, the unp withdrew its agreement to 
support the Bill. The Bill was debated in Parliament but not put to a vote, as the 
necessary two- thirds majority was not forthcoming.
The 2000 Constitution Bill proposed a non- unitary framework. Rather than 
using a label to describe the nature of the State, the Bill stated: ‘The Republic of Sri 
Lanka is one, free, sovereign and independent State consisting of the institutions 
of the Centre and of the Regions which shall exercise power as laid down in the 
Constitution’ (Article 1). A clear- cut division of powers between the Centre and 
the Regions was proposed. The legislative power of the Regions would be exclu-
sive and there would be no concurrent list. The subjects on which national policy 
could be made by the Central Legislature would be restricted.
At the parliamentary elections held in October 2000, the People’s Alliance 
(pa) won with a slim majority which it soon lost due to defections. At the 
elections held in December 2001, the unp secured a majority and Ranil 
Wickremasinghe formed a government under the Kumaratunga presidency. 
A ceasefire with the ltte was agreed to and peace talks were held. The gov-
ernment and the ltte agreed in Oslo in December 2002 to ‘explore’ a federal 
solution.
With Kumaratunga who introduced the 2000 Constitution Bill as President 
and Wickremasinghe as Premier, this was another opportunity for a Southern 
consensus, but Wickremasinghe did not get Kumaratunga on board the peace 
process, instead attempting to deal with her through intermediaries. This was 
not to the liking of the latter who was constitutionally empowered to ‘declare 
war and peace’ as President. While Wickremasinghe may have suspected that 
Kumaratunga would do a kind of tit for his tat of 2000, recent defectors from the 
slfp to the unp who held important positions in the Wickremasinghe admin-
istration are also said to have sabotaged any possibility of such rapprochement.
The Wickremasinghe government offered an interim administration dom-
inated by the ltte in the North- East40 but the ltte made a counter demand 
in October 2003 for an Interim Self- Governing Authority (isga) with ‘plenary 
 40 Edrisinha et al., Power- sharing in Sri Lanka, 654– 661. 
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power for the governance of the North- East’ including powers in relation to 
resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction, development, raising revenue 
including imposition of taxes, revenue, levies and duties, law and order, and 
over land. It demanded that all government expenditures in or for the North- 
East should be subject to the control of the isga. According to the proposal, 
the isga would have had powers to borrow internally and externally, pro-
vide guarantees and indemnities, receive aid directly, and engage in or regu-
late internal and external trade. It would also have had direction and control 
over any and all administrative structures and personnel in the North- East 
and the power to alienate and determine the appropriate use of all land in 
the North- East that was not privately owned. Land occupied by Sri Lankan 
armed forces would have had to be immediately vacated and restored to the 
possession of the previous owners. The isga would have had control over the 
marine and offshore resources of the adjacent seas and the power to regulate 
access thereto. It would also have had control over the natural resources in the 
region.41 However, some of the proposed powers of the isga would not have 
been possible under the existing unitary Constitution. Granting ‘plenary power 
for the governance of the North- East’ would have been permissible only in a 
confederal setting. While the people may have ultimately supported a federal 
structure as a part of a comprehensive peace agreement that would lead to the 
end of violence, the isga would have been hard to sell as an interim arrange-
ment. Nevertheless, the isga proposal could have been a basis for further talks.
On 4 November 2003, a few days after the isga was proposed, Kumaratunga 
used her presidential powers to take over the ministries of defence, interior 
and media. Without the key Ministry of Defence, Wickremasinghe now had 
very few remaining options. The peace process was all but dead. On 7 February 
2004 Parliament was dissolved. In the ensuing elections, the United People’s 
Freedom Front (upfa), led by Kumaratunga and joined by Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (jvp), a left- wing party opposed to devolution, won a majority of 
seats. Was the ltte sincere in agreeing to a ceasefire and talks about a political 
solution? Many observers take the view that it was only a tactical move and 
that the ltte’s commitment was to a separate state and nothing short of it. It 
was aware of the difficulties of the Southern polity to forge a consensus on a 
political solution. The ltte appears to have been bent on gaining control of 
an interim administration that would have ‘gelled’ with time and with no con-
stitutional solution. Its chief negotiator himself later disowned the ltte’s will-
ingness to explore a solution to the Tamil problem within a federal framework.
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7 War Over but No Peace
The ltte’s hard- line position in turn helped hardliners within the Sinhala 
majority. Mahinda Rajapakse ascended the presidency in 2005 with the sup-
port of Sinhala hardliners. Interestingly, the ltte preferred a hardliner to a 
moderate and enforced a boycott of the poll in the areas it controlled, denying 
Wickremasinghe, who offered a high degree of devolution, several hundred 
thousand decisive votes. This only confirms that the ltte was never interested 
in a political settlement and overestimated itself as a military force. Within 
four years, Rajapakse’s military machine completely decimated the ltte.
The ltte also misread the post- 9/ 11 international situation. Most inter-
national actors helped Rajapakse to defeat the ltte, directly or indirectly, 
although some were not happy with what was happening during the last stages 
of the war. India also helped; notwithstanding the large Tamil population in 
Tamil Nadu, most of whom did not support a separate state but had great sym-
pathy for Sri Lankan Tamils. The ruling Congress had another reason to see 
the end of the ltte; the latter had assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, a former Indian 
Prime Minister and Congress leader. Gandhi’s killing was another huge blun-
der on the part of the ltte and its arrogant leader Prabhakaran.
While the war against the ltte was on, President Rajapakse summoned an 
All Party Conference (apc) which in turn appointed an All Party Representative 
Committee (aprc) to make specific proposals for a constitutional settlement. 
He also appointed a 17- member panel of experts to assist the aprc. The panel 
of experts was divided. Eleven experts who included Sinhalese, Tamils and 
a Muslim proposed a strong power- sharing arrangement,42 four Sinhalese 
experts proposed minimal devolution while two others presented their own 
reports.
The so- called ‘majority report’ recommended a double- pronged 
approach: extensive devolution on the one hand, so that communities could 
exercise their power and develop their own territories within the respective 
areas, and power- sharing at the centre on the other hand, which would inte-
grate the various communities into the body and strengthen national integra-
tion. In other words, a clear- cut division of powers between the centre and 
the provinces was proposed. Subjects such as defence, national security, for-
eign affairs, immigration, communications, national transportation, interna-
tional trade, maritime zones and shipping, which are necessary to ensure the 
 42 Edrisinha et al., Power- sharing in Sri Lanka, 784. The author of this chapter was a signatory 





sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic unity of Sri Lanka, would be 
reserved for the Centre, while other subjects would be devolved. The majority 
also recommended avoiding the use of distinctive expressions such as unitary, 
federal, or union of regions and describing the state in the Constitution as con-
sisting of ‘institutions of the Centre and of the Provinces which shall exercise 
power in the manner provided for in the Constitution’, similar to the phrase 
used in the 2000 Constitution Bill.43 The multi- ethnic, multi- lingual, multi- 
religious and multi- cultural character of Sri Lankan society was to be recog-
nised, whilst safeguarding the unity and territorial integrity of the Republic. 
Another significant proposal was that the ‘Peoples’ of Sri Lanka were to be 
described in the Constitution as being composed of ‘the constituent peoples 
of Sri Lanka’ and that every constituent people would have the right, inter alia, 
to its due share of state power. This would be without in any way weakening 
the common Sri Lankan identity.
The majority report was welcomed by moderates among the majority 
Sinhalese and overwhelmingly by Tamils, Muslims and Hill Country Tamils. Not 
surprisingly, the ltte chose not to comment on the contents, instead question-
ing the right of the Tamil experts to represent the community. The aprc pro-
cess dragged on for three years. Sinhala nationalist parties withdrew at various 
stages, but the slfp, the main party in the government, remained. Although no 
report was officially published, aprc Chairman Vitarana presented a summary 
of its proposals to the President in 2009. The proposals fell short of what the 
‘majority report’ had recommended. Yet, extensive devolution within a unitary 
state was proposed with power- sharing at the centre and the proposals could 
form the basis for talks. Interestingly, the Presidential Secretariat denied that 
it had a copy of the proposals while Vitarana reiterated that he had submit-
ted a summary to the President. Subsequently, Ramaiah Yogarajan and Nizam 
Kariapper, who represented the Ceylon Workers Congress and the Sri Lanka 
Muslim Congress respectively, released a summary of the decisions based 
on the minutes of the aprc44 and Vitarana conceded that it was an accurate 
summary.
Dr. Colin Irwin of the University of Liverpool, with vast experience in con-
ducting opinion polls in conflict zones including Northern Ireland, Kashmir, 
 43 Clause 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Sri Lanka Bill, 2000, https:// www.peacea-
greements.org/ viewmasterdocument/ 1007, accessed 30 January 2021.
 44 Ramaiah Yogarajan and Nizam Kariapper, eds., “Proposals made by the All Party 
Representatives Committee to form the basis of a new Constitution,” www.ground-
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the former Yugoslavia and Sudan, tested the preliminary proposals of the aprc 
against public opinion in March 2009, just three months before the end of the 
war. A year later, in March 2010, nine months after the end of the war, the same 
proposals were tested again, but with a larger sample that included people in 
the Northern Province.45 A summary of the aprc proposals as they existed in 
February 2009 was listed as a series of 14 ‘show cards’. Those interviewed were 
asked what they thought of each item on a given card. Was it ‘essential’, ‘desir-
able’, ‘acceptable’, ‘tolerable’ or ‘unacceptable’? They were then asked for their 
views on the ‘package’ as a whole, that is to say, whether they would support 
such a ‘package’ and under what circumstances.
Irwin reported that the percentages of Tamils, Muslims and Hill Country 
Tamils to whom the reform proposals taken together as a ‘package’ were ‘essen-
tial’, ‘desirable’ or ‘acceptable’ were as follows (Table 6.1):
The above figures were not in any way surprising. What was surprising to 
many was the response of the Sinhalese (Table 6.2):
Contrary to the myth propagated by opponents of devolution that the 
Sinhalese did not support devolution, 59 % of the respondents considered the 
 45 Colin Irwin, “ ‘War and Peace’ and the APRC Proposals,” peacepolls.org (2010), www.pea-
cepolls.org/ peacepolls/ documents/ 001173.pdf, accessed on October 15, 2013.
table 6.1 Support for reform proposals among Tamils, 
Muslims and Hill Country Tamils 
Tamils Muslims Hill Country 
Tamils
2009 82% 85% 90%
2010 83% 88% 90%
table 6.2 Support for reform proposals among Sinhalese
2009 59% (essential – 13%, desirable – 21%, acceptable – 25%)








aprc proposals at least ‘acceptable’ three months before the end of the war in 
May 2009. One year later, the figure had risen to as much as 80 %.
The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (llrc), appointed by 
the President in May 2010 and headed by a former Attorney- General, submit-
ted its report in November 2011.46 The Commission made a number of far- 
reaching recommendations. The llrc report was well received both within Sri 
Lanka and abroad. In regard to a political solution, the llrc stated that a polit-
ical solution was imperative to address the causes of the conflict: ‘Everybody 
speaks about it, though there is no agreement about the diagnosis and the 
prescription,’ the Commission lamented. It said that the government had to 
take the initiative to have a serious and structured dialogue with all political 
parties, in particular those representing the minorities, based on a proposal 
containing the government’s own thinking on the form and content of the 
dialogue process envisaged. That dialogue would have to take place at a high 
political level and with an adequate technical backstop. The onus of initiating 
and carrying forward a dialogue was thus placed squarely on the shoulders of 
the government. The llrc also stated that any devolution or power- sharing 
mechanism would have to be implemented within the broad framework of 
a sovereign, politically independent and multi- ethnic Sri Lankan state. While 
the distribution of meaningful powers to the periphery was essential, there 
were powers that formed the core responsibilities of the state and that could 
not be so devolved – and therefore had to be retained and exercised by the gov-
ernment at the Centre. It was also important to ensure that any power- sharing 
arrangement had inbuilt mechanisms that would effectively address and dis-
courage secessionist tendencies and safeguard the sovereignty and integrity of 
the state.
The llrc’s views were not new, yet they were of significance coming from 
a commission appointed by the government. The Rajapakse Administration 
repeatedly made promises to the international community and to neighbour-
ing India that it was committed to a political solution,47 but no meaningful 
steps were taken towards that end. On the contrary, efforts were made to dilute 
the 13th Amendment. Such moves were not successful due to the Indian fac-
tor as well as opposition from within the ruling coalition. Although another 
 46 Commission on Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation, “Report of the Commission 
on Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation” (November 2011), http:// slembassyusa.
org/ downloads/ LLRC- REPORT.pdf, accessed on 8 May 2013.
 47 Dianne Silva, “Full Implementation of 13th Amendment Plus, MR Tells Krishna,” Daily 
Mirror, 17 January 2012, http:// www.dailymirror.lk/ 16141/ full- implementation- of- 13th- 
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Parliamentary Select Committee was appointed, the Tamil parties and the unp 
held back and declared that the government had to first make known its posi-
tion on a political solution.
In September 2013, the moderate Tamil Nationalist Alliance (tna) won 30 
out of 38 seats at the first elections to the Northern provincial council, making 
the new Council the only one controlled by the opposition. C.V. Wigneswaran, 
a former Judge of the Supreme Court, became the Chief Minister, raising hopes 
of pro- devolution forces in the country. But he soon joined Tamil hardliners 
and was accused of doing little for the cause of devolution.
The reports of the aprc, llrc and the Panel of Experts appointed by 
him notwithstanding, Rajapakse did nothing towards settling the con-
flict. Clearly, he was accused of only paying lip service. Having passed the 
18th Amendment to the Constitution to remove the few limitations on the 
executive presidency and the two- term limit, Rajapakse called elections in 
2014 two years in advance. At the Presidential election held on 8 January 
2015, Rajapakse lost to Maithripala Sirisena, the General Secretary of his 
own party (slfp) who defected to become the ‘common candidate’ of the 
opposition. The main plank of Sirisena’s platform was the abolition of the 
executive presidency and a return to a parliamentary form of government. 
Tamils, Muslims and Hill Country Tamils voted overwhelmingly for him. The 
Tamil Nationalist Alliance stated publicly that while it did not extract any 
promises from Sirisena on the resolution of the ethnic conflict, it had the 
fullest confidence in him that he would usher in a constitutional settlement. 
Wickremasinghe, the leader of the unp, was appointed Prime Minister. After 
his victory, Sirisena was invited by the slfp to lead the party in place of 
Rajapakse.
At the general elections that followed in August 2015, the United National 
Front for Good Governance (unfgg) led by Wickremasinghe won 106 out 
of 225 seats and Wickremasinghe was again appointed Prime Minister. 
The slfp- led United People’s Freedom Front (upfa) won ninety- six seats 
and the Tamil Nationalist Alliance won sixteen. The majority of Members 
of Parliament belonging to the upfa supported Rajapakse and sat in the 
Opposition benches, calling themselves the Joint Opposition while over 
thirty supported Sirisena and sat in the government benches. A major prob-
lem for Sirisena was that most of the Members who supported him sup-
ported Rajapakse on 8 January 2015 and did not identify themselves with 
the wishes of the masses who voted for Sirisena as the ‘common candidate’. 
Their support for the constitutional reform process was at best half- hearted. 
Some of them later joined the Opposition and finally, the slfp too left the 
government.
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8 The Unitary versus Federal Debate and the Issue of Secession
While power- sharing through devolution to the periphery has been a success-
ful tool in meeting secessionist challenges in many countries, a large number 
of those who opposed devolution in Sri Lanka have spread fear among the peo-
ple that devolution would lead to the secession of the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces. However, the author is not aware of a single example in which the 
governing authority of a regional unit has used the powers devolved on it for 
secession. If a majority in Scotland decided to leave the United Kingdom, 
secession would be despite devolution, not because of devolution. The same 
would apply in case of a secession of Catalonia from Spain. However, if there 
are people who genuinely believe that powers devolved may be used to secede, 
it is best that such fears be assuaged. Historical reasons too sometimes play 
a part: even an offer of the right to secede could not lure Eritrea to stay with 
Ethiopia, for example.
The description of the Sri Lankan state as ‘unitary’ in 1972 and its sub-
sequent entrenchment have impeded efforts at meaningful power- sharing. 
In constitutional theory, a unitary state is one in which the central govern-
ment is supreme and administrative divisions exercise only powers that the 
central government delegates. In short, there is only one ultimate source of 
state power. For many Sri Lankans, however, ‘unitary’ means ‘oneness’ or 
‘one country’. The Sinhala word for ‘unitary’ is ‘ekeeya’ and ‘eka’ is ‘one’. Thus, 
changing the unitary nature of the state is seen by some as ‘dividing’ the 
country.
The issue has been complicated with the Federal Party’s Tamil name being 
‘Illankai Thamil Arasu Kachchi’ which translates as ‘Lanka Tamil State Party’. 
While opponents say that the Tamil name makes it clear that the ultimate aim 
of the party is a separate state, party leaders deny this and point out that in 
India, the subnational unit is called a ‘state’. They say that when the party was 
formed, it took inspiration from India and all it wished to achieve was a ‘Tamil- 
majority state’ as in quasi- federal India.
Article 157A (4) of the Sri Lankan Constitution states that ‘[w] here any 
political party or other association or organization has as one of its aims or 
objects the establishment of a separate State within the territory of Sri Lanka, 
any person may make an application to the Supreme Court for a declaration 
that such political party or other association or organization has as one of its 
aims or objects the establishment of a separate State within the territory of 
Sri Lanka’. One of the consequences of such a declaration is that the politi-
cal party or other association or organisation concerned shall be deemed to 
be proscribed for all purposes, and that any member of the political party 
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or other association or organisation who is a Member of Parliament shall be 
deemed to have vacated their seat in Parliament with effect from the date of 
such declaration.48
In Chandrasoma v. Senathirajah,49 the petitioner sought a declaration 
that the Federal Party was a political party which had as its aims and objects 
the establishment of a separate State within the territory of Sri Lanka. The 
Supreme Court, having reviewed the party constitution and affidavits submit-
ted by party officials, found that the Federal Party supported or advocated the 
establishment of a federal State within a united Sri Lanka. It did not, however, 
support, espouse, promote, finance, encourage or advocate the establishment 
of a separate State within the territory of Sri Lanka. The Court observed that 
advocating a federal form of government within the existing state could not be 
considered as advocating separatism.
Federalism had become a ‘dirty word’ in Sri Lankan politics and much heat 
was generated when the People’s Alliance Government’s 1997 proposals sought 
to describe the state as a ‘union of regions’. Constitution drafters therefore 
needed to be pragmatic and avoid language that could lead to confusion. This 
is precisely what the pa government was advised to do and accordingly, the 
2000 Constitution Bill stated in proposed Article 1: ‘The Republic of Sri Lanka 
is one, free, sovereign and independent state consisting of the institutions of 
the Centre and of the Regions which shall exercise power as laid down in the 
Constitution.’ As the majority report of the Panel of Experts later stated in 
agreement, the use of distinctive expressions, such as unitary, federal, union 
of regions/ provinces was to be avoided in describing the nature of the state.
The Public Representations Committee on Constitutional Reform appointed 
by the government in 2016 to receive public representations on constitutional 
reform to support the present constitutional reform process stated in its report:
With regard to the nature of the State, there were many views expressed 
by people ranging from a federal to a unitary State, secular to non- secular 
with other in- between options between a federal and unitary State as 
well. Given the fact that the ideal of a federal State has been long mooted 
by Tamil politicians many of the representations from the Northern 
Province and also from the Tamil community in the Eastern Province, 
articulated the desire for a federal State. It should also be noted however, 
that some individuals and groups from other parts of the country and 
 48 Article 157A (5) of the Constitution.






from among the other communities also proposed a federal State or a 
power sharing mechanism as the best means of responding to the griev-
ances of the Tamil people.
At the same time, there were many submissions from other parts of 
the country that strongly expressed the desire for a unitary State. What is 
clear is that the idea of a federal State is strongly linked to the notion of 
separatism by those who opposed federalism. At the same time, they also 
associate a unitary State with an indivisible country. On the other hand, a 
unitary State is viewed by those who favour greater devolution and a fed-
eral structure as a continuation of an undemocratic, centralized form of 
State control. The fear of a federal State especially among the Sinhalese, 
arises from the idea that a federal State will eventually lead to separation. 
Fears regarding a unitary State are based on the idea that it will lead to 
rule of the majority and the centralization of power.50
Does the recognition of a State as a ‘unitary state’ ensure its territorial integrity 
and indivisibility? This has been a major issue raised in the current discourse. 
The Steering Committee stated in its report:
The President whilst speaking on the Resolution to set up the 
Constitutional Assembly, stated that whilst people in the south were fear-
ful of the word ‘federal’, people in the north were fearful of the word ‘uni-
tary.’ A constitution is not a document that people should fear. The classi-
cal definition of the English term ‘unitary state’ has undergone change. In 
the United Kingdom, it is now possible for Northern Ireland and Scotland 
to move away from the union. Therefore, the English term ‘Unitary State’ 
will not be appropriate for Sri Lanka. The Sinhala term ‘aekiya raajyaya’ 
best describes an undivided and indivisible country. The Tamil language 
equivalent of this is ‘orumiththa nadu’.51
The United Kingdom referred to here, with only local government institu-
tions below the national government, was long regarded as a proto- typical 
unitary state. According to the British doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, 
Parliament is the supreme legal authority in the United Kingdom which can 
make or repeal any law. Any law can be changed by a future parliament and 
 50 Public Representations Committee on Constitutional Reform, Report on Public 
Representations on Constitutional Reform (Colombo: Public Representations Committee 
on Constitutional Reform, 2016), 20.
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courts cannot overrule parliamentary legislation. The United Kingdom does 
not have a written Constitution against which the validity of laws passed by 
Parliament could be tested, but unwritten constitutional principles which are 
respected. It also has many laws of constitutional importance. If a ‘unitary state’ 
means a state whose territorial integrity is assured, then the United Kingdom 
was not and is not a unitary state. The Parliament of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland passed the Irish Free State Constitution Act52 in 1922 
to allow Ireland (minus Northern Ireland) to become a dominion and with the 
exit of Ireland the remainder became the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland. Ireland became a Republic in 1949 and left the British 
Commonwealth.53
In an effort to end the violence in Northern Ireland, the governments of 
the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland agreed on Good Friday in 
1998 that it was for the majority of the people of Northern Ireland to decide 
whether they preferred to continue to support the Union with Great Britain 
or a sovereign united Ireland. To put the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ into legal 
effect, the British Parliament passed the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which 
also repealed the Government of Ireland Act 1920. When a referendum 
on Scottish independence was to be held in Scotland, the UK government 
drafted an Order in Council granting the Scottish Parliament the necessary 
powers to hold an independence referendum. The draft Order was approved 
by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament of the United Kingdom. Under 
the powers thus temporarily transferred from Westminster, the Scottish 
Independence Referendum Act 2013 was passed by the Scottish Parliament. 
At the referendum held in 2014, a majority decided not to leave the United 
Kingdom. Thus, the UK Parliament itself provided for the secession of 
Ireland. It recognised that a majority of the people of Northern Ireland 
ought to be able to decide on the issue of secession from the UK and unifica-
tion with Ireland. It also recognised that a majority of Scots ought to be able 
to decide if Scotland should leave the United Kingdom. The above shows 
that describing a state as ‘unitary’ is not, in and of itself, a barrier against 
secession.
Proponents of devolution argue that describing the Sri Lankan State as ‘uni-
tary’ in the English version of the Constitution is undesirable for another rea-
son: namely that there exists a certain ‘unitary mindset’ in Sri Lanka according 
to which any issue that arises between the Centre and a Province is decided 
 52 Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) Act, 1922, http:// www.irishstatute-
book.ie/ eli/ 1922/ act/ 1/ enacted/ en/ print.html, accessed 12 August 2020.






in favour of the Centre. They argue that while ‘unitary’ in the classical sense 
means that powers devolved may be withdrawn by the Centre through consti-
tutional amendment, there have been many instances of legislative, executive 
and even judicial power which in turn undermine devolution. Sadly, succes-
sive governments have used every conceivable provision to frustrate devolu-
tion. The situation has been worsened due to the lack of a devolution- friendly 
administration.54 Examples of such a ‘unitary mindset’ are available in abun-
dance and several were given in detail earlier in this chapter.
Taking into consideration the fears of pro- devolution forces as well as those 
who fear that devolution has the potential to lead to secession, the Steering 
Committee proposed to include the following in the new Constitution:
 – In Sri Lanka, sovereignty will vest with the people and shall be inalienable 
and indivisible.
 – Sri Lanka should remain one undivided and indivisible country.
 – There shall be specific provisions included in the Constitution to prevent 
secession (division of the country).
 – Maximum devolution should be granted.
 – The Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of Sri Lanka.
 – The power to amend the Constitution, or to repeal and replace the 
Constitution, shall remain with the Parliament and the People of Sri Lanka 
(where applicable), in the manner set out in the Constitution.55
In consequence, the following formulation was proposed for consideration:
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) is a free, sovereign and independent Republic which is 
an aekiya rajyaya / orumiththa nadu, consisting of the institutions of the 
Centre and of the Provinces which shall exercise power as laid down in 
the Constitution.
In this Article aekiya rajyaya / orumiththa nadu means a State which 
is undivided and indivisible, and in which the power to amend the 
Constitution, or to repeal and replace the Constitution, shall remain 
with the Parliament and the People of Sri Lanka as provided in this 
Constitution.
 54 For the constitutional framework of devolution and important legal issues that arose 
see Jayampathy Wickramaratne, “Legal Aspects of Devolution in Sri Lanka,” in Towards 
Democratic Governance in Sri Lanka: A Constitutional Miscellany, ed. Jayampathy 
Wickramaratne (Rajagiriya: Institute for Constitutional Studies, 2014), 137– 233. For an in- 
depth study on the working of Provincial councils, see Amarasinghe et al., Thirty Years of 
Devolution.
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To assuage fears that a provincial council might use its powers to move towards 
secession, the Steering Committee proposed that the Centre should be consti-
tutionally empowered to intervene in a province in case there is a ‘clear and 
present danger’ to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic. The 
following provisions were proposed:
No Provincial Council or other authority may declare any part of the ter-
ritory of Sri Lanka to be a separate State or advocate or take steps towards 
the secession of any Province or part thereof, from Sri Lanka.
The President may, on the advice of the Prime Minister, where a situa-
tion has arisen in which a provincial administration is promoting armed 
rebellion or insurrection or engaging in an intentional violation of the 
Constitution which constitutes a clear and present danger to the territo-
rial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic, by Proclamation- 
 (a) assume to the President, all or any of the functions of the admin-
istration of the Province and all or any of the powers vested in, 
or exercisable by, the Governor, the Chief Minister, the Board of 
Ministers or any body or authority in the Province; and
 (b) where it is necessary for the effectual exercise of the powers under 
sub- paragraph (a) of this paragraph, dissolve the Provincial Council.
 (c) The proclamation shall include reasons for the making of such proc-
lamation. Such a Proclamation shall be subject to Parliamentary 
approval and be subject to judicial review.56
A very sensitive issue is the extent of devolution in the North and East. The 
recognition of the North- East as the traditional homeland of the Tamils and 
the ‘merger’ of the two provinces has always been a key demand of the Tamil 
nationalist movement. Tamils live predominantly in the North and the East. 
In the North, according to the last census, they accounted for more than 95 % 
of the total population. In the East, they live mainly in the Trincomalee and 
Batticaloa districts as well as with a significant percentage in the Ampara dis-
trict. In Batticaloa, the Tamil are the predominant community, but Batticaloa 
is not contiguous with the North: the Trincomalee district is in between them, 
and all three communities are found in roughly equal proportions there. The 
merger is fiercely opposed by the Sinhalese who claim that any ‘amalgamation’ 
of the districts would be a stepping stone to secession. Muslims in the East 
are also opposed to the idea fearing that they would be reduced to a small 
 56 Steering Committee, “The Constitutional Assembly of Sri Lanka,” 26. 
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minority in a Tamil dominated North- East. Some Muslims, however, are pre-
pared to consider a merger of the Tamil- dominated areas of the East with the 
North if the Muslim- majority areas of the East are recognised as a separate 
devolved unit.
Attempting to strike a balance, Article 154A (3) of the Constitution, intro-
duced by the 13th Amendment, allowed Parliament to enact a law providing 
for the merger of two or three adjoining Provinces. The provincial councils Act, 
enacted along with the 13th Amendment, provided that the President could 
make an order on the ‘merging’ of two or three adjoining provinces, and that a 
poll would be held on or before 31 December 1988 in the provinces concerned, 
so that voters could decide whether or not a province should remain linked to 
the other specified province or provinces. There were two special provisions 
that applied to a merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The President 
should not make a Proclamation of the merging of the said Provinces unless he 
was convinced that (a) arms, ammunition, weapons, explosives and other mili-
tary equipment owned or controlled by terrorist, militant or other groups with 
a view to establishing a separate state on 29 July 1987 had been surrendered to 
the government or to designated authorities, and (b) the hostilities and other 
acts of violence by such groups in the said Provinces had ceased. Sub- section 
(3) states if the electors of the Eastern Province decide that such a Province 
should be linked to the Northern Province, a poll shall not be required in the 
Northern Province.
As a result, the Northern and Eastern provinces were ‘merged’ by an order 
of the President and elections held for the North- Eastern provincial council in 
1988. While candidates of the Ealam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front 
(eprlf) were undisputedly elected in the districts in the Northern Province, 
the elections held in the districts of the Eastern Province were more contested. 
The eprlf, a separatist militant group that gave up separatism following the 
Indo- Lanka Accord, set up an administration. During a period of honeymoon 
talks between the government of President Premadasa and the ltte, the 
Indian Peace Keeping Force invited by President Jayewardene as part of the 
Accord and trying to contain the ltte’s military was requested to withdraw 
from Sri Lanka. The ltte soon began attacking the eprlf and other groups 
which had accepted the Accord and the eprlf made a rash ‘unilateral declara-
tion of independence’ which was used by President Premadasa to dissolve the 
North- East provincial council. Since the 13th Amendment did not permit the 
premature dissolution of a provincial council except on the advice of the Chief 
Minister, Parliament hurriedly passed the provincial councils (Amendment) 
Act No. 27 of 1990. A new provision (Section 5A) was inserted whereby a 
provin cial council would be dissolved if the Governor made a communication 
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to the President stating that more than half of the members of the Council 
expressly repudiated or manifestly disavowed obedience to the Constitution. 
The North- East provincial council was accordingly dissolved. Fresh elections 
to the North- East provincial council were repeatedly postponed by the use of 
Emergency Regulations. In 2007, the Supreme Court held that the merger of 
the two provinces was unconstitutional as the pre- conditions for the merger 
had not been satisfied.57
However, with regard to the abovementioned Article 154A (3) of the 
Constitution, the deadline for carrying out a poll expired on 31 December 1988 
and there was no law in force on possible mergers of provinces. Yet, Tamil par-
ties continued to insist on the merger of the North and the East. According to 
the interim report of the Steering Committee, three options were discussed: 
(1) the retention of Article 154A (3), but with the additional requirement 
that a referendum of the people of each of the provinces concerned was also 
required; (2) that the Constitution should not provide for mergers at all; and 
(3) that the Constitution recognise the Northern and Eastern Provinces as 
a single Province.58 The first option appeared to be the dominant view, but 
even if the proposal had been included in the new Constitution, Parliament’s 
chances of passing a law on the matter were remote.
9 Equality among Devolved Units
Although Kandyan Sinhala leaders were the first to demand a federal structure, 
that demand fizzled out after Independence was granted in 1948. Thereafter 
the demand came from the Tamils, as seen above. As Tamils dominate the 
Northern Province and live in substantial numbers in the East, the two prov-
inces were at the centre of the conflict. The B- C Pact of 1957 referred to above 
was for the setting up of Regional Councils in the North and East. The D- C 
Pact of 1968 proposed District Councils for the whole of the country but made 
special reference to the use of Tamil as a language of administration and land 
settlement in the North and East. The secessionist movement that emerged in 
the 1980s also sought to set up a separate State in the two provinces.
In the above background, one would have expected Sri Lankan lead-
ers to focus on devolution for the North and East rather than for the whole 
country, but they did just the opposite. A.C.S. Hameed, a senior Minister in 
 57 Wijesekera v. Attorney- General [2007] 1 Sri lr 38.







the Jayewardene government that introduced the 13th Amendment, stated 
publicly that when some leaders suggested to Jayewardene that devolution 
should be limited to the North and East, he responded negatively. Jayewardene 
thought that devolution only to the North and East would be seen by many as 
a stepping stone to separation. The 13th Amendment accordingly provided for 
symmetrical devolution for all nine Provinces. Since then, there has been no 
serious demand for asymmetrical devolution.
Devolution soon became a demand of the Muslims and Hill Country Tamils 
as well. An issue raised by them was the dispersed nature of the two commu-
nities and their consequent underrepresentation. Recent amendments to the 
provincial councils Elections Act had addressed this issue to some extent. The 
interim report of the Steering Committee proposed setting up Community 
Councils to ensure that at various levels of government and in different geo-
graphical areas, the rights of communities which are minorities within such 
areas would be protected.59 Recognition of local authorities as a third tier of 
government and an implementing agency for specified subjects both of the 
Centre and the Provinces would also provide dispersed communities more 
opportunities to take part in government.
10 Concluding Remarks: Devolution under the Proposed Constitution
Proponents of devolution were demanding that given the nearly thirty years 
of experience under the 13th Amendment, powers of the Centre and the 
Provinces finally be clearly defined. The best proposals in regard to devolu-
tion came from the Chief Ministers of the seven ‘southern’ provinces, all of 
which had a Sinhala majority. The Chief Ministers were all members of the 
slfp. In fact, the Chief Ministers’ Conference made similar proposals on sev-
eral occasions.
The main recommendations of the report on the principles of devolution 
were as follows:
 – Principle of subsidiarity: The principle of subsidiarity is accepted and 
should be a guide in deciding on the allocation of subjects and functions 
between the three tiers of government.
 – Community councils: constitutional provisions shall be made to ensure 
that at various levels of government and in different geographical areas, the 
rights of communities which are minorities within such areas are protected.
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 – Inter- Provincial cooperation: The Constitution should provide for the pos-
sibility of inter- provincial cooperation with regard to matters falling within 
the executive competence of such provinces.
 – Local Authorities: Local Authorities should be recognised as a third tier 
of government functioning under the provincial councils. While Local 
Authorities would not exercise legislative power, they would be an imple-
menting agency for specified subjects both of the Centre and the Provinces 
as prescribed by law.
 – Division of powers between the several tiers of government shall be clear 
and unambiguous: There is general consensus, including among the Chief 
Ministers who made submissions before the Steering Committee, that pow-
ers must be clearly and unambiguously divided and that the present concur-
rent list should be abolished. This was also suggested in the Report of the ad 
hoc Sub- Committee on the relationship between Parliament and provincial 
councils. Parliament may by law provide for the implementation of func-
tions on selected subjects in the reserved list by the Provinces. Parliament 
or provincial councils may by law or statute provide for the implementation 
of specified functions within their purview, to be carried out by the Local 
Authorities. Whether to retain a concurrent list and, if so, what specific sub-
ject areas should be included is to be further discussed.
 – National Standards, National Policy and Framework Legislation:
 – In particular areas, there could be a necessity for the Centre to pre-
scribe National Standards (e.g. healthcare, education, environment) 
or Framework Legislation (e.g. Local Authorities’ constitution, powers, 
functions, elections). Therefore, the Constitution should identify and 
include specified items in respect of which the Centre can enact frame-
work legislation or national standards.
 – In regard to National Standards, such minimum standards may be pre-
scribed where it is necessary to ensure (a) the enjoyment by citizens of a 
reasonable minimum standard of living throughout the country; (b) the 
enjoyment by citizens of a reasonable minimum standard of state service 
delivery throughout the country; or (c) a reasonable minimum standard 
of environmental protection throughout the country.
 – The Centre may also prescribe national standards by way of regulations 
under authority of law, in the circumstances specified above. Such regu-
lations shall not be valid unless approved by both Houses of Parliament. 
The substantive and procedural validity of such regulations may be chal-
lenged in the Constitutional Court.
 – National Policy should be a matter for the Cabinet of Ministers at the 
Centre. In formulating National Policy on matters contained in the 
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provincial list, the central government shall adopt a participatory pro-
cess involving provincial councils. Formulation of National Policy on a 
provincial list matter would not have the effect of the Centre taking over 
executive or administrative powers with regard to the implementation 
of the said devolved power. National Policy shall not override statutes 
enacted by a provincial council in respect to matters on the provincial 
list. However, in the event that the Centre enacts legislation to give effect 
to such national policy, in accordance with the constitutional provisions 
relating to the enactment of legislation on devolved subjects, the rele-
vant provincial council statutes shall be read subject to such national 
legislation.
 – Existing Central legislation on devolved subjects: All existing Central legis-
lation (on provincial list subjects) shall remain in force and shall be applica-
ble to the Provinces until amended or repealed by legislation enacted by the 
Province, and accordingly, the powers of Ministers and officials exercisable 
under such legislation shall be exercisable by the corresponding provincial 
Minister or official.
 – New Central legislation on devolved subjects: The Centre may enact legis-
lation on any subject in the provincial list provided all provincial councils 
agree to such legislation. The Centre should not legislate on matters on the 
provincial council list with regard to any Province that does not agree to 
such legislation, without recourse to adequate constitutional safeguards to 
ensure that powers devolved should not be taken back unilaterally from the 
Provinces.
 – A Second Chamber of Parliament:
 – There is general consensus that a Second Chamber should be established, 
which is largely representative of the Provinces.
 – It is suggested that the Second Chamber should consist of fifty- five 
Members; five from each of the nine provincial councils elected on the 
basis of a Single Transferable Vote (stv) and ten Members elected by 
Parliament again on the on the basis of stv.
 – The Second Chamber shall not have the power to veto ordinary legisla-
tion but may refer ordinary legislation back to Parliament for reconsider-
ation. After Bills are placed on the Order Paper of Parliament, they shall 
be referred to the Second Chamber to obtain its views, if any, prior to the 
Second Reading.
 – No Constitutional Amendment shall be enacted into law unless passed 
by both Parliament and the Second Chamber, each by a two- thirds major-
ity. If the referendum requirement is triggered, the Amendment shall not 
be enacted into law unless also approved by the people at a referendum.
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 – Constitutional Amendments seeking to amend basic features of the 
Constitution including fundamental rights and devolution may not be 
passed except by way of additional constitutional safeguards.
 – Governor: Several of the Chief Ministers who made submissions before the 
Steering Committee were of the view that executive power should be vested 
in the Board of Ministers, with the Governor playing a largely ceremonial 
role, while one Chief Minister called for the complete abolition of the posi-
tion of Governor.
 – The Steering Committee is of the view that the Governor should act on the 
advice of the Board of Ministers other than where the Governor is specif-
ically authorised by the Constitution. The Governor should be appointed 
by the President. Constitutional provision should be made to prohibit the 
Governor, while holding office, from engaging in party politics.
 – Provincial Public Service: The appointment, promotion, transfer, disciplinary 
control and dismissal of employees of the provincial Public Service should 
be matters for an independent provincial Public Service Commission con-
sisting of members approved by the Constitutional Council (which makes 
recommendations for the appointment of independent Commissions at the 
Centre). Currently, the Governor may override decisions of the Commission, 
which is also appointed by him.
 – Chief Minister’s Conference: It is recommended that a Chief Ministers’ 
Conference, comprising of the Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers of all 
Provinces be mandated to meet at regular intervals, in order to discuss issues 
of common concern, and to promote inter- provincial and Centre- Province 
cooperation. The Prime Minister shall preside at the Chief Ministers’ 
Conference.
The interim report also contained observations and comments by Members 
of the Steering Committee on the principles and formulations contained in 
the Report. Prime Minister Wickremasinghe informed the Committee that his 
party (unp) would go along with the entirety of the report. The slfp led by 
President Sirisena was generally supportive of devolution but its own propos-
als did not go as far as those of its own Chief Ministers. The slfp did not sub-
scribe to the interim report. As expected, the Joint Opposition effectively led 
by former President Rajapakse was not supportive of further devolution, even 
wanting to decrease some of the present powers of provincial councils. The 
Tamil Nationalist Alliance (tna), in which the fp was the dominant partner, 
while affirming its position that Sri Lanka should be a federal state within a 
united, undivided and indivisible country, nevertheless stated that in the inter-
ests of reaching an acceptable consensus, it was willing to consider agreement 
with the main principles articulated in the report if the same were acceptable 
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to the two main parties. The tna’s position was widely welcomed in the South 
although it was severely criticised by Tamil extremists.
As stated earlier, there has been little movement since the Steering Committee 
presented its interim report. The unp and the slfp as well as President Sirisena 
and Prime Minister Wickremasinghe moved away from each other. In October 
2018, the President removed Wickremasinghe as Prime Minister, which he was 
not empowered to do. Indicative of a new alignment, he appointed Rajapakse 
as Prime Minister, hoping that cross- overs from the unp and its allies would 
give the Sirisena- Rajapakse combination a majority in Parliament. When that 
did not materialise, Sirisena dissolved Parliament but the Supreme Court 
held that the dissolution was unconstitutional. Wickremesinghe was later re- 
appointed as Prime Minister. The October 2018 ‘constitutional coup’ dashed all 
hopes of constitutional reform through the Constitutional Assembly process.
At the Presidential elections held in November 2019, Gotabhaya Rajapakse, 
Mahinda Rajapakse’s younger brother, was elected as President; he is a former 
Army officer and Secretary, Ministry of Defence, and considered a stronger 
hardliner than Mahinda. He was enthusiastically supported by Sinhala extrem-
ists who were opposed to any devolution and who maintained that there was 
no ‘ethnic problem’ in Sri Lanka. Wickremesinghe resigned and the elder 
Rajapakse was appointed Prime Minister.
At the Parliamentary elections held in August 2020, the Rajapakses, together 
with allies, obtained a two- thirds majority. This time, their immediate target 
was to be the 19th Amendment to the Constitution of 2015 which reduced the 
powers of the President, thereby strengthening Parliament.
Hardliners might press upon the Rajapakses to abolish the provincial coun-
cils altogether, but this is unlikely because of the strong Indian factor. During a 
recent visit of Mahinda Rajapakse to India, Indian Prime Minister Modi urged 
that the 13th Amendment be implemented in full. What is most likely to hap-
pen under the Rajapakses is that provincial councils will stay but under the 
effective control of the Centre. This unfortunately means that the ethnic crisis 
will continue to simmer.
Yet another chance for a constitutional settlement has been missed and 
added to a history of missed opportunities.
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 chapter 7
Equality and Advantage in Emerging Federations 
and the Dilemma of Non- Renewable Natural 
Resources
The Cases of the Solomon Islands and Trinidad and Tobago
Nico Steytler
1 Introduction
In many fragmented societies, where identifiable groups are clustered in dis-
tinct territorial areas, conflict often revolves around ownership, control and 
access to the benefits of non- renewable natural resources (nrnr s), particu-
larly when it concerns the highly lucrative resources of oil and gas, which are 
usually very unevenly spread across a country. A World Bank report even claims 
that this is one of the most important causes of civil war.1 In the case of South 
Sudan, the current civil war appears to be driven by the struggle for control of 
oil resources. The splitting up of provinces by the Kirr regime, in violation of 
a peace agreement, was to ensure that the oil- producing areas would not fall 
under the jurisdiction of the provinces controlled by ethnic groups other than 
his Dinka community.2 The acquisitive urge of political elites to benefit from 
nrnr s is usually clothed in the garb of interests organised around language, 
culture, ethnicity, religion, clans, and so forth.
In many fragile countries, federalism is seen as the last resort to address 
conflict, as the centralised state is seen as the very reason for the conflict in the 
first place. The centralisation of power has led to inequality and the margin-
alisation of minority groups. The failure of the centralised state to be a redis-
tributor of resources across the nation becomes most obvious when natural 
 1 Nicholas Haysom and Sean Kane, “Negotiating Natural Resources for Peace: Ownership, 
Control and Wealth Sharing,” Briefing Paper (October 2009): 20 footnote 9, http:// compara-
tiveconstitutionsproject.org/ files/ resources_ peace.pdf.
 2 See Zemelak Ayitenew Ayele, “Constitutionalism: The Missing Element in South Sudan’s 
Elusive Quest for Peace through Federalism?,” in Decentralisation and Constitutionalism 
in Africa, eds. Charles Fombad and Nico Steytler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 
234– 254.
198 Steytler
resources are monopolised by the elite (most often from a particular group) to 
the exclusion of the country as a whole, often exacerbating inequality and the 
marginalisation of producing regions.
As a conflict resolution mechanism, federal arrangements for such coun-
tries are confronted with two contradictory objectives: self- government for 
minority or marginalised groups, and at the same time, solidarity between 
subnational governments in the sense that there is an equality of citizenship, 
including access to equivalent public services, irrespective of their location.
When natural resources become part of the controversy (or are the contro-
versy) the tension between self- government and solidarity intensifies. If the 
emphasis is on self- government, the control and benefits of nrnr s are claimed 
by the group on whose territory they are found; the claim is seen as an essen-
tial part of self- government and thus of federalism itself. Where solidarity is the 
more prominent impulse, nrnr s are deemed to be the patrimony of the coun-
try as a whole, the benefits of which are to be fairly shared by both the national 
and subnational governments alike. Whereas solidarity leads to more equal out-
comes, a self- government approach to nrnr s may result in inequality.
The dilemma is then how this tension between self- government and sol-
idarity is managed: is equality among subnational governments pursued or 
are producing regions allowed to keep the advantages of nrnr s? Where self- 
government (or a measure thereof) over nrnr s is accepted, possibly leading 
to inequality, how are regional claims to superior access to such resources jus-
tified? Conversely, how is such advantage or inequality tolerated by the regions 
less endowed or the polity in general?
In practice, management of the tension between self- government and soli-
darity hovers between two extremes. At the one end of the spectrum, nrnr s 
are seen as a component of self- government, the benefits of which accrue to 
subnational governments. At the other end, nrnr s, regarded as the nation’s 
patrimony, fall under central government’s control, but revenue derived from 
such resources is shared among all levels of government. Within this spectrum 
one finds the partial recognition of claims of oil producing subnational govern-
ments (sng s), for a higher share of oil revenue than others which have no such 
bounty. The justifications for arrangements that lean towards self- government 
and giving the producing sng s a greater share in natural resources wealth, 
include ‘fend- for- yourself ’ federalism, corrective measures to compensate for 
damage caused by the extraction of the resource, and historical land owing 
regimes.
This chapter examines the question with reference to two countries on oppo-
site sides of the globe – the Solomon Islands and Trinidad and Tobago. They 
have been chosen because both island states are currently debating a possible 
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non- centrist future: in the case of the Solomon Islands, a fully- fledged federa-
tion, while in Trinidad and Tobago an autonomy status for Tobago is being con-
sidered. In both countries, the discussions are grounded by draft constitutional 
texts. Furthermore, nrnr s are on the constitutional negotiating table with oil 
and gas a focal area. Although oil and gas are exploited in Trinidad and Tobago, 
the discovery of such riches is still but a hope in the Solomon Islands. However, 
in both cases the question of equality and advantage are firmly on the agenda.
The chapter is organised in three parts. Section 2 sets out the broad issues 
with regard to the drivers of self- government and solidarity, the ownership, 
control and benefit of nrnr s, and the approaches in practice to the question of 
equality and advantage. Section 3 examines the proposals for self- government 
and the management of nrnr s in the Solomon Islands and in Trinidad and 
Tobago. Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
2 Managing Non- Renewable Natural Resources
The management of nrnr s reveals an inherent tension in the federal system – 
tension between the objectives of self- government and solidarity. Where the 
emphasis falls on self- government, sng s usually have a greater say over own-
ership, control and the financial benefits of nrnr s. Where the focus is on sol-
idarity, nrnr s are seen as a national asset and the federal government must 
see to the equitable distribution of revenue through an equalisation system. 
Where the sng s are in control of nrnr s (which are mostly unevenly spread), 
inequality among sng s is more likely to prevail, while when the federal gov-
ernment is in charge, equalisation is the most likely outcome.
2.1 Drivers of Self- Government and Solidarity
In conflict ridden societies, the fight by territorially based groups for decen-
tralisation is most often driven by the quest for equal citizenship (including 
equal access to public services) and self- government. The first seeks equitable 
access to the wealth of the nation, while the latter demands access to sufficient 
revenue resources to enable self- government.
Inequality between people living in one region compared to others can be 
measured by various indicators such as relative poverty levels, literacy rates, 
infant mortality rates, life expectancy, and so forth.3 Often these indicators 
are proxies of state action or inaction. The per capita state expenditure across 
 3 See Peter Wanyande, “Devolution and Territorial Development Inequalities: The Kenyan 









regions can vary significantly, resulting in unequal levels of services (health, 
education, social development), economic development and infrastructure 
(roads, water, sanitation). Even if the per capita spending is the same across 
regions, historical backlogs in previously marginalised regions may prevent 
any catching up with other more well- off regions.
Inequality flows from various factors including political, social, economic and 
natural reasons. For narrow political reasons, a regime may marginalise regions 
that fall in an opposition camp.4 Where economic development is concentrated 
around the capital, regions on the periphery suffer under- development. The 
un equal distribution of natural resources (water, arable land, minerals, and oil 
and gas) also affects levels of economic development and living standards.
In diverse societies such inter- regional inequality may be coloured by prac-
tices and perceptions of marginalisation and discrimination on the basis of 
identity markers, such as ethnicity, language, race, custom or religion. In many 
developing countries this sense of inequality often drives quests by territorially- 
based groups for autonomy; apart from sentiments for the preservation of lan-
guage, custom or religion, the notion of being treated as equal citizens through 
equitable development often lies at the heart of the quest for decentralisation. 
The centralised government is seen as serving a narrow partisan group, which 
results in the lived experience of material inequality with regard to access to 
basic state services, government jobs, and overall development.5 The quest for 
decentralisation is thus for equality of outcomes, shifting the focus to obtain-
ing an equitable slice of the nationally raised revenue including that derived 
from nrnr s.
But the quest goes further; self- government is the other goal which seeks 
to control the territorial space occupied by the group. nrnr s are thus seen as 
assets of the region to be owned and controlled by the subnational government 
of the region, also enjoying the financial revenue flowing from such assets.
2.2 Ownership, Control and Revenue of Non- Renewable Natural 
Resources
The constitutional management of natural resources usually entails three 
dimensions: (1) who owns the resources; (2) who controls the resources; and 
(3) who benefits from the revenue generated by their exploitation.6 These 
 4 Wanyade, “Devolution,”.
 5 Wanyade, “Devolution,”.
 6 See Forum of Federations, “Oil and Gas in Federal Systems,” forumfed.org (2014), https:// 
www.shareweb.ch/ site/ DDLGN/ Documents/ OIL%20_ %20GAS%20in%20federal%20
countries%20(2014)_ G%20Anderson.pdf. This paper is based on George Anderson, Oil 
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questions are mostly interlinked: ‘ownership’ often also entails management, 
but federal ‘ownership’ does not necessarily imply that producing regions do 
not benefit more from the revenue than the other regions.
The regulation of nrnr s has become so important that in more recent 
constitutions the sharing of revenue from such resources is dealt with sep-
arately from the other revenue sharing provisions.7 As Haysom and Kane 
argue, where the conflict was driven by disputes of control and access to 
natural resources, these issues should lie at the heart of a peace- making 
constitution.8
As far as ownership is concerned, two trends are discernible. The first is 
that the federal government owns the resources on the basis that they are 
the national patrimony belonging to the nation as a whole. Examples of this 
trend are found in Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and Nigeria. The second trend 
is that the producing sng s exercise ‘ownership’, with examples coming from 
Argentina, Australia, Canada and India. In the latter trend, the demarcation 
of a producing sng’s boundaries becomes important where the resource lies 
offshore. In most countries such resources belong to the federal government,9 
but subnational boundaries may be drawn differently. A country’s territorial 
waters of up to 12 nautical miles from the low water mark could be placed 
under the jurisdiction of the coastal sng s (as in Argentina) or a lesser area 
(as in the USA – mostly three nautical miles). Anderson reports that in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (eez; up to 200 nautical miles) the federal gov-
ernment has control over all economic resources, such as the exploitation of 
marine life, minerals, and oil and gas.10
‘Ownership’ usually also means the management of the resource, but not 
always.11 Management includes the issuing of licences for exploration and the 
extraction of the resource, and the taxing of such activities.12 However, the 
issuing of mining or exploration licences by, say, the federal government may 
have to contend with a sng’s powers, including those relating to land use and 
environmental protection.
of a 3- year comparative knowledge exchange project run by the Forum of Federations as 
part of its sectoral work.
 7 Haysom and Kane, “Negotiating Natural Resources,” 5.
 8 Haysom and Kane, “Negotiating Natural Resources,” 7.
 9 Giorgio Brosio and Raju Jan Singh, “Raising and Sharing Revenues from Natural Resources: A 
Review of Country Practices,” Discussion Paper, MFM Global Practice, no. 5 (August 2015): 11.
 10 Forum of Federations, “Oil and Gas,” 5.
 11 Forum of Federations, “Oil and Gas”, 2.














Separate from, but related to, the questions of who ‘owns’ or manages a 
resource, is the sharing of revenue that accrues from taxation and other fiscal 
instruments. Revenue is raised by either the federal government or sng s (or 
both) through licences, royalties, corporate income tax, land use fees, etc. Both 
ownership and access to revenue are matters often regulated in a constitution. 
Where the federal government owns the resource, and raises revenue through 
different fiscal instruments, a number of approaches to sharing that revenue 
are observed in practice. First, such revenue may become part of the federal 
consolidated fund from which equitable transfers are made to each sng. This 
is usually the case with revenue generated offshore. Secondly, in terms of a 
deriva tion principle, an additional amount is allocated to the producing sng in 
terms of an agreed upon formula.13 For example, in Nigeria 13 % of oil re venue 
goes to the producing states, while in Brazil that percentage differs accord-
ing to the type of revenue source. Brazil is also an exception in that revenues 
accruing from off shore natural resources are reserved for the federal govern-
ment.14 Where the sng is the ‘owner’ or manager of the resource, re venue may 
accrue to the sng or be shared with other sng s, but also take into account the 
derivative principle.
2.3 Approaches to Resource- Rich sng s
As the uneven distribution of nrnr s may lead to inequality among sng s, 
various approaches are evident in dealing with the matter. These approaches 
reflect the interest of the different parties; the federal government may view all 
nrnr s as the patrimony of the nation, a view shared by non- producing sng s. 
The resource- rich sng s may, on the other hand, emphasise their ownership of 
such resources and entitlement to the revenue flowing from such resources.
2.3.1 Shared Resources – Equalisation
The argument advanced by federal governments (and non- producing sng s) 
is that natural resources must be seen as part of ‘a national heritage’, the pro-
ceeds of which are ‘important in the financing of equal services and develop-
ment nationwide, rather than [being] regional resources’.15 This argument is 
the strongest when the resource extraction takes place off- shore; no sng has a 
direct link to such resources.16
 13 Andrew Bauer et al., Natural Resource Revenue Sharing (Natural Resource Governance 
Institute (nrgi) and the United Nations Development Programme (undp), 2016).
 14 Brosio and Singh, “Raising and Sharing Revenues,”.
 15 Haysom and Kane, “Negotiating Natural Resources,” 5.
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However, despite this intention, the sharing of resource revenue is often 
not equitable. Inequality persists because the marginalised communities in 
producing sng s do not benefit from the natural resources derived from the 
area in which they are settled.17 The revenue so collected is at best distributed 
equitably among all the regions, at worst (and most often) to the political dom-
inant elites or regions.18 However, where the object is total equality (and is 
achieved), Ahmad and Brosio remind us, that this may lead to the evaporation 
of the very purpose of having a decentralised system.19
In response, marginalised regions demand greater control of and bene-
fit from the natural resources in their areas. As noted above, where such 
marginalisation is based on discrimination on the basis of culture, language, 
custom, or religion (or a combination of these), conflicts most often follow. 
The quest is then for the region to own the natural resources, control their 
exploitation, and be the main beneficiary of revenue flowing from such 
exploitation.
The argument for this demand is two- fold: the first is that revenue should 
simply follow ownership, while the second argument is that the producing 
region must get a larger slice of the cake than others in order to compensate 
it or an indigenous community for the cost of exploitation, including environ-
mental damage caused by it.20
2.3.2 Arguments for Sole Access
Producing sng s argue for the retention of the benefits accruing from such 
resources even though this may lead to inequality. Two interlinked arguments 
are put forward in justification: the first is that the benefits of the resources fol-
low ‘ownership’, and the second is that inequality is an inevitable consequence 
of federalism.
The demand for sole benefit is based, according to Haysom and Kane, 
on ‘strong feelings of local community ownership over [natural resources] 
development and the resulting revenues’.21 When it comes to ownership of 
natural resources, they observe that ‘emotional concerns can override fiscal 
 17 Bauer et al., Revenue Sharing, 9.
 18 Haysom and Kane, “Negotiating Natural Resources,” 20.
 19 Ehitisham Ahmad and Giorgio Brosio, “Can Lessons from Equalisation Transfers in 
Industrialised Countries be Applied to Reforms in Emerging- Market Countries?,” 
in Comparing Fiscal Federalism, eds. Alice Valdesalici and Francsco Palermo (The 
Hague: Brill/ Nijhoff, 2018), 169– 189, 192.
 20 Haysom and Kane, “Negotiating Natural Resources,” 24.













rationality’. These concerns may be labelled as ‘emotions’, which turn into 
‘feelings’, to culminate in ‘desires’, but they become politically significant; 
the communities expressing these concerns may become ‘secessionist- 
prone areas’ which then require special measures to prevent a secessionist 
conflict.22
The first and most profound cause of the conflict is then the contestation 
over ‘ownership’. Often it is a case of a regional polity wanting to ‘take back’ 
resources that have been exploited by the centre. The sentiment that natural 
resources are ‘theirs’ are often bound up in strong sentiments of identity poli-
tics and the quest for autonomy. The ‘emotions’ are fuelled, first, by a historical 
sense of injustice of past financial marginalisation (‘this is payback time’); and 
secondly, compensation for damages caused by exploitation from which they 
did not benefit. Above all, it would seem that the notion of the nrnr s being 
an incident of land ownership or occupation is a powerful driver, backed up by 
a community’s view of itself being distinctive from the others (and the usual 
cleavages of ethnicity, race and religion which may apply). Such identity is tied 
with a sense of place, and attachment to land since time immemorial, where 
land and culture are intimately intertwined.
Linked to the notion of ownership, is a mode of federalism that has been 
described, with reference to the USA, as ‘fend- for- yourself ’ federalism.23 Based 
on a culture of ‘rugged state- individualism’, where no equalisation system 
applies, inequality between states is tolerated on the basis that each state, 
legally equal to the other, must look after its own well- being. If one state has 
the fortune to be better endowed resource- wise, leading to inequality among 
sng s, that is merely a consequence of federal self- rule. The consequence 
has been that in the USA, oil and gas rich states, retaining a larger percent-
age of revenue, have been able to provide better services than lower income, 
resource- poor states.24
2.3.3 Compromises
Between the two positions compromises are often struck in practice, allow-
ing some extra benefit for the producing sng s. As Ahmad and Brosio argue, 
some trade- offs need to be made between keeping a country together through 
 22 Haysom and Kane, “Negotiating Natural Resources,” 17.
 23 Elizabeth Alber, “Intergovernmental Financial Relations: Institutions, Rules and Praxis,” 
in Comparing Fiscal Federalism, eds. Alice Valdesalici and Francesco Palermo (The 
Hague: Brill/ Nijhoff, 2018), 223– 273, 233.
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sharing natural resources but allowing some differences to meet self- rule 
impulses.25 Haysom and Kane also remark that a high degree of autonomy can 
lead ‘to concerns regarding the unequal provision of public services between 
provinces (as in Canada), disparate levels of development (as in the United 
Arab Emirates) or may even spark the resentments which could provoke new 
sources of conflicts in divided societies’.26 They then ask ‘[h] ow will a min-
imum standard of public services be ensured across states and provinces, if 
resource wealth is trapped in one region only?’27
Compromises must be struck and as the matter goes to the heart of fed-
eral arrangements, it is best settled in the federal compact – the constitution. 
As Haysom and Kane write: ‘[C] onstitutions may be called upon to balance 
the competing feelings of community ownership over local resources against 
equally strong assertions that the wealth of the country belongs to all.’28 A con-
stitutional compromise is to entrench the derivation principle mentioned 
above; Nigeria is a clear example of providing 13 % of resource revenue allo-
cated to producing states, although it has not yet resolved the conflict in the 
Niger delta.
The justification of the unequal benefit from nrnr s is that it serves as com-
pensation for the environmental and social damage caused by the extractive 
industries. The latter may include loss of livelihoods, displacement of commu-
nities, and the attraction of migrants.29 Economists such as Brosio and Singh 
would argue that the amount of the compensation should then reflect as 
closely as possible the extent of the damage.30 The compensation rationale is 
thus no more than seeking to achieve equality among sng s, making sure that 
a producing sng is not prejudiced by the process of extraction. Arguments are 
also raised that the damage should be seen against a long- term horizon; in the 
case of nrnr s, the producing regions may be worse off after the depletion of 
the resource.31
 25 Ahmad and Brosio, “Can Lessons from Equalisation Transfers be Applied?,” 181.
 26 Haysom and Kane, “Negotiating Natural Resources,” 24.
 27 Haysom and Kane, “Negotiating Natural Resources,” 15.
 28 Haysom and Kane, “Negotiating Natural Resources,” 21.
 29 Bauer et al., Revenu Sharing, 24.
 30 Brosio and Singh, “Raising and Sharing Revenues,” 3.
 31 André Lecours and Daniel Béland, “Federalism and Fiscal Policy: The Politics of 

















3 An ‘Emerging’ Federation and Autonomous Islands
The question of sng s’ relationship to nrnr s and inequality has come to the 
fore in two countries composed of islands – Solomon Islands and Trinidad and 
Tobago. In both countries, interest groups, speaking on behalf of the compo-
nent islands (in the latter case, only from one), have put forward constitutional 
drafts that seek to establish a federal system in the Solomon Islands and an 
autonomy status for Tobago. Included in the proposals are provisions for the 
financing of the proposed sng s, including access to nrnr s, which, if imple-
mented, may lead to inequality among the sng s. Although neither constitu-
tional project has yet led to constitutional change, they are both indicative of 
the type of thinking that would justify a constitutional dispensation that may 
eventually lead to the advantage of a sng(s) to the detriment of others. The 
questions posed in this section are: (a) what are the financial and fiscal mea-
sures proposed, including those relating to nrnr s that may result in  inequality; 
(b) what would be the justification of inequality should that materialise; and 
(c) what may be the likely national responses to these proposals, and eventual 
constitutional reform outcomes?
3.1 Solomon Islands
3.1.1 History and Quest for Constitutional Reform
The Solomon Islands, located in the South Pacific, is a country comprising of 
nine archipelagos, each currently designated as a province. The population of 
nearly 600 000 is mainly Melanesian (95 %) and is scattered across the prov-
inces, with the largest concentrations found on Guadalcanal (141 000) and 
Malaita (160 000) while six provinces have less than 50 000 inhabitants, with 
the smallest (Rennell and Bellona) comprising of just over 3 000 souls. There 
are over 63 distinct languages, but English is the official language and Solomon 
Pijin the lingua franca for most. The notion of one nation of Solomon Islanders 
has been questioned; some argue that they identify themselves more with their 
island, cultural groups and community than with the nation.32 The Islanders 
are relatively poor, and are mostly involved in subsistence or cash crop farming 
and less than a third are in paid work.33
 32 Gordon Nanau, “Unifying the Fragments: Solomon Islands Constitutional Reforms,” 
Development Bulletin – Australian Development Studies Network 60 (January 2002): 4.
 33 Solomon Islands Government (sig), “Solomon Islands: Economic Development 
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As a political entity, the country emerged first as a declared British protec-
torate of the southern Solomons in 1893, with further islands being added to the 
British Administration until 1900. In 1976, the country became self- governing 
and attained independence in 1978 within the British Commonwealth.34 It 
currently has a centralised system with a very weak provincial system com-
prising the nine provinces. The main sources of revenue are based on natural 
resources: fishing, logging and mining, with logging contributing about half of 
the government’s export earnings. Foreign aid is significant, some of which is 
keenly provided by Taiwan on condition that the government recognises it as 
a country.
In 1998, tensions arose between residents indigenous to Guadalcanal 
(which also hosts the capital city of Honiara) and persons hailing from the 
other islands.35 In particular, the inflow of persons from Malaita irked the 
Gaudalcanalians who claimed that the former dominated the civil service 
and economy in Honiara. Tensions erupted in 1999 in communal violence on 
Guadalcanal when persons from Malaita had to flee Guadalcanal. Following a 
state of emergency, an Australian- led peace- making and - keeping intervention 
force was invited in 2003 and restored order. Ever since then a solution has 
been sought to the ‘communal tensions’ between the different island popula-
tions. Federalism has been chief among them.36
After the Federal Constitution of Solomon Islands Bill of 2004 found no 
traction,37 a slow process of constitutional reform commenced in 2007, when 
a Constitutional Reform Unit was established in the Prime Minister’s Office, 
which spearheaded a constitutional review body. The body comprised the 
Constitutional Review Congress, which was composed mainly of represent-
atives from the nine provinces, and the Eminent Persons Group, which was 
appointed by the Prime Minister composed of eminent elders including a for-
mer Governor- General. The body worked for ten years and produced a Draft 
Federal Constitution by June 2018.38 At the time of writing, the draft has not 
yet been debated in Parliament.
 34 Nanau, “Unifying the Fragments,”.
 35 Nanau, “Unifying the Fragments,” 11.
 36 Nanau, “Unifying the Fragments,” 15; Jennifer Corrin, “Breaking the Mould: Constitutional 
Review in Solomon Islands,” Revue Juridique Polynésienne 13 (2007): 143, 167 et seq.
 37 For a discussion of the Bill see Corrin, “Breaking the Mould.”
 38 Milton Ragaruma, “Final Plenary on Draft Federal Constitution Underway,” The Island 














The federal project of the draft constitution is animated by two key goals: the 
first is to ensure equality between the different archipelago states (the former 
provinces) – equality in services provided by the states themselves. The second 
goal is to secure significant autonomy of the states, including the maximum 
possible control by each state over the natural resources of that archipelago 
and the revenue they may generate. The two goals often prove to be in con-
flict: the quest for equalisation is based on the notion of the oneness of the 
nation – the equality of citizenship – which emphasises the sharing of wealth. 
The goal of autonomy and the quest for control over natural resources (and 
the inevitable consequence of inequality) sets the interests of individual states 
and its customary communities before the nation.
On the face of it, then, the quest for a federal Solomon Islands was, in part, 
driven by the goal of equal outcomes. The debates in the constitution- drafting 
process were informed by repeated statements about the marginalisation of 
the islands other than Guadalcanal; the main centre of development has been 
the capital of Honiara. Not surprisingly for such a small population, all the 
main state facilities are located in the capital. When the debate came about 
whether each province should have a High Court, the provincial voices were 
clear: ‘we want our own courts because we are not served by the central High 
Court’. The underlying premise of the federal compact is thus a common cit-
izenship of a constructed ‘nation’ with no second- class citizens in geograph-
ically located communities. At the same time, the autonomy of each island 
state is to be secured by strongly entrenched powers in general and fiscal 
arrangements in particular.
In line with modern constitutional trends, the country is to have three lev-
els of government: federal, state, and community governments. Power is to be 
divided between the three levels in terms of an extensive list of exclusive fed-
eral power, a short list of exclusive state powers, and a broad list of concurrent 
powers. Key items on the concurrent list fall under federal paramountcy, while 
the remainder fall under state paramountcy. There is also an extensive list of 
powers shared by the states and the community governments, the precise divi-
sion of which is to be regulated by state constitutions.
In neither the exclusive federal list nor in the exclusive state list is men-
tion made of land or natural resources.39 In the list of concurrent federal 
and state jurisdiction with state law paramountcy, the following items are to 
be found: ‘land tenure and dealings’, ‘land planning, use, management and 
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development’, ‘prospecting for, and mining of, minerals’, ‘exploration for, and 
extraction of, hydrocarbons and natural gasses’, and ‘fisheries’. In the list of 
state and community concurrent functional areas (with state paramountcy) 
fall: ‘customary land’, ‘sea resources and other customary ownership rights’, 
‘tabu sites’, ‘control and manage the boundaries and ownership of customary 
land and other resources’, and ‘logging and fishing’.40 The clear inference is that 
ownership and control resorts under the subnational governments.
The financing of the states is foreseen to be based, in the main, by the 
sharing of revenue raised or collected by the federal government. The most 
buoyant taxes are allocated to the federal government; examples are company 
tax, personal income tax, and goods and sales taxes.41 State government taxes 
include ‘mining and prospecting fees’, ‘land rents’, ‘state land leases’, gaming, 
liquor licenses, ‘foreign investment applications and approval rights’, and a bed 
tax.42 Community governments have access to a local business tax and prop-
erty taxes. With this division, the federal government would raise the bulk of 
revenue, which must then be shared with the states and community govern-
ments in terms of a ‘public finance system’ which ‘must promote a just soci-
ety’, including that ‘expenditures must promote the fair and balanced devel-
opment of the country, including by making special provision for Community 
Governments and remote areas’.43
The envisaged system of revenue sharing is fairly rigid; specific percentages 
and a formula are provided for various types of revenue sources. For general 
revenue, the split is 50 % to the federal government and the rest goes to the 
states. In the case of personal income tax and sales taxes, the states receive 
55 %. The split between the nine states is made according to a fix formula: 20 % 
on an equal basis, 50 % on population size, and 30 % in proportion to the land 
and sea area of each state.44
To address past marginalisation, the revenue necessary for equalisation 
comes from the federal government’s share of the revenue raised nationally. 
The federal government must ensure, ‘in accordance with the recommenda-
tions from the National Finance Commission’ that:
 (a) Each state has the resources to provide comparable levels of services at 
comparable levels of state taxation; and
 40 Schedule 5, list v.
 41 Schedule 6, part A.
 42 Schedule 6, part B, items 1 and 5.
 43 Clause 176 (1) (b) (ii) Draft Federal Constitution.












 (b) State disparities in development and living standards are minimised tak-
ing into account the following factors:
 (i) Distance from the closest economic hub;
 (ii) Existing levels of infrastructure;
 (iii) Levels of development according to social indicators;
 (iv) Vulnerability to natural disasters including effects of climate 
change; and
 (v) Own capacity to raise revenue.45
The reference to ‘comparable levels of services at comparable levels of state tax-
ation’ combines the principles of equivalence of services, but also the need 
for state tax effort. It should also be noted that the word ‘comparable’ is not 
necessarily the same as ‘equal’. Tax capacity refers to states’ own efforts to use 
their taxing powers, not what they may receive from transfers.
Quite separate from the above described financial framework is the regime 
pertaining to the revenue produced by natural resources. First, ‘[a] ll revenue 
derived from natural resource royalties, land lease and those customary in 
nature are to be paid directly to the resource owners’.46 The resource owners 
are defined in terms of customary law, the state (federal, state, or commu-
nity), or private. The territorial domain of ownership is thus important when 
it comes to offshore resources. The draft Constitution provides very exten-
sive boundaries for states; the entire sea domain of the Solomon Islands state 
(12 nautical mile territorial waters, and 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic 
Zone) is carved up between the nine states, where international boundaries 
are also those of the island states. The extent of the revenue would then be 
dependent on definitions of the various types of revenue sources listed.
Secondly, the revenue the federal government may raise from corporate tax, 
import and export duties, as well as excise duties ‘arising from the exploitation 
of forestry, mining, petroleum, oil, natural gas, agricultural products, marine 
and non- migratory fisheries, air space and other natural resources’ must be 
shared between the three levels of government as well as with resource own-
ers. The federal government receives 40 %, and the rest goes to the State 
Governments and Community Governments in whose territory the natural 
resources are located, and ‘the tribe, clan, group, family or individual who 
owns the land or other natural resources, from which the revenue arises’.47 The 
sharing between the state, community governments and resource owners is to 
be done in accordance with a formula determined in each State Constitution.
 45 Schedule 7, part A, item 3, emphasis added.
 46 Schedule 7, part B, item 7.
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The implications of these provisions are clear: first, as customary own-
ership of territorial waters would be limited to recognised reefs, the vast 
expanse of the carved up eez would fall within the jurisdiction of the states, 
and they would be the main beneficiaries of off- shore mining and oil and gas 
exploitation. Secondly, the revenue derived from natural resources are not to 
be shared equitably among the states. While a state in which an exploitable 
natural resource is located should tax such revenue source within its taxing 
competency (exploration fees, royalties), the major revenue source (corpo-
rate and export taxes) would be shared between the federal government and 
specific oil and gas producing states. When such largesse, such as oil and 
gas, is discovered and exploited, a high level of inequality may arise between 
states. The question is then what would politically justify such unevenness in 
outcomes.
3.1.3 Inequality and Justification
The draft Constitution is largely driven by the quest for a recognition of and 
a return to customary values and practices. In the preamble, the new system 
will ‘recognise the sovereignty of the people and protect the autonomy and 
interdependence of tribes, clans, lineages, natural family and communities’. 
Also, first among the values listed in clause 1(2) of the draft Constitution is 
‘respect for our indigenous political units, wisdom, customs, societal values, 
traditions and governing practices’. The bond between a community and the 
land they occupy is very strong. Indirectly, when a resource owner seeks to 
develop a resource on customary land, impact studies must be conducted to 
‘assess the potential social, spiritual, cultural and environmental impact’ of the 
envisaged development or activity.48 The linkage is thus more than seeing a 
resource in commercial terms, but also that the land fulfils certain social and 
spiritual functions that define the tribe, clan or community.
The claim to property rights has two legs: the first is restoring the owner-
ship to the indigenous communities, and the second is that it also includes all 
natural resources found on land. The draft thus provides that ‘[i] n Solomon 
Islands, land is to be held, used and managed according with the following 
principles: (a) recognition and enforcement of customary law in relation to the 
ownership use of land and natural resources [… and] (c) as far as possible, land 
is to be restored to the community to which it belonged under the relevant cus-
tomary law’.49 The meaning of land is extensive: ‘all land includes everything 
 48 Clause 56 (2) (a) Draft Federal Constitution.







on, or below the surface of the land down to the centre of the earth, including, 
in particular, water, petroleum, oil, other minerals and natural gas.’50
For the islanders, the concept of land is not merely terra firma; the sea adja-
cent to the island is seen as part of the land. This linkage is commonly expressed 
as ‘the sea is our farm, the reefs and lagoons are our gardens and fields from 
whence our sustenance comes’. Living off marine resources (narrowly defined) 
has been an integral part of the communities’ way of life. This view of territo-
rial waters, however, undergoes an extension in the draft in two ways. First, the 
focus is no longer on marine resources, but what lies beneath the seabed, and 
secondly, the claims of contiguous territorial waters now stretches to the deep 
sea up to the international borders of the country.
The draft Constitution reflects the views from the various island communi-
ties, and the debate with the central government and centrists has yet to com-
mence. Parliament must still debate the draft and holds the key to any consti-
tutional reform. A high level of agreement is required as the 1978 Constitution 
requires the support of at least three- quarters of the mp s to support the 
amendment of key provisions (of which the replacement of the Constitution 
would be one).51 Whether sitting mp s would be interested in effecting radical 
change is debatable particularly as an important provision in the draft is the 
abolishment of Constituency Development Funds (cdf) which are doled out 
to mp s, and have such funds reallocated to the future states. The total cdf 
budget is currently more than what provinces receive in transfers, and it is the 
life blood of the Solomon Islands’ politics of patronage.
A more important issue would be the agreement among all parties to the 
establishment of a strong federal system and the possibility of inequality that 
may flow from the financial arrangements. At the moment, with no real pros-
pects of offshore riches on the horizon, the different island communities may be 
united in their demand for ownership of the vastly expanded territorial waters, 
as they all have an even chance to hit the jackpot. If there is a socio- political 
acceptance of the return to a more customary way of governance, a country 
comprising of mini- nations each on their own island, a measure of inequality 
may be seen as inevitable and even celebrated. However, when the riches of 
the deep emerge for one island and not others, it then becomes a question of 
the nature and extent of such inequality. Would the claim of the oil- producing 
state then be questioned as inimical to the national goal of equality, and not 
supported by customary law’s more limited scope of landowners’ property 
 50 Clause 53 (2) Draft Federal Constitution.
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rights? When that happens the debate on the importance of the unity of the 
Solomon Islands and the sharing of nature’s bounty are bound to resurface.
3.2 Trinidad and Tobago
A major reform of the 1976 Trinidad and Tobago Constitution is proposed by 
Tobago, which would grant this island an elevated autonomy status. The gov-
ernance of nrnr s would be a component of the new dispensation. Although 
the current constitutional debate is not about federalism, but about Tobago’s 
autonomy status, the same ‘federal question’ of equality and inequality, as 
posed in the Solomon Islands, is present.
3.2.1 History and Quest for Constitutional Reform
Trinidad had a long history of various European nations occupying the island 
since it was sighted by Christopher Columbus in 1498, until the island finally 
fell under British control in 1801. Tobago became a British Crown Colony only 
in 1876 which was then joined ten years later with the larger island of Trinidad 
to form the colony of Trinidad and Tobago, the latter island being the ‘ward’ of 
the former. From 1958 to 1962 the nation was part of the West Indies Federation, 
but with the dissolution of the federation it became independent in August 
1962, and a republic in 1976 in terms of the Constitution of that year.52
The differences between the two islands – Trinidad and Tobago – are stark. 
Trinidad has a land mass of 4828 km2, while Tobago’s is only 300 km2 (4.8 % of 
the former). The latter’s population reflects a similar proportion; of the coun-
try’s 1.35 million people only 64 000 reside on Tobago (4.7 %).53 The composi-
tion of the country’s population reflects its colonial past: people of African ori-
gin, resulting from centuries of slave trade, comprise 34.2 % of the population, 
those from Indian origin (indentured labour during British rule) form a slightly 
higher proportion of 34.4 %, and those of mixed origins comprise 23 %. The 
indigenous Amerindians make up a fraction of the population (0.1 %).54 On 
Tobago, the vast majority of the population (87 %) is of African origin.
The country is one of the wealthiest in the Caribbean because of its oil and 
gas reserves (mostly offshore), accounting for 40 % of its gdp and 80 % of 
 52 See Richard Drayton, “Whose Constitution? Law, Justice and History in the Caribbean,” 
Sixth Distinguished Jurist Lecture 2016 (Judicial Education Institute of Trinidad and 
Tobago, 2016).
 53 See Government of Trinidad and Tobago’s website: http:// www.tntisland.com/ tnt.html, 
accessed 1 March 2019.
 54 Index Mundi 2018, “Trinidad and Tobago Demographigs Profile 2018”, accessed 1 March 










its exports. While Trinidad has the industries flowing from oil and gas, the 
Tobago economy is based on tourism (more than half of the country’s hotel 
rooms),55 fishing, and government spending. In the main, economic develop-
ment and infrastructure are concentrated on Trinidad, giving rise to claims by 
Tobagonians of systemic marginalisation.
A year after independence, the first proposal for Tobago’s internal self- 
government was submitted to Parliament.56 In 1980 a Tobago House of 
Assembly was established by statute, granting this body some legislative 
powers. In 1996 the Constitution was amended to enshrine the Tobago House 
of Assembly, but its powers were still subject to the direction and control 
of the Trinidad and Tobago government, thus falling short of internal self- 
government.57 The quest continued with the publication of a Green Paper 
on the topic in 2013. The process came to a head when Dr Keith Rowley, a 
Tobagonian, became Prime Minister after the election in 2015 and called 
upon the Tobagonians to come up with proposals. Leading the process on the 
island was the Forum of Political Parties of Tobago which conducted exten-
sive consultations. Its proposals were adopted in 2017 by the Tobago House 
of Assembly, in the form of a Bill amending the 1976 Constitution.58 The pro-
posed autonomy status would appear to be a clear expression of Tobagonians’ 
desire for self- government.
In March 2018 the Prime Minister laid the draft Bill – as it was adopted by 
the tha – before Parliament as the basis for discussion on the way forward. 
A Joint Standing Committee (jsc), comprising members of both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, was tasked to examine the Bill and report back 
to Parliament by May 2019. By March 2019 the jsc had held three public hear-
ings, receiving evidence and submissions from Tobagonians and government 
officials and institutions.
3.2.2 Proposals
The two objectives of the Bill – self- government and equalisation between 
the two islands – are pertinently set out upfront. The 1976 Constitution’s 
 55 See Nations Encyclopedia, “Trinidad and Tobago – Overview of Economy,” accessed 
February 1, 2019, https:// www.nationsencyclopedia.com/ economies/ Americas/ Trinidad- 
and- Tobago- OVERVIEW- OF- ECONOMY.html.
 56 For an exposition of the quest for internal self- government see the statement to Parliament 
by Prime Minister Dr Keith Rowley, “The History, Evolution and Current Status of Internal 
Self- Government for Tobago,” March 9, 2018, accessed 1 February 2019, https:// www.opm.
gov.tt/ the- history- evolution- and- current- status- of- internal- self- government- for- tobago/ .
 57 In the view of Rowley, “The History, Evolution and Current Status.”
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preamble is to be amended with the following statement: the people of 
Trinidad and Tobago
[…] recognise the right to self- determination of the people of Trinidad 
and Tobago including the right of the people of Tobago to determine in 
Tobago their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.59
The second objective of equality is expressed as follows:
There shall be equality of status between the Island of Trinidad and the 
Island of Tobago within the sovereign democratic State of Trinidad and 
Tobago and the Island of Tobago shall no longer carry the designation of 
a ward.60
Although within the proposed scheme Trinidad would have no separate status, 
being governed by the Trinidad and Tobago Government (ttg), the sentiment 
is clear: Tobago’s marginalisation can only be measured and corrected with 
reference to the more prosperous Trinidad.
The question is then how these two objectives are to be pursued simultane-
ously; are trade- offs to be made to reconcile them? Or would the emphasis on 
self- government in the end not only ensure equality but also a better standard 
of living on Tobago? The financial provisions relating to own revenue, reve-
nue derived from non- renewable natural resources, and transfers are key to 
answering these questions.
While no taxing powers are specifically allocated to Tobago, such powers 
are located in the general division of powers. Reflecting self- government, the 
Bill provides for wide legislative powers for the Tobago House of Assembly 
(tha). On the face of it, the tha has an extensive legislative competence over 
all matters, bar one short list of exclusive ttg functions which includes the fol-
lowing substantive areas: civil aviation, immigration, foreign affairs, judiciary, 
meteorology, ‘National Security (except that internal policing shall be under 
the jurisdiction of the Tobago Island Government’).61 Although it is uncertain 
whether all matters not mentioned on the list are concurrent powers of both 
the ttg and Tobago Island Government (tig), the latter thus has competence 
over all taxing sources.
 59 Clause 4 of the Bill.
 60 Clause 5 of the Bill.








Despite the dependence of the economy on oil and gas, these revenue sources 
are addressed only in a roundabout way. Given the expansive scope of tig’s 
powers, it would certainly include both the control, management and revenue 
raising from nrnr s. While there is no reference of taxing or other revenue- 
raising measures relating to oil and gas, the task of sharing the revenue accrued 
from ‘marine resources’ is bestowed on the Fiscal Revenue Commission (frc). 
This body is envisaged to be an independent intergovernmental body; it has 
two members appointed by the Tobago Executive Council, and two members 
by the ttg Cabinet. The fifth member, the chairperson, is appointed by the 
President at their discretion after consulting the Prime Minister and the Leader 
of the Opposition.62 Although its main task is the vertical division of reve-
nue (discussed below), it must also ‘develop a regime for sharing the revenue 
obtained from marine resources in the waters comprising each island and the 
maritime boundaries superjacent air space and telecommunications’.63 Two 
elements are key to sharing in the revenue of nrnr s: the meaning of ‘marine 
resources’ and the jurisdictional area of Tobago. Given that Tobago has jurisdic-
tion over ‘such areas of the archipelagic waters of Trinidad and Tobago, includ-
ing any islands, the seabed and the subsoil, that lies within eleven miles from 
the low watermark of Tobago’,64 it would follow that marine resources would 
include oil and gas. The other element is the area of jurisdiction. The Bill states 
‘11 miles’, which is slightly less than the 12 miles originally claimed.65 As most 
of the current oil and gas fields lie outside the future Tobago’s jurisdiction, the 
issue is not pertinently dealt with. Nevertheless, some Tobagonians still express 
the view that the Tobagonian territorial waters should stretch to the median 
line between Trinidad and Tobago, a distance of 42 nautical miles.66
Despite the prospect of wide taxing powers, including those relating to 
nrnr s, the emphasis of the financing model falls on revenue sharing and 
transfers. The Bill provides that the annual national budget must include 
an allocation of ‘no less than 8 % of the total sum’ of that budget.67 The 
 62 Clause 141AD (1) of the Bill.
 63 Clause 141AD (3) (c) of the Bill.
 64 Clause 141A (11) of the Bill.
 65 The jsc Chairperson, Camilla Robinson- Regis mp, stated that this was the only change 
made to the draft Bill on the advice of the Department of Foreign Affairs in the light 
of international law; Camilla Robinson, “First Public Meeting, jsc,” filmed 19 June 
2018, accessed 15 February 2019, video, 1 March 2019 https:// www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=mFv7GpXjAY8&t=11366s.
 66 Vanus James, “First Public Meeting, jsc,” filmed 10 June 2018, accessed 15 February 2019, 
video, 1 March 2019, https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mFv7GpXjAY8&t=11366s.
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actual amount of the transfer could be higher, following the Fiscal Review 
Commission’s recommendations.68 This intergovernmental advisory body is 
tasked to ensure that, in the context of the ‘financial and developmental needs 
of Tobago’, the resources be allocated to the island ‘as fairly as is practicable’. 
And in this endeavour, it is to be guided by the following considerations:
 (i) physical separation of Tobago by sea from Trinidad;
 (ii) isolation from the principal national growth centres;
 (iii) absence of the multiplier effect of expenditures and investments (private 
and public) made in Trinidad;
 (iv) restricted opportunities for employment and career fulfilment; and
 (v) the impracticability of participation by residents of Tobago in the major 
educational, cultural and sporting facilities located in Trinidad.69
These factors not only explain the causes of inequality between the two 
islands, but indirectly set out an agenda that goes beyond the equalisation of 
government services. If Tobago is isolated from ‘the principal national growth 
centres’ then the frc must consider additional transfers in order for the tig to 
establish its own growth centres. The recognition of ‘restricted opportunities 
for employment and career fulfilment’ in Tobago, should lead to transfers ena-
bling the tig to develop job opportunities. The overall object is thus more than 
securing the equalisation of government services, but pointing towards equal 
economic opportunities and eventually living standards.
The Commission is also mandated to ‘ensure that all revenues, fees and duties 
collected in Trinidad that are attributable to Tobago such as customs duties, 
import duties and stamp duties shall be held for the account of Tobago’.70 If 
the open- ended phrase ‘all revenues, fees and duties’ also includes, as it does 
on the face of it, taxes such as personal income tax or value added tax, it means 
that the ttg cannot use any of the taxes raised in Tobago even for services it 
will provide in Tobago.
3.2.3 Inequality and Justification
The likely outcome of the financial provisions is that the tig may in the future 
have more funds than would otherwise have been the case if equalisation was 
the only goal. The three sources of revenue – own taxes (unlimited), an entitle-
ment to all tax revenue originating from Tobago but raised by the national gov-
ernment, and a minimum floor of 8 % of the national budget – should result 
in a financial position that favours Tobago. The likely amount of revenue to 
 68 Clause 141AD (3) (a) of the Bill.
 69 Clause 14AD (3) (f) of the Bill.









be collected and received has not yet been calculated.71 Similarly, the likely 
expenditure burden of the tig as the responsibilities and functions to be per-
formed is not settled at all. Whether there will be more funds flowing into the 
tig coffers than are required to ensure equal outcomes (and the elimination 
of backlogs) in respect of government services, plus equalising living condi-
tions, cannot be said with any measure of certainty. Also, the possible revenue 
flowing from oil and gas within the territorial jurisdiction of Tobago is to be 
brought into the equation.
In its public hearings, members of the jsc have raised the spectre of 
inequal ity, now with Tobago being better off. The focus of concern was the 
fixed minimum floor of 8 % of the national budget that should be transferred 
to the tig.
jsc members quizzed representatives of Tobago on how 8 % was settled 
upon. The argument was also raised that Tobago should raise its own resources 
so that it could be ‘economically independent’; the 8 % should simply be tran-
sitionary.72 It was also pointed out that if the tig had a surplus of revenue for 
its expenditure needs, the 8 % transfer would be superfluous; a sunset clause 
should thus be inserted. Another view was that the percentage should be reg-
ularly reviewed.73 Although some arguments were put forward as to how the 
tha arrived at the 8 %, it was mostly based on historical patterns of transfers 
without any reference to the projected new responsibilities and tax sources. 
The rub of the matter was, as a jsc member pointed out, that ttg may in the 
future obtain revenue from Tobago if the latter flourishes.74
Should any inequality materialise in favour of Tobago, how would such a 
situation be justified in the union of Trinidad and Tobago? Two possibilities 
have been suggested: the first is that the goal of self- government is bounded up 
in past neglect and marginalisation, which requires compensation. The sec-
ond, only tangentially argued, is that the Tobagonians are a separate nation. 
As such, the wealth of the island (and the territorial waters around) belong to 
them. In the public hearings, a Tobagonian argued for the ‘need of a contract 
 71 The Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, Sandra Sookram, con-
ceded that such estimates have yet to be made; Sandra Sookram, “Third Public Meeting, 
jsc,” filmed 8 February 2019, accessed 1 March 2019, video, https:// www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=8kYjFcTSvoA.
 72 “First Public Meeting, jsc,” filmed 10 June 2018, accessed 15 February 2019, video, https:// 
www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mFv7GpXjAY8&t=11366s.
 73 “Third Public Meeting, jsc,” filmed 8 February 2019, accessed 1 March 2019, video, https:// 
www.youtube.com/ watch?v=8kYjFcTSvoA.
 74 Terence Deyalsingh mp, “Third Public Meeting, jsc,” filmed 8 February 2019, accessed 
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between both nations [Trinidadians and Tobagonians]’, calling the 1888 act of 
union ‘a disaster’.75 The jsc’s chairperson immediately reacted, proclaiming 
that there is only one nation, that of Trinidad and Tobago. Moreover, there was 
no definition of a Tobagonian other than any person living on Tobago.76 No 
claims to ancestral lands are made. Although the majority of the population 
on Tobago are of African heritage, no claims to the island based on origin have 
been made.
The demand for Tobago autonomy has not spilled over in conflict but is 
a slow process of increasing political pressure that is finding traction in the 
current political discourse of the country. Little direct attention is given to 
nrnr s in the autonomy claims, despite the fact that oil and gas are major 
resources. This is partially explained by the fact that the oil and gas fields fall 
mostly outside the claimed Tobago jurisdiction. Yet, with an expansive scope 
of powers, the tig would have substantive control over oil and gas found in 
its claimed jurisdiction. The immediate Tobagonian concern is accessing the 
revenue raised nationally from these resources. Pinning the share of revenue 
at a fixed 8 % is likely to meet considerable opposition precisely because of 
a prospect of future inequality. Quite different from the island claims in the 
Solomon Islands, a preferential treatment of Tobago would likely be confined 
to rectifying past marginalisation and underdevelopment. The case for a possi-
ble economically elevated position for Tobago seems at present unlikely to be 
accepted by the majority of the population.
4 Concluding Remarks
In the Solomon Islands and Trinidad and Tobago, the quest for non- centralism 
has been a slow process, coming to some sort of fruition in the form of draft 
constitutions (or amendments) at more or less the same time. The propo-
nents of self- government for island communities have produced remarkably 
similar constitutional proposals, although the political processes in the two 
countries bore no knowledge of one another. Although the ownership, control 
and revenue of nrnr s are approached differently, the results are uncannily 
similar. Whether the two sets of proposals will eventually find constitutional 
entrenchment, and if so, in what form, it is too early to say.
 75 Anthony Hector, “First Public Meeting, jsc,” filmed 10 June 2018, accessed 15 February 
2019, video, https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mFv7GpXjAY8&t=11366s.
 76 Foster Cummings mp, “First Public Meeting, jsc,” filmed 10 June 2018, accessed 15 February 







In both sets of constitutional proposals, the twin goals of self- government 
and solidarity are pursued. In both cases a sense of marginalisation is the well-
spring for these goals. In the Solomon Islands the quest is also tied up with an 
attempt to return to custom and tradition of old. In both cases, the financial 
claims are likely to be to the advantage of some islands in the Solomon Islands 
and Tobago, with inequality the likely outcome.
Similarities in the claims relating to access to financial resources abound. 
First, taxing powers of the subnational governments are substantial. For 
Tobago, there are no constitutional limits to the range of taxing powers the 
island government would exercise. In the Solomon Islands the subnational 
taxing powers are clearly listed, but are still substantial.
Secondly, in both cases priority access to the wealth of nrnr s is assured. In 
the draft Solomon Constitution subnational claims are directly aimed at the 
control and benefit of nrnr s, which are bolstered by an expansive definition 
of the states’ jurisdiction which goes beyond a narrow definition of territorial 
waters, to the country’s exclusive economic zone. In the Tobago Bill, only indi-
rect claims are made with regard to nrnr s; ownership, control and benefit of 
nrnr s would fall within the Tobago’s almost unlimited powers. The claim to 
the seabed and the subsoil is more modest, stretching only to 11 nautical miles 
territorial waters.
Thirdly, the stated goal of equalisation in government services in both coun-
tries is pursued through substantial claims to revenue raised nationally. High 
percentages are set in the Solomon Islands, depending on the revenue source, 
which overall would be more than 50 % of the national budget. In the case of 
Trinidad, the percentage is eight.
In both countries the financial arrangements will more than likely lead to 
inequality; in the case of the Solomon Islands, among the future states, and 
in Tobago, greater per capita state expenditure than in Trinidad as well as on 
equal economic opportunities. The questions are then, first, how such inequal-
ity is to be justified by the claimants, and secondly, the acceptability in the 
broader body politic of such justifications.
The justification of any inequality among the island states of the Solomon 
Islands is closely tied to the unarticulated notion of separate ‘nations’, but 
expressed in terms of strong self- government. The ‘nation’ claims are expressed 
through the exultation of the custom and tradition of island communities 
and their return, recognising their historical claims to land and the adjacent 
sea. It highlights the artificial clumping together of the ‘nation’ of Solomon 
Islanders by the British in the 19th century for administrative convenience. 
Future inequality would thus simply be a consequence of ownership of land 
and sea which should be returned to the rightful owners in terms of customary 
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law. A level of inequality may thus be tolerated by the island polities based on 
a shared vision of communities owning resources, accepting the eventuality 
that only some islands may be resource- rich.
In contrast, the claims of the Tobagonians are based on past neglect and 
marginalisation, not ownership. Equality is the overall goal and claiming 
ownership rights by a ‘nation’ of Tobagonians is weak. There are no histori-
cal claims of indigenous people as Tobagonians are defined as such simply 
by reference to residency. While there seems to be acceptance in principle by 
Trinidadians that corrective action should be taken, any notion of a separate 
‘Tobago nation’, with historical property rights, is not being entertained. The 
placing of Tobagonians in a better position than their compatriots in Trinidad 
is not likely to be accepted. Thus, the claim for a fixed 8 % of the national 
budget, which may result in such an advantage, is under close scrutiny.
How the contradiction between the need for equality and the demand for 
self- government which may result in advantage to producing regions vis- à- 
vis the others, can be sustained (or legitimated), lies in the particular polit-
ical and social norms and culture of a country. Levels of inequality which 
would be unpalatable in one country, may be acceptable in another. The 
theoretical underpinning of the equalisation of service outcomes and eco-
nomic opportunities is usually the assertion of the oneness of the nation; in a 
diverse society every citizen, no matter where they are located, should enjoy 
the benefits of equal citizenship. The reasoning behind the unequal benefit 
from nrnr s, is based on ownership claims where the oneness of the nation 
(or nation building) is not the primary goal, but the well- being of  individual 
regions takes centre stage. There may also be other reasons for  levels of 
inequal ity to be tolerated, such as a specific subnational government’s per-
ceived position of strength. There is no formula to determine the balance 
between self- government and national solidarity; achieving the right balance 
lies in the hands of the negotiating parties. At their disposal are the flexible 
tools in the federalism toolbox which one hopes they will use judiciously, by 
not allowing the manner in which nrnr s are dealt with to be the cause of 
future conflicts.
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Throughout history, when federal unions have been formed, inequality has 
characterised their development. Yet, liberty and regional equality have 
not followed a similar path, as they have been essential but also specific to 
each of the federate units. Holland in the United Provinces, Prussia in the 
Germanic Confederation, New York in relation to its counterparts among the 
US states are clear examples of this.1 Unity with diversity or unity and diver-
sity prevail.2
If we look back at its origins in the 19th century, the federal formation of 
Argentina, after some failed or provisional constitutional agreements, is also 
characterised by large differences between the regional units which signed the 
Federal Constitution.3
Given the ample differences between the federate states regarding aspects 
such as their respective economy, geography and demography, while the Federal 
Constitution achieved equality regarding competences and rights, it did not 
aim at ensuring a similar equivalence regarding the development and opportu-
nities for each state. For instance, even if differences already existed before the 
independence from Spain in the early 19th century, the gap between the big 
‘Interior’ and the region of the Rio de la Plata has been continually increasing 
since the Constitutional Agreement, which was achieved in the beginning of 
 1 Not to mention New South Wales and Victoria in Australia or Central Canada (Ontario and 
Quebec) vis- à- vis the rest of the country, among others.
 2 See Michael Burgess and Alain C. Gagnon, Comparative Federalism and Federation, Competing 
Traditions and Future Directions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); Michael Burgess 
and Alain C. Gagnon, General Document Presented at the Montreal Meeting of IACFS on Unity 
and Diversity in Federal Systems (Montreal, 2015). See also Preston King, Federalism and 
Federation (Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
 3 The constitutional texts of 1819 and 1826 were rejected by the provinces, and the Federal Pact 
of 1831, being relevant as a precedent, had a fragile and incomplete existence previous to the 
Constitution framed in 1853.
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the 1850s.4 At the present time, more than 160 years later and in spite of some 
significant variations, these important differences between regions remain. In 
fact, when the representatives gathered together to approve the last reform 
to the Argentine Constitution (1994), the personal Gross Domestic Product 
(gdp) in the wealthiest jurisdiction had reached nine times that of the poor-
est.5 In such a context, the ‘equivalent development’ and ‘equality in the living 
conditions’ were outstanding goals set during the sessions and debates in the 
Reforming Constitutional Convention, finally incorporated in the accorded 
text of the Fundamental Law. These goals had to be reached by the revenue 
sharing regime, a mechanism that would be at the core of the federal fiscal 
system.
These objectives are explicitly set forth in the Constitutional Document, 
Art. 75, item 2, stating that ‘the distribution among the Nation, the provinces 
and the city of Buenos Aires and among the latter […] will be equitable, 
 solidary and shall give priority to the achievement of an equivalent deg ree 
of development, quality of life and equal opportunities in the whole national 
 territory’. Despite this, the process of uneven economic growth among regions 
and provinces has continued and, a quarter of a century after the sanction of 
the reform of the original Magna Charta, the new revenue sharing system has 
still not been enacted, except for particular modifications emerging from dif-
ferent Intergovernmental Agreements.6
In this chapter, we will produce an analysis in which we will review un-
even regional and provincial development, have a closer look at the chal-
lenges and limits faced by the federal fiscal system, as well as examine the 
possibilities available that would make it possible to overcome this uneven 
development. Throughout this analysis, we will keep in mind the role and 
 4 See Alberto J. Figueras, “Enfoque regional de la economía argentina: Su estructuración 
histórica,” in El desafío del territorio, Un análisis de las economías regionales, eds. Alberto 
J. Figueras and José L. Arrufat (Córdoba: Asociación Cooperadora de la Facultad de Ciencias 
Económicas de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, 2007), 37– 50. See also Alejandro 
B. Rofman and Luis A. Romero, Sistema socioeconómico y estructura regional en Argentina 
(Buenos Aires: Amorrortu, 1974).
 5 We refer to the per capita gdp. Alejandro B. Rofman, Las economías regionales (Buenos 
Aires: Centro Cultural de la Cooperación Floreal Gorini and Universidad Nacional de 
Quilmes, 2012).
 6 The Complementary Clause Six to the Constitution stated that for the year 1996 (two after 
the sanction of the Reform) a new revenue sharing law should be enacted. The ‘patchwork 
system’ was the option instead and no general law for the distribution of taxes among Nation 
and Provinces was approved. Recently, another Intergovernmental Agreement, regulating 
partial issues of the multilevel fiscal relationship (the so- called Fiscal Consensus) was signed, 








mission assigned to the federal- fiscal scheme and the complexity of achiev-
ing a ‘magic formula’ embedded in a new revenue sharing system, consid-
ering the ambitious objectives stated in the National Constitution. The 
aim of this chapter is to question the present situation in the Argentinian 
Federation and demonstrate that other mechanisms should be considered 
in addition to the sole fiscal formulas aiming at tackling the current un-
even development. Concretely, after this brief introduction, we will address 
the origins of the regional divergences and their significance in the federal 
 association (2). Next, we will consider some regional indicators in order to 
highlight the current differences and existing asymmetries (3). In doing so, 
we must bear in mind that the statistics available in Argentina are not up- to- 
date and this chapter should also be regarded as a call urging researchers and 
the federal administration to update them, in order to attain higher accuracy 
in the determination of territorial divergences. We will then look at what 
can be done to achieve ‘equivalence in development’ and will reflect on this 
contemptuous issue (4). Then, we will give a more detailed explanation of 
the previous legal norms that aim to solve the provincial- regional inequal-
ities and the limited outcomes in such a field, as well as the current situa-
tion of uneven development (5). Finally, before closing this chapter with our 
concluding remarks, as an answer to the limitations that we unveiled in the 
previous sections, we address the need for designing and introducing other 
instruments of regional policy aimed at changing the unbalanced provincial 
and regional development of the country.
2 Growing and Great Divergence
From the 1820s onwards, hardly a decade after breaking off its ties with Spain 
and thus gaining its independence, Argentina began to operate as a loose con-
federation where the provinces claimed autonomy, with Buenos Aires in charge 
of international relations, the main seaport and customs. The union between 
the prosperous Buenos Aires and the poorer ‘thirteen huts’7 materialised under 
 7 We allude to the despective denomination given to the rest of the Provinces from centralist 
and unitarian politicians, media and thinkers of Buenos Aires, in an unequal Union of 14 
members which represented in fact the two parts of Argentina in the middle of the 19th cen-
tury, one rich and prosperous and the others suffering from scarcity of resources. Recently, 
the expression has been attributed to the famous poet José Mármol: see Julio Pinto and 
Fortunato Mallimaci, La influencia de las religiones en el Estado y la Nación Argentina (Buenos 
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the 1853 Constitution was not only difficult but fragile. After renewed conflicts 
and some reforms, it was consolidated in 1860– 1866.
However, these conflicts concealed the lagging situation of the inland and non- 
Atlantic regions, which were deprived of their export markets in the North due 
to the new border that emerged after some incidents and battles of war. The epi-
sodes were fuelled again by the divergent interest of Buenos Aires and the other 
provinces, which conditioned the final agreement. The financial issue, always 
decisive, implied as a condition the assurance of five years of budget support for 
the previous ‘State of Buenos Aires’.8 The supremacy of the National Government 
was accepted by the other provinces, because it allowed them to maintain the 
Federal Compact. This ensured the receipt of funds from the Customs Offices, 
which had been monopolised for decades by the Government of Buenos Aires.
From a territorial point of view, the development of Argentina as a country 
resulted in permanent loss of economic and demographic importance of the 
inland regions and a growing significance and power of the Littoral ones. In 
such a context, the Federal Constitution did not alter the natural competitive 
advantages of Buenos Aires and – despite a weaker participation of other parts 
of the Pampean Region – its domination continually increased, while other 
regions faced a slower economic progression and a demographic weakening. 
The result of this general tendency was that the main centres of the Interior, 
particularly Córdoba – located on the ancient trade route between Buenos 
Aires and the northwest – but also Salta, Tucumán and Mendoza, lost eco-
nomic weight in the country. Research carried out a few years ago by economic 
historians analysing data on population, exports and other aspects, reveals the 
growing importance of the richer region compared to the rest of the country, 
namely the West, North and South. To illustrate this evolution, Table 8.1 shows 
the development of the Littoral and Interior until the first decade of the second 
half of the 19th century, right at the beginning of the Argentine ‘golden age’.9
From the last half of the 19th century onwards, the process continued and 
the prosperity of the Pampean Region10 and its provinces spread throughout 
 8 The ‘nationalisation’ of the Customs Office implies that the taxation provided by foreign 
trade would be collected by the federal government and not by the Province of Buenos Aires. 
The Province of Buenos Aires reached a compromise with the Federal Government which 
must send an annual amount of money to support the budget of the Province for five years.
 9 See Ricardo Salvatore and Carlos Newland, “Between Independence and the Golden 
Age: The Early Argentine Economy,” in A New Economic History of Argentina, eds. Gerardo 
Della Paolera and Alan M. Taylor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 19– 45.
 10 In the literature, it is possible to find the words ‘Littoral’ and ‘Pampean’ sometimes uti-
lised alternatively. Littoral alludes to coastal regions, maritime or fluvial. In Argentina, 









the regions, while the Interior faced a situation of stagnating development. 
From 1860 to 1930 the country followed an export- led model of growth and in 
the year 1913 it reached the tenth position worldwide in per capita gdp. This 
period was called the ‘golden age’ or ‘belle époque’ by some authors due to 
the prosperity then achieved and was associated with a strong international 
insertion in a world economy lead by Great Britain.11 In spite of this, the ‘belle 
époque’ considered as a whole was not a well- balanced process but rather an 
uneven one. In fact, the growth then achieved was largely concentrated in 
some specific regions due to the comparative advantages enjoyed by a part of 
the country, combined with the dynamic export economy well inserted in the 
international markets. Thus, provinces and regions that enjoyed such a process 
progressively improved their situation with regard to the other ones, which 
continued lagging behind.
table 8.1 Evolution of economic and demographic variables 









coast of Parana River and the Lower Littoral (from Santa Fe to Buenos Aires) on the coast 
of the Parana River and the Rio de la Plata to Buenos Aires approximately. The Lower 
Littoral or ‘Pampean Littoral’ coincides with the North of the Pampean Region. This is 
why an interchangeable denomination appears to refer to that geographical portion of 
the country, which sometimes extends to the southern part of the present Entre Rios to 
the coast of the Rio Uruguay (both rivers Parana and Uruguay give existence to the very 
short and wide Rio de la Plata).
 11 For such denomination see Carlos F. Díaz Alejandro, “No Less Than One Hundred Years 
of Argentine Economic History Plus Some Comparisons,” in Comparative Development 
Perspectives: Essays in Honor of Lloyd G. Reynolds, eds Gustav Ranis, Robert L. West, Mark 
W. Leiserson and Cynthia Taft Morris (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984) 328– 361; 
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This so- called ‘outward- looking’ model was followed after the 1930s by an 
‘inward- looking’ or ‘import- substitution model’, reasserted after World War ii. 
World War ii, as well as the post- war era, was a period of time that deeply 
changed Argentina’s demography and resulted in a concentration of its pop-
ulation in the prosperous Pampean area. While Argentina had to deal with 
important internal migration, it encountered massive immigration of for-
eigners, which increased the impact on the population’s repartition inside 
the country. The society and its economy continued to grow concentrated in 
the same area, particularly in and around the city of Buenos Aires. There were 
nevertheless some moderate spill- overs from Buenos Aires to San Nicolás and 
Rosario, on the Paraná River, which made up the ‘industrial belt’, on the one 
hand, while on the other hand, the emergence of Córdoba in the centre of the 
country appeared as the base for a car- manufacturing hub (thanks to power 
facilities).12
3 Advanced and Backward Partners
While Argentina as a federation encompasses some more advanced partners, 
others appear to be in a more backward position. The facts and results men-
tioned above can be examined by analysing the temporal variations in the 
national and regional context using a quantitative approach. We will use the 
data of the provinces and aggregate them in order to obtain a better overview 
of the regions they form. It is possible to consider a period of more than half 
a century from the beginning of the 1950s to the first years of the present cen-
tury. In this section, we will therefore look at the regions as aggregates of the 
provinces forming the Federal union, and compare Buenos Aires on its own 
with the rest of the regions, within the same period of time. What we expect 
to highlight is the importance of the gap between wealthy, or advanced, and 
 12 The stages and models for considering the economic development of Argentina in a his-
torical perspective are ample. See Aldo Ferrer, Economía argentina, Etapas de su desarrollo 
y principales problemas (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2009); Carlos F. Díaz 
Alejandro, Ensayos sobre la historia económica argentina (Buenos Aires: Amorrortu, 1983); 
Guido Di Tella and Manuel Zymmelman, Las etapas del desarrollo económico argentino 
(Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1973); Mario Rapoport, Historia económica y social de la Argentina 
(Buenos Aires: Ariel, 2008); Pablo Gerchunoff and Lucas Llach, El ciclo de la ilusión y el 
desencanto (Buenos Aires: Crítica, 2015); Eduardo Miguez, Historia económica argentina 
(Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2003); Jonathan Brown, Historia socieconómica del Rio de 
la Plata (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1998); Gerardo Della Paolera and Alan M. Taylor, A 





poor, or backward, partners in the Federation, which is at the core of the 
proposal calling for a revenue sharing regime with a levelling profile to be 
adopted in the country (we will examine this proposal in further detail in 
section 6).
Before elaborating, we shall first emphasise two elements, namely, on the 
one hand, the meaning and significance of the regions and their relationship 
with the ‘provinces’ and, on the other hand, the statistical gaps and limits 
in the existing data. Regarding the regions, a distinction needs to be made 
between ‘natural regions’ and other types of regions. To understand this, we 
need to go back in time, some decades ago, when Jacques Boudeville offered 
a now well- known typology, where he classified regions into three catego-
ries: ‘homogeneous’, ‘polar’ and ‘planning’ regions.13 This proposal influenced 
the division that was then adopted and that is today commonly used to refer 
to Argentina’s different regions. While the ‘homogeneous regions’ are closer 
to the idea of being ‘natural’ or ‘geographic’ ones, it is the category of ‘plan-
ning region’ that is more frequently used when it comes to adopting develop-
ment policies. In Argentina, as in other countries, the regions were originally 
designated on the basis of their topography, but were then altered for political 
and administrative reasons to create comparable units.14 If we look at the 
provinces, unlike the regions, they are the original political units which made 
up the federal state and are not influenced by topographic considerations as 
they can include a wide range of different natural environments. A group of 
provinces forms a region; however, it is the region and not the province that 
is taken into account when adopting development policies and yet, it is the 
province and not the region that enjoys parliamentary representation on the 
federal level.
Regarding the statistical limitations we referred to, some of them originated 
in the past and affect the accuracy of regional economic data today. However, 
a major limitation that affects scholars from all fields of study analysing the 
Argentinian case, as well as the federal administration when it has to develop 
or implement its policies, is related to data on Argentina’s gdp. As a matter of 
fact, there is to this day no up- to- date statistical data measuring the gdp of 
the provinces or regions. In the years 2006 and 2007, methodological changes 
were implemented without general technical consensus, weakening the data 
 13 See Jacques Boudeville, Los espacios económicos (Buenos Aires: eudeba, 1967).
 14 The ‘planning regions’ have also been denominated functional regions in the sense 
that they exist linked to some political proposal. See Carlo Desideri, “Regionalism and 
Territorial Politics in Italy,” in Federalism, Regionalism and Territory, ed. Stelio Mangiamelli 
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produced and affecting its quality for use as a tool for analysis and interpre-
tation. The present situation resulted not only from methodological changes, 
but also from a lack of resources that would ensure a systematic collection and 
treatment of data. While alternative methods might be found by researchers 
to reach an approximation of the gdp of provinces and regions, there is no 
reliable and official data after the year 2005. Consequently, we shall take into 
account these limits – eventually addressing them – without, however, ignor-
ing global trends.
In Table 8.2, we can observe the territorial gdp weight of a grouping of 
five regions in Argentina, namely, the North West region (noa) (Jujuy, Salta, 
Catamarca, La Rioja and Santiago del Estero), the North East region (nea) 
(Chaco, Formosa, Corrientes and Misiones), the Cuyo region (Mendoza, San 
Juan and San Luis), the Pampean region (Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Córdoba, La 
Pampa and Entre Rios) and finally the Patagonia region (Rio Negro, Chubut, 
Santa Cruz, Tierra del Fuego). This classification is in principle the same as 
that used by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (indec).15 What 
is striking in this figure is the enormous relative size of the Pampean aggre-
gate of provinces, especially when considering that it additionally includes the 
caba and its surrounding area, denominated amba. However, if we look at its 
evolution over time, we can see that the present territorial giant has actually 
reduced a little of its economic magnitude. In fact, over more than half a cen-
tury, despite an increase in the 1970s, the Pampean Region has seen its weight 
in the Argentine economy slowly decline from four fifths of the global size of 
the national economy to three fourths.16
In the rest of the country, there are some compensatory steps toward prog-
ress such as the modest but visible ones of the noa and Cuyo regions, par-
tially counterbalanced by the decline of the nea region. The clear winner, 
however, is the Southern Region of Patagonia, whose performance has been 
sustained, without setbacks. This measurement, however, depends on the 
importance of the provincial gdp, and does not capture the actual regional 
incomes absorbed by each jurisdiction. If that were the case, the relevance 
 15 We are incorporating the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires (amba), which consists 
of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (caba) added to its surroundings, within the 
Pampean, as is frequently done.
 16 In the following table we follow the data from Alberto J. Figueras and José L. Arrufat, “La 
regionalización como respuesta a los desafíos sociales y económicos del Siglo XXI,” in El 
desafío del territorio, Un análisis de las economías regionales, eds. Alberto J. Figueras and 
José L. Arrufat (Córdoba: Asociación Cooperadora de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas 






of the highly urbanised caba area and its surroundings, as well as the whole 
province of Buenos Aires, would probably be higher.17
Table 8.2, above, shows these results, which are the expression of the enor-
mous territorial imbalance, with the Pampean region absorbing three quarters 
of the total gdp. Figure 8.1 below illustrates this. It shows, on the one hand, the 
large discrepancy that prevailed consistently in the second half of the last cen-
tury and, on the other hand, how the correlation between the weaker regions 
has shifted.
4 Beyond the Geographic Contiguity: Advanced Provinces in a 
Different Context
While the above does not alter the ‘geographic continuum’, it is however possi-
ble to take an alternative regional approach. Since the beginning of the 1970s, 
Argentina has classified its provinces on the basis of certain main indica-
tors. These criteria made it possible to group them within the whole country 
according to specific objectives, essentially aimed at supporting federal fis-
cal decisions and policy changes in intergovernmental finance. Such criteria 
led to a grouping comprising four types of provinces: a) advanced provinces, 
b) provinces of low demographic density, c) intermediate provinces and 
d) backward provinces.
table 8.2 Economic role of the regions in Argentina (1953– 2005, percentage of the national 
gdp) 
Region 1953 1970 1980 1993 2001 2005
Pampean 81 81.6 78.3 77.2 76.7 74.6
Patagonia 2.9 3.5 5.3 6 6.8 8.4
noa 6.1 5.6 6.6 6.3 6.2 6.9
Cuyo 5.5 5.6 5.8 6 5.8 6.2
nea 4.5 3.7 4.1 4.7 4.4 4.1
 17 It should also be mentioned that this provincial conformation of regions is closer to the 
idea of territorial ‘homogeneity’ and contiguity, without omitting polarisation in amba; 
see Francois Perroux, Nota sobre la noción de polo de crecimiento (Buenos Aires: Consejo 
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The so- called ‘advanced’ regions comprised the main Pampean juris-
dictions, as well as the biggest province of the region of Cuyo, Mendoza. 
The group therefore included the City of Buenos Aires and the Provinces of 
Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Córdoba and Mendoza. In view of the long- lasting 
economic dominance they had over the other provinces of the Argentinian 
Federation, they are today commonly referred to as the ‘traditionally 
advanced’ ones.
Table 8.3 gathers the main results derived from the previously mentioned 
grouping. Figure 8.2 below shows a non- equivalent but similar conclusion to 
the previous grouping included in Table 8.2 and Figure 8.1. Why are the results 
similar, even though we are following an alternative regional classification? 
This is because the regions considered as ‘advanced’ in this alternative typol-
ogy are the bigger jurisdictions like caba, Buenos Aires, Córdoba and Santa Fe, 
which are also mainly ‘Pampean’. Nevertheless, this alternative classification 
enables us to highlight some trends in a more detailed way.
In fact, despite lacking more updated statistical information, this new 
approach makes it possible to highlight the slow but constant increase in 
importance of the Patagonian Region, or the so- called ‘low density’ provinces. 
It also shows the lasting dominance of the Pampean Region, or the most mixed 
combination of the ‘advanced provinces’, in spite of a slow reduction in its 
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In any case, this crude magnitude could not omit the existence of extreme 
measures which confront the ‘have’ with the ‘have not’ provinces and regions. 
It is very useful to compare the existing differences in the case of the United 
States of America (USA) with the case of Argentina, employing the ‘maximum’, 
table 8.3 Regional development: traditionally advanced provinces and others (1953– 2005, 
percentage of the national gdp)
Region 1953 1970 1980 1993 2001 2005
Advanced 81.1 82.4 80.7 78.1 77.7 75.9
caba 31.5 33.6 30 34.4 33.7 33.7
Buenos Aires 30 29 28.2 24 25.2 21.8
Santa Fe 9.1 8.9 9.1 7.9 7.4 8.1
Córdoba 6.6 6.7 7.6 7.9 7.5 8.1
Mendoza 3.9 4.2 4.2 3.9 3.9 4.2
Low Density 3.9 4.3 6.2 6.8 7.6 9.3
Chubut 1 1.2 1.7 1.3 1.5 2
Santa Cruz 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.6
La Pampa 1 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9
Rio Negro 0.9 1 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3
Neuquén 0.4 0.7 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.8
T. del Fuego 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.7
Intermediate 8 7.5 8.2 7.8 7.4 7.3
San Juan 1.1 0.9 1 1.1 1 0.9
San Luis 0.5 0.6 0.6 1 0.9 1.1
Entre Ríos 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.1 2
Tucumán 2.5 2.2 2.7 2 1.9 1.7
Salta 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6
Backward 7 5.8 6.6 7.5 7.2 7.7
La Rioja 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
Catamarca 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.4
Corrientes 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
Jujuy 0.8 0.8 1 0.9 0.8 0.8
Misiones 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.4 1.3 1.2
Chaco 1.8 1 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
S. del Estero 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9
Formosa 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5
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‘minimum’ and ‘average’ points in terms of personal territorial income among 
states or provinces (Table 8.4).18
Table 8.4 illustrates some striking differences. While the USA has clear 
regional and national differences, with a ratio of 1.6 times from better to worse, 
Argentina has more than 8 times the same ratio. In spite of a very modest 
reduction (9 times in the early 1990s to 8 times in the last estimation of per 
capita provincial gdp), the differences continue to be extensive, as the poorest 
territories have a long ‘economic distance’ to the richest territories.
5 Equivalence about What?
Although the idea of ‘equivalence in development’ is important in itself, it also 












Advanced Low Density Intermediate Backward
FIGURE 8.2  The ‘advanced’ jurisdictions and the others (1953– 2005, percentage of the 
national gdp)
 18 Source of the following table: USA; bea (Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department 
of Commerce), Paper by Bettina Atten et al, August 2016. Argentina; Author, based on 
Miguel A. Asensio, “Political Unity and Economic Diversity in the Argentine Federation,” 
in Revisiting Unity and Diversity in Federal Countries: Changing Concepts, Reform Proposals 
and New Institutional Realities, eds. Alain G. Gagnon and Michael Burgess (Leiden and 







capable of supporting and sustaining appropriate policy decisions and defi-
nitions. It encompasses problems of a technical nature, not to mention the 
complex issue of adopting a unified concept of ‘development’ as such, which 
frequently involves questions of normative dimensions. As we know, the defi-
nition of growth and development is subject to intense debates and an accept-
able definition has yet to be established.
We have recently introduced some available indicators expressing differ-
ences, whose consideration confirms the above- mentioned observation.19 The 
difficulties in defining policies and concepts increase when the gap appears 
between those that were based only on so- called ‘crude’ economic indicators 
and those that mobilise indicators that also contain or mix social components. 
Thus, when dealing with the problem of approaching equivalence in the 
level of development, gdp can be evaluated with the additional and parallel 
consideration of other alternative measures, such as the well- known Human 
Development Index (hdi) or the Coverage of Basic Needs Index (cbn). In 
addition, the benchmark could be some leading province or region, or even 
the national average. The first option could be to display something like ‘guides 
and trailers’, like an ideal blueprint that should then be adapted to the local 
reality, to its specific context and constraints. A second option could be to 
 display the distance to the desired minimum. Hence, Table 8.5 shows the ‘dis-
tance’ of provincial indexes with respect to national averages.
Quite unexpectedly, the alternative indicators exhibited in Table 8.5 showed 
that, given the reduction in the differences detected by examining the juris-
dictional outcomes obtained from employing cbn or hdi, any future reform 
would have to take care of ‘something more’ than only the per capita gdp as 
determinant of development.
 19 Asensio, “Political Unity and Economic Diversity,” 193– 205.
table 8.4 Regional- provincial divergences: the USA and Argentina 
(Index numbers: average = 100)






Highest 132.6 Highest 317.8
Average 100 Average 100
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6 The Legal- Constitutional Way – From ‘Gap of Development’ to 
‘Equivalent Development’
The problem of uneven development raises questions with respect to equality 
between citizens living in different parts of the territory and the needed increase 
of equilibrium in the federal spectrum. In fact, regional imbalance impacts the 
‘federal balance’. This issue affects the design and objectives of the federal fiscal 
table 8.5 The search for equivalence: distance from the national 
averages in three indicators [National average = 100 (gdp 
2005; cbn 2010; hdi 2006)]
Provinces GDPpc cbn hdi
Buenos Aires - 10,7 +1,5 - 1,5
caba +217,8 +6,3 +5,8
Catamarca - 30,0 - 2,4 - 1,2
Córdoba - 7,9 +4,3 +1,2
Corrientes - 52,5 - 8,2 - 3,3
Chaco - 56,2 - 12,2 - 4,5
Chubut +19,2 +2,1 - 0,3
Entre Ríos - 29,0 +1,0 - 1,2
Formosa - 60,7 - 14,5 - 6,8
Jujuy - 49,8 - 6,4 - 2,5
La Pampa - 1,1 +7,8 +1,1
La Rioja - 38,8 - 3,4 - 1,5
Mendoza - 10,2 +2,5 +0,5
Misiones - 47,3 - 7,5 - 3,8
Neuquén +32,7 +0,1 +2,2
Río Negro - 2,9 +0,9 - 1,2
Salta - 52,2 - 12,8 - 4,1
San Juan - 43,1 - 10,7 - 2,8
San Luis - 6,4 +2,1 - 1,7
Santa Cruz +64,2 +3,2 +2,8
Santa Fe - 6,1 +3,4 +0,5
Sgo. del Estero - 58,5 - 11,7 - 5,4
Tierra del Fuego +96,6 2,3 +4,4




system. In spite of its partial nature, such a fiscal system will endure pressure 
so that it increases its ability to reach the general objective of a larger regional 
balance, which is achievable if it is combined with a multiplicity of other politi-
cal tools.
The last encompassing federal fiscal legislation was enacted half a cen-
tury ago, regulating the revenue sharing system in Argentina, which explicitly 
enhanced the importance of redistribution. Thereby, not only proportional 
(devolutive) indicators were employed but also redistributive ones. It must be 
recalled that the revenue sharing mechanism operating with modifications 
since the 1930s20 implies two types of distribution of the revenue collected 
from national taxes:21 the first one, primary distribution, consists of a distri-
bution between the Federal Government and the Provincial ones; the second 
one, secondary distribution, is the distribution among provinces of the provin-
cial share. The focus was placed on secondary distribution, with the idea of 
balancing out inequalities of development on the territorial level, introducing 
redistributive mechanisms of pro rata sharing among provinces. This was done 
in order to address the notion of brecha de desarrollo (‘development gap’) and 
thus incorporated the formula in the law 20.221 (1973). In view of the indicators 
and coefficients then available, proportional and redistributive formulae were 
further considered and incorporated.22
Article 3 of the law stated that ‘the distribution among the provinces […] 
shall be effectuated in accordance with the following criteria: a) Directly pro-
portional to the population, sixty five per cent (65 %); b) In per capita propor-
tion to the gap of development between each province and the more developed 
area of the country […] twenty five per cent (25 %); and c) To the provinces 
which do not have a population density higher than the average of the whole 
of the provinces, in proportion to the difference between the population den-
sity of each province and the mentioned average, ten per cent (10 %)’. Article 
4 immediately solved the problem of clarifying the concept of ‘gap of devel-
opment’ stating that ‘[…] it must be understood as gap of development of each 
 20 Since the constitutional agreement reached in 1853– 60, different periods of evolution in 
the federal fiscal system have been highlighted: b) concurrency of sources until 1930s; c) 
revenue sharing from 1930s onwards; a) separation of sources until 1890. Horacio Núñez 
Miñana, Finanzas Públicas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Macchi, 1994).
 21 We have exposed with more detail such a system in previous works. See Miguel A. Asensio, 
Federalismo fiscal, Analisis. Fundamentos y caso argentino (Buenos Aires: Ciudad Argentina, 
2000); Miguel A. Asensio, Local Government Finance in Argentina (Washington: The World 
Bank, 2006); Miguel A. Asensio, “Subnational Tax Powers in Argentina,” Occasional Paper 
N° 16 (Ottawa: Forum of Federations, 2015).
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province the difference in percentage between its level of development and the 
pertaining to the area which embraces the Federal Capital and the Province of 
Buenos Aires. For the determination of the development level of each prov-
ince, it will be applied the simple arithmetic average of the following indexes: 
a) Housing quality, following the last Housing National Census; b) Level of 
education of the human resources, following the last National Population 
Census; and c) Automobiles per inhabitant, belonging to the year in which the 
last National Population Census was conducted.’ The legislator sought to rem-
edy the lack of statistical data on the real personal income of the provinces 
or gdp per capita on a territorial basis by taking alternative measures aimed 
at quantitatively approximating the similarities and differences between the 
provinces. Considering that the differences related to the area of the Capital 
and Province of Buenos Aires, the redistributive fiscal impact was noticeable.
The need of ‘closing the gap’ with regards to provincial imbalances was 
related to another objective, namely the one of ‘getting equality in the deliv-
ery of public services in the different provinces’.23 This last objective is more 
pragmatic than the former.24 The results, in terms of coefficients of secondary 
distribution among provinces, were favourable to the less advanced ones. The 
design which was then achieved reached a higher fiscal redistributive profile, 
reinforced by the creation of an additional institution, known as Fondo de 
Desarrollo Regional (Regional Development Fund), which reserved 3 % of the 
national taxation fund to be assigned to developmental projects in the whole 
country, aiming at the same objective of territorial- regional- provincial devel-
opment for the underdeveloped regions.25 However, while maintaining the 
 23 Alberto Porto, “Análisis comparado de las finanzas de los gobiernos provinciales 
en la Argentina,” in Finanzas Públicas y Desarollo Regional, ed. Luis E. Di Marco 
(Córdoba: Dirección General de Publicaciones de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, 
1989), 227.
 24 Curiously, this is the constitutional axis for the definition of the equalisation fiscal sys-
tem in Canada. See Porto, “Análisis comparado de las finanzas de los gobiernos provin-
ciales en la Argentina,” 227; Richard M. Bird, Federal Finance in Comparative Perspective 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); Bev Dahlby and Joanna Roberts, “Fiscal 
Federalism and Equalization in Canada,” in Federalismo fiscal, Experiencia nacional y com-
parada, eds. Miguel A. Asensio and Pablo M. Garat (Santa Fe: Rubinzal y Culzoni, 2011), 
295– 320.
 25 In stricter terms, primary distribution, which mainly divides the bourse between the 
Federal Governments and the Provinces, also devoted a minor part to the Fondo de 
Desarrollo Regional. Thus, the Law assigned 45 % to the Federal Level, 45 % to the 
Provinces and 3 % to the mentioned Fund. In such a way, the redistributive or equalising 
objective was pursued by redistributive coefficients in the secondary distribution and by 








redistributive pro rata in secondary distribution, the primary distribution was 
weakened in the early 1980s by a ‘puncture in the bourse’ whose revenue was 
assigned to an unexpected partner: the social security system whose contri-
butions, previously ensured by the business sector, had been eliminated for 
reasons of competition. This ‘puncture in the bourse’ that saw resources being 
redirected from the primary distribution into the social security system is now 
commonly referred to in Argentina as ‘pre- coparticipation’. The direct conse-
quence of this happening was that the core of the original system, which aimed 
at reducing the ‘gap of development’, was disrupted after only eight years.26
From 1988 on, the later known system of revenue sharing was introduced 
as a technical alternative, which was implemented in Argentina a decade and 
a half later than provided for by Law 20.221. As already mentioned, it main-
tained the revenue sharing regime and the classic profile of two main types of 
distributions, the primary one and the secondary. The difficulties arose when 
the last one was designed. In fact, when enacting the secondary distribution, in 
spite of establishing a new pro rata system among the provinces, the legal text 
did not show explicit indexes or coefficients of an objective nature supporting 
the pro rata method.27 As Table 8.6 shows, the clear loser was the Province of 
Buenos Aires and the winners were the large majority of provinces. In that 
sense, one could say that there was a territorial redistribution of the ‘fiscal 
pool’, which later caused recriminations from the affected big province. In 
addition, another important modification occurred, namely the elimination 
of the Fondo de Desarrollo Regional and its replacement by another fund. It 
was denominated Fondo de Aportes del Tesoro Nacional (National Treasury 
Grants Fund), which supported different objectives, such as the need to pro-
vide aid to Provinces suffering or having been affected by financial or emer-
gency circumstances.28
During the 1990s, the corrections made on that regime were imposed, 
like in the past, by the ‘social security issue’ and other key issues such as the 
Patagonian demands, the situation of the Buenos Aires conurbation, and a 
number of other, smaller conurbations. The problem of those issues underly-
ing the corrections made to the regime, is that the corrections did not explic-
itly consider the regional imbalance as a very long- term and essential issue 
 26 Enacted by Law 22.293. The same legal instrument imposed an elevation of the vat’s 
compensatory tax rate which failed to achieve the full compensatory objective.
 27 Enacted by Ley 23.548/ 88, called ‘Regimen Transitorio de Distribución de Recursos 
Fiscales entre la Nación y las Provincias’.
 28 The primary distribution assigned 56,66 % of tax revenues for Provinces, 42,34 % for the 
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to be addressed for the country’s development and conformation.29 This non- 
consideration for the regional imbalance question was confirmed when, in the 
 29 We have called the period between the last decade of the 20th century and the beginning 
of the 21st century the ‘era of the Pacts’, given that over the regime designed by Law 23.588 
different modifications across Fiscal Pacts among Nation and Provinces were superim-
posed; see Miguel A. Asensio, Descentralización fiscal en el Cono Sur y la experiencia inter-
nacional (Buenos Aires: Buyatti, 2006).
table 8.6 1988: A new attempt for Argentina’s regional redistribution through the revenue 
sharing system
Provincial Jurisdictions Law 20221/ 73 Law 23548/ 88 Differences
caba - - 1.4 1.4
Buenos Aires 27.99 21.5 - 6.49
Catamarca 1.93 2.86 0.93
Córdoba 8.9 9.22 0.32
Corrientes 3.79 3.86 0.07
Chaco 4.13 5.18 1.05
Chubut 1.86 1.52 - 0.34
Entre Rios 4.56 5.07 0.51
Formosa 2.29 3.78 1.49
Jujuy 2.21 2.95 0.74
La Pampa 1.8 1.95 0.15
La Rioja 1.72 2.15 0.43
Mendoza 4.73 4.33 - 0.4
Misiones 2.96 3.43 0.47
Neuquén 1.72 1.68 - 0.04
Rio Negro 2.29 2.62 0.33
Salta 3.74 3.98 0.24
San Juan 2.55 3.51 0.96
San Luis 1.75 2.37 0.62
Santa Cruz 1.44 1.52 0.08
Santa Fe 9.06 9.28 0.22
Santiago del Estero 4.01 4.29 0.28
Tucuman 4.55 4.94 0.39
Tierra del Fuego - - 0.7 0.7





early 1990s, the pre- coparticipation instruments for funding the social security 
system were reinstated, altering the operation of the territorial redistributive 
coefficients, which had been approved in the 1988 legislation for the secondary 
distribution in the revenue sharing scheme.30 Shortly afterwards, in 1994, the 
National Convention approved the Reformed Constitutional Text, which again 
brought up the redistributive objective stating the need for a renewed revenue 
sharing regime which aimed at equivalent development and related goals as 
‘equivalence in the quality of life’ and ‘equality of opportunities’ in the whole 
national territory.
Considering the time span elapsed from 1973 (Law 20.221) to 1994 (National 
Constitution), we can notice a change in the formulation used to refer to the 
fiscal regime’s aspiration. In fact, while ‘gap of development’ was initially 
commonly used, ‘equivalent development’ was later imposed. Both word-
ings express the need and aspiration of transferring fiscal resources from rich 
regions and provinces to the less favoured ones. Art. 75 of the Constitution, as 
its reading reveals, clearly states that:
[…] The sharing among the Nation, the provinces and the city of Buenos 
Aires, and in turn among the latter, will be effectuated […] considering 
objective criteria for sharing, it will be equitable, solidary (supportive) 
and will give priority to achieving an equivalent degree of development, 
quality of life and equality of opportunities in the whole national 
territory.31
Unfortunately, following much economic turmoil, including the 2002 
national insolvency, only provisional instruments were designed and adopted 
(Table 8.7), without complying with the constitutional mandate to enact a new 
revenue sharing arrangement that would take into account the redistributive 
goals imposed by the National Constitution as the supreme law and based on 
‘objective coefficients’, as mentioned above.
Today, despite almost 25 years having passed since the approval of the 1994 
constitutional mandate – which sanctioned a new regime aiming for objec-
tives like equivalent development, quality of life and equality of opportuni-
ties – the whole system is still characterised by imperfect conformation and 
the implementation of its institutional framework undoubtedly needs to be 
improved. In any case, the question remains as to how such an ambitious goal 
like the achievement of an ‘equivalent level of development’ can be reached, 
 30 Intergovernmental Agreements of 1992 and 1993.
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a question that is even more relevant if we consider the ability of the Federal 
Financial Regime, ineffective when it comes to revenue sharing. In other 
words, could the fiscal mechanism of revenue sharing on its own meet this 
objective?
7 Regional Policies Again, Fiscal and Non- Fiscal Ones32
The problems mentioned above reinforce the need to emphasise the impor-
tance of sound regional policies. Such regional policies must be understood 
table 8.7 Closing the gap? The legal winding road to ‘Equivalent Development’ 
Date Normative body Characteristics
1973 National Law 20221 Revenue Sharing considering explicit 
redistributive coefficients based on 
‘brecha de desarrollo’ (development gap).
1980 National Law 22.293 Introduces detractions for Social Security.
1988 National Law 23.548 Revenue Sharing without objective 
coefficients for sharing and redistribution 
without technical sustain.
1990/ 94 National Law 23548 
+ Intergovernmental 
Agreements
Important pre- coparticipation detractions 
from the taxation bag for the Social 
Security System.
1994 National Constitution 
Reformed
Imposes the sanction of a new revenue 
sharing regime, based on objective 







Mandate for new 
revenue sharing
Provisional system ‘patchwork type’ 
including the redistributive prorate from 
Ley 23548 applied on a reduced taxation 
base or ‘tax bag’.
 32 To have a deeper understanding of the importance of regional policies in a context of 
territorial imbalances, see Miguel A. Asensio, “Territorial Imbalances and Regional 
Disparities within a Federal Context: The Case of Argentina,” in Federalism, Regionalism 





as a set of instruments going beyond only one fiscal instrument, in order to 
improve the reduction of asymmetries in the Argentine federal scheme’s func-
tioning. Regional- territorial policies are essential, not only in Argentina, but in 
any federal organisation. This is of particular importance when a concentra-
tion process33 and economies of agglomeration – in other words, ‘agglomera-
tion effects’ – have occurred over many decades,34 based on mechanisms like 
the ‘cumulative circular causation’ which predominantly favours some portion 
of the territorial space of a country.35
In view of the above situation in which the Argentinian Federation finds 
itself, we will present in this section some relevant policies that could be 
implemented to support the overall effort of addressing the uneven develop-
ment. We will allude to some relevant policies at the regional level, rather than 
those on the national level, because we consider the regional level as an envi-
ronment close to the people, where policies can be tested and improved. Of 
course, it is possible to imagine new fiscal equalisation processes – or improve 
existing ones – on the national level. It is good and important to improve the 
fiscal regime and the revenue sharing mechanism, yet we consider that fed-
eral policies should be supported by regional policies. We strongly believe that 
mechanisms on the national level would profit from inputs, best- practices 
and knowledge gathered by regional authorities through locally implemented 
development mechanisms.
On the one hand, regarding fiscal measures, we propose two alternatives, 
which differ from the mere equalisation or revenue sharing with redistribu-
tive prorate. The first are the budgetary spending and budgetary allocations, 
which could acknowledge internal varieties from investment projects, pub-
lic works, transfers or assignments. These allocations are aligned differently 
depending on the regions. The second, the so- called tax expenditures or fiscal 
stimulus, are aimed at promoting the development of the stagnant or less 
dynamic territorial areas. If these mechanisms have any limitations, they 
 33 Francois Perroux has reminded us that ‘economic growth does not occur in all points 
and at the same moment, but the opposite’, considering points as equivalent to industrial 
branches, sectors and regions; Perroux, Nota sobre la noción de polo de crecimiento.
 34 Or more prolonged spaces of time, like in Europe, as is documented in Juán R. Cuadrado 
Roura and Tomás Mancha Navarro, “Política regional y de cohesión,” in Economía de la 
Unión Europea, ed. Josep M. Jordán Galduf (Madrid: Thompson- Civitas, 2008), 465– 514.
 35 The theory of ‘cumulative circular causation’ was developed by Gunnar Myrdal to 
describe concentrated regional economic growth. See Gunnar Myrdal, Teoría económica 
y regiones subdesarrolladas (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1957), with English 
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are to be found in the relation between the revenue cost and the outcomes 
achieved.36
On the other hand, regarding financial measures and credits, we shall first 
highlight the fact that some have already been regulated by monetary author-
ities in order to support specific regions. In Argentina, the central bank estab-
lished one monetary mechanism, which involved loans made by private and 
commercial banks and not by the central bank directly.37 Those loans are 
however short term ones, while development needs to be planned on the long 
term. An alternative would be to implement financial measures and credits 
that would involve a variety of specific loans aiming at development. Such spe-
cific loans would need differential lapses for repayment in the long term, ena-
bling more flexibility and avoiding the constraints imposed by the short term. 
They would also be characterised by differentiated rates of interest and fre-
quently involve subsidies for the selected territorial areas. They would require 
the creation of specific institutions like development banks which are guided 
by such objectives. These institutions and corporations operate in national 
contexts, as well as in the international arena, the Brazilian Banco Nacional do 
Desenvolvimento, the World Bank and eubi (European Bank for Investments) 
being outstanding examples. However, this kind of measures linked to the 
banking system, even if their objective is development, are not free from con-
troversies. They need to be monitored and it has to be insured that political or 
private interests, among others, which could jeopardise the development of 
the targeted regions, do not bias them.
Furthermore, it is necessary to mention the importance of regulations 
for regional development policies. According to the definition given by the 
Economic Council of Canada ‘regulation is defined as government imposi-
tion of rules and controls designed to direct, restrict or change the economic 
 36 The underlying culture that conditions the way economic and political problems are 
dealt with must also be taken into account when planning development policies. 
Regional problems are very difficult to deal with and overcoming them needs planning in 
the short term, middle term but most of all in the long term. For uneven development to 
eventually be overcome inside a Federation, the differences that can exist in the under-
lying problem- solving culture of the different federate states needs to be addressed. For 
an illustration of this argument, see Vittorio Marrama: Política económica y países subde-
sarrollados, (Madrid: Editorial Aguilar, 1961); Elena Rodríguez, “Commentary,” Desarrollo 
Económico, Vol. i, N° 3 (October- December 1961): 217– 219.
 37 This mechanism had at its core the reduction of the Cash Deposit Ratio (cdr), which can 
be understood as an amount of minimum cash private banks must effectively possess. 
Being a percentage of the overall amount of money being lent, when the cdr is relaxed 






behaviour of individuals and business, and these rules and controls are sup-
ported by sanctions and penalties for non- compliance’.38 In fact, regulations 
and controls, together with procedures, monitor the efficiency and competi-
tiveness of such important activities as those of big business with extended 
territorial dimensions, public services, transport activities, natural monopolies 
and public utilities, and thus are bound to have a regional impact. Increased 
competitiveness of regions is perhaps one of the most important outcomes 
of policy decisions. Therefore, regulation and deregulation are not neutral in 
relation to the development of regions, provinces, districts and cities. If well 
designed they could improve and foster the economic and commercial posi-
tion of such territorial areas, given a good institutional framework and prac-
tices of public bureaucracies and governance.39
Regarding the issue of competitiveness, a number of regional policies are 
linked to public and private capacity building and distribution. Such capacities 
need to be included in the concept of regional (or provincial) competitiveness. 
The regional imbalances could be overcome by improving the competitiveness 
of less advanced regions vis- à- vis the developed ones. In this way, it could be 
possible to foster a balanced federalism with regional balance across regional 
policy itself, and to combine fiscal and non- fiscal measures. Achieving this is 
not an easy task, as shown by continuous efforts in developed federal coun-
tries or the European Union.40 But ‘difficult’ is not equivalent to ‘impossible’. 
The Argentinean constitutional objective of achieving a more equal (or less 
unequal) territorial and provincial development in the sense of ‘equivalence at 
the stage of development’ must be included in such a broadened perspective.
As can be observed from the data mentioned above, Argentina has pre-
sented – since more than a century and a half – a very particular and unique 
case of demographic and economic concentration in the city of Buenos Aires 
and the surrounding area, which conditions and influences the unequal 
 38 John C. Strick, “Regulation and Deregulation,” in The Handbook of Canadian Public 
Administration, ed. Christopher Dunn (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), 263– 278.
 39 The creation of bodies or agencies to foster progress as institutional devices for territorial 
development has been mentioned as third generation measures for regional growth. See 
Bert A.H.J Helmsing, “Teorías del desarrollo industrial regional,” Revista eure, Vol. xxv, N° 
75 (September 1999): 5– 39.
 40 Here, we allude to the strategy based on the ‘structural funds’ and correlative measures, 
whose objective is the reduction of differences between the member States. For the 
case of Canada, see James P. Bickerton, “Regional Development in Canada: Fifty Years 
of Federal Policies and Agencies,” International Meeting on Economic and Institutional 
Trajectories in Federal Countries, March 30– 31 (Santa Fe, Argentina: International Meeting 
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federation. This inequality does not only relate to development, but also to 
sociology, culture, political organisation, electoral weight and so on. This 
essential aspect has been addressed many times throughout history, including 
recently. As I have mentioned in previous works,41 Buenos Aires was accused 
of ‘macrocephaly’ in the face of a nation with a huge and disproportionate 
head and a fragile and weak body. There is a quotation widely known among 
Argentinians, attributed to the French Minister of Culture André Malraux 
who visited Argentina in the 1960s, that says ‘Buenos Aires is the Capital of 
an Empire that never existed’.42 His compatriot, the famous French politician 
George Clemenceau had also eulogised the capital half a century earlier as he 
visited Argentina in 1910 for the country’s centennial celebration and named 
Buenos Aires a ‘great city’, ‘one like a great city of Europe’.43 That was however 
in more prosperous times, when the level of personal income in the country 
corresponded to that of advanced nations.44 Today the metropolitan city con-
tinues to be enormous, despite changed conditions and sluggish economic 
growth. Buenos Aires and its surroundings represent a weight of ten times the 
population of the next largest cities, Córdoba and Rosario. Attempts to limit 
the growth of the capital city by changing the location of the central adminis-
trative units (establishing a new capital for Argentina) have failed.45
Several of the regional policies mentioned above have been imple-
mented with time: fiscal incentives,46 national and provincial development 
 41 For further information, see Miguel A. Asensio, “Territorial Imbalances and Regional 
Disparities within a Federal Context: The Case of Argentina,” in Federalism, Regionalism 
and Territory, ed. Stelio Mangiamelli (Milano: Giuffre, 2013); Miguel A. Asensio, Local 
Government Finance in Argentina (Washington: The World Bank, 2006); Miguel A. Asensio, 
“Subnational Tax Powers in Argentina,” Occasional Paper N° 16 (Ottawa: Forum of 
Federations, 2015); Miguel A. Asensio, “Political Unity and Economic Diversity in the 
Argentine Federation,” in Revisiting Unity and Diversity in Federal Countries: Changing 
Concepts, Reform Proposals and New Institutional Realities, eds. Alain G. Gagnon and 
Michael Burgess (Leiden and Boston: Brill- Nijhoff, 2018).
 42 This expression is deeply rooted in Argentina’s present memory. It inspired the title of 
book by Horacio Vázquez Rial, Memoria de las ciudades. Buenos Aires 1880– 1930. La capital 
de un imperio imaginario (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1996).
 43 For further information on Clemenceau and Argentina at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury, see Richard J. Walter, Politics and Urban Growth in Buenos Aires: 1910– 1942 (New York 
and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
 44 For similar comments on this same issue, please consult the famous historian Félix Luna, 
who wrote Buenos Aires y el país (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1978).
 45 Such attempts already started in the 19th century, all without success.
 46 The so called ‘Leyes Nacionales de Promoción Industrial’, during and after the 1950s tar-
geted some specific territorial resources, such as the resources from the Province of Tierra 














banks,47 infrastructural projects, etc. Because those policies either have 
sometimes failed or had rather modest results, the Constitution reaffirmed 
the proposal of pursuing the objective of equalisation by means of the pre-
viously mentioned revenue sharing mechanism. Even an equalising task for 
the budget was considered, in its expenditure side, under the same philos-
ophy.48 In any case, however, the current outcomes do not look very strong 
and it seems that natural resources are the real force fuelling the changes 
such as those observed in the Patagonian evolution.49
Additionally, some studies have demonstrated existing divergences in provin-
cial capacities, expressed in different indices showing a significant gap between 
the main geographical units and those that do less well when it comes to com-
petitiveness. The global index for Santa Fe is in fact three times that of Chaco 
and the index for Buenos Aires is twice as high as that of Formosa.50
8 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have tried to address the difficulties and challenges that 
emerged in Argentina when the country intended to meet the objectives that 
were stated in the modern constitutional text. These objectives, contained 
in the version approved in 1994, established the mechanism of revenue shar-
ing as the axis of the fiscal federal system, and aimed at achieving equity 
and equivalent development in the Nation.51 Given that these goals would 
be incorporated in the much delayed reform to the needed legislation, some 
considerations are revised as an enlarged analysis of previous contributions 
to the territorial divergences of the country. In the constitutional system of 
 47 On the national level, the ‘Banco Nacional de Desarrollo’, created in 1971 and closed in the 
1990s under claims for inefficiency and corruption. In the Province of Santa Fe, the ‘Banco 
Santafesino de Inversión y Desarrollo’, also existed until the 1990s.
 48 Art. 75, section 8, National Constitution.
 49 On this topic also Equality and Advantage in Emerging Federations and the Dilemma of 
Non- Renewable Natural Resources: the cases of the Solomon Islands and Trinidad and 
Tobago by Nico Steytler ( chapter 7).
 50 See Alberto J. Figueras, “La competitividad de las economías provinciales,” in El desafío 
del territorio, Un análisis de las economías regionales, eds. Alberto J. Figueras and José 
L. Arrufat (Córdoba: Asociación Cooperadora de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas de 
la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, 2007), 296.
 51 The Federal Constitution established qualitative conditions not only for the legislation 
enacting the revenue sharing system as technical option, but also for the national budget, 
aiming at the two big tools interpreted as main instruments in the federal fiscal system of 
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Argentina, in view of the clauses and Articles incorporated into the Supreme 
Law, ‘the regulating laws must lay down (detail) its execution’. This is the task 
necessary to overcome the ‘transitional legal patchwork’ to achieve the consti-
tutional objectives.
Considering the data for provincial per capita gdp, the differences among 
the highest level and the lowest is striking. As usual, the income of caba 
exceeds that of the national average many times over, as well as that of the 
‘have not’ jurisdictions. The information shown for the USA, bearing in mind 
that the USA also has problems of regional inequality, explains the calami-
tous imbalances registered for Argentina. Therefore, in order to reach a more 
balanced growth and development in Argentina, the federal fiscal system will 
need the help of other policies to yield more effective results in the process 
of achieving ambitious objectives such as ‘equivalence of development’. The 
reduction of the horizontal economic imbalances or the accomplishment of a 
more even territorial development must result in expanded capacities induced 
by an increased competitiveness. In such a perspective, systemic competitive-
ness matters to attain more balanced growth and development.
Given the importance of a new redistribution scheme for revenue sharing, 
it would also be necessary to develop a new and improved package of coordi-
nated policies, developed in time to achieve a more robust impact in terms of 
more even territorial development.
Finally, it seems necessary to adopt a combination of regional policy with 
the fiscal- federal policy presented for the revenue sharing system and its sec-
ondary distribution, taking into account redistributive coefficients in the func-
tioning of the pro- rata mechanism.
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1.1 The Tax System as a Measure of State Autonomy
A central element of federal constitutional systems is their financial organisa-
tion. Anyone who wants to determine the degree of autonomy of the member 
states inevitably has to address the question of the financial autonomy of the var-
ious regional authorities.2 In this chapter, we will first analyse the constitutional 
framework with regard to the margin left to the subnational units in Switzerland 
in the field of taxation. We will show that they hold a considerable degree of 
autonomy, which leads to a number of consequences, among them a remarka-
ble disparity between the cantons in terms of individual charges for taxpayers. 
In the following step, we will examine the system that Switzerland has set up to 
alleviate these inequalities, i.e. the constitutional rights of individual taxpayers 
(illustrated with cases decided upon by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court) and 
other constitutional limits of cantonal tax autonomy on the one hand, and the 
system of fiscal equalisation on the other hand. While fiscal equalisation aims to 
correct the disparities on an institutional level, taxpayers can directly invoke the 
individual constitutional guarantees and principles provided in the constitution.
1.2 Public Expenditure in Switzerland
One of the most striking features of Swiss federalism is the competence of the 
cantons to levy income taxes and to set tax rates. This fact is reflected in the sta-
tistics on federal, cantonal and communal expenditure, amongst others. The 
allocation of expenditure in the three- tier Swiss system highlighted in Table 9.1 
 1 I would like to thank Géraldine Cattilaz (MLaw) for her precious support in the completion 
of this contribution; I particularly benefited from her excellent English language skills for the 
final version.
 2 Peter Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” in Basler Kommentar, Bundesverfassung, 
eds. Bernhard Waldmann, Eva Maria Belser and Astrid Epiney (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn, 
2015), marginal no. 1.
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table 9.1 Public expenditure in Switzerland 2016
Important figures according to the gfs Model
chf mn 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
General 
government
Revenue 203,941 208,762 210,864 219,115 220,177
Expenditure 201,547 211,501 212,257 214,896 217,703
Net lending/ borrowing 2,394 - 2,739 - 1,392 4,219 2,474
Tax- to- gdp ratio 27.0 27.1 26.9 27.6 27.8
Debt ratio (Maastricht)2 30.6 30.3 30.6 30.0 29.0
Confederation1 Revenue 65,814 67,965 67,292 71,726 71,571
Expenditure 64,737 67,039 67,294 69,138 70,600
Net lending/ borrowing 1,077 926 - 1 2,588 971
Tax- to- gdp ratio 9.5 9.6 9.4 9.9 9.8
Debt ratio (Maastricht)2 16.8 16.4 15.8 15.0 14.0
Cantons Revenue 82,728 84,303 85,762 89,190 90,320
Expenditure 83,576 88,657 87,724 88,803 89,426
Net lending/ borrowing - 848 - 4,353 - 1,962 387 894
Tax- to- gdp ratio 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.8 7.0
Debt ratio (Maastricht) 7.3 7.5 8.3 8.4 8.4
Municipalities Revenue 43,493 44,041 45,093 46,221 47,026
Expenditure 44,238 45,407 46,714 46,631 47,160
Net lending/ borrowing - 745 - 1,367 - 1,621 - 410 - 133
Tax- to- gdp ratio 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.3
Debt ratio (Maastricht)2 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.7
Social security 
funds
Revenue 59,141 60,185 61,426 61,836 62,351
Expenditure 56,230 58,131 59,233 60,181 61,609
Net lending/ borrowing 2,911 2,055 2,192 1,654 742
Tax- to- gdp ratio 6.7 6.7 6.6 6.7 6.7
Debt ratio (Maastricht)2 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.4
1   incl. separate accounts
2   according to the Maastricht definition
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shows that in 2015, the Confederation spent roughly 26 % of the total public 
expenditure, the cantons 34 % and the municipalities3 17 %. The expenditure 
for social insurances (which lies in the hands of the Confederation) amounts 
to 23 %. Even the share of total public spending shows that the cantons have 
a strong financial position. Below, we will look at the constitutional reasons 
which enable the cantons to exercise such fiscal strength.
2 The Constitutional Framework
2.1 The Power to Levy Direct Taxes: The Federal and the Cantonal Level
The Swiss tax system is laid down in the Federal Constitution (FedCst). Given 
that the Swiss Constitution provides the so- called presumption of autonomy 
in favour of the cantons, any Federal competence needs a constitutional basis.4 
This is particularly true when we deal with the power to levy taxes. While value 
added taxes (vat), special consumption taxes, the stamp duty, and withhold-
ing tax and customs duties are codified in the Federal Constitution as exclusive 
competences of the Federal state,5 the situation is fundamentally different in 
the field of direct taxes. Indeed, the Confederation as well as the cantons hold 
the competence to levy direct taxes.6 The relevant article in the FedCst reads 
as follows:
Art. 128 FedCst.
 1 The Confederation may levy a direct tax:
 a. of a maximum of 11.5 per cent on the income of private individuals;
 b. of a maximum of 8.5 per cent of the net profit of legal entities;
 c. […]
 3 As there is no difference in Switzerland between municipalities and communes, both terms 
will be used in this chapter.
 4 Cf. Art. 3 FedCst.: ‘The Cantons are sovereign except to the extent that their sovereignty 
is limited by the Federal Constitution. They exercise all rights that are not vested in the 
Confederation’; see also, amongst others, for the context of taxation: Jean- François Aubert, 
“Commentary on Chapter 3 FedCst.,” in Petit Commentaire de la Constitution fédérale 
de la Confédération suisse, eds. Jean- François Aubert and Pascal Mahon (Zurich, Basel, 
Geneva: Schulthess, 2003), marginal no. 2; Urs Behnisch, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” 
in Basler Kommentar, Bundesverfassung, eds. Bernhard Waldmann, Eva Maria Belser and 
Astrid Epiney (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2015), marginal no. 4.
 5 Cf. Art. 130- 133 FedCst.
 6 Giovanni Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 












 2 The Confederation, in fixing the taxation rates, shall take account of 
the burden of direct taxation imposed by the Cantons and communes.
 3 In relation to the tax on the income of private individuals, regular 
revisions shall be made to compensate for the consequences of an 
increased tax burden due to inflation.
 4 The tax is assessed and collected by the Cantons. A minimum of 17 per 
cent of the gross revenue from taxation is allocated to the Cantons. 
This share may be reduced to 15 per cent if the consequences of finan-
cial equalisation so require.
The constitutional right of the Confederation to levy direct taxes on income or 
net income is not of a binding nature, either in principle or with regard to the 
exact extent of the taxes imposed.7 However, the constitution sets binding limits 
as to the maximal burden imposed on tax payers by federal taxes.8 These limits 
are set relatively low at 11.5 % for natural persons and 8.5 % for legal persons. The 
fact that the upper limits are enshrined in the Constitution in numerical terms 
means that the cantons’ scope for tax planning is very effectively protected,9 
because if the Confederation wished to raise these upper limits, it would have 
to overcome the hurdle of a double majority of voters and cantons within the 
framework of the obligatory constitutional referendum – an almost insurmount-
able task. If these limits were not codified in the Federal Constitution, the federal 
legislator could be inclined to claim the tax substrate of the cantons – through a 
continuous increase in the direct federal tax – to such an extent that the finan-
cial autonomy of the cantons would ultimately be such in name only.10
These considerations (notwithstanding the constitutional provisions on 
tax harmonisation) show that the cantons are granted extensive autonomy in 
levying direct cantonal taxes.11 This autonomy is further protected by Art. 129 
 7 Jean- François Aubert, “Commentary on Art. 128 FedCst.,” in Petit Commentaire de la 
Constitution fédérale de la Confédération suisse, eds. Jean- François Aubert and Pascal 
Mahon (Zurich, Basel, Geneva: Schulthess, 2003), marginal no. 6; Biaggini, Kommentar 
zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 128 marginal no. 3.
 8 Klaus A. Vallender and Ulrich Cavelti, “Commentary on Art. 128 FedCst.,” in Die schweizer-
ische Bundesverfassung, St. Galler Kommentar, eds. Bernhard Ehrenzeller et al. (Zurich, St. 
Gallen: Schulthess, 2014), Art. 128 marginal no. 2.
 9 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 128 marginal no. 3; Madeleine Simonek, 
“Commentary on Art. 128 FedCst.,” in Basler Kommentar, Bundesverfassung, eds. Bernhard 
Waldmann, Eva Maria Belser and Astrid Epiney (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2015), mar-
ginal no. 7.
 10 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 1.
 11 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 128 marginal no. 3; Hänni, “Commentary 
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para. 2 FedCst., which explicitly excludes tax tariffs, tax rates and tax allowances 
from federal competence within the framework of tax harmonisation. Indirect 
protection of cantonal financial autonomy is also based on the constitutional 
regulation of value- added tax, because even in this area – which is reserved for 
the Confederation – the constitution contains, in comparison to international 
standards, a relatively low upper limit for the tax burden (cf. Art. 130 para. 1 
FedCst.).
Due to the cantons’ subsidiary general competence, the tax competences of 
the cantons can be described in simplified terms as the sum of the competences 
not claimed by the Confederation in this area.12 In this regard, it is important 
to keep in mind the constitutional exclusion of cantonal and communal tax-
ation codified in Art. 134 FedCst. This exclusion is made effective by federal 
legislation: insofar as federal legislation declares a taxable event to be subject 
to or exempt from vat, special consumption taxes, stamp duty and withhold-
ing tax, the cantons may not burden such an event with similar taxes (Art. 134 
FedCst.). Generally speaking, however, the cantons have considerable room for 
manoeuvre.13 All cantons tax the income and assets of natural persons and 
levy taxes on profits and capital of legal entities. Inheritance and gift taxes, 
motor vehicle taxes, property gains and transfer taxes are also widespread. 
However, increased tax competition has recently led inheritance and gift taxes 
in particular to be questioned. In various cantons, these types of taxes have 
been abolished or their scope considerably restricted.
2.2 Modalities for the Levying of Direct Federal Taxes
Pursuant to para. 2 of Art. 128 FedCst., the Confederation must take into account 
the burden of the direct taxes of the cantons and municipalities when setting 
the tax rates.14 However, this provision is more of an appeal to the federal leg-
islator to keep a low profile. Legal consequences cannot be derived from it.15
The FedCst. outlines the need to adjust the burden to taxpayers caused by 
inflation as a result of the progressive structure of the tax rates, this is termed 
as cold progression and is outlined in Art. 128 FedCst.16 If this compensation 
were not achieved and the tax rates for the income of natural persons remained 
 12 Markus Reich, Steuerrecht (Zurich: Schulthess, 2012),  chapter 4 marginal no. 8.
 13 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 128 marginal no. 3.
 14 See also: Simonek, “Commentary on Art. 128 FedCst.,” marginal no. 18; Vallender and 
Cavelti, “Commentary on Art. 128 FedCst.,” marginal no. 25.
 15 Aubert, “Commentary on Art. 128 FedCst.,” marginal no. 11; Vallender and Cavelti, 
“Commentary on Art. 128 FedCst.,” marginal no. 26.
 16 Aubert, “Commentary on Art. 128 FedCst.,” marginal no. 12; Vallender and Cavelti, 













the same (cold progression), the tax burden would increase disproportionally 
compared to purchasing power.17
Direct federal tax is assessed (determination of the tax in individual cases 
by decree) and collected by the cantons (Art. 128 para. 4 sentence 1 FedCst.); 
enforcement is therefore the responsibility of the cantons. Accurate process-
ing by the cantons is ensured by special federal supervisory and control powers 
provided for by law.18
17 % of the gross income from the direct federal tax is assigned to the can-
tons as a so- called cantonal share (Art. 128 para. 4 FedCst.). This cantonal share 
has historical roots, since the competence of the Confederation to levy direct 
federal taxes was only introduced in 1915 and against significant resistance 
from the cantons.19 This historical context also explains the continuing tem-
poral limits imposed on the Confederation’s competence to levy direct federal 
taxes (Art. 196 para. 13 FedCst., the current period expired at the end of 2020 
and needs to be renewed).20
2.3 Municipal Taxes in the Swiss Federal State
When comparing federal, cantonal and municipal budget expenditure (exclud-
ing social security contributions), we find that municipalities account for 
around 17 % of government expenditure (see Table 9.1 above). To cover these 
expenditures, municipalities have various kinds of revenues at their disposal, 
but municipal taxes in Switzerland are by far the main source of income for 
municipal spending.
The existence of municipalities is not mandatory under the Federal 
Constitution, nor is the way in which they are financed. The communes do 
not have any original taxing powers, but rather are granted such powers by 
the cantons.21 Such a delegation of taxing powers to municipalities has taken 
place in all cantons, either at the (cantonal) constitutional level or (above all) 
through cantonal tax laws. The municipalities are therefore not authorised 
 17 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 128 marginal no. 8; Vallender and Cavelti, 
“Commentary on Art. 128 FedCst.,” marginal no. 17.
 18 See the provisions in the dbg (the federal law on direct federal taxes); see also: Biaggini, 
Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 128 marginal no. 9; Simonek, “Commentary on Art. 
128 FedCst.,” marginal no. 23; Vallender and Cavelti, “Commentary on Art. 128 FedCst.,” 
marginal no. 32.
 19 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 128 marginal no. 10.
 20 Vallender and Cavelti, “Commentary on Art. 128 FedCst.,” marginal no. 34.
 21 Urs Behnisch, “Commentary on Art. 129 FedCst.,” in Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung, 
St. Galler Kommentar, eds. Bernhard Ehrenzeller et al. (Zurich, St. Gallen: Schulthess, 
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under federal constitutional law to levy taxes; this competence is regularly 
granted to them by cantonal law.22 Nevertheless, the municipalities are bound 
by all federal law requirements without further specification.
3 Consequences for Individual Taxpayers: Large Differences in the 
Tax Burden
As explained above, in the three- tiered federal state (with a few exceptions), 
individual taxpayers have to pay taxes on their income and assets at three 
different levels: the federal, cantonal and municipal.23 Since the Federal 
Constitution explicitly guarantees the canton the right to set tax rates,24 there 
exists – in practice – considerable differences in the tax burden for the individ-
ual taxpayer, depending on the canton in which they are domiciled. Figures 9.1 
and 9.2 show these differences in direct taxes at the cantonal level.
As explained above, due to the federalist structure of the Swiss tax sys-
tems, cantons and communes can have parallel competences to levy taxes. In 
addition to delegating taxing powers to communes, cantons can also delegate 
taxing powers to other entities, such as the church. Some churches therefore 
exercise their right to levy taxes, which is why this these graphs also take into 
account church taxes.25
4 Constitutional Measures in Favour of Equality
4.1 Introduction
As we have seen, the tax autonomy of the cantons (and the municipalities) 
leads to large disparities concerning the tax burden of individual taxpayers. 
In this context and to address the risk of incoherent and unjust situations 
for individuals as a consequence of their choice of canton or municipality in 
which to live, the federal constitutional law has set up a series of measures to 
protect taxpayers from extreme disparities. In this section, we will present and 
discuss these measures.
 22 Reich, Steuerrecht,  chapter 4 marginal nos. 11 et seq.
 23 Chapter 3; see also: Behnisch, “Commentary on Art. 129 FedCst.,” marginal no. 5.
 24 See Art. 129 para. 2 of the Federal Constitution: ‘Harmonisation shall extend to tax lia-
bility, the object of the tax and the tax period, procedural law and the law relating to tax 
offences. Matters excluded from harmonisation shall include in particular tax scales, tax 
rates and tax allowances.’













Tax burden expressed as percentage of the gross  earned income (cantonal, communal and church taxes)
17.4% 16.0% 14.6% 13.2% 11.8% 10.4% 9.0% 7.6% 6.2%
 figure 9.1  Tax burden for a single taxpayer without children (income: chf 100’000) in 2015
Tax burden expressed as percentage of the gross  earned income (cantonal, communal and church taxes)
9.6% 8.7% 7.8% 7.0% 6.1% 5.2% 4.3% 3.4% 2.5%
 figure 9.2  Tax burden for a married taxpayer with two children (income: chf 100’000) in 2015
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4.2 Principles of Tax Law
4.2.1 Meaning and Scope
The tax- law principles are, on the one hand, binding for the legislative author-
ities and represent guidelines for the content of tax- law enactments.26 On the 
other hand, however, they are also of an individual- law nature, in that they 
confer (individual) constitutional rights (in the determination of public- law 
levies) to taxpayers.27
According to the Federal Constitution, these principles apply primarily to 
federal taxes and levies, but the case law of the Federal Supreme Court leaves 
no doubt that they are also applicable to cantonal taxes and levies, as they 
were developed by the Federal Supreme Court in the area of cantonal tax and 
levies legislation before they were anchored in the Federal Constitution.28
4.2.2 The Principles in Detail
(a) The Principle of Legality
The principle of legality in the context of tax law is enshrined in Art. 127 para. 
1 FedCst. and requires that ‘the basic features of the tax structure, in particu-
lar the group of taxpayers, the object of the tax and its assessment’ must be 
regulated in the law itself. The validity of the principle of legality for taxes in 
general results from Art. 164 para. 1 lit. d FedCst.,29 which stipulates that all 
important legislative provisions are to be enacted in the form of a federal law. 
These include, in particular, the basic provisions on the group of taxpayers 
and the object and assessment of levies. However, a certain attenuation of this 
principle is permissible in the case of causal levies.30
 26 Reich, Steuerrecht,  chapter 4 marginal no. 122; Klaus A. Vallender and René Wiederkehr, 
“Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” in Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung, St. Galler 
Kommentar, eds. Bernhard Ehrenzeller et al. (Zurich, St. Gallen: Schulthess, 2014), mar-
ginal no. 4.
 27 Instead of many: Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 127 marginal no. 7; 
Reich, Steuerrecht,  chapter 4 marginal no. 122.
 28 Behnisch, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal nos. 3 and 17; for a slightly dif-
ferent line of argument see: Jean- François Aubert, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” in 
Petit Commentaire de la Constitution fédérale de la Confédération suisse, eds. Jean- François 
Aubert and Pascal Mahon (Zurich, Basel, Geneva: Schulthess, 2003), marginal no. 4; 
Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 127 marginal no. 8.
 29 Aubert, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 5; Behnisch, “Commentary on 
Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 3; Vallender and Wiederkehr, “Commentary on Art. 127 
FedCst.,” marginal no. 5.
 30 The principle of legality was first developed in the American Revolution and 
became famous in the formulation of ‘No taxation without representation’; see 
also: Behnisch, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 17; Biaggini, Kommentar 

















The term ‘law’ refers to a law in the formal sense,31 i.e. a general- abstract 
decree that was passed within the framework of the ordinary legislative proce-
dure.32 The law itself must therefore regulate the group of persons subject to 
tax or duty (subject of tax or duty), the object of the tax or duty (e.g. income, 
assets, turnover, consumption) and the assessment of taxes or duties (tax tar-
iffs, tax rates, timing).33 According to federal constitutional law, the executive 
branch must not legislate on these subject matters.34
In addition to these requirements, the fact that a law in the formal sense 
is necessary also leads to any tax law (be it federal, cantonal or communal) 
necessarily being subject to an optional or mandatory referendum.35 One can 
easily imagine that any proposal by the government and/ or the parliament for 
higher (or lower) taxes only passes in a popular vote if it is carefully designed 
and if it can be justified by an overriding public interest. It is not enough for 
powerful interest groups to support the project.
(b) Principles of Taxation
In addition to the principle of legality, the legislative authorities must com-
ply with certain taxation principles when structuring taxes. Pursuant to Art. 
127 para. 2 FedCst. ‘in particular, the principles of generality and uniformity of 
taxation as well as the principle of taxation on the basis of economic capacity 
must be observed’ – and this to the extent permitted by the nature of the tax.36 
The taxation principles, as explained above, represent enforceable constitu-
tional individual rights, which the Federal Supreme Court had developed from 
the principle of equality of law in many years of jurisprudence prior to the 
entry into force of the now applicable FedCst. in 2000.37
(c) The Principle of Universality
The principle of universality of taxation is intended to prevent both unjusti-
fied privileges for and discrimination against individual taxpayers or certain 
 31 Instead of many: Aubert, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 5.
 32 Instead of many: Pierre Tschannen, Ulrich Zimmerli and Markus Müller, Allgemeines 
Verwaltungsrecht (Bern: Stämpfli, 2014),  chapter 13 marginal nos. 2 f.
 33 Behnisch, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 6; Biaggini, Kommentar zur 
Bundesverfassung, Art. 127 marginal no. 6.
 34 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 127 marginal no. 3; Vallender and 
Wiederkehr, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 7.
 35 Vallender and Wiederkehr, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 9.
 36 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 127 marginal no. 9.
 37 Behnisch, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 18; Biaggini, Kommentar zur 
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groups of persons.38 However, the principle of universality only excludes 
exceptions for general taxes, but not for objectively justified special taxes 
(e.g. special excise duties).39 Historically, tax privileges were widespread in 
Switzerland.40
(d) The Principle of Uniformity
The principle of uniformity of taxation ensures that identical or comparable 
situations are treated equally.41
(e) The Principle of Taxation According to Economic Capacity
The principle of taxation according to economic capacity is intended to take 
into account the fact that the same tax rate for all leads to proportionally 
unequal charges.42 This makes progressive – i.e. disproportionately increas-
ing – taxation of income taxes permissible, in complete contrast to digressively 
structured tax rates.43 However, it must be borne in mind that the legislator 
has left considerable room for manoeuvre to the authorities applying the prin-
ciple of taxation according to economic capacity, because this principle is a 
concept that requires a great deal of interpretation.
(f) Prohibition of Inter- Cantonal Double Taxation
Finally, another principle of taxation is the prohibition of inter- cantonal dou-
ble taxation (Art. 127 para. 3 FedCst.). Such inter- cantonal double taxation 
would be possible in a federal state that grants the member states consider-
able tax powers for autonomous structuring (as is the case in Switzerland).44 
Double taxation occurs when the tax subject, tax object, tax period and tax 
 38 Reich, Steuerrecht,  chapter 4 marginal no. 126; Vallender and Wiederkehr, “Commentary 
on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal nos. 12 et seq.
 39 Vallender and Wiederkehr, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 18.
 40 For the whole paragraph see: Behnisch, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal 
no. 24: Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 127 marginal no. 10.
 41 Aubert, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 9; Behnisch, “Commentary on 
Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 27; Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 127 
marginal no. 11; Vallender and Wiederkehr, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal 
no. 21.
 42 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 127 marginal no. 12; Reich, Steuerrecht, 
 chapter 4 marginal no. 139.
 43 See the case law below.
 44 Aubert, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 12; Behnisch, “Commentary on 
Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 48; Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 127 





















type are identical.45 In principle, only taxes are covered, but not so- called 
causal taxes (for example fees).46 The double taxation prohibition constitutes 
an enforceable constitutional individual right as well.47 At the same time, it 
obliges the Confederation to adopt the necessary measures.48
4.3 Tax Harmonisation
As mentioned above, due to the considerable autonomy of the cantons in 
the area of taxation, direct taxes are structured very differently according to 
the canton (or commune).49 In order to place at least some aspects of taxa-
tion on a comparable footing, Article 129 para. 1 of the FedCst. confers on the 
Confederation the authority to lay down principles to harmonise direct taxes 
of the Confederation, the cantons and the communes. This competence is thus 
a mandate for so- called basic legislation, with the aim of harmonising rather 
than standardising.50 The mandate covers only direct taxes, primarily income 
and wealth taxes or taxes on profits and capital.51 Still, this formal tax harmo-
nisation creates a basis for the comparability of the tax burden, which in the 
past was nearly impossible even in purely conceptual terms due to an almost 
incomprehensible diversity.
Art. 129 para. 2 FedCst. specifies the object of harmonisation. According to 
this provision, tax harmonisation extends ‘to tax liability, subject matter and 
temporal assessment of taxes, procedural law and criminal tax law. Tax tar-
iffs, tax rates and tax allowances in particular are exempt from harmonisation’. 
 45 Behnisch, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 54; Biaggini, Kommentar zur 
Bundesverfassung, Art. 127 marginal no. 16; Vallender and Wiederkehr, “Commentary on 
Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 71.
 46 Behnisch, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 55; Biaggini, Kommentar zur 
Bundesverfassung, Art. 127 marginal no. 16.
 47 Behnisch, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 52; Biaggini, Kommentar zur 
Bundesverfassung, Art. 127 marginal no. 14; Reich, Steuerrecht,  chapter 4 marginal no. 17; 
Vallender and Wiederkehr, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 59.
 48 Behnisch, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 53; Biaggini, Kommentar zur 
Bundesverfassung, Art. 127 marginal no. 15; Reich, Steuerrecht,  chapter 4 marginal no. 17; 
Vallender and Wiederkehr, “Commentary on Art. 127 FedCst.,” marginal no. 59.
 49 Chapter 4; see also Jean- François Aubert, “Commentary on Art. 129 FedCst.,” in Petit 
Commentaire de la Constitution fédérale de la Confédération suisse, eds. Jean- François 
Aubert and Pascal Mahon (Zurich, Basel, Geneva: Schulthess, 2003), marginal no. 2; 
Behnisch, “Commentary on Art. 129 FedCst.,” marginal no. 7.
 50 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 129 marginal no. 2; for a detailed discus-
sion of different forms of harmonisation: Aubert, “Commentary on Art. 129 FedCst.,” mar-
ginal nos. 2 et seq.
 51 Behnisch, “Commentary on Art. 129 FedCst.,” marginal no. 12; Biaggini, Kommentar zur 
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This means that three fundamental areas remain excluded from harmonisa-
tion, which is why the autonomy of the cantons in (substantive) core areas of 
tax legislation is not affected by harmonisation measures and on the contrary 
even enjoys explicit constitutional protection.52 However, there are reserva-
tions regarding compliance with the principles of taxation outlined above.
Finally, Art. 129 para. 3 FedCst. grants the Confederation a limited, non- 
binding legislative competence to enact regulations against unjustified tax 
advantages. However, the Confederation has not to date made use of the asso-
ciated powers of intervention.53
In the following section, we will illustrate the individual rights of taxpayers 
explained above by analysing two recent cases decided by the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court.
5 Case Law: The Constitutional Limits of Cantonal Tax Autonomy
5.1 The Case of Regressive Tariffs in the Canton of Obwalden
In a landmark decision that received much attention, the Federal Supreme 
Court dealt with the issue of regressive tax rates. These fundamental consid-
erations were prompted by a new tax law of the Canton of Obwalden, which 
provided for the following tax burdens on income (Table 9.2, below).
 52 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 129 marginal no. 6; Madeleine Simonek, 
“Commentary on Art. 129 FedCst.,” in Basler Kommentar, Bundesverfassung, eds. Bernhard 
Waldmann, Eva Maria Belser and Astrid Epiney (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2015), mar-
ginal no. 11.
 53 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 129 marginal no. 8.
table 9.2 Provided tax burdens on income by the tax law of 
the Canton of Obwalden
Income Simple tax Tax burden in 
percentage
chf chf
5,000 – 0 – 0
10,000 – 45 – 0.45
20,000 – 183 – 0.915
30,000 – 385 – 1.2833









The Federal Supreme Court ruled that this regressive tax burden does not 
conform to the constitution:
9.3 The new Obwalden tax rate is regressive only for taxable income of 
chf 300,000 or more. Nevertheless, in some sections it causes burden dif-
ferences that can no longer be described as insignificant. For example, the 
average tax burden on a taxable income of chf 300,000 (2.2340) is 32.33 
per cent higher than the average tax burden on an income of chf 1,000,000 
(1.6882). With a taxable income of chf 200,000 (2.1760), the average tax 
rate is 28.89 per cent higher than with a taxable income of chf 1,000,000. 
Even with an income of chf 100,000 (2.0020), the average tax burden is 
still 18.58 per cent higher than with an income of chf 1,000,000. In effect, 
the average tax burden for an income of chf 1,000,000 (1.6882) is practi-
cally the same as for an income of chf 51,200 (1.6887).
The differences in tax burden shown do not stand up to the principle 
of equal taxation and the principle of taxation according to economic 
performance. These require that the burden of each income level within 
the system and in comparison with the other income levels be carried 
out according to the same rules, appear objectively justified and in a rea-
sonable proportion […]. The claim is central, especially since compara-
bility in the vertical direction is made more difficult and equality of law 
and tax justice cannot be established in any other way.
Moreover, the canton does not claim that the taxation according to 
the principle of efficiency requires a regressive tariff process. Rather, the 
reason for this tariff structure was other (fiscal or non- fiscal) motives, as 
can also be seen from the legal opinion of Prof. Reich on the question of 
Income Simple tax Tax burden in 
percentage
100,000 – 2,002 – 2.002
200,000 – 4,352 – 2.176
300,000 – 6,702 – 2.234
400,000 – 8,342 – 2.0855
550,000 – 9,882 – 1.7967
1,000,000 – 16,882 – 1.6882
2,000,000 – 33,382 – 1.6691
table 9.2 Provided tax burdens on income by the tax law of 
the Canton of Obwalden (cont.)
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the constitutionality of the Obwalden income and wealth tax tariff of 18 
April 2006 submitted by the cantonal Government […]. The reference to 
the regressive tariff design merely compensating for the progression of 
the direct federal tax does not justify its unconstitutionality, especially as 
the cantonal tax must also comply with the principle of efficiency.
The contested income tax tariff therefore violates the principle of taxa-
tion according to economic capacity (Art. 127 para. 2 FedCst.) as well as the 
general principle of equality (Art. 8 para. 1 FedCst.) insofar as it provides 
for a lower average tax rate for higher incomes than for lower incomes.54
5.2 Tax Amnesty in the Canton of Ticino
5.2.1 The Factual Basis of the Case
On 25 November 2013, the Grand Council of the Canton of Ticino (Parliament) 
decided to introduce the following provisions into the transitional provisions 
of the Ticino tax law of 21 June 1994:
Art. 309e (new) Reduced rates in the case of self- disclosure without 
penalty
 1 The rates applied to the recovery of uncollected tax in accordance with 
Article 236(1) in respect of exempt self- declarations submitted from 1 
January of entry into force to 31 December of the year following entry 
into force shall be reduced by 70 per cent. On the elements already 
taxed, the reduction is applied to the increase in the marginal rate.
 2 The reduction in rates shall be applied when the conditions of Article 
258(3) (self- disclosure without penalty) are fulfilled.
 3 Reduced rates are not allowed for the creation of untaxed hidden 
reserves.
 4 The reduction in the rates referred to in paragraph 1 shall be permitted 
only in respect of deducted items which have not been declared to the 
tax authority by 31 December of the year preceding their entry into force.
Art. 314e (new) Reduced rates for self- disclosure without penalty.
 1 The rates applied to the recovery of uncollected tax pursuant to 
Article 236 (1), in respect of exempt self- declarations submitted from 
1 January of the entry into force to 31 December of the year following 
the entry into force, shall be reduced by 70 per cent.
 2 The reduced rates are only applicable if the conditions of Article 265a 
(1) (self- disclosure without penalty) are met.
 54 bge 133 i 206, E. 9.3 (translation by the author of this chapter, emphasis added); see 






 3 Reduced rates are not permitted in connection with the creation of 
untaxed hidden reserves.
 4 The reduction in the rates referred to in paragraph 1 shall be permit-
ted only in respect of stolen items which have not been declared to 
the tax authority by 31 December of the year preceding their entry 
into force.
The new law, which concerns natural persons (art. 309e lt) and legal persons 
(art. 314e lt), was published in the Cantonal Official Gazette on 29 November 
2013 with an indication of the deadline for exercising the right of referendum. 
Accepted by the people of Ticino, after a successful referendum had been 
launched against it, the law was then published in the Official Bulletin of the 
laws and executive acts of the Canton of Ticino of 4 July 2014.
The plaintiffs addressed the Federal Supreme Court with regards to the new 
law, doing so for two separate reasons:
On the one hand, they claimed the violation of the principle of the primacy 
of federal law (Art. 49 FedCst.), questioning the compatibility of the contested 
provisions with those of the relevant federal law on tax harmonisation that 
was voted on by the Federal Assembly on 20 March 2008. They also challenged 
the exercise of powers by the Ticino legislature with regard to tariffs and tax 
rates (Art. 129 para. 2 FedCst.).
On the other hand, they claimed that the rules had an unlawful retroactive 
effect (Art. 5 para. 1 FedCst.) and that they were contrary to both the principle 
of legal equality (Art. 8 para. 1 FedCst.) and the principles of universality, uni-
formity and taxation according to economic capacity (Art. 127 para. 2 FedCst.), 
without there being sufficient grounds to justify such violations.
5.2.2 The Reasoning of the Court
With respect to the first argument invoked by the plaintiffs, the court shared 
their opinion that the cantonal law was inconsistent with the Federal law on 
Tax harmonisation and thus violated Art. 49 FedCst.
What is more interesting in the present context is the court’s opinion on 
the second argument. The court found, in line with the plaintiffs’ claims, that 
the cantonal law was also inconsistent with the general principles of tax law 
discussed above and that these are applicable not only to federal taxes but also 
to cantonal tax law. The judges dealt first with the meaning of these principles:
 9.1 […] In the field of taxation, Art. 8 para. 1 of the Federal Constitution 
is implemented by the principles of universality and uniformity of 
taxation and by the principle of taxation according to economic 
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power (Art. 127 para. 2 of the Federal Constitution […]. These are 
tax principles which were originally derived from Article 4 of the 
Federal Constitution of 29 May 1874 and were then expressly incor-
porated into the Federal Constitution approved by the Swiss people 
and the cantons on 18 April 1999 […].
 9.2 The principle of general taxation requires that all persons and 
groups of persons be taxed in accordance with the same legal provi-
sion. It prohibits the exemption of certain persons or groups of per-
sons from tax liability without objective reasons, since the financial 
burden on the Community of public tasks of a general nature must 
be borne by all citizens […].
   The principles of uniformity of taxation and of taxation according 
to economic strength require taxpayers in the same economic situ-
ation to bear a similar tax burden according to their ability to pay; 
in different circumstances, the tax burden must also take this into 
account. At the same time, the tax burden must be proportionate 
to the economic substrate available to the individual who, taking 
into account their personal situation and in proportion to their 
resources, has to contribute to covering public expenditure […]
 9.3 Art. 127 FedCst. is not contained in the chapter on fundamen-
tal rights (Art. 7 et seq. FedCst.), but in the chapter on the fed-
eral financial system (Art. 126 et seq. FedCst.). This rule therefore 
applies primarily to taxes levied by the Confederation. As already 
mentioned, however, the taxation principles contained therein are 
conceived and serve to concretise the principle of equal treatment 
(Art. 8 FedCst.), which as such permeates the entire Swiss legal sys-
tem […]. The cantonal legislature is therefore also bound by these 
provisions and must take them into account when regulating its tax 
system […].55
The court, in a second step, applied these principles on the present case and 
concluded that the Ticino tax law was also inconsistent in this regard:
9.4 In the present case, Articles 309e and 314e of the Income Tax Act aim 
to reduce by 70 % the tax recovery rates for all exempt voluntary declara-
tions made during a period of two years following their entry into force. 
These are clear violations of Articles 8(1) and 127(2) of the Constitution.
 55 bge 141 i 78, Consid. 9.1- 9.3 (translation by the author of this chapter). 
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Articles 309e and 314e of the Income Tax Act exempt self- incriminating 
persons from paying 70 % of the taxes originally due and are therefore 
contrary to the principle of the generality of taxation, as they provide 
for a different and much more favourable treatment for those who have 
deducted taxes from the tax authorities than for those who, as taxpayers, 
do not belong to this category of persons.
At the same time, they are contrary to the principles of uniformity 
of taxation and taxation according to economic strength, according to 
which taxpayers in the same economic situation have to bear a simi-
lar tax burden depending on their ability to pay, and different circum-
stances have to be regarded differently from the point of view of the 
tax burden (previous consideration 9.2 with reference to case- law and 
doctrine).
Taxpayers who have correctly declared their taxable amounts and 
paid 100 % of the amount due are treated differently to taxpayers who 
have not declared anything in the same case and who only declare their 
amounts in their self- declaration. The rules in question lead not only to 
a very different treatment of taxpayers with exactly the same economic 
power (violation of the so- called horizontal tax justice), but also to an 
unjustified unequal treatment of taxpayers with different economic 
power (violation of the so- called vertical tax justice). As the applications 
for interim measures have repeatedly pointed out, the application of 
Articles 309e and 314e lt also has consequences in this respect and, in 
particular, it cannot be excluded that – in view of the reduction intro-
duced – taxpayers who have correctly declared their taxable amounts 
may have to pay even higher amounts compared to taxpayers who have 
failed to exist for higher taxable amounts and only do so when making 
their voluntary declaration.56
6 Strengthening the Weak: Finance and Burden Equalisation
6.1 Unequal Financial Strength and Unequal Burdens as a Starting 
Point
One of the downsides of the cantons’ financial autonomy is that the financially 
weak cantons have to offset their unequal economic starting conditions with 
higher taxes, which in turn reduces their attractiveness for companies and 
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private individuals. On the other hand, the financially strong cantons become 
even more attractive, which allows them to further reduce their taxes.
A second element that affects the financial (and thus the tax) starting posi-
tion of the different cantons is the unequal burdens that the different cantons 
have to bear:
These include, on the one hand, the geographical and topographical in-
equalities that lead to excessive burdens in certain cantons due to their loca-
tion. Regions with an excessive burden in this sense are characterised by an 
above- average proportion of mountainous areas, dispersed settlement struc-
tures and low population density.
On the other hand, a specific population structure of a canton or its central 
functions can have a particular impact. This refers in particular to the core  cities 
with large agglomerations (e.g. Zurich). These so- called sociodemographic spe-
cialties lead to disproportionate burdens for the affected cantons, while some 
other cantons benefit from their location in proximity to the affected cantons 
without carrying parts of the burden themselves (free- rider problem).
6.2 Equalisation Mechanisms as a Means to Counter Those Inequalities
This background led to the creation of Art. 135 FedCst. within the framework 
of the so- called New Financial Equalisation (nfa). The nfa formed an integral 
part of a very ambitious project to strengthen federalism and to unbundle tasks 
between the Confederation and the cantons.57 In its message to Parliament, 
the Federal Council described financial equalisation as follows:
Financial equalisation in the narrower sense between the cantons now 
distinguishes between equalisation of resources and equalisation of bur-
dens. This makes the balance more targeted and effective. The balance 
between the resource- rich and the resource- weak cantons will be extended 
compared to the current system. In addition to the resource- rich cantons, 
the Confederation is now also contributing to their financing. It ensures 
that all cantons have sufficient resources. The current system, which is 
opaque and complicated – and transparent for only a few specialists – will 
be replaced by a transparent and comprehensible financial equilibrium. 
The federal parliament will be given the opportunity to set the parame-
ters for equalisation of resources. This will make financial equalisation, 
 57 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 5; René Wiederkehr and 
August Mächler, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” in Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung, 
St. Galler Kommentar, eds. Bernhard Ehrenzeller et al. (Zurich, St. Gallen: Schulthess, 





which is intended to reduce differences in the financial performance of 
the cantons, politically controllable. The resource index, which measures 
the financial performance of the cantons, cannot be manipulated in its 
concept and, in contrast to the current financial strength index, delib-
erately refrains from taking burden elements into account. In future, for 
example, the cantonal tax burden will no longer be used as a criterion 
for measuring the financial performance of a canton, but will instead be 
limited to the tax or resource potential of a canton that can be exhausted 
from a fiscal point of view. In this way, misguided incentives and conflict-
ing objectives are to be avoided in future. The Confederation is to com-
pensate the cantons for excessive and uninfluenceable burdens arising 
from geographical and topographical conditions or their specific popula-
tion structure by means of a corresponding equalisation of burdens. This 
compensation will also be determined to its extent by the federal parlia-
ment and is therefore politically controllable.58
In 2004, vertical fiscal equalisation was put on a new constitutional basis, sup-
plemented by horizontal equalisation between the cantons. The constitutional 
provision reads as follows:
Art. 135 FedCst. Equalisation of financial resources and burdens
 1 The Confederation shall issue regulations on the equitable equalisa-
tion of financial resources and burdens between the Confederation 
and the Cantons as well as among the Cantons.
 2 The equalisation of financial resources and burdens is intended in 
particular to:
 a. reduce the differences in financial capacity among the Cantons;
 b. guarantee the Cantons a minimum level of financial resources;
 c. compensate for excessive financial burdens on individual 
Cantons due to geo- topographical or socio- demographic factors;
 d. encourage inter- cantonal cooperation on burden equalisation;
 e. maintain the tax competitiveness of the Cantons by national and 
international comparison.
 3 The funds for the equalisation of financial resources shall be pro-
vided by those Cantons with a higher level of resources and by the 
Confederation. The payments made by those Cantons with a higher 
 58 Message of the Federal Council, BBl 2002, 2294 et seq. (translation by the author of this 
chapter); see also Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal nos. 88 et seq.
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level of resources shall amount to a minimum of two thirds and a 
maximum of 80 per cent of the payments made by the Confederation.
6.3 The Provision (Regulating Equalisation Mechanisms) in Detail
6.3.1 Legislative Mandate (para. 1)
Art. 135 para. 1 FedCst. mandates the Confederation to issue regulations 
on appropriate financial resources and burden equalisation between the 
Confederation and the cantons and between the cantons. Financial equalisa-
tion (in a narrow sense) means ‘all financial transfers which serve the redis-
tribution of resources between the cantons and the equalisation of excessive 
structural burdens’;59 whereas financial equalisation in the broader sense 
also includes transfers between the Confederation and the cantons which are 
related to the distribution of tasks and revenues.60 The notion of load balanc-
ing was only introduced during parliamentary deliberations and is intended 
to distinguish the second branch of the financial equalisation mechanism, 
namely the equalisation of burdens, from the first branch of the financial 
equalisation mechanism, the equalisation of financial resources, a distinction 
which is also reflected in the terminology of the federal law on the financial 
and resource equalisation that resulted from the legislative mandate codified 
in Art. 135 para. 1 FedCst.61
A distinction must be made between vertical and horizontal financial equal-
isation. Transfer payments by the Confederation to the cantons are referred to 
as vertical equalisation, whereas those between the cantons fall under hori-
zontal equalisation.62 This is expressed in the wording of paragraph 1 ‘between 
the Confederation and the cantons’ or ‘between the cantons’. The legislative 
competence of the Confederation encompasses both forms.63 However, the 
constitutional provision does not affect intra- cantonal finance and burden 
sharing.64 Nevertheless, the federal state’s equalisation has not remained 
 59 Message of the Federal Council, BBl 2002 2543 (translation by the author of this chapter).
 60 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 7; Hänni, “Commentary 
on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 13.
 61 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 13.
 62 Jean- François Aubert, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” in Petit Commentaire de la 
Constitution fédérale de la Confédération suisse, eds. Jean- François Aubert and Pascal 
Mahon (Zurich, Basel, Geneva: Schulthess, 2003), marginal no. 4; Biaggini, Kommentar 
zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 8; Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” 
marginal no. 14; Wiederkehr and Mächler, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal 
no. 13.
 63 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 8.
 64 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 8; Hänni, “Commentary 
















without consequences for the inner- cantonal level.65 Indeed, the cantons 
have almost entirely reorganised their inner- cantonal equalisation systems 
between the communes at the same time as (or shortly after) the entry into 
force of the nfa.66 This development is worth mentioning, since the federal 
government must take into account the possible effects on the municipalities 
when carrying out its legislative mandate according to Art. 50 para. 2 of the 
Federal Constitution.67
Concerning the scope of the federal competence, Art. 135 para. 1 FedCst. 
obliges the Confederation to issue regulations on appropriate vertical and 
horizontal financial and burden balancing. The new constitutional provision 
drawn up within the framework of the nfa thus differs significantly from its 
predecessor, which only explicitly mentioned a federal power to promote hori-
zontal equalisation. With regard to vertical financial equalisation, the federal 
competence is exclusive; the cantons therefore would have no authority to 
oblige the Confederation to make transfer payments, even if the federal legisla-
ture failed to act. As far as horizontal financial equalisation is concerned, there 
is scope for cantonal regulations insofar as the implementing legislation of the 
Confederation does not contain conclusive provisions. However, the remain-
ing cantonal regulations are likely to be of a more theoretical nature, with can-
tonal regulations in the area of horizontal inter- cantonal burden sharing most 
likely to be considered.68
The addressee of the constitutional obligation to enact regulations is the 
Confederation; the cantons are not addressed.69 The constitutional provision 
does not prescribe any specific method for the legislator to achieve the objec-
tives of financial and burden equalisation.70 This means that the legislator has 
considerable room for manoeuvre. However, there can be no doubt that fiscal 
equalisation should (henceforth) be clearly distinguished from federal sub-
sidies.71 The constitutional text does not explicitly exclude this link, but the 
declarations of the different organs involved in the elaboration of the nfa are 
 65 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 8.
 66 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 14.
 67 See also: Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 8.
 68 For the whole paragraph see: Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 mar-
ginal no. 9; Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 15.
 69 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 10; Hänni, “Commentary 
on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 16.
 70 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 10; Hänni, “Commentary 
on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 16.
 71 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 10; Hänni, “Commentary 
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clear in this respect,72 as one of the main objectives of the entire nfa reform 
project is to decouple federal subsidies from fiscal equalisation. Federal legis-
lation has, moreover, been based on this implicit requirement, in that both the 
means for equalising resources and burdens are directed without any commit-
ment to a specific purpose.73
Substantive limits are set to the Confederation in the fulfilment of its leg-
islative mandate by the principle of proportionality: the equalisation of 
finances and burdens should be ‘appropriate’. This indeterminate legal con-
cept is intended to serve the legislature as a guideline for the implementation 
of the constitutional mandate: on the one hand, a merely symbolic legislation 
without recognisable and noticeable effects would not be compatible with the 
constitutional provision (lower minimum). On the other hand, the limits of 
solidarity must not be overstretched. What is needed are political decisions 
with a sense of proportion which, in particular, do not call into question the 
willingness of the resource- rich cantons to perform within the framework of 
horizontal financial equalisation. Further substantive provisions on the struc-
ture of financial equalisation and burden sharing are contained in paragraphs 
2 and 3 of Art. 135 of the Federal Constitution.74
The Confederation has fulfilled its legislative mandate by enacting the 
Federal Law on the Equalisation of Finances and Burdens (FiLaG). The funds 
to be made available by the Confederation and (resource- rich) cantons for the 
equalisation of resources are determined by the Federal Assembly in a federal 
decree requiring a referendum for a period of four years (Art. 5 para. 1 FiLaG). 
The same applies to the basic contribution for geographical- topographical 
and sociodemographic burden sharing (Art. 9 para. 1 FiLaG). In the inter-
est of transparency, both basic contributions are determined separately. 
Furthermore, the law expressly states that the funds are to be allocated to the 
cantons without earmarking.75 The gradation of the federal subsidies on the 
basis of the so- called financial strength index, which was practised in the for-
mer financial equalisation system, became obsolete with the implementation 
of the legislative mandate of Art. 135 para. 1 of the Federal Constitution;76 this 
also applies to the cantons’ shares of federal revenue and of the Swiss National 
 72 Message of the Federal Council, BBl 2002 2291 et seq.
 73 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 16.
 74 For this paragraph, see: Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal 
no. 11; Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 17.
 75 Art. 6 para. 2 FiLaG and Art. 9 para. 4 FiLaG.












Bank’s profits. In a broader sense, the latter two federal transfers nevertheless 
have a certain compensatory effect.77
6.3.2 Objectives (para. 2)
Paragraph 2 lists five objectives of financial and burden equalisation, which 
have the effect of limiting the scope of the legislator.78 In fact, it is hardly con-
ceivable that the legislator could strive for further targets in addition to these 
relatively broad objectives, although the constitutional text would suggest this 
possibility by using the addition ‘in particular’.79
Letter a deals with the first aim of financial and burden sharing, which is to 
reduce the differences in financial performance between the cantons. The aim 
is to reduce differences, but not to achieve full equality.80 When determining 
financial performance, the so- called resource potential is the decisive crite-
rion.81 Resource potential is to be understood as the value of the resources of 
the canton concerned that can be exhausted from a fiscal point of view and 
not the actual tax revenues or the tax burdens.82 The concrete determination 
of the resource potential is based on the taxable income and assets of natu-
ral persons and the taxable profits of legal entities.83 The resource potential 
is determined annually by the Federal Council together with the cantons for 
each canton per capita of its inhabitants; the figures for the last three available 
years are decisive (Art. 3 para. 4 FiLaG). Art. 3 para. 5 FiLaG stipulates that 
cantons whose resource potential per capita is above the Swiss average (=100) 
are considered to have a strong resource base, while cantons whose potential 
per capita is below the average are considered to have a weak resource base.
These seemingly very technical regulations for the calculation of resource 
potentials have a significant influence on the question of the financing of 
 77 For this paragraph, see: Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal 
no. 12; Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 18.
 78 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 19.
 79 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 20.
 80 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 14; Hänni, “Commentary 
on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 20; Wiederkehr and Mächler, “Commentary on Art. 135 
FedCst.,” marginal no. 22.
 81 Art. 3 et seq. FiLaG; see also: Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal 
no. 14; Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 20.
 82 Art. 3 para. 1 FiLaG; see also: Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal 
no. 14; Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 20.
 83 Art. 3 et seq. FiLaG; Art. 1 FiLaV; see also: Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 
135 marginal no. 14; Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 20; Wiederkehr 
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resource compensation and on the determination of the recipient can-
tons: Art. 135 para. 3 FedCst. makes it clear that resource- rich cantons and the 
Confederation must provide the resources for resource compensation in favour 
of resource- weak cantons.84 As explained above, the amount to be spent on 
resource equalisation is determined every four years by the Federal Assembly 
in a federal decree subject to mandatory referendum.
Letter b provides a further aim of financial and burden sharing i.e. to guar-
antee the cantons’ minimum financial resources.85 This is intended to enable 
the cantons to fulfil their tasks independently and at the same time to have 
a certain degree of freedom of choice.86 Autonomy and personal responsi-
bility become empty promises when a canton has to continuously fight for 
financial survival for structural reasons, without any prospect of improve-
ment.87 The open concept of ‘minimal financial resources’ must be concre-
tised by the legislator and is closely related to letter a, where the reduction 
of differences in financial performance is addressed. Even the weakest can-
tons should have at their disposal a minimum of financial resources through 
resource equalisation.88 The Federal Assembly has set this lower minimum 
at 85 % of the Swiss average in financial resources (Art. 6 para. 3 FiLaG). 
This requirement is met if the canton’s own relevant resources, together with 
the services it receives from the resource equalisation scheme, reach the 
desired minimum.89 At the same time, the equalisation of resources may not 
change the ranking of the cantons, which means that there is also an (indi-
rect) upper limit of equalisation of resources.90 The distribution of resources 
among the resource- weak cantons is carried out by the Federal Council and 
is redefined annually, with the particularly resource- weak cantons receiving 
 84 Art. 4 para. 1 FiLaG and Art. 6 para. 1 FiLaG; see also: Biaggini, Kommentar zur 
Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 14; Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” mar-
ginal no. 21.
 85 The entire system was recently evaluated and is currently being revised based on experi-
ence gained. The aim of the planned adjustment is to relieve the financial burden on the 
strong cantons, but the total amount of funds invested in financial equalisation should 
remain the same. See: https:// www.efv.admin.ch/ efv/ de/ home/ aktuell/ nsb- news_ list.
msg- id- 72354.html, last updated on 28 september 2018, accessed on 20 november 2018.
 86 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 22.
 87 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 22.
 88 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 15; Hänni, “Commentary 
on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 22.
 89 Art. 6 para. 3 FiLaG; see also: Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 22.
 90 Art. 6 para. 1 sentence 3 FiLaG; see also: Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 
















above- average benefits in the sense of the objective set out in Art. 135 para. 2 
lit. b FedCst.
The so- called geographic- topographic and sociodemographic burden shar-
ing is provided in letter c. Indeed, in addition to resource equalisation and 
strictly separate from it, the nfa reform project created a second equalisation 
vessel aimed at granting cantons compensation payments for excessive bur-
dens. This second instrument of financial equalisation consists of a burden 
sharing scheme financed by the Confederation.91 The compensation is not 
complete, but only partial and does take into account special burdens, most of 
which however cannot be changed.92
On the one hand, cantons under Art. 7 FiLaG are entitled to burden sharing 
if they are overburdened by their geographical and topographical situation. 
Indications for such excessive burdens are, in particular, an above- average 
proportion of high- lying settlement and productive areas as well as disperse 
settlement structures and a low population density (Art. 7 para. 2 FiLaG). The 
excessive burden results from the altitude (e.g. higher costs for winter road 
clearance, maintenance costs for infrastructure, etc.), from burdens resulting 
from the steepness of the terrain (forest management, avalanche barriers, etc.), 
and from the sparsity of the population (e.g. compulsory schooling, sewage 
supply, health care).93 The special burdens of these three categories can be 
measured by sub- indicators such as the median altitude of the productive area, 
the proportion of inhabitants with a residential altitude of over 800 metres 
above sea level or the proportion of inhabitants in settlements with less than 
200 inhabitants, which can be used to make plausible statements about the 
extent of these special burdens.94
On the other hand, cantons that are exposed to particular burdens due 
to socio- demographic conditions are entitled to burden sharing.95 These 
sociodemographic burdens are special burdens that can be traced back to 
the population structure of a canton or to the importance of a certain can-
ton due to its function as a socio- economic and infrastructural centre.96 
 91 Art. 7 et seq. FiLaG; see also: Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 23; 
Wiederkehr and Mächler, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 25.
 92 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 16; Hänni, “Commentary 
on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 23.
 93 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 24.
 94 Art. 29 et seq. FiLaV (the FiLaV being the decree concretising certain provisions of the 
FiLaG).
 95 Art. 7 et seq. FiLaG.
 96 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 16; Hänni, “Commentary 
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Such a situation, for which the abbreviation A- city problem is often used, 
is characterised by the fact that the core cities typically have an above- 
average proportion of older and poor people, single people, single parents, 
dependent people, trainees, unemployed people, outsiders and foreigners 
in their population structure.97 What these A- groups have in common is 
that they cause relatively high burdens while at the same time generating 
little tax revenue. Not to be equated with sociodemographic burdens are 
the external effects associated with centre services, so- called spillovers.98 
In this context, spillovers are negative effects that occur when services pro-
vided by a canton or a city can also be claimed by residents of other local 
authorities without the latter being (financially) responsible for the ser-
vices consumed (by their residents).99 Centre services with spillover effects 
can be found, for example, in the areas of transport, health and culture. 
Such centre services are to be compensated by the inter- cantonal equalisa-
tion of burdens.100
As in the case of equalisation of resources, the Federal Assembly, in a federal 
decree subject to a referendum, determines a basic contribution for each of 
the four years for geographical- topographic and sociodemographic equalisa-
tion of burdens (Art. 9 para. 1 FiLaG). It is also obliged to take into account 
the results of the effectiveness report pursuant to Art. 18 FiLaG. The funds 
allocated to the cantons under this heading are not earmarked (Art. 9 para. 4 
FiLaG). Unlike resource equalisation, burden equalisation is financed entirely 
by the Confederation.101
A further objective of financial and burden sharing is to use inter- cantonal 
burden sharing to compensate for services received by residents of one can-
ton in another canton without paying the full cost (letter d). This provision 
is intended to prevent spillover effects and free- riding behaviour.102 It should 
lead to public services being provided to an optimum extent and to a fair dis-
tribution of burdens based on actual usufruct.103 Closely linked to the first 
 97 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 16; Hänni, “Commentary 
on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 25.
 98 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 25.
 99 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 25; Wiederkehr and Mächler, 
“Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 11.
 100 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 25; Wiederkehr and Mächler, 
“Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 11.
 101 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 16.
 102 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 27.
















objective is the intended improvement of efficiency due to the exploitation of 
economies of scale.104 In this way, a significant advantage of an area reform is 
exploited without having to accept its disadvantages. In addition, intensified 
inter- cantonal cooperation should have a preventive effect against excessive 
centralisation.105 Indeed, cross- cantonal tasks can be performed in a mean-
ingful way without being transferred to the federal level. A typical example is 
the financial compensation of so- called ‘centre services’ (e.g. in the areas of 
transport, health and culture).106
The classic instrument for achieving these objectives is the inter- cantonal 
treaty (Art. 48 FedCst.).107 The federal government’s financial resource and bur-
den equalisation must be structured and the legislative competence according 
to para. 1 exercised in such a way that inter- cantonal cooperation is promoted 
with regards to burden equalisation.108 Art. 135 FedCst. does not comment on 
the instruments. At the legislative level, the Confederation obliges the cantons 
to draw up an inter- cantonal framework agreement in which the principles 
and certain modalities of inter- cantonal cooperation are laid down (Art. 13 
FiLaG). This inter- cantonal framework agreement will then form the basis for 
the negotiation of specific cooperation agreements, which will thus be notice-
ably facilitated.109 Such a framework agreement was drawn up under the aus-
pices of the Conference of Cantonal Governments.110 Art. 48a of the Federal 
Constitution then provides for instruments which, under certain conditions, 
make it possible to force unwilling cantons to cooperate horizontally in cer-
tain areas of responsibility.111 These instruments go well beyond the promotion 
objective enshrined in Art. 135 para. 2 lit. d of the Federal Constitution but are 
 104 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 27.
 105 Message of the Federal Council, BBl 2002 2352; Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” 
marginal no. 27.
 106 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 17; Hänni, “Commentary 
on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 27.
 107 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 17.
 108 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 17; Hänni, “Commentary 
on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 28.
 109 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 17; Hänni, “Commentary 
on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 28.
 110 See for more information and a link to the framework agreement: https:// kdk.ch/ de/ 
themen/ nfa- und- interkantonale- zusammenarbeit/ interkantonale- zusammenarbeit- mit- 
lastenausgleich/ , accessed on 29 November 2018.
 111 See also Art. 10 FiLaG, which explicitly refers to Art. 48a FedCst; Biaggini, Kommentar zur 
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likely to be covered by Art. 48a of the Federal Constitution as a constitutional 
basis.112
The fifth and last of the objectives explicitly mentioned in Article 135 para. 
2 of the Federal Constitution (lit. e) is intended to ensure that the balancing 
of financial resources and burdens preserves the tax competitiveness of the 
cantons in national and international relations. While the first four objec-
tives have been given clearer contours by the legislator in the FiLaG, specific 
provisions on tax competitiveness have been sought in vain.113 On the one 
hand, it could be argued that the tax competitiveness of the resource- weak 
cantons is supported and promoted by the equalisation of resources.114 On 
the other hand, the target could be seen as an unspecified limit to financial 
and burden equalisation that would allow resource- rich cantons to (con-
tinue to) pursue a low tax policy.115 At the same time, the goal is that finan-
cial resources and burden sharing would not prevent resource- weak cantons 
from participating in inter- cantonal and international tax competition.116 
The provision, which only found its way into the constitution in the debates 
of the Councils (i.e. the National Council and the Council of the Cantons),117 
also has a referendum- political dimension in that there are fears that finan-
cial and burden balancing could ultimately lead to (undesirable) material tax 
harmonisation.118
6.3.3 Financing the Equalisation of Resources (para. 3)
The financing of the equalisation of resources is regulated in para. 3. The 
political significance of this issue justifies standardisation at constitutional 
level.119 In contrast, the financing of burden sharing, which is borne solely 
 112 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 17; Hänni, “Commentary 
on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 28; Wiederkehr and Mächler, “Commentary on Art. 135 
FedCst.,” marginal no. 26.
 113 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 18.
 114 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 29.
 115 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 29; Wiederkehr and Mächler, 
“Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 28.
 116 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 29; Wiederkehr and Mächler, 
“Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 28.
 117 Wiederkehr and Mächler, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 28.
 118 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 18; Hänni, “Commentary 
on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 29.
 119 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 20; Hänni, “Commentary 



















by the Confederation, appears less sensitive, which is why it is only regu-
lated at the legislative level.120 Paragraph 3 anchors the principle that the 
federal government and the resource- rich cantons are responsible for equal-
ising resources (vertical and horizontal equalisation).121 The share to be paid 
by the resource- rich cantons depends on the funds made available by the 
Confederation. In this respect, the constitutional legislator has set a lower 
minimum (two- thirds of the federal contribution) and an upper maximum 
(80 % of the federal contribution) for the cantonal share.122 Since these lim-
its do not yet say anything about the absolute amount of the funds made 
available by the Confederation, the protection of the resource- rich cantons 
is also provided by para. 1 (‘appropriate’ financial and burden equalisation) 
on the one hand and by lit. b of para. 2, according to which the financial 
equalisation in favour of the resource- weak cantons should only lead to a 
minimum endowment, on the other hand.123 Should the resource- rich can-
tons be overused by the federal legislature despite these protection mecha-
nisms, they would have to defend themselves against this ‘exploitation’ using 
political means.124
6.3.4 Compensation for Hardship
The transition to the nfa brought about considerable changes in finan-
cial flows both between the Confederation and the cantons and between 
the cantons. As a result of these changes, some resource- weak cantons, 
which benefited from the former equalisation system, now receive less 
financial compensation. For some of these cantons, the losses represented 
a major burden, especially since their income and expenditure structures 
had adapted strongly to the then existing equalisation system in recent 
decades.125
Without being obliged to do so by Article 135 of the Federal 
Constitution, the Federal legislator decided to give the cantons time to 
adapt their public finance structure to the nfa by means of a hardship 
 120 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 20; Hänni, “Commentary 
on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 30.
 121 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 21.
 122 Art. 135 para. 3 sentence 2 FedCst.
 123 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 21; Hänni, “Commentary 
on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 30.
 124 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 30.
 125 For the whole paragraph, see: Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 31; 
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adjustment.126 Article 19 of the FiLaG thus provides for a temporary hardship 
adjustment, the contributions of which are intended to cushion the transi-
tion from the old to the new system. Pursuant to Article 19 para. 3 FiLaG, the 
Federal Assembly shall determine the initial amount of the hardship adjust-
ment in a federal decree requiring a referendum. According to the 2004/ 
05 global balance sheet, chf 430 million per year must be made available 
for the hardship adjustment. Two- thirds of the hardship compensation is 
financed by the Confederation and one third by the cantons (Art. 19 para. 2 
FiLaG). The hardship compensation is conceived as a temporary transitional 
aid and is therefore not an integral part of the new compensation system.127 
It therefore also breaks through the limitations of budget neutrality in the 
transition to the nfa,128 the former creating a close link between the unbun-
dling of tasks, the abolition of the previous financial equalisation and the 
new equalisation system.129
The total annual volume of the hardship adjustment is definitively deter-
mined in a federal decree and stays in place for eight years.130 Thereafter, 
this amount is reduced annually by 5 % of the initial amount. The basis for 
determining the initial amount is the 2004/ 05 global balance sheet. Every 
four years, the Federal Assembly can decide, on the basis of the effectiveness 
report, whether the hardship adjustment should be abolished in whole or in 
part. Contributions within the framework of the hardship adjustment are paid 
for a maximum of 28 years.131
7 Rules and Methods for Equalisation of Financial Resources – The 
Mechanism of Implementation
The technical implementation, which was decided by the Confederation 
together with the cantons, has been agreed on as a multi- stage procedure. 
 126 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 19; Hänni, “Commentary 
on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 32; Wiederkehr and Mächler, “Commentary on Art. 135 
FedCst.,” marginal no. 12.
 127 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 32; Wiederkehr and Mächler, 
“Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 12.
 128 Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 19.
 129 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 32.
 130 Hänni, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 33.
 131 Wiederkehr and Mächler, “Commentary on Art. 135 FedCst.,” marginal no. 12; for the 
whole paragraph see: Biaggini, Kommentar zur Bundesverfassung, Art. 135 marginal no. 19; 















Firstly, the taxable income of individual taxpayers in the cantons must be 
determined. In a second step, income from taxpayers’ taxable assets in the 
cantons is added. In a third step, the taxable profits of companies are included, 
as shown in Figure 9.3.
This data can then be used to determine the standardised tax revenue per 
capita in each canton. On this basis, the cantonal average and 85 % of this 
average can be determined.
The fifth and final step ensures that all cantons reach at least 85 % (guaran-
teed minimum financing) of the cantonal average through resource equalisa-
tion, as shown in Figure 9.4.
The graph shows that resources are allocated from the resource- rich can-
tons to the resource- weak cantons so that after the equalisation, all the can-
tons dispose of at least 85 % of the Swiss average in resources.
The final practical results of the vertical and horizontal flows of resources 
and burden equalisation is as shown in Figure 9.5 (in million chf).
 figure 9.3  Different elements of the resource potential of the cantons in 2019
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Figure 9.6 shows the equalisation for 2019.
This graph shows that in the richest cantons, each taxpayer contributes 
(an average of) 2,727 chf of his taxes to resource- weak cantons whereas in 
resource- weak cantons, taxpayers each receive (an average of) 2,288 chf com-
ing from the equalisation mechanism.
 figure 9.4  Standardised tax revenue and cantonal average in 2020





The Swiss Tax System is an illustration of the tension that exists between diver-
sity and equality in a federal State. The Federal Constitution grants the can-
tons (and indirectly the communes) considerable autonomy in levying direct 
taxes on the income and assets of natural and legal persons. Autonomy leads to 
significant differences in the tax burden, depending on the canton. These dif-
ferences are first of all mitigated by the vertical and horizontal financial com-
pensation attributed according to the equalisation mechanism. Furthermore, 
the formal tax harmonisation makes the various cantonal tax systems at least 
comparable. It has to be mentioned that to date, all proposals for material 
tax harmonisation132 have been rejected.133 Finally, individual taxpayers are 
 figure 9.5  Schema of the final result of the Swiss financial resources and burden 
equalisation 2019
  source: federal finance administration
 132 Material tax harmonisation as in the substance of tax law being harmonised, not only 
formal, procedural elements of it.
 133 The most recent propositions being the federal initiative ‘Steuergerechtigkeits- Initiative’, 
rejected by the Swiss voters (see BBl 2011 2772) and the parliamentary motion 15.3113 intro-
duced by Barbara Gysi, member of the Swiss National Council (one of the chambers of 

































































protected against arbitrary discrimination due to differences in tax burdens by 
certain constitutional, legally enforceable minimal guarantees, which consti-
tute the concretisation of the general right to equal treatment.
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 chapter 10
Principle of Equality and Social Care Policies in the 
Italian Regional System between Autonomy and 
Centralisation
Giulia Maria Napolitano and Gabriella Saputelli
1 Introduction1
Since the Constitution of 1947, Italy has been a regional system with fifteen 
ordinary Regions, five special Regions (enjoying ‘special forms and conditions 
of autonomy’) and two autonomous Provinces (Trent and Bolzano) that were 
guaranteed legislative and administrative powers defined in the Constitution. 
The implementation and the evolution of Italian regionalism over the years 
have been strictly linked to the main political events of the Republic, which 
sometimes brought ‘formal’ revision of the Constitution (i.e. the constitutional 
reform of 2001) and in most cases ‘substantially’ affected the regional powers 
or the relationship between State and Regions.2
This chapter aims to analyse the extent to which the principle of equality 
is respected and implemented in social care policies in the Italian regional 
system, deepening the tensions between autonomy and centralisation aris-
ing from the relationships between State and Regions. The principle of 
equality is a fundamental principle of the Italian legal system, established 
in Article 3 of the Italian Constitution with formal (para. 1) and substan-
tive (para. 2) meaning: ‘All citizens shall have equal social dignity and shall 
be equal before the law, without distinction of gender, race, language, reli-
gion, political opinion, personal and social conditions. It shall be the duty 
of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an economic or social nature 
which constrain the freedom and equality of citizens, thereby impeding the 
 1 This chapter was produced in close cooperation of the two authors. As regards the drafting 
of the text, however, Dr. Napolitano edited para. 1 and 4 while Dr. Saputelli edited para. 2, 3, 
5 and 6.
 2 For a description of the Italian regional system and its evolution, see Stelio Mangiameli, ed., 
Italian Regionalism: Between Unitary Traditions and Federal Processes, Investigating Italy’s 
Form of State (Heidelberg, Cham: Springer, 2014); Antonio D’Atena, “Regionalism in Italy,” 
Italian Papers on Federalism, no. 1 (2013): 1.
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full development of the human person and the effective participation of 
all workers in the political, economic and social organisation of the coun-
try.’3 According to this second paragraph, the Republic (which means all 
Institutions) has the responsibility to do whatever is necessary to fulfil the 
principle of equality.
Article 38 of the Constitution establishes that ‘Every citizen unable to work 
and without the necessary means of subsistence shall be entitled to welfare 
support. Workers shall be entitled to adequate means for their living require-
ments in case of accidents, illness, disability, old age and involuntary unem-
ployment. Physically and mentally disabled persons shall be entitled to edu-
cation and vocational training. Responsibilities under this Article shall be 
entrusted to entities and institutions established or supported by the State. 
Private- sector assistance may be freely provided.’4
These provisions are the core of the welfare state, which has been affirmed 
in Europe and includes several services and benefits: pensions, healthcare, 
education, social care, etc.
 3 On art. 3 of the Constitution see Carlo Esposito, “Eguaglianza e giustizia nell’art. 3 della 
Costituzione,” in La Costituzione italiana, Saggi, ed. Carlo Esposito (Padova: Cedam, 1954), 
17 et seq; Livio Paladin, Il principio costituzionale di eguaglianza (Milano: Giuffré, 1965); 
Alessandro Pizzorusso, Che cos’è l’eguaglianza (Roma: Editori riuniti, 1983); Claudio Rossano, 
Il principio d’eguaglianza nell’ordinamento costituzionale (Milano: Giuffré, 1966); Augusto 
Cerri, “Uguaglianza (principio costituzionale di),” in Enciclopedia Giuridica Treccani, XIV, eds. 
Pasquale Stanislao Mancini and Errico Pessina (Milano: società editrice libraria, 2005), 1– 13; 
Beniamino Caravita, Oltre l’eguaglianza formale, Un’analisi del’art. 3 comma 2 della Costituzione 
(Padova: Cedam, 1984); Norberto Bobbio, Eguaglianza e libertà (Torino: Giappichelli, 1995); 
Paolo Biscaretti di Ruffia, “Uguaglianza (principio di),” in Novissimo Digesto Italiano, XIX 
(Torino: Utet, 1973); Antonio Stefano Agrò, “Art. 3,” in Commentario della Costituzione, ed. 
Giuseppe Branca (Bologna, Roma: Zanichelli, 1975), 123 et seq; AaVv., Corte costituzionale e 
principio di eguaglianza, Atti del Convegno in ricordo di Livio Paladin (Padova: Cedam, 2002); 
Alfonso Celotto, “Art. 3, 1° comma,” in Commentario alla Costituzione, eds. Raffaele Bifulco, 
Alfonso Celotto and Marco Olivetti (Milano: Utet giuridica, 2006), 65 et seq; Andrea Giorgis, 
“Art. 3, 2° comma,” in Commentario alla Costituzione, eds. Raffaele Bifulco, Alfonso Celotto 
and Marco Olivetti (Milano; Utet giuridica, 2006), 88 et seq.
 4 On art. 38 of the Constitution see Lorenza Violini, “Art. 38,” in Commentario alla Costituzione, 
eds. Raffaele Bifulco, Alfonso Celotto, Marco Olivetti (Milano: Utet giuridica, 2006), 775 et 
seq; Ugo M. Colombo, Principi e ordinamento dell’assistenza sociale (Milano: Giuffré, 1959); 
Guido Corso, “I diritti sociali nella Costituzione italiana,” Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto 
Pubblico (1981), 755 et seq; Roberto Gianolio, Luciano Guerzoni and G. Paolo Storchi, eds., 
Assistenza e beneficenza tra pubblico e privato (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1980); Mattia Persiani, 
“Art. 38,” in Commentario della Costituzione, ed. Giuseppe Branca (Bologna, Roma: Zanichelli, 
1979), 232 et seq; Raffaello Maggian, Il sistema integrato dell’assistenza (Roma: Carocci, 2003); 
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Social care policy is one of the most discussed competences or subject mat-
ters when speaking of the fulfilment of the principle of equality and it is also 
emblematic of the tension between autonomy and centralisation which occurs 
in a regional system in the relationships between the State and the Regions.5
In the expression ‘social services’ are usually included ‘all the activities relat-
ing to the provision and delivery of free and paid services and all monetary 
benefits to remove and supersede states of need and difficulty which people 
may encounter in the course of their lives, excluding only those provided 
by the pension and health care systems, and those guaranteed through the 
administration of justice’.6
2 The Constitutional Framework of Social Care Policy after the 
Constitutional Reform of 2001
The constitutional reform of 2001 gave the Regions residual legislative powers 
on social care,7 while acknowledging that the State has the exclusive compe-
tence to ‘determine the basic levels of care relating to civil and social entitle-
ments to be guaranteed throughout the national territory’.8 Therefore, since 
2001, the Regions have become the first planning tier and the State is respon-
sible for ensuring essential service levels and benefits in civil and social rights, 
delivered all over the country according to uniform standards.9
The constitutional reform was designed to introduce a high degree of 
regional autonomy into the Constitution and identified the essential levels of 
care10 as the elements that could maintain unity and homogeneity (equality) 
 5 In the Italian system health care and education are shared competences (art. 117 para. 3 of 
the Constitution) while the pension system is an exclusive competence of the State (art. 
117 para. 2 letter o of the Constitution).
 6 Legislative Decree no. 112 of 1998, art. 128 para. 2.
 7 Art. 117 para. 4 of the Constitution.
 8 Art. 117 para. 2 letter m of the Constitution. For the constitutional reform and implica-
tions of the new division of competences see Stelio Mangiameli, La riforma del regio-
nalismo italiano (Torino: Giappichelli, 2002), 107– 152; Antonio D’Atena, Diritto regionale 
(Torino: Giappichelli, 2017), 137– 180.
 9 On the Italian welfare system in an historical and sociological perspective see Yuri 
Kazepov, ed., La dimensione territoriale delle politiche sociali in Italia (Roma: Carocci, 
2014); Cristiano Gori et al., Il welfare sociale in Italia, Realtà e prospettive (Roma: Carocci, 
2015); Ilaria Madama, Le politiche di assistenza sociale (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010).
 10 On this concept see Enzo Balboni, “I livelli essenziali e i procedimenti per la loro determi-
nazione,” Le Regioni, no. 6 (2013): 1183– 1199; Enzo Balboni, “Coesione sociale e livelli essen-
ziali delle prestazioni: due paradigmi paralleli della tutela multilivello dei diritti sociali,” 
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throughout the whole of the national territory.11 These levels constitute an 
inviolable set of core services which must be guaranteed by the Regions by 
complying with standards defined as ‘essential’,12 and are protected by the 
Constitution by giving the State exclusive control over this subject- matter: the 
Regions do not have the power to reduce these levels and, if anything, they may 
only extend them.13
Closely related to the loss of planning powers, the State has lost the right to 
place allocation constraints on funding, which, however, continue to take the 
form of transfers from the centre to the periphery. Welfare, in fact, has hitherto 
been funded by a variety of different national, regional and local funds, some-
times with a part of the cost being charged to the beneficiaries in the form of 
co- payment.14 The main source of funding is the National Social Policies Fund, 
first introduced in 1997 and modified over time. Where the reform of Title v 
Panzera, “I livelli essenziali delle prestazioni concernenti i diritti sociali,” in Diritto costitu-
zionale e diritto amministrativo: un confronto giurisprudenziale, eds. Giuseppe Campanelli, 
Michele Carducci, Nicola Grasso and Vincenzo Tondi della Mura (Torino: Giappichelli, 
2010), 57– 105; Michele Belletti, “I livelli essenziali delle prestazioni concernenti i diritti 
civili e sociali alla prova della giurisprudenza costituzionale, Alla ricerca del parametro 
plausibile,” Le istituzioni del federalismo, no. 3– 4 (2003): 613– 646; Giovanni Guiglia, I livel li 
essenziali delle prestazioni sociali alla luce della recente giurisprudenza costituzionale e 
dell’evoluzione interpretativa (Padova: Cedam, 2007); Anna Banchero, “I livelli essenziali 
delle prestazioni nell’ambito dei servizi alla persona: dalla tutela della salute alla pro-
tezione sociale,” Quaderni regionali, no. 2 (2008): 461– 483; Lara Trucco, “Livelli essenziali 
delle prestazioni e sostenibilità finanziaria dei diritti sociali,” Gruppo di Pisa, Rivista, 
no. 3 (2012): 1– 92, https:// www.gruppodipisa.it/ images/ rivista/ pdf/ Lara_ Trucco_ - _ Livelli_ 
essenziali_ delle_ prestazioni_ e_ sostenibilita_ finanziaria_ dei_ diritti_ sociali.pdf; Cristiano 
Gori, “I livelli essenziali di assistenza,” in La riforma dei servizi sociali in Italia, L’attuazione 
della legge 328 e le sfide future, ed. Cristiano Gori (Roma: Carocci, 2002), 55 et seq.
 11 According to Luisa Torchia, “Premessa,” in Welfare e federalismo (Bologna: Il Mulino, 
2005), 15, in the Italian system the clause concerning essential levels of care could be 
the keystone of the relationship between welfare and federalism, and serve as a basis for 
the construction of a unitary system in which responsibilities between different levels of 
government are consistently distributed.
 12 Enzo Balboni, “Il concetto di ‘livelli essenziali e uniformi’ come garanzia in materia di 
diritti sociali,” Le istituzioni del federalismo, no 6 (2001): 1103 et seq.
 13 Judgements no. 10 and 207 of 2010; no. 200 and no. 322 of 2009; no. 387 of 2007; no. 248 
of 2006.
 14 The Constitutional Court (in Judgement no. 423 of 2004, point 4.2.) indicated the major 
novelties introduced by Act no. 328 ‘setting forth a general rule according to which the 
implementation of an integrated system of welfare services is provided for from a variety 
of different funding sources to which the Central Government, the Regions and the Local 
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redefined the procedures for financing the Regions,15 it removed the allocation 
constraint on funds from the National Social Fund thus allowing the Regions 
to manage their social policies autonomously, using transfers.
At the legislative level, just one year before the constitutional reform of 
2001, the State adopted framework Act no. 328 of 2000,16 which formally is no 
longer binding on the Regions but still ‘authoritative’, because all the regional 
re- organisation laws that followed took up many of its innovations (such as the 
model of an integrated network system, the central role of the municipalities 
as the essential link in the care system, the ‘zonal plan’ as the programming 
instrument, and the enhanced role given to the ‘third sector’). The emerging 
system of regional legislation was not dissimilar to that of the framework Act, 
except for one major difference, in that the regional Governments achieved 
planning powers and general legislative powers over welfare services, even if 
this legislative power was bound to run into the State’s legislative power to 
establish essential levels of service.
In general, placing social care services among the residual competences of 
the Regions has substantially increased the volume of legislation and regula-
tions governing this sector, and has greatly increased the caseload of litigation 
between the State and the Regions before the constitutional Court on matters 
of competence.17 Moreover, the new financing model, whose profile was not 
 15 For the financial model see Luca Antonini, “La vicenda e la prospettiva dell’autonomia 
finanziaria regionale: dal vecchio al nuovo art. 119,” Le Regioni (2003): 34 et seq; Piero 
Giarda, “Le regole del federalismo fiscale nell’articolo 119: un’economista di fronte alla 
nuova Costituzione,” Le Regioni (2001): 1425 et seq; Davide De Grazia, “L’autonomia 
finanziaria degli enti territoriali nel nuovo Titolo V della Costituzione,” Le istituzioni 
del federalismo, no.2 (2002): 267 et seq; Stelio Mangiameli, “Autonomia finanziaria,” in 
Dizionario sistematico di Diritto costituzionale, ed. Stelio Mangiameli (Milano: Il sole 
24 Ore, 2008); Enrico Buglione, “Regional Finance in Italy: Past and Future,” in Italian 
Regionalism: Between Unitary Traditions and Federal Processes, Investigating Italy’s Form 
of State, ed. Stelio Mangiameli (Heidelberg, Cham: Springer, 2014), 307 et seq.
 16 For comments see Enzo Balboni, Bassano Baroni and Angelo Mattioni, eds., Il sistema 
integrato dei servizi sociali, Commento alla legge no. 328 del 2000 e ai provvedimenti attua-
tivi dopo la riforma del titolo V della Costituzione (Milano: Giuffré, 2003).
 17 The role of the constitutional Court has been fundamental in defining the division of 
competences between the State and the Regions. According to Stelio Mangiameli, “Il 
Titolo V della Costituzione alla luce della giurisprudenza costituzionale e delle prospet-
tive di riforma,” Rivista AIC, no. 2 (2016), 36, https:// www.rivistaaic.it/ it/ rivista/ ultimi- 
contributi- pubblicati/ stelio- mangiameli/ il- titolo- v- della- costituzione- alla- luce- della- 
giurisprudenza- costituzionale- e- delle- prospettive- di- riforma: ‘the constitutional case 
law was animated by the desire to safeguard the unity of the legal system, supporting – 
even in a substitute role – the state legislature, and what has been done has had the sense 
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clearly defined and which was difficult to establish at the time, was one of the 
critical aspects of the system from the outset. This inevitably led to a great deal 
of litigation before the constitutional Court, which was called upon to rule on 
a complex range of issues.
Both tiers of government have been trying to carve out a place for them-
selves in the new system: the Central Government has been endeavouring to 
hold on to its existing prerogatives, while the Regions have been determined to 
defend the powers already acquired, as well as their autonomy.
3 What the State Has (Not) Done in the Field
Unlike healthcare18 and education,19 the State has failed to lay down the essen-
tial levels of welfare during the ten years following the constitutional reform. 
This legal vacuum is of particular importance because of what is involved is the 
policy financing, as well as what is deemed to be (or rather, what the Central 
Government considers to be) the unchangeable core of services and benefits 
that must be guaranteed in order to enable citizens to fully enjoy their civil 
and social rights. The main reasons for the persistence of this state of affairs 
are that the definition of the essential level of care implies that the State is to 
provide the relevant funding.
The 2003 Budget Act20 entrusted the task of defining the essential levels of 
welfare to a Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers in agreement 
neocentralismo, Verso una nuova stagione del regionalismo italiano? (Torino: Giappichelli, 
2016), chapters iii and iv.
 18 The Decree of the President of the Republic of 29 November 2001 defined the essen-
tial levels of health care; see George France, “The Italian Health Care System and the 
Economics of the Right to Health,” in Italian Regionalism: Between Unitary Traditions and 
Federal Processes, Investigating Italy’s Form of State, ed. Stelio Mangiameli (Heidelberg, 
Cham: Springer, 2014), 335 et seq. Essential levels of health care have recently been 
updated by a prime ministerial decree (d.P.C.m.) of 12 January 2017.
 19 Actually, there are no clear indications regarding the essential standards to be met with 
regard to education except for a reference in Article 21 of Act no. 59 of 1997 which pro-
vided for ‘unitary and nationwide levels of the right to an education, and the elements 
common to the whole State school system regarding Central Government management 
and planning’. Subsequently, Act no. 53 of 2003 gave the government delegated powers 
to lay down general rules for education and set the essential levels of the services to be 
provided by schools and vocational training. Legislative Decree no. 226 of 2005 then laid 
down the essential levels for the second cycle of the educational and vocational training 
system.
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with the State- Regions Conference (or the Joint Conference), with the limita-
tion of the resources available in the National Social Fund. However, this proce-
dure has never been applied. Later attempts were made by a number of institu-
tional players to provide a standard nationwide definition of essential levels of 
care, but this never went further than being a mere proposal. The deadlock was 
not resolved, and between 2004 and 2005 the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policies drafted a document defining a list of services and benefits, with an 
explicit acknowledgement of the work done by the Regional Governments and 
of the inertia of Central Government.21
Over the years, several acts have indicated how to define and finance the 
essential levels of care without indicating the contents, which nowadays 
remain those of the framework Act 328 of 200022 – even if the Court has con-
sidered the levels defined in that Act to be ‘a series of services and benefits 
that are wholly heterogeneous both in terms of content and conditions of 
entitlement’.23
The results of this failure are the disaggregation of benefits, the lack of a 
commonly agreed list24 and of a joint commonly agreed approach to the non- 
monetary benefits and services to be provided to people in a specific state of 
need.25 The main consequence of the absence of State intervention on the 
 21 As stated in the Social Services Monitoring Report, published by the Directorate- General 
for the Management of the National Fund for Social Policies and of Social Expenditure at 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, ‘[t] he Regions are beginning to govern types 
of services and benefits that have been traditionally the preserve of Central Government, 
such as poverty- alleviation measures, legislation on matters very closely connected with 
the (as- yet undefined) ‘essential levels of care’’; Directorate- General for the Management 
of the National Fund for Social Policies and of Social Expenditure at the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policies, Social Services Monitoring Report (September 2005), 44.
 22 The law seemed to point the way to establishing ‘the essential levels of welfare to be deliv-
ered in the form of goods and services in accordance with the characteristics and require-
ments established in national, regional and zonal plans, within the limits of the resources 
of the National Fund for Social Policies, taking into account the ordinary resources 
already allocated by the local authorities for social expenditure’ (Article 22).
 23 Judgement no. 224 of 2006.
 24 It was not until October 2009 that a ‘Nomenclature of services and social measures’ was 
adopted by the Conference of Regions and of Autonomous Provinces. This idea was first 
broached at the beginning of 2006 following an analysis of the results of the ‘Survey of 
social services and measures’ adopted by individual and associated municipalities, con-
ducted by istat in conjunction with the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Policies, 
the General Accounting Office and the regional Governments. The nomenclature can 
be found on http:// www.regioni.it/ upload/ DOCCRP10%29NOMENCLATORE_ SERVIZI_ 
SOCIALI.pdf.
 25 Cristiano Gori, “Applicare i livelli essenziali nel sociale,” Prospettive sociali e sanitarie 33, 
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essential levels of care means that not everyone has access to the same level of 
care across the country.
The only two provisions which have been introduced in terms of essen-
tial levels of care during the past fifteen years are the isee26 and the recent 
Inclusion Income Act.27 The latter is the means by which the State ensures 
uniformity in care delivery across the country, thus overcoming the absence or 
different degrees of income support.
From a financial point of view, even in the years that followed the con-
stitutional reform, measures were taken to maintain pre- existing funds.28 
Additional sectoral funds, parallel to the National Fund, were also created, 
such as the Family Policies Fund,29 the Youth Policies Fund,30 the Fund for 
the Non- Self- Sufficient,31 all of which were designed to support interventions 
in the social sphere. Some of these funds, mostly set up under the State’s 
Budget Acts, have led to numerous legal disputes with the State. In particu-
lar, the Regions claimed their right to new money transfers from the Central 
Government with no allocation constraints, and they accused the State of hav-
ing created funds for matters falling within the Regions’ competence in viola-
tion of their constitutional autonomy over revenue and expenditure (Article 
119 of the Constitution).
in La riforma del Welfare, Dieci anni dopo la ‘Commissione Onofri’, ed. Luciano Gurzoni 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007), 347– 358; Alberto Comino, Alessandra De Marco and 
Alessandro Natalini, “La determinazione dei livelli essenziali delle prestazioni,” in Welfare 
e federalismo, ed. Luisa Torchia (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005), 95 et seq.
 26 Legislative Decree no. 109/ 1998, amended in 2011 and 2013. isee is the index for evaluating 
the economic situation of the family in order to access social services or to establish the 
co- payment of social benefits. It was introduced by Legislative Decree no. 109/ 1998, and 
then amended by Article 5 of Legislative Decree 201/ 2011 (converted into Act no. 214/ 2011) 
and by d.P.C.m. no. 159/ 2013, Regolamento concernente la revisione delle modalità di deter-
minazione e i campi di applicazione dell’Indicatore della Situazione Economica Equivalente 
(isee), which established that it has to be considered an essential level of care, thus bind-
ing for the Regions.
 27 Act no. 33/ 2017 was adopted by the State to combat poverty and social exclusion and 
introduced the so- called ‘Reddito di Inclusione’ (Inclusion Income), a measure that pro-
vides a form of direct income for households below the absolute poverty line and is aimed 
at ensuring economic autonomy and occupation for idle, unemployed or precariously 
employed citizens.
 28 In addition to those listed below there is also the National Fund for Children and 
Adolescents instituted by Act no. 285 of 1997.
 29 Instituted by Decree- Act no. 223 of 2006, enacted by Act no. 248 of 2006.
 30 Instituted by Decree- Act no. 223 of 2006, enacted by Act no. 248 of 2006.
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For instance, during the economic crisis of the late 2000s, the State drasti-
cally reduced the shares of the National Social Fund allocated to the Regions 
(see Figure 10.1) and adopted a different measure instead: the Social Card,32 
which cannot be considered an essential level of care but can be regarded as 
a way of aiding the satisfaction of basic needs (such as for purchasing food, 
paying for gas bills and healthcare services, etc.).
The Act which introduced the Social Card was challenged by the Regions 
on the grounds that it infringed their competence over social care mat-
ters. However, the constitutional Court saved the provisions, because ‘State 
laws designed to protect particularly disadvantaged individuals, although 
encroaching on the Regions’ competence in the field of social services and 
assistance, must be evaluated also in the light of the fundamental principles 
of Articles 2 and 3, para. 2, 38 and Article 117, para. 2 letter M’. In consequence, 
the principles of equality and solidarity represent the foundation for State 
intervention, which is permitted in extraordinary, exceptional and urgent 
cases resulting from international economic and financial crisis situations 
such as those that affected the country in 2008 and 2009. Moreover, according 
to the reasoning followed by the Court, the jurisdiction of the State and the 
exceptional situation in which it was exercised also make the requirement to 
respect the principle of loyal cooperation irrelevant, but rather involve the 
 32 D.L. 112/ 2008, converted into Act no. 133 of 2008 (Conversion into law, with amendments, 
of Law Decree no 112 of 25 June 2008 laying down urgent provisions for economic devel-
opment, for the simplification, competitiveness and stabilisation of public finance and 
tax equality), amended by Article 60 of D.L. no. 5/ 2013.
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exercise of the regulatory power by the State, and the establishment of the 
discipline in detail.33
In this judgement, the Court clearly considered the State to be the main 
guarantor of the principle of equality, and despite the division of competences 
between the State and the Regions, it justified the intervention of the State on 
the basis of the constitutional framework.
Finally, it is worth specifying that even the act carrying out fiscal federal-
ism – adopted with considerable delay and whose unwieldy process of imple-
mentation was interrupted because of the negative economic cycle caused 
by the international economic crisis – requires essential levels of care to be 
defined because it lays down new rules for financing these services.34
4 What the Regions Have Done: Regional Social Care Policies as 
‘Labs’ for Welfare Policies and as a Test- Bench for Autonomy
The national framework law and the reform of Title v of the Constitution fos-
tered the development of different regional welfare models. All Regions issued 
welfare laws which fall into three groups: (1) those issued before the framework 
Act No. 328 of 2000, (2) those passed more or less at the same time as the 
framework law, and (3) those enacted subsequently.35 Despite their different 
procedures, planning in all Regions takes place at two levels: at the regional 
 33 Constitutional Court, Judgement n. 10 of 2010, point 6.4; Judgement no. 62 of 2013. For 
comments on the judgements: Adele Anzon Demmig, “Potestà legislativa regionale resi-
duale e livelli essenziali delle prestazioni,” Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, no. 1 (2010): 155 
et seq; Erik Longo, “I diritti sociali al tempo della crisi, La Consulta salva la social card 
e ne ricava un nuovo titolo di competenza statale,” Giurisprudenza costituzionale 55 
(2010): 164 et seq; Marta Cerioni, “Un’ulteriore fattispecie di superamento giurispru-
denziale della rigidità del riparto di competenze: ‘I livelli essenziali delle prestazioni al 
tempo della crisi’,” Giurisprudenza italiana (2010): 2518 et seq; Antonio Ruggeri, “ ‘Livelli 
essenziali’ delle prestazioni relative ai diritti e ridefinizione delle sfere di competenza 
di Stato e Regioni in situazioni di emergenza economica (a prima lettura di Corte cost. 
n. 10 del 2010),” forumcostituzionale.it (February 2010), http:// www.forumcostituzionale.
it/ wordpress/ images/ stories/ pdf/ documenti_ forum/ giurisprudenza/ 2010/ 0002_ nota_ 10_ 
2010_ ruggeri.pdf; Claudio Panzera, “I livelli essenziali delle prestazioni fra sussidiarietà e 
collaborazione,” Le Regioni, no. 4 (2010): 941.
 34 Act no. 42 of 2009.
 35 On the regional welfare models see Giulia Maria Napolitano, “Social Care as a Workshop 
for Regional Welfare Policies,” in Italian Regionalism: Between Unitary Traditions and 
Federal Processes, Investigating Italy’s Form of State, ed. Stelio Mangiameli (Heidelberg, 
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level, through the Welfare Plan or the Social and Health Care Plan, and at the 
sub- regional level, through the Zonal Plan.
A total of 739 laws on welfare and health care policies were issued between 
2001 and 2015, accounting for about 8 % of the total regional legislation pro-
duced in that period.36 The number of laws varied from one year to another 
during these fifteen years (see Figure 10.2). The figures reveal the regional law-
makers’ increasing interest in, and sensitivity towards, social policies.
Within social and health care policies there are four areas that account for 
the bulk of the laws passed in the 2001– 2015 period (see Figure 10.3)37: the 
‘third sector’ and the reorganisation of care and charitable entities (16 %), 
family and mother- child policies (16 %), disabilities and invalidity (15 %) and 
organisational- institutional matters, namely implementation and manage-
ment of the system (11 %).
The lack of indications on services and benefits, as well as on the minimum 
levels of care to be guaranteed, together with the large number of regional 
 36 issirfa sources; see the systematic collection of regional legislation in the chapters 
edited by Giulia Maria Napolitano and published annually in “Tendenze e problemi della 
legislazione regionale,” in Rapporto sulla legislazione tra Stato, Regioni e Unione europea, 
ed. Camera dei deputi (Rome: Camera dei deputati, 2007– 2015), http:// www.issirfa.cnr.it/ 
rapporto- camera.html.
 37 Napolitano, “Tendenze e problemi.”
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legislation and administrative measures on social and welfare policies, also 
free from State funding and planning constraints, have given rise to different 
approaches to the question of essential levels of care by the Regions. They 
intervened in this process in three ways, which may be summarised as prag-
matic, wait- and- see, and innovative. In the first approach, some Regions have 
not addressed the issue of qualifying services and benefits as ‘essential’ but 
have set objectives and priorities on the basis of available resources. Others – 
the ‘wait- and- see’ Regions – have wholly or partially transposed the text of the 
State law into regional law, or simply make reference to the articles of the State 
law without issuing provisions defining what those essential levels are. Lastly, 
the innovative Regions have moved far beyond the State law provisions in that 
they have broadened the range of services and benefits. In all these cases, it 
could be said that the Regions have somehow filled the empty space left by the 
State in defining the essential levels of services.
In the absence of State regulations on the essential levels of care, 
regional policy choices were strongly differentiated throughout the coun-
try. Subsequently, since the essential levels of care were never defined, all 
the benefits and services provided by the Regions in the social sphere were 
mapped in the ‘Interregional Nomenclature of services and social measures’ 
 figure 10.3  Regional legislation governing welfare and health care: distribution per sector
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drawn up by the Social Policies Committee of the Conference of Regions and 
of the Autonomous Provinces. This document was adopted in 2009 by the 
Conference of Regions and of Autonomous Provinces and updated in 2014 
both in terminology and content. The Nomenclature has provided a grouping 
of social services and defined macro levels of services, within which ‘service 
objectives’ have been identified.
With the economic crisis, the Regions have expanded existing services or 
introduced new measures to support incomes (examples: baby/ child bonus, 
income support measures, etc.). These measures vary depending on the finan-
cial resources available for each Region, thus increasing the gap between 
Regions (especially between North and South), and on political pressure.
From a financial point of view, the Regions and the Municipalities have con-
tributed with their own resources,38 besides receiving transfers from the State 
and EU funds, with co- payment by beneficiaries which vary from one Region 
to another. On the whole, during the economic crisis, regional resources 
have been increased while national resources have been reduced. Therefore, 
it may be stated that the Regions have provided social safety nets during 
the economic crisis thus filling in the vacuum left by the State. This aspect 
was adversely affected by the local governments’ failure to achieve financial 
autonomy, which meant that the regional policies were managed through a 
top- down approach to the detriment of the accountability and autonomy of 
local governments. This situation was considerably worsened over the years 
because public spending was curtailed, and the coordination of public finance 
led to an impoverishment of the already scanty regional resources.39
 38 Regional resources take the form of co- financing that is added to Central Government 
transfers for the management and maintenance of the care system, and to other funds to 
finance policies identified by the Regions as priorities, such as the Regional Funds for the 
Non- Self- Sufficient, or to provide various kinds of support for family policies and policies 
for immigrants.
 39 On the impact of the coordination of public finance over regional policies see D’Atena, 
Diritto regionale, 220; Michele Belletti, “Forme di coordinamento della finanza pubblica 
e incidenza sulle competenze regionali, Il coordinamento per principi, di dettaglio e ‘vir-
tuoso’, ovvero nuove declinazioni dell’unità economica e dell’unità giuridica,” in Il regio-
nalismo italiano tra giurisprudenza costituzionale e involuzioni legislative dopo la revisione 
del Titolo V – Atti del Seminario, ed. Stelio Mangiameli (Milano: Giuffré, 2014), 86 et seq; 
Guido Rivosecchi, “Il coordinamento della finanza pubblica: dall’attuazione del titolo 
V alla deroga al riparto costituzionale delle competenze,” in Il regionalismo italiano tra 
giurisprudenza costituzionale e involuzioni legislative dopo la revisione del Titolo V – Atti del 
Seminario, ed. Stelio Mangiameli (Milano: Giuffré, 2014), 147 et seq; on the impact of crisis 
over regionalism and the relationship between State and Regions see Stelio Mangiameli, 
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The Regions have also been laboratories for testing policies addressing new 
needs, such as in the field of immigration: the Regions were the first institu-
tions to develop measures to deal with this situation, in some cases including, 
and in other cases excluding, migrants from services, and causing State inter-
vention in both cases.40
In fact, even if the State has exclusive competence over immigration mat-
ters,41 specifically migration flows, the Regions have claimed the power to 
guarantee the integration of immigrant populations in different ways and with 
different means, recognising their entitlement to essential health and welfare 
services and benefits regardless of whether their presence in the territory is legal 
or not. All the comprehensive laws on immigration, except for the regional law 
of Lazio, have been challenged before the constitutional Court42 by the State.
5 The Constitutional Court as a Balance between the State and the 
Regions, between Equality and Autonomy
The constitutional Court has been called upon to strike a balance between State 
and Regional competences. The case law of the last fifteen years shows that the 
Court has taken on the role of mediator between autonomy and equality.
 40 On this issue see Laura Ronchetti, ed., I diritti di cittadinanza dei migranti, Il ruolo delle 
Regioni (Milano: Giuffré, 2012); Laura Ronchetti, ed., La Repubblica e le migrazioni 
(Milano: Giuffré, 2014).
 41 Article 117 (2) (b) of the Constitution provides that immigration is one of the subject- 
matters over which the State has exclusive competence.
 42 The main complaint made against them is that Regions have unlawfully encroached on 
the State’s powers in the matter of immigration and unlawfully recognised ‘the rights 
of immigrants living illegally in Italy or awaiting regularization’ (Referral against the 
Campania Region, No. 62 of 2010, published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale, no. 20 (May, 2010). 
According to a ruling of the Constitutional Court, ‘[t] he Regions are fully empowered 
to enact legislation relating to immigration […] it being understood that this legislative 
power may not be applied to matters referring to policies for planning the entry or stay 
of immigrants on national soil, but over other matters, such as the right to study and 
to receive social care, which fall within the scope of the Regions’ concurrent or residual 
powers’ (Judgements nos. 134 and 299 of 2010, italics added). The Constitutional Court 
recently reiterated the fact that ‘public intervention relating to foreign nationals cannot 
be limited merely to controlling the entry and stay in Italy of immigrants, but must nec-
essarily consider other areas – welfare, education, healthcare, housing – which involve 
many legislative powers, some of which are vested in the State and others in the Regions’ 
(Judgement no. 61 of 2011, see also Judgements no. 300 of 2005; no. 156 of 2006), a for-
tiori because ‘foreign nationals possess all the constitutionally guaranteed basic personal 
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On the one hand, the constitutional Court has recognised social care as a 
residual competence of the Regions because it is not on the list of exclusive com-
petences of the State nor is it included among the concurrent competences.43 
On the other hand, the constitutional Court has explicitly recognised that the 
State’s competence to establish essential levels of services regarding civil and 
social rights is not a ‘subject- matter’ strictu sensu, but a ‘competence of Central 
Government that may affect all subject- matters in respect of which the State leg-
islator must lay down the necessary rules to guarantee that everyone, through-
out the country, may enjoy guaranteed services, as the essential substance of 
these rights, without Regional law being able to restrict or condition them’.44
The cross- cutting nature of State competence entails ‘a strong impact on the 
exercise of the legislative and administrative powers of the Regions’,45 so that its 
exercise requires compliance with the principle of loyal cooperation between 
the State and the Regions,46 unless there are exceptional circumstances in 
which the determination of the essential levels of care ‘is not sufficient to effec-
tively realize the purpose […] of protecting extremely disadvantaged individ-
uals’ but it legitimises the State to provide welfare benefits directly, without 
considering the principle of loyal cooperation with the Regions.47
For these reasons, the State, in the few cases in which it has determined the 
essential levels of health care or social care, has often provided instruments 
for the involvement of the Regions (in the form of ‘agreement’) to respect 
their competences. In the case of the isee, for instance, the determination of 
the index, of the types of benefits provided, and of the income level provid-
ing access to the benefits significantly affects the residual competence of the 
Regions in the field of ‘social services’ and, at least potentially, the finances 
of the Region that sustain the economic burden of such services. According 
to the Court, ‘[it] is, therefore, evident that such determination of the isee 
requires the reconsideration of local situations and the assessment of financial 
sustainability […] It follows that fair cooperation by the Region is necessary to 
implement the challenged provision’.48
 43 Cfr., ex plurimis, Judgements no. 296 of 2012; no. 61 of 2011; no. 121 and no. 10 of 2010; 
no. 168, no. 166 and no. 50 of 2008; no. 300 of 2005.
 44 Judgement no. 282 of 2002. See also Judgements no. 203 of 2012; no. 232 of 2011; no. 10 of 
2010; no. 322 of 2009; no. 168 and no. 50 of 2008; no. 162 and no. 94 of 2007; no. 282 of 2002. 
On the characteristics of cross- cutting matters see D’Atena, Diritto regionale, 161 et seq.
 45 Judgements no. 8 of 2011; no. 88 of 2003.
 46 Judgements no. 330 and no. 8 of 2011; no. 309 and no. 121 of 2010; no. 322 and no. 124 of 
2009; no. 162 of 2007; no. 134 of 2006; no. 88 of 2003.
 47 Judgement no. 10 of 2010 on the ‘Social card’.
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An important part of the case law of the Court concerns the financial sys-
tem. Both the National Social Fund and the ‘parallel funds’ established after 
2001 for social and health care purposes have been challenged before the con-
stitutional Court. The circumstances surrounding these funds are emblematic 
of the huge efforts that the Court has deployed to resolve the issues created by 
the Central Government’s attempts to continue laying down social policies in 
respect of matters that the Regions are empowered to manage autonomously. 
In particular, the Court has declared a number of State funds to be unconsti-
tutional,49 on the grounds that ‘funding with allocation constraints shall not 
be provided for matters and functions of Regional competence, whether they 
fall within the exclusive competence of the Regions or within their concurrent 
powers, albeit in compliance with the fundamental principles established in 
State law’.50 However, the Court has also ruled that any effects they had already 
produced should be retained, on the grounds that ‘the social nature of the ben-
efits provided, which refer to fundamental rights, are such that the continuity 
of said services are to be guaranteed, on the basis of principles of social sol-
idarity, such that it is necessary to maintain any expenditure proceedings in 
progress, even if they have not yet been completed’.51
On the other hand, the Court has ‘saved’ other Central Government funds,52 
sometimes on the grounds that the provisions were unable to undermine 
regional powers,53 or acknowledging the unitary and indivisible nature of the 
 49 In Judgement no. 50 of 2008, the Court ruled the Fund for the Social Inclusion of 
Immigrants (article 1 (1267) of Act no. 296 of 2006), and the Fund for the Removal of 
Architectural Barriers (article 1 (389) of Act no. 296 of 2006) to be unconstitutional. In 
Judgement no. 370 of 2003 it also ruled that the Fund for the Institution of Nurseries 
(article 70 of Act no. 448 of 2001) was unconstitutional. The Court has not only intervened 
in relation to ‘parallel’ funds but also in relation to the National Social Fund itself, and 
has reiterated the ruling that any allocation constraint is non- legitimate, even if it relates 
to only a portion of the Fund, because this would limit the autonomy of the Regions 
(Judgement no. 423 of 2004). In reality, the Court has challenged the very survival of the 
Fund once the constitutional reform is implemented, since the structure and function of 
the Fund do not reflect any of the financing instruments provided for by the new article 
119 of the Constitution. At the same time, continuing to keep its balance, the Court has 
not wholly excluded the survival of the Fund once article 119 is implemented, provided 
that it is used exclusively to finance welfare or minimum levels of care, which are exclu-
sive competences of the State (see Judgement no. 423 of 2004).
 50 Judgement no. 160 of 2005. See also Judgements no. 50 of 2008; no. 77 and 51 of 2005; 
no. 423 and 16 of 2004; no. 370 of 2003.
 51 Judgement no. 50 of 2008. See also Judgements no. 423 of 2004; no. 370 of 2003.
 52 Judgements no. 453 of 2007; no. 141 of 2007. For example, the Family Policies Fund, the 
Youth Policies Fund, the Equal Rights and Opportunities Policies Fund.
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Fund and its purpose of being used for matters over which both Regions and 
State have competence,54 without any material sphere being identifiable as 
having prevalence over the others. In this case, referring to the principle of 
loyal cooperation, the Court ruled that the agreement or the opinion issued by 
the Joint Conference was an instrument for ‘safeguarding’ the fund.
During the years of the crisis, the Court was called upon on several occa-
sions to judge the curtailing of regional resources imposed in order to ensure 
budgetary consolidation. In the abundant case law on the coordination of 
public finance, it is worth mentioning the judgement stating that ‘the deter-
mination by the State of the essential levels of service with regard to civil 
and social rights that are to be ensured across the national territory is use-
ful. With regard to the health sector this determination occurred recently 
with d.P.C.m. of 12 January 2017 (prime ministerial decree) which offers the 
Regions a significant orientation criterion for identifying objectives and 
areas where resources are to be reduced, also indicating the threshold below 
which spending – provided it is efficient – cannot be further compressed 
(Judgement no. 65 of 2016)’.55 Failure to set essential levels for social policies 
has led to a reversal in the burden of proof,56 and so the Regions, in order to 
counter the linear cuts made within the framework of a policy curbing pub-
lic spending, are compelled to provide evidence showing that it is impossi-
ble for them to offer adequate levels of service to cater to the needs of the 
people.57
The efforts made over the past few years by the constitutional Court seem 
to have been designed with several purposes: firstly, to reconcile the need to 
guarantee adequate economic support for social policies, with respect for 
the autonomy of the Regions in the management of social policies; secondly, 
to restrict attempts by the Executive to assert its earlier overarching Central 
Government power; thirdly, to ensure that any effects produced by the allo-
cation of resources are protected, while ensuring that any possible benefits, 
rights or expectations created are not cancelled; lastly, to shuttle the welfare 
model into the new system via a transition phase. This complex operation 
shows the Court to be walking the tightrope in an area where the boundaries 
are still ill- defined while awaiting the implementation of the constitutional 
reform that the Court itself has so frequently called for.
 54 This particular case referred to the Family Policies Fund and to the National Fund against 
Sexual Violence (Judgement no. 453 of 2008).
 55 Judgement no. 154 of 2017, point 4.6.2.1.
 56 Judgement no. 154 of 2017.
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Finally, it is necessary to mention the case law on migration, because for 
the constitutional Court the protection of equality also extends to the recog-
nition of social assistance benefits to foreigners present in the country.58 For 
instance, in Judgement 40/ 2011, the Court declares unconstitutional an Act of 
the Region of Friuli Venezia Giulia which offers access to the integrated system 
of social services of the Region only to EU citizens who have resided in the 
Region for at least thirty- six months. The exclusion of entire categories of per-
sons was considered by the Court to be a violation of the principle of equality, 
since it introduces arbitrary distinctive elements that constitute the prereq-
uisite for provisions which, by their very nature, do not tolerate distinctions 
based on citizenship, or on particular types of residence.59
6 Concluding Remarks: The Relationship between the State and the 
Regions, from Conflict to ‘Political Agreement’ and Institutional 
Involvement
The State has frequently claimed the power to define the essential levels of 
care, but it has been unable to do so, even by resorting to instruments other 
than State law. The Regions have shown their determination to protect their 
powers by claiming, on the one hand, compliance with the principle of legality, 
and on the other, they have defended their right to play a part, in one way or 
another, in defining social policies based on the principle of loyal cooperation.
As pointed out, the Regions have filled the vacuum left by the State in defin-
ing the essential levels of services and the State has intervened in very few cases 
to guarantee equality. However, this role of the Regions, which has substituted 
that of the State, has not succeeded in redressing the effects of the absence of 
State intervention because it does not solve the problem of different levels of 
services in different areas of the country.
The relationship between the State and the Regions has often been riddled 
with constitutional conflicts. The division of competences between State and 
Regions and the complex financing system under the Italian legal order could 
 58 Judgements no. 306 of 2008; no. 187 of 2010; no. 269 of 2010; no. 40 of 2011; no. 61 of 2011.
 59 On this issue see Gabriella Saputelli, “Differenziazioni regionali in merito all’accesso dei 
migranti ai servizi sociali,” in I diritti di cittadinanza dei migranti, Il ruolo delle Regioni, ed. 
Laura Ronchetti (Milano: Giuffré, 2012), 227– 263; Laura Ronchetti, “I diritti fondamentali 
alla prova delle migrazioni (a proposito delle sentenze nn. 299 del 2010 e 61 del 2011),” 
Rivista aic, no. 3 (2011); on the rights of migrants see Enzo Di Salvatore and Michela 
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not avoid the intervention of the constitutional Court, which has the func-
tion of clarifying and defining a balance between the two legislators. In recent 
years, some elements have revealed that the system has been going from con-
flict to ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ and to institutional involvement.
In 2012, when the national resources for the Regions were significantly 
reduced, there was no agreement in the State- Regions Conference (or the 
Joint Conference) on the allocation of Social Funds because of insufficient 
resources, and the distribution of funds was frozen. This circumstance was the 
starting point for moving into a phase of negotiations.
The following year, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies ‘transposed’ 
the Nomenclature of Services and Social Measures adopted by the Conference 
of Regions and of Autonomous Provinces in 2009 into the administrative 
decree for the distribution of National Social Policies Fund for the period 
2013– 2015.60 Consequently, agreements were reached on allocations from the 
National Social Policy Fund and resources were distributed.
This mechanism was repeated in the following years. The recent Act on 
Minimum Income61 introduced a new form of regional participation: a net-
work which involves a delegation from each regional or provincial Government 
is commissioned to develop a number of plans (the National Social Plan, the 
Social Action Plan and Social Services for Poverty, the Plan for Self- Sufficiency) 
and to define guidelines for social policies. It is worth specifying that this nov-
elty does not exclude, but it comes to add to, the participation in the Joint 
Conference because it precedes the legislative phase.
In the decentralised Italian system, the Regions have become essential inter-
locutors of the State which, in defining its policies, cannot ignore the results 
achieved. Both the nomenclature of 2009 and the network introduced in the 
recent Legislative Decree confirm this relationship.
The real challenge for the State and the Regions seems to be the need to 
find a ‘no- conflict zone’ for participation wherein policies can be defined. 
This question involves the well- known problems of the lack of an institutional 
forum where the Regions can participate in the legislative process (which is a 
characteristic of Federal States).62 As mentioned in this chapter on the Italian 
 60 dm 26/ 6/ 2013.
 61 L. 15 marzo 2017, n. 33, Delega recante norme relative al contrasto della poverta’, al riordino 
delle prestazioni e al sistema degli interventi e dei servizi sociali. (17G00047) (gu Serie 
Generale n.70 del 24- 03- 2017) available on https:// www.gazzettaufficiale.it/ eli/ id/ 2017/ 
03/ 24/ 17G00047/ sg.
 62 On the second Chamber there is a vast literature. See Stelio Mangiameli, ed., Un senato 
delle autonomie per l’Italia federale (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2003); Luca 
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experience, the system of Conferences, even if considered inadequate, is used 
‘in the continuing absence of changes in the parliamentary institutions’.63 
While the choice of cooperation compensates for the absence of a ‘Senate of 
the Regions’, the issue of financial regional autonomy remains unsolved.
Failure to implement Article 119 of the Constitution (financial autonomy), 
together with the State competence over coordination of public finance have 
been obstacles to the autonomous management of regional policies.64 Without 
fiscal powers and being repeatedly subject to linear cuts, the Regions are una-
ble to achieve the purpose of being the institution that can best meet the 
needs of the territories. As is well known, these two elements are essential in 
a regional state, and their absence undermines the functioning of the system.
It can be concluded that the analysis of the institutional political events 
and the case law of the Court shows that the implementation of the principle 
of equality in the Italian regional system was not achieved through a dual sys-
tem of rigid separation of competences, but through an often contradictory 
dynamic process of relations between central and regional levels.
Furthermore, in a decentralised system, the two principles of autonomy and 
equality may seem to be in opposition with each other, but an analysis of social 
care in the Italian system has shown that the principle of equality can also be 
achieved through autonomy. This circumstance demonstrates the value of the 
decentralised system, where the two levels stimulate each other – even through 
conflict – and play a mutually complementary role. Indeed, the Regions which 
are the institutions that are closest to the citizens are responsible for the needs 
and demands that come from the communities and can develop diverse expe-
riences in the territory. Obviously, there is a tension between the two institu-
tional subjects (State and Regions), but this tension is functional to the imple-
mentation of equality.
D’Atena, Tra autonomia e neocentralismo, 271 et seq; Eduardo Gianfrancesco, “La parte-
cipazione delle regioni alla vita dello Stato (e della Repubblica): bicameralismo, camera 
delle regioni e conferenze,” Italian Papers on Federalism, no. 2 (2017).
 63 Judgement no. 6 of 2004. On the system of Conferences see Guido Carpani, La Conferenza 
Stato- regioni, Competenze e modalità di funzionamento dall’istituzione ad oggi (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 2006), 20; Riccardo Carpino, “Evoluzione del sistema delle Conferenze,” Istituzioni 
del Federalismo, no. 1 (2006): 19 et seq; Commissione parlamentare per le questioni 
regionali, A Conclusione dell’indagine conoscitiva sulle forme di raccordo tra lo Stato e le 
Autonomie territoriali, con particolare riguardo al ‘Sistema delle Conferenze’ – Approvato 
dalla Commissione parlamentare per le questioni regionali nella seduta del 13 ottobre 2016, 
Doc. xvii- bis n. 7, http:// www.senato.it/ service/ PDF/ PDFServer/ DF/ 327040.pdf.
 64 See Antonio D’Atena, “The Financial Autonomy of Italy’s Regional Authorities: its 
Constitutional Model and the History of its Implementation,” Italian Papers on Federalism, 
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In this perspective, we can make use of what US Supreme Court Justice 
Louis Brandeis said in a famous Dissenting opinion:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious conse-
quences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal 
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve 
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments with-
out risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the power to prevent 
an experiment. We may strike down the statute which embodies it on 
the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious, or 
unreasonable. We have the power to do this because the due process 
clause has been held by the Court applicable to matters of substantive 
law as well as to matters of procedure. But, in the exercise of this high 
power, we must be ever on our guard lest we erect our prejudices into 
legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our 
minds be bold.65
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1 Introduction: Aim and Outline of the Research
This chapter aims to present a brief reflection on the distribution of seats in 
the lower chamber of Brazilian parliament and its possible impact on the prin-
ciple of equality and democracy.
The survey was based on empirical data concerning the number of repre-
sentatives from each state and the number of voters. All data was obtained 
from publicly available government sources. From simple calculations, there 
was the possibility of verifying that the division of seats, as provided for in 
Brazilian legislation, leads to an imbalance in the representation of citizens 
from different States.
This chapter will proceed with the following outline:  chapter 2 will pre-
sent the one person, one vote principle as well as its practical application. In 
addition, the relationship between such a principle and democracy will be dis-
cussed. Chapter 3 will point out some elements of formation of parliaments in 
federal states, bicameralism and the reasons for its adoption. In this chapter, 
the methods for the constitution of the lower house and the need to distribute 
seats between certain groups of the electorate, territorially determined, will 
also be considered. In  chapter 4, basic data about Brazil and its Constitution 
will initially be shown so that the reader can more easily understand the prob-
lem to be examined. Then, the numbers obtained in the empirical survey 
and their impact on equality among voters will be analysed. In this chapter, 
the causes of the distortion found will also be discussed. In  chapter 5, pos-
sible measures to solve or mitigate the distortion will be appraised, discuss-
ing the advantages and disadvantages of each one. Finally, in the conclusion 
( chapter 6), the arguments and possible solutions will be taken up, with the 
opinion of the author.
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2 One Person, One Vote: Democracy and Equality in Representation
The relationship between democracy and equality is almost intuitive. Every 
human being enjoys the same dignity and is entitled to the same possibilities 
to participate in the decision- making of the community.
The term one man, one vote (today, more appropriately, one person, one 
vote) often designates such a rule of equal representation in the United States 
Constitution, as stated in the 14th Amendment, 1868, Section 2:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according 
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed.1
Historically, the idea of universal suffrage was a conquest that took many cen-
turies to happen. Women and ethnic minority groups were denied political 
rights. Nowadays, there is a general consensus that the principle of equality 
requires every human to be equally represented in the deliberative cham-
bers of the country. In this sense, equality is an essential requirement for 
democracy.
This idea is widely accepted by scholars, as Snyder and Samuels say:
Although scholars vigorously dispute the exact meaning and definition 
of democracy, wide agreement exists that free and fair elections are the 
cornerstone of any democratic system of government. An essential char-
acteristic of electoral ‘fairness’ in democracies is that the vote of each 
citizen counts equally. This notion of fairness embodies the well- known 
principle of ‘one person, one vote‘ that theorists such as Robert Dahl con-
sider a necessary ingredient of democracy.2
 1 Indigenous people, under American law, have a special legal regime; they are not consid-
ered subject to the sovereignty of the states or the central government, which is called ‘tri-
adic federalism’: ‘Indeed, Indian tribes today continue to possess important governmental 
authority over their lands and members. The rationale is that tribes were sovereign before 
European contact and have retained all pre- existing sovereignty that (1) remains consistent 
with the tribes´ ‘dependent status’, (2) has never been ceded away by them by treaty, and 
(3) has never been pre- empted by federal statute.’ Daniel A. Farber, William N. Eskridge Jr., 
Philip P. Frickey. Constitutional Law (St. Paul: Thomson West, 2003), 1048.
 2 Richard Snyder and David J. Samuels, “Legislative Malapportionment in Latin America,” 
in Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Edward L. Gibson (Baltimore: The John 
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It is also present in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 25)3 
and in the American Convention on Human Rights (article 23).4 A similar 
statement is found in article 14 of the Brazilian Constitution.5 Moreover, 
this assumption leads to the idea that every vote is worth the same. Ideally, 
each member of the parliament should represent the same number of 
citizens.
3 Representation in Federal States
In this section, representation in federal states and its repercussions on the 
principle of equality among citizens will be analysed. In the first part (3.1), 
bicameralism, the reasons for its adoption in federal states and the division of 
chairs in the upper chamber will be discussed. In the second part (3.2), the for-
mation of the lower house and the difficulties of finding a method that meets 
proportionality between the states and, therefore, equality between citizens 
will be specifically analysed.
3.1 Bicameralism and the Reasons for Its Emergence: The Formation of 
the Upper House
The federal form of state, despite some characteristic traits in previous histori-
cal periods,6 had its genesis in the foundation of the United States of America.7 
In addition, the American Constitution of 1787 influenced the Constitutions 
 3 The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
 4 Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities:
 a. to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives;
 b. to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will 
of the voters.
 5 Art. 14. Popular sovereignty will be exercised by universal suffrage and by direct and secret 
vote, with equal value for all.
 6 Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1987), xii.
 7 Sanchez Agesta says about the importance of the USA example: ‘The founders of Philadelphia 
had a very clear idea of the problems they had to solve and of the solution with which they 
wanted to solve them. Few times we find in History, with so much evidence, the root of institu-
tions’; Luis Sanchez Agesta, Curso de derecho constitucional comparado (Madrid: Universidad 













of Latin American countries that gained independence in the nineteenth cen-
tury,8 including Brazil.
During the formation of the US federation at the Philadelphia Convention, 
discussions took place on how best to balance the representation of States. As 
can be read in the Federalist Papers (n. 62I) ‘The Equality of representation in the 
senate is another point, which, being evidently the result of compromise between 
the opposite pretensions of the large and the small states, does not call for much 
discussion.’9
The main issue in federations is the need to represent citizens individually but 
also the constituent states in a reasonably balanced way. Thus, the bicameral for-
mation emerges as a solution to this question. According to George Anderson’s 
summary, the representation of constituent units, in almost all federations, leads 
to a bicameral organisation.10
However, this formula of bicameralism already generates some distor-
tion: the population of less populous states will have a larger representation in 
the upper chamber. Therefore, it means there are two factors present in federal 
states, which must be taken into account in the distribution of seats of parlia-
ment: equal representation of citizens and equal representation of constituent 
units. If only one of such factors is considered – as it usually is in the upper 
chambers – clearly, the other will be impaired. This impairment will be more 
extensive, proportionally to the difference of population between the constit-
uent units. Hueglin and Flenna show some examples of inequality in the upper 
chamber, including the critical case of the USA.11
 8 ‘While the federations of Latin America followed American governmental design very 
closely, these institutional similarities tend to obscure the fact that the Latin America 
road to federalism was quite different.’ Thomas O. Hueglin and Alan Fenna. Comparative 
Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry (Quebec: Broadview Press, 2005), 133.
 9 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, The Federalist, eds. George W. Carey 
and James McClellan (2001), 320, http:// files.libertyfund.org/ files/ 788/ 0084_ LFeBk.pdf.
 10 ‘Almost all the federations count on a high chamber whose composition, in some way, 
represents the constituent units. The prevalence of upper chambers thus configured in 
federations is associated with the idea that both the population and the constituent units 
are parts of the federation and that these two dimensions need to be reflected in the 
central institutions’; George Anderson, Federalismo: uma introdução (Rio de Janeiro: fgv, 
2009), 69.
 11 ‘The path of equal representation was taken by the Americans, conforming naturally 
to their original confederal approach under the Articles and carried over to the final 
Constitution. This results in ‘massive overrepresentation’ of the small states; modern- day 
California is awarded only the same number of Senate seats as Wyoming despite hav-
ing 66 times the population. Among the classical federations, only Australia and, with a 
minor variation, Switzerland has followed this  example – and in Australia malapportion-
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That is why we do not need to be afraid to say that, in this specific point, fed-
eral arrangement is not democratic. Preston King points it out in a clear way:
First, the voting populations of the different territorial units in federa-
tions are always of unequal size, sometimes dramatically so. Since the 
votes of citizens in some territories will have greater force than those 
of citizens in other states, federations must in this sense, and in varying 
degree from case to case, prove undemocratic.12
Regarding specifically the Brazilian case, George Anderson presents the fol-
lowing numbers: ‘At one extreme is Brazil, where senators from states that 
together comprise 8 % of the national population occupy more than 50 % of 
seats.’13 In the extreme, there are Roraima (177 thousand people for each sena-
tor) and São Paulo (14.5 million people for each senator).
Therefore, in short, it is possible to say that, in a federal state, the adoption 
of bicameralism is justified because:
– The upper chamber is supposed to represent states, guaranteeing the same 
number of chairs for each of them and
– The lower chamber is supposed to represent citizens, distributing the seats 
proportionally to the population or the electorate of each state.
This statement is deliberately a simplification. We know there are federal 
states that do not adopt bicameralism. There are also federal states where rep-
resentation of states in the upper house is not entirely equal. These exceptions, 
however, do not invalidate the above findings.
The overrepresentation of some citizens in the upper house, in this sense, 
can be an important guarantee for the representation of minorities. If the 
upper house already performs this function, the lower house must, on the 
other hand, guarantee, to the greatest extent possible, the equality of citizens’ 
representation. Understanding this point is the only reason why this chapter 
discusses bicameralism and its role in federations. The purpose of the chapter 
is to analyse exclusively the formation of the lower chamber in a federal state 
and how its criteria can impact equality.
An interesting approach to representation in federal states is offered 
by Francesco Palermo, who suggests that, in order to guarantee more 
O. Hueglin and Alan Fenna, Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry (Quebec: 
Broadview Press, 2005), 181.
 12 Preston King, Federalism and Federation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1982), 88.






representation and participation to local interests, we should focus on ana-
lysing the phenomenon of bilateralism.14 Bilateralism, in this context, can be 
understood as the process of cooperation and direct understanding between 
a single local government and the central government, without the aspect of 
collective deliberation that characterises multilateral bodies.15
Nevertheless, the focus of this chapter is the lower chamber. It will be dis-
cussed in the next chapters, regarding the Brazilian case.
3.2 The Lower Chamber and Its Formation
As seen above, the composition of the lower chamber should be proportional 
to the electorate of each state (one person, one vote …) so that it may be capable 
of representing citizens equally. Also, in federations, states are usually elec-
toral districts. For this reason, the ratio between the number of citizens and 
the number of seats assigned to each state becomes a very important issue.
At this point, it is possible to say that bicameralism can offer a balance 
between the two factors mentioned above, that is, equality of representation 
between citizens and equality of representation between constituent units. 
Clearly, disproportional representation of citizens in the upper house is a price 
to pay for the federative balance.16 The option for federalism brings with it 
the acceptance of this difference between the citizens of the states regarding 
the representation in the upper house. The assumption, however, is that in the 
lower house the representation of citizens is as egalitarian as possible. So far, 
there is nothing new.
However, when, in addition to the natural imbalance of representation of 
citizens in the upper house (a fact inherent in almost all federations), there 
 14 ‘While the political and scholarly discourse too often looks at how second chambers 
could be made more effective in representing subnational interests, it forgets that the 
issue is participation, that participation takes place outside of second chambers and that, 
in a growing number of cases, the main problem is to determine the right balance between 
individual and collective bargaining between the levels of government’; Francesco Palermo, 
“Beyond Second Chambers: Alternative Representation of Territorial Interests and Their 
Reasons,” Perspectives on Federalism 10, no. 2 (2018).
 15 ‘This is why more and more frequently strong subnational units pursue bilateral instru-
ments for negotiation and cooperation with the national level and very often such fora 
are legally established since the national level acknowledges that they are necessary.‘ 
Francesco Palermo, “Beyond Second Chambers: Alternative Representation of Territorial 
Interests and Their Reasons,” Perspectives on Federalism 10, no. 2 (2018).
 16 ‘Federations, then, sacrifice in some degree citizen equality in order to secure, again 
in some degree, regional equality.‘ King, Preston. “Federalism and Representation,” in 
Comparative Federalism and Federation, eds. Michael Burgess and Alain- G. Gagnon 
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is also an overrepresentation of some constituent units in the lower house, 
there is an excessive impairment to equality among citizens. In this sense, it 
is understood that the federal organisation can mean a threat to democracy.
In federal states, there is a division of chairs, in lower chamber, among the 
states. Therefore, since members of congress must be elected by the votes of 
only a single state, territorial division can cause an impact on equality of rep-
resentation. Hence, there is a clear relationship between the division of ter-
ritory (one of the key subjects of studies on federalism) and equality in rep-
resentation: if the states are different in population or density, it is often hard 
to find a mathematical formula to preserve equal representation.
Proportionality in the representation of citizens of different states may seem 
a simple task, but, indeed, it is not. The first problem concerns only mathe-
matics. As a starting point, let us take the division of the total population of a 
country by the number of seats in the lower chamber, obtaining a ‘quotient’. 
Then, we divide the population of each state by this quotient. The result should 
indicate how many inhabitants each congressperson represents. However, the 
division will rarely be exact, i.e., resulting in a counting number. If the result 
indicates that state A should have 5.6 representatives, and state B must have 
2.4 representatives, which state should assign the chair, A or B? Also, if a state 
has a population below the quotient, can it remain without representation?
Almost all Constitutions of federations require that each constituent unit 
must have at least one representative in the lower house. This point is high-
lighted, for instance, in the Swiss system of dividing the 200 seats of the lower 
house,17 as well as in the formula of the US Constitution.18 Despite the different 
solutions adopted in each federation, the minimum of one representative per 
constituent unit has an obvious basis: if a constituent unit without representa-
tives were possible, its citizens would simply not be represented in parliament, 
 17 ‘In the first round, the total number of all inhabitants is divided by 200. Cantons that 
have a population of less than the determined number receive one seat. These cantons 
and their share in the Swiss population are excluded from the further procedure. In the 
second round, the remaining population is divided by the remaining seats. Again, the 
cantons whose population is less than the determined number receive one seat, and 
they and their populations are, from then on, excluded from the procedure. This pro-
cedure is repeated until all remaining cantons have populations higher than the deter-
mined number. In the third round, for the distribution of remaining seats, the population 
of each remaining canton is divided by the last determined number’; Thomas Fleiner, 
Alexander Misic and Nicole Töpperwien, Constitutional Law in Switzerland (Alphen aan 
den Rijn: Stämpfli Publishers, 2012), 89.
 18 Article i, section 2, clause 3: ‘The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for 





which would mean the annulment of their citizenship. This conclusion, how-
ever, will only be valid if we have as an insuperable dogma the idea that a 
citizen can only be represented in the lower house,by another citizen of the 
same state.
A second mathematical problem is the assignment of minimum and max-
imum numbers of representatives per constituent unit. This tends to damage 
the more populous states and favour the less populous. From a strictly arith-
metic point of view, it is quite clear that citizens of more populous constituent 
units are underrepresented, in comparison with citizens of less populous ones 
(overrepresented). In my view, a simple breach of the rule one person, one vote 
is enough to characterise an impairment to equality of representation and, 
consequently, to democracy. It is true that the functionality of the system may 
require toleration of some distortion, at least in extreme cases (very populous 
or very sparsely populated constituent units). Nevertheless, the preservation 
of equality and democracy means that we must always seek the formula that 
minimises these problems as much as possible.
Finally, in a time perspective, population may vary over time from one con-
stituent unit to another in a different way. Taking any period of time, a constit-
uent unit may have a higher population growth than another one. This may 
be due to demographic differences such as higher birth rates or longevity in 
some states. However, the most common cause in Brazil is migration within 
the country.19 This is especially dramatic in countries with high social inequal-
ity, such as Brazil, where workers from the north and northeast regions tend to 
migrate to the southeast region, in search of jobs and a higher quality of life. 
Hence, rules of division of chairs must be periodically updated. In case such 
updates prove to be impossible, flexible rules should at least be adopted, in 
order to modify the division with a simple update of population numbers. If 
there are no updates (of rules or information), such distortion tends to increase 
over time.
4 The Brazilian Case
From this topic, the Brazilian case will be specifically addressed, in three sub-
topics. In the first, some general information will be presented for a better 
understanding of the local context, especially for the foreign reader. In the 
 19 Jairo Nicolau, Representantes de quem? Os descaminhos do seu voto da urna à Câmara dos 
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second topic, Brazilian constitutional and legal rules on the formation of the 
lower house will be exposed, as well as the figures resulting from the applica-
tion of these rules. In the third, the effects of these results on the principle of 
equality will be discussed.
4.1 The Context: Key Facts about Brazil
As an overview, the Brazilian federation is made up of 26 states and one fed-
eral district. The total population estimated for 2017 is 207.7 million people.20 
For study purposes, the country is usually divided into five regions: north, 
northeast, centre- west, southeast and south.21 The southeast is where most 
of the population is concentrated, while the north and centre- west have great 
territorial extension and smaller population, resulting in low demographic 
density.22 The northern region holds large, still- preserved forests and indig-
enous populations.23 The centre- west is currently one of the world’s largest 
producers of animal protein and grains, especially soybeans.24 The north 
and northeast have the worst indicators of development and quality of life.25 
The south and southeast regions have higher rates of development and some 
cultural homogeneity between them. More than 40 % of the population is 
 20 ibge (2017), https:// agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/ agencia- sala- de- imprensa/ 2013- agencia- 
denoticias/ releases/ 16131- ibge- divulga- as- estimativas- populacionais- dos- municipios- para 
2017#:~:text=O%20IBGE%20divulga%20hoje%20as,2016%20(0%2C80%25).
 21 ibge (2020), https:// www.ibge.gov.br/ geociencias/ organizacao- do- territorio/ divisao- 
regional/ 15778- divisoes- regionais- do- brasil.html?=&t=o- que- e. The states of each region 
are: North: Amazonas (am), Pará (pa), Acre (ac), Rondônia (ro), Amapá (ap), Roraima 
(rr) and Tocantins (to); Northeast: Maranhão (ma), Piauí (pi), Ceará (ce), Rio Grande 
do Norte (rn); Pernambuco (pe), Alagoas (al), Paraíba (pb), Sergipe (se) and Bahia (ba); 
Centre- West: Mato Grosso (mt), Mato Grosso do Sul (ms), Goiás (go) and the federal 
district – Distrito Federal (df); Southeast: Espírito Santo (es), Minas Gerais (mg), Rio de 
Janeiro (rj) and São Paulo (sp); South: Paraná (pr), Santa Catarina (sc) and Rio Grande 
do Sul (rs).
 22 ibge (2010a), https:// censo2010.ibge.gov.br/ sinopse/ index.php?dados=10&uf=00. Agência 
Brasil (2019), https:// agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/ economia/ noticia/ 2019- 10/ estudo- diz- 
que- sudeste- reune- maior- numero- de- residentes- 422#:~:text=A%20regi%C3%A3o%20
Sudeste%20%C3%A9%20a,Oeste%20(7%2C7%25).
 23 Ministério do Meio Ambiente (2020), https:// www.mma.gov.br/ informma/ item/ 8746- 
regiao- norte.html.
 24 conab (2019), https:// www.conab.gov.br/ institucional/ publicacoes/ perspectivas- para- a 
- agropecuaria.

















concentrated in only three states of the federation (São Paulo, Minas Gerais 
and Rio de Janeiro), all in the southeast region.26 The three coastal states of 
the southeast region (Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Espírito Santo) produce 
more than 95 % of Brazilian oil.27 For this reason, they also have a predomi-
nant share of royalty revenue.
Although there are variations between states, none of them significantly 
concentrates any ethnic or religious group, which are scattered over the coun-
try. The uniformity of the language is almost total, since only a very small part 
of the population (indigenous people still living in isolation) do not speak 
Portuguese.28 Regional variations of the language are irrelevant.
In summary, Brazilian states and regions are highly homogeneous as to 
the key factors that most commonly identify minorities in need of protec-
tion: nationality, ethnicity, religion and language.
Presidentialism is the system of government, with a president elected 
directly every four years, on the same date as the legislative elections. Only a 
second consecutive term is allowed for the president, with no limits for non- 
consecutive periods. Voting is mandatory for all Brazilians between 18 and 
70 years of age, and it is optional for those between the ages of 16 and 17 and 
those over 70. In the 2016 elections, there were 144 million people eligible to 
vote.29
The 26 states and the Federal District have their own parliaments (with a 
single chamber), directly elected by citizens according to the one person, one 
vote principle. However, its relevance is narrow. All important legislative mat-
ters, according to the Constitution, must be regulated by federal laws and, 
therefore, passed in the national parliament.30
 26 ibge (2017), https:// agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/ agencia- sala- de- imprensa/ 2013- 
agencia- de- noticias/ releases/ 16131- ibge- divulga- as- estimativas- populacionais- dos- 
municipios- para2017#:~:text=O%20IBGE%20divulga%20hoje%20as,2016%20
(0%2C80%25).
 27 anp (2019) http:// www.anp.gov.br/ publicacoes/ anuario- estatistico/ 5237- anuario- estatistico 
- 2019.
 28 According to the latest official information available (2010 census), 17.5 % (143,144) of 
indigenous people (817,963), who represent 0.08 % of the total population (190,755,799) 
do not speak Portuguese. ibge (2010b), censo2010.ibge.gov.br/ https:// indigenas.ibge.gov.
br/ graficos- e- tabelas- 2.html.
 29 tse (2016), http:// www.tse.jus.br/ imprensa/ noticias- tse/ 2016/ Novembro/ segundo- turno 
- municipios- com- biometria- tem- indice- menor- de- abstencoes.
 30 Marcelo Piancasteli. “The Federal Republic of Brazil,” in Distribution of Powers and 
Responsibilities in Federal Countries, eds. Akhtar Majeed, Ronald L. Watts and Douglas 
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Brazilian Constitution clearly establishes the role of each house: the 
Chamber of Deputies is composed of representatives of the people and the 
Federal Senate is composed of representatives of the states.31
The Senate is composed of three representatives from each constituent 
unit (26 states and the federal district), totalling eighty- one senators. Each 
senator has a mandate of eight years. Renewal occurs every four years, alter-
nating one of three and two of three, i.e., one senator per state in one election, 
and two senators per state in the next election, and so on. Election occurs 
through the majority system, that is, the most voted are elected, regardless 
of party.32
4.2 The Formation of the Brazilian Lower Chamber: Rules and Numbers
For the composition of the Chamber of Deputies, candidates within the same 
state compete for the chairs allocated to that constituent unit. Voters in each 
state can only vote for candidates from that state. Election obeys the propor-
tional system, that is, the seats are divided between parties according to the 
total votes for each party, in that state.33
The total number of deputies is determined by complementary law.34 The 
Constitution further determines that the number of representatives per state 
must be proportional to its population. However, the Constitution itself (not 
an ordinary law) also establishes a minimum of eight and a maximum of sev-
enty deputies per constituent unit.35
It is important to note that the role of each chamber in the legislative pro-
cedure is very similar. Both are equally important in the law- making and in 
the oversight of the Executive Branch. Ordinarily, every law must be passed 
 31 Art. 44: ‘The Legislative Power is exercised by the National Congress, which is composed 
of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate.’
 32 Art. 46: ‘The Federal Senate is constituted of representatives of the States and the Federal 
District, elected according to the majority principle; Paragraph 1: Each State and the 
Federal District shall elect three Senators, with a term of eight years.’
 33 Art. 45: ‘The Chamber of Deputies is composed of representatives of the people, elected 
by the proportional system, in each State, in each Territory and in the Federal District.’
 34 The complementary law (‘lei complementar’) is a special type of law whose subject to be 
regulated is previously determined by the Constitution. Its approval requires an absolute 
majority (more than half of the members of the whole chamber), while the ordinary law 
(‘lei ordinária’) may be passed by a simple majority (more than a half of those present).
 35 Art. 46 Paragraph 1: ‘The total number of Deputies, as well as the representation by State 
and by the Federal District, shall be established by complementary law, proportionately 
to the population, with the necessary adjustments, in the year preceding the elections, 














in both chambers successively. In addition, several deliberations are bound to 
the Congresso Nacional (National Congress), which consists of the unicameral 
meeting of the two chambers.
The Complementary Law 78 of 1993, which complements these norms, thus 
establishes that the maximum number of federal deputies is 513, the most pop-
ulous state must have seventy deputies and none of them shall have less than 
eight (repeating what the Constitution settles). Furthermore, information 
from the official statistics institute must be used to calculate the distribution 
of chairs between states.36
The last general revision of the composition of the Chamber of Deputies 
took place in 1986. Subsequently, seats were added only to some states, reach-
ing the number of 513, which has remained the same since 1993. Therefore, 
for almost 25 years, the division of seats between constituent units has been 
unchanged, despite the variation of total population and also in each constit-
uent unit.
These rules contained in Brazilian laws generate great distortion in the rep-
resentation of the states in the lower chamber. Table 11.1 shows the number of 
representatives (second column, ‘A’) and inhabitants (third column, ‘B’) in each 
constituent unit. In the fourth column, the number of citizens represented 
by each representative is shown. This results from a simple division between 
the number of inhabitants (third column) and the number of representatives 
per constituent unit (second column). In the fifth column, there would be the 
number for each State, if an exact proportion were adopted (the ‘ideal’ num-
ber). In order to calculate the exact proportion, 513 seats were divided between 
the constituent units, without considering the minimum of eight and the maxi-
mum of seventy. In the fifth column is the difference, more or less, in that num-
ber of representatives.
This difference can be seen in Figure 11.1 below, where the bars indicate the 
number of citizens represented by each Member of the lower chamber by state 
(the ‘C’ factor in the table above).
The midpoint would be situated at 394,658 citizens, so that seven con-
stituent units are underrepresented. On the other hand, twenty constituent 
 36 Art. 1: ‘Proportional to the population of the States and the Federal District, the number 
of federal deputies shall not exceed five hundred and thirteen representatives, provided 
by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics Foundation, in the year prior to the 
elections, the demographic statistical update of the units of the Federation.’
Art. 2: ‘None of the member states of the Federation shall have less than eight federal 
deputies.’
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table 11.1 Number of representatives and inhabitants per constituent unit in Brazil
Constituent unit Representatives Inhabitants Division Exact 
proportion
Distortion
(A) (B) C=B/ A (D) (A- D)
´(2010)
São Paulo (sp) 70 43.592.011 622.743 110 - 40
Minas Gerais (mg) 53 20.524.700 387.258 52 1
Rio de Janeiro (rj) 46 16.868.851 366.714 43 3
Bahia (ba) 39 14.517.499 372.244 37 2
Rio Grande do Sul 
(rs)
31 10.959.601 353.536 28 3
Paraná (pr) 30 10.917.904 363.930 28 2
Pernambuco (pe) 25 9.275.121 371.005 24 1
Ceará (ce) 22 9.022.175 410.099 23 - 1
Pará (pa) 17 8.390.051 493.532 21 - 4
Maranhão (ma) 18 7.096.909 394.273 18 0
Santa Catarina (sc) 16 6.753.006 422.063 17 - 1
Goiás (go) 17 6.581.240 387.132 17 0
Paraíba (pb) 12 3.941.613 328.468 10 2
Espírito Santo (es) 10 3.746.205 374.621 9 1
Piauí (pi) 10 3.266.919 326.692 8 2
Alagoas (al) 9 3.283.025 364.781 8 1
Rio Grande do 
Norte (rn)
8 3.387.060 423.383 9 - 1
Amazonas (am) 8 3.877.243 484.655 10 - 2
Mato Grosso (mt) 8 3.342.705 417.838 8 0
Mato Grosso do Sul 
(ms)
8 2.660.685 332.586 7 1
Distrito Federal 
(df)
8 2.882.625 360.328 7 1
Sergipe (se) 8 2.227.984 278.498 6 2
Rondônia (ro) 8 1.663.797 207.975 4 4
Tocantins (to) 8 1.513.492 189.187 4 4
Acre (ac) 8 841.660 105.208 2 6
Amapá (ap) 8 794.181 99.273 2 6
Roraima (rr) 8 531.053 66.382 1 7
total 513 202.459.315 394.658 513
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units are consequently overrepresented. However, the overrepresentation is 
proportionally very large. As shown, there is a huge difference between the 
population of the states, from 43 million people in São Paulo to 0.5 million 
in Roraima. However, the Constitution determines a range from eight to sev-
enty representatives for each state, and a total number of 513. According to 
such numbers (settled by the Constitution, not only by a regulation), Brazil 
is an excellent example of the mathematical impossibility of a totally equal 
representation. Very briefly, it means there is overrepresentation in the lower 
chamber of less populated states, mainly by the northeast and the north 
regions.
4.3 Consequences of Distortion: Is It a Real Problem?
The correlation between democracy and federalism is almost a commonplace 
in studies of federations. In very succinct terms, the greater decentralisation of 
power between different constituent units would, in the most common view, 
lead to greater citizen participation and, consequently, bring them closer to a 
democracy. According to Ronald Watts:
Democracy and governmental responsiveness can be enhanced within 
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FIGURE 11.1  Citizen representation by members of the lower chamber by state
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opportunity for citizen participation and because they provide for gov-
ernments that are smaller and closer to the people.37
In spite of recognising the predominance of this view, some scholars, such as 
Alfred Stepan, ask for more research to confirm this statement.38
Regarding the specific issue of the present chapter, numbers alone demon-
strate that the rule one person, one vote is seriously impaired in such a situation 
of inequality. There is clear inequality between citizens of different constituent 
units, which results from overrepresentation or underrepresentation. If there 
is no equality of representation, it cannot be said that democracy is whole.
In a non- federal state, inequalities in representation are also possible. 
However, the problem is certainly less severe because there is more flexibility 
for adjustments. The division of electoral districts could be done on the basis 
of equality of representation, with no limits in the borders of constituent units. 
On the contrary, in federal states, the limit of electoral districts, in the grid of 
borders of constituent units, makes it more difficult to manage distortions.
However, in a federation, the mandatory election of representatives within 
each state results in distortions. Such distortions can be more or less serious in 
each federation, for the reasons already mentioned above: mathematical prob-
lems, minimum and maximum number of representatives per state and inter-
nal migration (without periodic revisions of the representation of each state).
It cannot be denied, then, that the federal form of state can be, from such a 
point of view, less democratic, due to the distortion of the proportionality of 
representation in the lower chamber (which is supposed to represent the peo-
ple) and the breaking of the principle one person, one vote.
In other words, when seeking formal equality between constituent units 
that are quite different, federalism leads to political inequality between citi-
zens of different states. In the lower chamber, if the organisational model does 
not follow proportionality (for example, determining minimum and maxi-
mum numbers of representatives for each constituent unit), the result could 
be the inequality between citizens of different states.
 37 Ronald L. Watts. Comparing Federal Systems (Montreal: McGill- Queen´s University Press, 
2008), 155.
 38 ‘Some advocate federalism, as opposed to unitary government, because they believe it 
contributes to freedom, subsidiarity and democracy. I have not seen any systematic evi-
dence to support these assumptions, but they clearly need to be researched’; Alfred Stepan, 
“Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, Multinationalism and Democracy,” in 
Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Edward L. Gibson (Baltimore: The Johns 






In addition, researching some Latin American cases, including Brazil, 
Snyder and Samuels revealed important consequences of this distortion:
Specifically, the high levels of malapportionment in Latin American 
countries have fostered: (1) a rural- conservative bias in legislature, 
(2) estrangement of the executive and legislative branches, (3) the pro-
liferation of subnational authoritarian enclaves and (4) a strong capacity 
for subnational elites to ‘hold the center hostage' with regard to major 
policy issues. 39
Could such distortion be considered a benefit, rather than a problem? In 
other words, could it be said that this overrepresentation of some states is 
a way of protecting minorities, which, in the end, is one of the key ideas of 
federalism?
There are two answers: a more general one and a specific one for the 
Brazilian case.
In a more general perspective, if the citizens of smaller states are already 
overrepresented in the upper house, it does not make sense to give them an 
overrepresentation in the lower house as well. The role of the lower house, 
as seen, is to represent all citizens, regardless of the constituent unit in 
which they live. Therefore, there is no reason why the principle of equality 
should not be respected to the greatest extent possible in the lower house.
In Brazil, ethnic and religious groups are spread over several states, making it 
impossible to feature any state as representative of any minority. As for the lan-
guage, the homogeneity of the Brazilian population is almost total. Therefore, 
overrepresentation of any state, just because it has fewer inhabitants, does not 
bring any benefit to minorities.
Further reflection is necessary: why should each state be an electoral district? 
Why have all federations, since the beginning, adopted this ‘rule’? Is it part of the 
federal concept?
From the first federations, the election of representatives has been made by 
constituent units. It is as old a tradition as the federal form of state. In federations 
formed by aggregation of units (such as the United States and Switzerland), the 
historical reason seems fairly clear: the people of each state or canton elect their 
representatives to a central body. Each constituent unit already existed before the 
federation and the national parliament.
 39 Richard Snyder and David J. Samuels, “Legislative Malapportionment in Latin America,” 
in Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Edward L. Gibson, (Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 2004), 151.
 
 
Federal States and Equality in Political Representation 333
However, in countries like Brazil, where their states were never independ-
ent, nor did they form a confederation, there is no such historical reason. So, 
the maintenance of this dogma (election of representatives only within the 
limits of each constituent unity) is the result only of a long tradition. It is 
not part of the federal concept. Simply, as far as is known, no different way 
has ever been attempted.
5 Possible Measures to Solve or Mitigate the Problem
At this point, I will discuss some suggestions for measures to solve or mitigate the 
problem of distortion of citizens representation in Brazil.
5.1 An Almost Absolute Proportion
One first idea would be to adopt an absolute proportion, determining the 
number of citizens that would be represented by each of the deputies, without 
establishing any maximum by states, and the minimum of one (this is the rea-
son for the almost in the subsection title), but keeping the total size of the lower 
chamber. It means that the minimum number of representatives by state shall 
be one. In addition, a periodic review of the division would be important in 
order to take into account the internal migratory movements that could alter 
the population of the states.40 The obvious advantage of this system would be 
the closest possible approximation to the principle one person, one vote.
On the other hand, such a solution could generate another distortion, since 
some states would have only one deputy and three senators. In this situation, 
it would be easier to be elected to the upper chamber than to the lower one.
5.2 Developing Bilateralism
In Brazil, a more extensive practice of bilateralism could go through the crea-
tion of interstate representation bodies for a collective dialogue with the cen-
tral government. These bodies could be created by region, or by specific inter-
ests (oil producing states, for example), in order to make this dialogue more 
efficient. These ideas, however, would depend on deeper changes in the system 
and, therefore, on extensive and difficult changes in the Constitution.
Encouraging bilateralism would not exactly be a solution to the problem, 
but only a mitigating measure. With space for dialogue and discussion between 
 40 Jairo Nicolau argues that the periodic review should be done every four years, before each 








the constituent units and the central power, especially about the most contro-
versial issues, citizens representativeness would be favoured, albeit indirectly.
5.3 One State, Two or More Electoral Districts
Observing the figures in the table above (Table 11.1), it is noted that the most 
serious problem of underrepresentation is in the State of São Paulo. This is an 
extensive state with a large population. In this sense, the idea of dividing it into 
two electoral districts would be reasonable, so that each of them would have 
the number of deputies proportional to its electorate, according to the rules of 
the Constitution.
To implement this idea, it would be necessary to break the paradigm, present 
in many federal states, that each constituent unit constitutes a single electoral 
district. This procedure would encounter great difficulty, as it would depend 
on a constitutional amendment, with approval by three- fifths of each chamber 
of the parliament. In addition, all electoral legislation, based on organs within 
each state, would have to be modified.
5.4 The National Deputy
Breaking the same paradigm, and going beyond the more obvious ideas, there 
is the suggestion of the national deputy. The idea would be to allow candidates 
to have votes in all states, forming a single voting list across the country. This 
would end the limitation of the electoral district to the state. In my view, this 
procedure would be compatible with the idea that the lower house should rep-
resent the entire population, not the states.
In today’s world, communication among citizens occurs mainly in virtual 
environments, such as television and the internet, which do not observe terri-
torial barriers. It is common for a person to be known and admired throughout 
the country, regardless of territorial division into states. Thus, it seems fair that 
this person can receive votes nationally, that is, by citizens of different states.
The adoption of this system as the only form of election of representatives 
could generate some apparently negative consequences, such as the fact that 
citizens of smaller constituent units would be represented only in the upper 
chamber. According to the approach of this work, this would not be real, 
since these citizens would always have some participation in the election of 
the national deputy, even when such a deputy comes from a state different 
from that of the voter. It is important to reinforce that the territorial division 
of Brazil does not correspond to the allocation of ethnic, religious, linguis-
tic or any other minorities that require special protection from federalism. 
Furthermore, these minorities, spread across the whole country, could sum 
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votes nationally, in order to elect a representative and successfully have a voice 
in the parliament.
In Brazil, national minorities are also local minorities. In fact, if a minority 
group is scattered across the country, it is more likely to achieve some rep-
resentation if it can elect a deputy nationally, uniting the votes of its members 
throughout the country. In this context, invisible minorities in the country, 
united by a common problem (for example, disabled people) could elect one 
or more representatives, adding their votes nationally. With the modern media 
and virtual communication, it is reasonable to assume that these groups could 
unite nationally, even though they are physically distant.
However, as a way of experiencing this novelty in a gradual way, a mixed for-
mula would also be possible. In this way, part of the deputies would be elected 
by their states of origin and others nationally.
6 Conclusion
As seen in previous sections, the mainstream ideas in federalism point to a 
direct relationship between federalism and democracy. The one person, one 
vote principle, in turn, is usually pointed out as essential to the equal rep-
resentation of citizens in a democratic regime. In this chapter, I developed 
a specific point, the distortion in the representation of citizens in the lower 
chamber of a federal state, looking at the Brazilian case.
The first point, quite evident, is that the existence of an upper chamber with 
identical representation of all states (without proportionality) already repre-
sents inequality, to the detriment of the inhabitants of the most populous 
states.
This inequality of representation in the upper chamber, however, brings 
some important advantages to federalism, such as stability between constitu-
ent units. In the federal states, the upper chamber plays an important role in 
ensuring stability and, ultimately, in maintaining federation cohesion.
However, even in the lower house, which should represent the popula-
tion equally, the simple fact of dividing the population into electoral districts 
equivalent to the states is enough to create a distortion in the equality of 
representation.
Therefore, although under and overrepresentation can also occur in non- 
federal states, the limits of federal organisation (especially the election of rep-
resentatives in the strict limits of a constituent unit), by itself, already causes 
inequality in representation of citizens.
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The problem can still be aggravated, for several reasons, but mainly by the 
establishment of the minimum and maximum number of representatives. In 
the Brazilian case, this distortion is large and evident.
To reduce the problem, it would be advisable to eliminate the maximum 
of representatives and keep a minimum of one, establishing an almost abso-
lute proportion, as far as mathematically possible. This would not necessarily 
mean an increase in parliament size. The idea here is to modify the division of 
chairs, without a maximum for each constituent unit (and the minimum of 
one), while maintaining the total number.
In addition, the adoption of bilateral discussion mechanisms can open 
important channels for dialogue. This would not eliminate distortion in rep-
resentation, but it could give citizens of underrepresented states more voice. 
Also, the establishment of electoral districts different from the borders of the 
constituent units, in order to counterbalance differences in population den-
sity, would mitigate the problem.
Finally, a possible proposal would be the idea of the national deputy, elected 
with votes from all over the country, without being limited to a state. This for-
mula could be used for the entire lower chamber, or, in different degrees, in 
mixed formulas, where part of the deputies would be elected by their states of 
origin and others nationally.
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 chapter 12
Equality and Inequality in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Soeren Keil
1 Introduction
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a peculiar federal state.1 Some have referred 
to it as a confederal state;2 others call it a loose multinational federation.3 This 
author has described Bosnia as an imposed federal system, which is interna-
tionally administered by outside intervention in the political decision- making 
process.4 These different definitions and labels already demonstrate the com-
plexity that is inherent in Bosnia’s federalism and federation – namely the fact 
that it is hard to label and characterise the political system through the use of 
established terminology within the field of comparative federalism.5
This chapter discusses one aspect of this complexity: the issue of constitu-
tional equality in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the 1995 Constitution, 
‘Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and 
citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ determine the Constitution.6 However, 
while the Constitution includes a focus on non- discrimination between dif-
ferent ethnic groups, it also introduces power- sharing mechanisms between 
Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, to ensure their peaceful cooperation after the end 
of the war in 1995 and to address their desire to have a strong stake in the state. 
This includes, for example, the existence of a three- person Presidency, includ-
ing one Bosniak and one Croat (elected in the mainly Bosniak- Croat Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and one Serb member, elected in the Serb part of 
 1 The terms Bosnia, BiH and Bosnia and Herzegovina will be used interchangeably and always 
refer to the whole territory of the country known as Bosnia and Herzegovina.
 2 Mirjana Kasapović, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Consociational or Liberal Democracy?,” 
Politička misao 42, no. 5 (2008): 3– 30.
 3 Florian Bieber, Post- War Bosnia, Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
 4 Soeren Keil, Multinational Federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).
 5 For a more general debate on this see Aleksandra Zdeb, “A Federation like No Other: The Case 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 50 Shades of Federalism (2018), https:// 50shadesoffederalism.
com/ case- studies/ federation- like- no- case- bosnia- herzegovina/ .
 6 Preamble of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution of 1995. On this topic also Federal 
Equality in Multinational Bosnia and Herzegovina by Dejan Vanjek ( chapter 13).
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Bosnia (Republika Srpska). Hence, equality is split between the equality of the 
three constituent peoples and the equality of the two entities in Bosnia.
Bosnia’s Constitution also includes a long list of human rights provisions, 
which ensure the equal treatment of all people in Bosnia. As a result of this 
obvious contradiction between the rights of certain ethnic groups and all 
citizens of Bosnia, the European Court of Human Rights (echr) found in 
December 2009 that Bosnia discriminates against ‘Others’, because certain 
institutions in the state (i.e. the Presidency and the House of Peoples) only 
foresee representation for Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. The judgement was the 
result of a complaint by a Bosnian Roma and a member of the Jewish commu-
nity. However, to date it has not resulted in fundamental constitutional change. 
Yet, it is worth thinking about the very practical implications of this judge-
ment, namely that a key element for ensuring peace in post- war Bosnia – eth-
nic power- sharing – might be modified and indeed questioned. This could also 
have potential consequences for the territorial division of Bosnia and the role 
of the constituent peoples and all other citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In order to demonstrate the complex – and contradictory – nature of equality 
(and inequality) in Bosnia’s constitutional framework, I proceed as follows: in 
the first part, a discussion of the federal political system in Bosnia, its origins 
as a result of the war (1992– 1995), and its development in the post- war era will 
be outlined, with the aim of demonstrating the multiple facets of equality (and 
inequality) within the different constitutional frameworks (at state, entity, 
cantonal and local level) in the country. In the second part, I discuss the origin 
of the Sejdić- Finci judgement of the European Court of Human Rights (echr) 
and outline the judgement and its meaning for Bosnia’s constitutional reality. 
Finally, in the third part, I demonstrate why this judgement is so important for 
Bosnia, but also why the judgement has still not been implemented by Bosnian 
elites – more than ten years after the Court’s original ruling.
2 Federalism and Federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina – A Question 
of Equality?
Bosnia’s unique, and highly complex federal political system is the result of a 
three- and- a- half- year long conflict that devastated the country between 1992 
and 1995. In the wake of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and after the independ-
ence declarations of Slovenia and Croatia, Bosniaks and Croats pushed for 
Bosnian independence as well. As a result of the independence declaration in 
April 1992, Serb elites, with the support of the Yugoslav army and paramilitary 
troops, began to establish zones of Serb autonomy, which were later united 
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under the banner ‘Republika Srpska’ – the Serb Republic. The idea of the polit-
ical project led by Radoslav Karadžić and military organised by Ratko Mladić7 
was to create a coherent and united territory in Bosnia, in which all non- Serbs 
would be ethnically cleansed so that a homogenous Serbian territory could 
declare independence from Bosnia and later join Serbia or rump Yugoslavia.8 
In addition to the conflict between Bosniaks and Croats on the one side, and 
Serbs on the other side, in 1993 a conflict broke out between the Bosniak army 
and Croat fighters, when Croat paramilitaries, with support from Croatia, 
fought for the secession of the Herzeg- Bosnia territory in the East of Bosnia, 
and its inclusion into Croatia.9 This conflict came to an end in early 1994 when, 
as a result of American pressure, the Presidents of Croatia and Bosnia signed 
the Washington Agreement. The Washington Agreement would create a mili-
tary alliance between the two countries, and a Federation of several cantons 
in those territories of Bosnia which were under the control of the Bosniak and 
Croat militaries. Fighting eventually came to an end in Bosnia in late 1995 as 
a result of the Dayton Peace Agreement (dpa), which included a comprehen-
sive peace plan for Bosnia and its future political organisation. Bosnia’s current 
Constitution is included in the dpa as Annex iv. The dpa was the result of 
extensive US pressure on all parties in Bosnia, and would lay the foundations of 
the political developments in Bosnia that have played a key role until today.10
2.1 The Dayton System
The Bosnian state that the dpa created was one characterised by a number 
of contradictory principles.11 The federal system portrayed elements of both, 
an ethnic federation in the style of the Ethiopian federation,12 and a more 
 7 Both were later indicted and sentenced by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (icty) for their role in ethnic cleansing campaigns, war crimes and 
genocide.
 8 More generally on the dissolution of Yugoslavia see Laura Silber and Alan Little, The 
Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin Books and bbc Books, 1996). More specifically 
on Bosnia and Herzegovina see the excellent discussion in Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, 
The War in Bosnia- Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, 
London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).
 9 Attila Hoare, “The Croatian Project to Partition Bosnia- Hercegovina, 1990– 1994,” East 
European Quarterly 31, no. 1 (March 1997): 121– 138.
 10 On the role of the USA in Bosnia see Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: The 
Modern Library, 1999); Ivo Daalder, Getting to Dayton – The Making of America’s Bosnia 
Policy (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2000).
 11 Jens Woelk, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Trying to Build a Federal State on Paradoxes,” in 
Constitutional Dynamics in Federal States – Sub- national Perspectives, eds. Michael Burgess 
and Alan Tarr (Kingston, Montreal: McGill- Queen’s University Press, 2012), 109.
 12 On ethnic federalism in Ethiopia see David Turton, ed., Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian 














Equality and Inequality in Bosnia and Herzegovina 341
classical European and North American federation, based on territorial, 
rather than ethnic principles.13 The federal system created was based on two 
territorial units, known as ‘entities’ – one of them, the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (FBiH), was further sub- divided into ten cantons, while the 
other, the Republika Srpska (rs), was highly centralised. In addition to these 
two entities, the Brčko District in the North East of the country was put under 
international administration and later through arbitration became an inde-
pendent District, which belonged to both entities but was governed by nei-
ther neither (Figure 12.1, below).14
The FBiH was to control 51 % of Bosnian territory, while the rs controlled 
49 % of the territory, with the borders between the two very much reflecting the 
cease fire line established between the enemy armies in the late summer of 1995. 
However, since 1999, both entities had to give up territory when the Brčko District 
was formed as an independently administered unit within this complex federal 
system.15
All territorial units within the federation are based on ethnic criteria, with 
the exception of Brčko District and the two mixed cantons in the FBiH, in which 
mainly Bosniak and Croats live. A census in 2013 confirmed the homogenous 
nature of the different territories in Bosnia, with 92.11 % of all Serbs in Bosnia liv-
ing in the rs, as well as 88.23 % of all Bosniaks and 91.39 % of all Croats in Bosnia 
living in the FBiH.16 The ten cantons within the FBiH themselves are more or less 
ethnically homogenous, with five of them having a clear Bosniak majority, three 
having a clear Croat majority, and only the Central Bosnia and the Herzegovina 
Neretva cantons having a mixed population, mainly consisting of Bosniaks and 
Croats.
Yet, while the territorial organisation of the country might indicate the 
installation of a federal system based on exclusive ethnic criteria, this is not 
 13 On territorial federalism, and particularly the European tradition of federalism see Michael 
Burgess, Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice (Basingstoke, New York: Routledge, 
2006), 162– 191.
 14 A Map of Bosnia’s complex federal system, published by the Office of the High 
Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 7 October 2003, can be found at http:// 
reliefweb.int/ map/ bosnia- and- herzegovina/ federation- bosnia- and- herzegovina.
 15 For the final decision of the Arbitration Tribunal see Office of the High Representative, 
Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over Inter- Entity Boundary in Brcko Area, Final Award, 5 
March 1999, http:// www.ohr.int/ ?ohr_ archive=arbitral- tribunal- for- dispute- over- inter- 
entity- boundary- in- brcko- area- final- award.
 16 Rodolfo Toe, “Census Reveals Bosnia’s Changed Demography,” BalkanInsight, 30 June 
2016, http:// www.balkaninsight.com/ en/ article/ new- demographic- picture- of- bosnia 










 figure 12.1  Map of Bosnia’s complex federal system
  The name of canton ten has been declared illegal by the Constitutional Court 
of the FBiH, because ‘Herceg Bosna’ refers to the Croat statelet that tried to 
secede from Bosnia during the war. The canton has since been referred to as 
Canton 10.
  source: office of the high representative in bosnia and 
herzegovina (see Footnote 14)
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completely the case.17 An important ruling by the Bosnian Constitutional 
Court in 2000 established that the two entities cannot claim to represent one 
(or two) of the constituent peoples exclusively, as was the case until then. The 
rs claimed in fact to represent ‘the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, while 
the Constitution of the FBiH referred only to Bosniaks and Croats as constit-
uent peoples until then. The Constitutional Court found this practice to be a 
breach of the Bosnian Constitution, which outlines Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats 
(along with Others) as constituent peoples, hence – so the Court ruled – they 
also have to be constituent peoples in all territories of the country.18 This cre-
ates a legal situation in which Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats are recognised as 
constituent peoples in the whole country, and in each of the entities and in 
the Brčko District, while in terms of demography it can clearly be argued that 
certain territorial units represent only one (or two) of these groups. This has 
very complicated and indeed negative consequences for the institutional rep-
resentation of these three groups in the different territories of Bosnia, as will 
be discussed below.
In addition to this complex federal system, the dpa also established a federal 
political system that was highly decentralised. Indeed, in 1995 the Constitution 
only assigned the following responsibilities to the institutions of BiH: foreign 
policy, foreign trade policy, customs policy, monetary policy, finances of the 
institutions; regarding the country’s international obligations, it assigned 
federal government immigration, refugee and asylum policy, international 
and inter- Entity criminal law enforcement, establishment and operation of 
common international communication facilities, regulation of inter- Entity 
transportation and air traffic control.19 All other competences, including mil-
itary and defence, policing, taxation and tax collection, economic and social 
welfare policies, amongst others, were given to the entities. Article iii.3a of 
the Bosnian Constitution states specifically: ‘All governmental functions and 
powers not expressly assigned in this Constitution to the institutions of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina shall be those of the Entities.’20 Bosnia, in other words, 
became one of the most decentralised federal systems in the world. This sit-
uation has not changed fundamentally to this day, despite some processes of 
 17 Soeren Keil, “Mythos und Realität eines ethnischen Föderalismus in Bosnien und 
Herzegowina,” Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 50, no. 1 (2010): 76– 86.
 18 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Judgement no. U- 5/ 98, ‘On Constituency’, 
para 55, 60, available at http:// www.ccbh.ba/ odluke/ ). The judgement is however more 
widely known as ‘ Constituent Peoples Case ‘.
 19 Bosnian Constitution, Art. iii.1 a- j.










centralisation taking place21 over the last twenty years, in particular through 
the creation of a centralised Defence Ministry, through the Indirect- Taxation 
Authority, and the centralisation of border security provisions.22
In addition to the high degree of decentralisation, it needs to be pointed 
out that Bosnia is a nearly perfect example of Arend Lijphart’s consociational 
democracy model.23 Strict power- sharing applies to all of Bosnia’s central insti-
tutions. In the Executive, the semi- presidential system is characterised by a 
rotating presidency consisting of three members: one Bosniak and one Croat 
who are elected in the FBiH, and one Serb who is elected in the rs. The govern-
ment therefore consists of two- thirds of Ministers from the FBiH and one- third 
of Ministers from the rs and is called Council of Ministers.24 In the legislative 
branch, there are two chambers of parliament. The House of Representatives, 
which is elected through proportional representation, consists of two- thirds 
of mp s from the FBiH and one- third of mp s from the rs. The second cham-
ber, the House of Peoples, consists of fifteen members: five Bosniaks and five 
Croats elected from the FBiH parliament, and five Serbs elected from the rs 
assembly.25 In the judiciary branch, the Constitutional Court consists of nine 
judges: four are appointed from the FBiH and two are appointed by the rs, 
while three judges are appointed by the President of the European Court of 
Human Rights. These last three are international judges who cannot be cit-
izens of Bosnia or any of its neighbouring countries.26 Decisions require a 
majority in both houses, and due to complex veto regulations, Bosniak, Serb 
and Croat parties have to work together in order to establish the required 
 21 It is worth mentioning that all these centralisation efforts were driven by external actors 
rather than Bosnian elites. This is why I referred to Bosnia as an internationally adminis-
tered federation earlier.
 22 For an assessment of the developments within Bosnia’s political system see Soeren 
Keil and Valery Perry, “Introduction: State- Building and Democratization in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,” in State- Building and Democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina, eds. 
Soeren Keil and Valery Perry (London, New York: Routledge, 2015), 1– 14; as well as Soeren 
Keil and Anastasiia Kudlenko, “Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 Years after Dayton: Complexity 
Born of Paradoxes,” International Peacekeeping 22, no. 5 (2015): 471– 489.
For a more recent discussion of some of the disfunctionalities of the system and 
how they feed into public unrest see Jasmin Mujanović, Hunger and Fury – The Crisis of 
Democracy in the Balkans (London: Hurst and Co., 2018).
 23 On Lijphart’s model see Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1977).
 24 Bosnian Constitution, Art. v: Presidency.
 25 Bosnian Constitution, Art. iv: Parliamentary Assembly.
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majorities and prevent any vetoes.27 This complex power- sharing architecture 
is also applied to the entities, cantons and even in municipalities. However, as 
mentioned above, most of these units are ethnically homogenous, and since 
ethnic identity is based on self- identification, it is easy for the ruling parties in 
certain territories to have self- declared Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Others on 
their party list and fill the seats reserved for these groups by loyal party mem-
bers. There is no institutional provision for example to prevent a Serb in the 
rs supporting the dominant Serb party to declare themselves as a Croat and 
take one seat reserved for Croats in the government of the rs. While this does 
not happen at central level, it is a very common practice in the cantons of the 
FBiH, and also at municipality level, where seats are either filled by loyalists 
to the dominant group (through self- declaration), or seats reserved for other 
groups remain empty, because there are no representatives of these other 
groups in these municipalities.
2.2 The Equality Question
The Dayton system introduced a political framework, which attempts on the 
one hand to find a balance between equality and power- sharing between 
Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, and on the other hand, the protection of individ-
ual liberal (non- ethnically focused) rights. For example, while the discussion 
above has demonstrated the complex power- sharing nature of Bosnia’s politi-
cal system, the Constitution, in Article ii, provides a long list of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. It goes as far as stating in Article ii.2 that ‘[t] he 
rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply 
directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These shall have priority over all other 
law.’ In light of Article ii and its link to Bosnia’s human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms’ regime, it could be argued that Bosnia probably has one of the 
most advanced human rights regimes, and one of the most extensive pro-
tections for human rights and fundamental freedoms, not least because the 
provisions in Bosnia’s Constitution are linked to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECtHR) of the 
Council of Europe, which in case of conflict, has priority. This embedded rights 
protection is connected with a clear commitment to non- discrimination, as 
stated in Article ii.4 of the Bosnian Constitution:
 27 On the complex veto system in Bosnia see Birgit Bahtić- Kunrath, “Of Veto Players and 
Entity Voting: Institutional Gridlock in the Bosnian Reform Process,” Nationalities Papers 





The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms provided for in this Article 
or in the international agreements listed in Annex I to this Constitution 
shall be secured to all persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina without dis-
crimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status.
On paper, therefore, BiH seems to be one of the most advanced countries 
when it comes to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Yet, when looking at international monitoring organisations such as Freedom 
House, Bosnia scores as partially free overall, with a 4 out of 7 score for free-
dom rating, 4 out of 7 for political rights and 4 out of 7 for civil liberties.28 
Likewise, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index in its 2018 report for BiH 
places the country in the category of a ‘defective democracy’.29 This contrast 
between extensive protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms on 
the one side, and poor performance in the indexes of international think tanks 
on the other side is rather puzzling.
One explanation can be found in the above- mentioned contrast between 
ethnically based power- sharing and the provisions for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms. These seem to be in direct and obvious conflict. For example, 
one could wonder how the rights of Bosniaks and Croats in the rs can be pro-
tected, when the rs understands itself – and indeed until 2002 referred to itself 
in its Constitution – as the entity of Serbs in Bosnia. The FBiH did the same, 
by only mentioning Bosniaks and Croats (amongst Others). Hence, until the 
above- mentioned judgement of the Constitutional Court in 2000, the equality 
of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats (and of Others) was not ensured throughout the 
territory of Bosnia, and the Constitutions of the entities allowed the positive 
discrimination of the majority ethnic group(s). This exclusion mechanism can 
also be found in a less formalised and less radical way in other federal states, 
such as Canada, where Quebec can discriminate against immigrants based on 
its own language laws, and in Belgium and Switzerland, where the territoriality 
principles also favour one language group over others in a certain territory. In 
BiH, this form of exclusion was found illegal by the Constitutional Court in 
 28 In Freedom House’s scale, 1 means most free, 7 means least free. Bosnia’s 2018 report and 
scores are available at Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2018, Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 
https:// freedomhouse.org/ report/ freedom- world/ 2018/ bosnia- and - herzegovina.
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reference to its Constitution, which clearly states that the three ethnic groups 
(Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats) have to be treated equally across the whole ter-
ritory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It took until 2002, and extreme pressure 
by international actors, before the entities were to change and amend their 
Constitutions in order to comply with the judgement of the Court.30 However, 
while this judgement dealt with the question of equality between the three 
constituent peoples across the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it did not 
engage with the strange constitutional status of ‘The Others’ – which are men-
tioned in brackets in the Constitution, but which are excluded from many of 
the power- sharing arrangements in the country. This question would only be 
dealt with nine years later in the famous Sejdić- Finci judgement of the echr.
3 Equality and the Sejdić- Finci Judgement of the echr
The 2009 judgement of the echr in the case of Sejdić- Finci vs. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina31 was the result of a complaint by Dervo Sejdić, a leading Roma 
activist and Jakob Finci, a public intellectual and prominent member of the 
Bosnian Jewish community. They originally complained about their inability 
to stand for election to both the House of Peoples and the Presidency of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, based on their Roma and Jewish origin, referring to Articles 
3, 13 and 14 of the ECtHR, as well as Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 12 – in short claiming that this constituted a form of discrimi-
nation based on racial/ ethnic self- identification, which is not in line with the 
ECtHR. The Bosnian Constitutional Court immediately referred the case to the 
echr, because the claim was based on the ECtHR, which has priority over all 
Bosnian laws, as discussed above. The Court indeed ruled that a violation of 
Article 14 of the ECtHR in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in rela-
tion to the House of Peoples could be found, as well as a violation of Article 1 
of Protocol No. 12 in relation to the Presidency. The Court therefore established 
 30 For a wider discussion on the Constituent Peoples Case see International Crisis Group, 
“Implementing Equality: The ‘Constituent Peoples’ Decision in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 
ICG Balkans Report, no. 128 (Sarajevo, Brussels: 2002); Peter Neussl, “The Constituent 
Peoples Decision of the Constitutional Court and the Sarajevo- Mrakovica Agreement – 
A ‘Milestone Product’ of the Dayton Concept?,” in Dayton and Beyond: Perspectives on 
the Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, eds. Christophe Solioz and Tobias Vogel (Baden- 
Baden: Nomos, 2004), 65– 73.
 31 European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (application nos. 27996/ 06 and 34836/ 06), judgment of 22 December 2009, 







that Bosnia discriminated against both complainants on the basis of their 
ethnicity without ‘objective and reasonable justification’.32 What is more, the 
Court established that the relevant constitutional provisions in Bosnia in rela-
tion to the Presidency and the House of Peoples, as well as the accompanying 
electoral laws would have to change in order to address and eliminate this form 
of discrimination. It is worth highlighting that the judgement of the echr 
was not unanimous, and that discrimination in the election of the House of 
Peoples was agreed by 14 judges (against 3) and for the Presidency of Bosnia 
by 16 judges (against 1). In their opinions, the dissenting judges highlighted the 
need to take more strongly into account the historical evolution of Bosnia’s 
complex power- sharing system, which was first and foremost an instrument of 
peace- building after the war in the country. Within academia, the judgement 
has also been criticised by those supporting power- sharing regimes in post- 
conflict societies, who have argued that the judgement is a threat to enforced 
cooperation and consensus that is often key in post- conflict countries, and it 
threatens to undermine the legitimacy of international courts, when these 
intervene in the internal affairs of states to such a drastic extent.33 Many aca-
demics, however, argued that the judgement could be a chance for Bosnia to 
promote human rights over selected group rights and break open some of 
the strict power- sharing rules in order to make the system more flexible and 
enhance its democratic credentials.34
Despite the original window of opportunity that was opened as a result of 
the echr’s judgement in the Sejdić- Finci case, implementation has since been 
lacking. There has been no major revision of the Bosnian Constitution since 
1995, and BiH has been pushed by the Council of Europe, the European Union 
(eu) and other international agencies to implement the judgement urgently. 
However, the failure to implement this court judgement highlights another key 
feature of Bosnia’s complex political system – although nobody is really happy 
with the Dayton provisions, there is a complete lack of agreement on what 
should be changed and the direction these changes should take. Bosniak, Serb 
 32 Sejdić- Finci case, p. 32.
 33 See here particularly Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O’Leary, Courts and 
Consociations (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
 34 Amongst many see Elyse Wakelin, “The Sejdic and Finci Case: More Than Just a Human 
Rights Issue?,” E- International Relations (October 2012), http:// www.e- ir.info/ 2012/ 10/ 31/ 
the- sejdic- and- finci- case- more- than- just- a- human- rights- issue- for- bosnia- and- herze-
govina/ ; Lindsey Wakely, “From Constituent Peoples to Constituents: Europe Solidifies 
Fundamental Political Rights for Minority Groups in Sejdic v. Bosnia,” North Carolina 
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and Croat elites have very different visions of the Bosnian state, and they all 
have their own interests to protect; therefore, they favour the current status 
quo over any change that might harm their current position in the system.35 
Likewise, the many suggestions about reform possibilities that emerged from 
political parties and civil society organisations after 2009 have so far failed to 
gain wider recognition, as well as the local and international support needed 
for a push for wider reform of this complex institutional architecture.36 What 
all these different proposals have in common is a contested notion of equality – 
any form of judgement implementation has in recent years become a battle-
ground for all ethnic groups in the country to claim that they are discriminated 
against and disadvantaged by the Dayton provisions. Bosniak elites feel that as 
the representatives of the majority population they are constrained in a sys-
tem in which the rights of smaller communities (such as the Serbs and Croats) 
are disproportionally protected and undermine the ‘one person, one vote’ prin-
ciple. Likewise, Serb elites feel that the rights of the rs, and of Serbs in Bosnia 
generally, need to be protected and enhanced, and that processes of centralisa-
tion since 1995 have undermined the originally guaranteed autonomy of Serbs 
in the Bosnian state. Finally, Croat elites, representing the smallest of the three 
constituent peoples, argue that the current institutional provisions disadvan-
tage them, because they see themselves as a junior partner to Bosniaks in the 
FBiH, and instead demand the creation of a third – Croat – entity to ensure that 
each ethnic group would have their own territory with guaranteed autonomy 
provisions.37 The political debate on the Sejdić- Finci judgement has therefore 
shifted since 2009, as it is no longer about implementing a judgement which 
at its heart complained about ethnic discrimination of ‘the Others’ in Bosnia’s 
complex system at the expense of power- sharing between elites representing 
the former warring groups of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats; instead, the debate 
 35 Kurt Bassuener, “The Dayton Legacy and the Future of Bosnia and the Western Balkans – 
House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing,” Written Statement for the Congressional Record 
(April 2018), http:// www.democratizationpolicy.org/ pdf/ Bassuener_ US_ Congressional_ 
Hearing_ Written_ Statement_ 4_ 18.pdf.
 36 Valery Perry, “Constitutional Reform Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Top- Down 
Failure, Bottom- Up Potential, Continued Stalemate,” in State- Building and Democratization 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, eds. Soeren Keil and Valery Perry (London, New York: Routledge, 
2015), 15– 40.
 37 For a wider discussion on these constitutional debates and their legal quagmire see Valery 
Perry, “Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Does the Road to Confederation 
go through the EU?,” International Peacekeeping 22, no. 5 (2015): 490– 510; Soeren Keil and 
Valery Perry, “Introduction: Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 Years after Dayton,” International 








is now about the extent to which the Dayton system should be reformed so 
these three groups, and especially the elites that represent them, can have a 
stronger stake in the country, and how equality amongst them can and should 
be implemented through means of both institutional and territorial (meaning 
creation of new federal units) engineering. This has, once again, resulted in a 
complete ignorance of the main aim of the judgement, namely, to make the 
system less ethnically exclusive and to allow all Bosnian citizens to access its 
core institutions.
4 Learning from Bosnia? Wider Theoretical and Empirical 
Implications of the Sejdić- Finci Judgement and Its Aftermath
The discussion surrounding the state- building and federalisation experience 
in BiH, now over twenty years after the war ended and with the installation 
of the federal system, questions federalism and its understanding, as well as 
power- sharing, equality, and the processes of peace- and state- building. After 
the extensive discussion on Bosnia’s institutional framework above, and the 
arguments surrounding the Sejdić- Finci case and its impact on equality, it is 
necessary at this stage to return to the overall theme of this book – namely 
the question of equality in federal states. In order to do this, a number of areas 
need to be considered in further detail, and the theoretical and empirical 
implications of the Bosnian case for these areas need to be teased out.
4.1 Power- Sharing as Peace- Building and the Question of Equality
As demonstrated above, the power- sharing arrangements within Bosnia’s polit-
ical system are extremely complicated. Yet, the provisions for the Presidency, 
which exclusively allow Bosniaks and Croats from the FBiH, and Serbs from 
the rs, to stand in elections, and the provisions for the appointment of the 
House of Peoples (five Bosniaks, five Croats appointed by the FBiH parliament, 
and five Serbs appointed by the rs Assembly) had in particular been heav-
ily criticised, even before the Sejdić- Finci judgement.38 The echr judgement 
in the Sejdić- Finci case confirmed previous concerns about unjustified eth-
nic discrimination. Yet, critics and indeed the dissenting judges at the echr 
have pointed out that the power- sharing provisions in Bosnia, while nominally 
 38 For one of these critiques see European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice 
Commission), Opinion on the Constitutional Situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Powers of the High Representative (cdl- ad (2005)004), 11 March 2005, https:// www.ven-
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discriminating, serve a greater good, namely the protection of peace in a post- 
war society.39 The paradox that emerges from this debate can be found in the 
following question: is it justified that in post- war countries institutional mech-
anisms might exclude some communities from certain institutions, when 
these arrangements serve the purpose of uniting and bringing together for-
mer enemies and therefore contribute to peace- building? In other words, is it 
acceptable to build in discriminatory mechanisms into specific institutions if 
these mechanisms serve the greater good of keeping the peace? Answers to this 
question vary, with some authors vehemently arguing for discriminatory prac-
tices within power- sharing arrangements, claiming that these mechanisms 
ultimately serve to protect peace. These authors have also highlighted that in 
the case of Bosnia, both Sejdić and Finci could have run for the Presidency, had 
they chosen to self- identify as Bosniaks or Croats (both were living in the FBiH 
at the time). Hence, it was their choice to identify as Roma and as a member 
of the Jewish community, which they knew would lead to their exclusion from 
the elections for the Presidency.40
The counter- argument is that democracy in post- war societies cannot be 
built if certain groups, irrespective of their size and political importance within 
the country, are systematically (and also constitutionally, which is especially 
the case in BiH) excluded from political participation in key state institutions. 
This, so the argument goes, only lays the foundation for future conflicts, and 
undermines any aspirations to build an inclusive liberal democracy.41 While 
critiques to this approach would argue that politics in post- conflict countries is 
not about liberal democracy but about preserving peace by ensuring inclusion 
of the major groups in decision- making and therefore promoting the idea of 
consociational, rather than liberal majoritarian democracy, it can be argued in 
return that any system that puts human rights on the back foot is ultimately 
doomed to fail.
At the heart of these debates lies a moral dilemma – namely the need to 
make a value judgement. In countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
 39 For a wider discussion on this topic see Stefan Graziadei, “Democracy v Human Rights? 
The Strasbourg Court and the Challenge of Power Sharing,” European Constitutional Law 
Review 12, no. 1 (May 2016): 54– 84, https:// doi.org/ 10.1017/ S1574019616000043.
 40 For a discussion on identity and peace- building within power- sharing systems see 
Brendan O’Leary, “Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places: An Advocate’s Introduction,” 
in Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places, eds. Joanne McEvoy and Brendan O’Leary 
(Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 1– 66.
 41 Specifically for Bosnia on this issue see Valery Perry, “More Ethnic Politics and Virtual 
Partition will not Help,” Bosnia Daily, 30 May 2016, 9– 10, http:// www.democratizationpol-








have experienced extensive violence, and in which ethnic relations are char-
acterised by antagonism and mistrust, can the focus on preserving peace 
through stable power- sharing institutions be considered more important 
than the focus on fundamental freedoms and human rights of each and all 
individuals? The echr judgement clearly answered this question by arguing 
against this focus on stability and pushing forward the importance of human 
rights in post- conflict societies. The inability of Bosnian elites to implement 
this judgement demonstrates that this debate might have been decided by the 
echr, but Bosnian elites are reluctant to give up their monopoly of power, 
and they are unwilling to create a shared vision for the future of the state, in 
which those citizens that do not self- recognise as Bosniaks, Serbs or Croats 
would also be included, recognised and have equal access to the state and its 
institutions.
4.2 The Federalisation Process – Countering or Embracing Ethnic 
Division?
Bosnia’s federalisation since 1995 has been characterised by a slow, externally 
driven centralisation process, the undermining of ethnic- exclusivity of the 
entities (and cantons) through the Constituent Peoples Case judgement of the 
Bosnian Constitutional Court, and by countering forces, principally the elites 
from the three constituent peoples, who have pushed the interpretation of 
Bosnia’s federal system ever- closer towards the idea of an ethnic federal sys-
tem. Demands by Bosnian Croat elites for a third – Croat – entity in Bosnia 
clearly fit this pattern.42 The language of the political elites of the three con-
stituent peoples has been one characterised by exclusivity and at times border-
ing on hate speech.43 Ethnic relations, in other words, remain full of tensions 
more than twenty years after the end of hostilities. The conflict, as some have 
argued, has become frozen, and is now continued through the means of poli-
tics, in which each side attempts to push for their own benefits and their own 
vision of Bosnia, which resultantly creates a situation of permanent paralysis 
in the institutions and stasis in terms of political progress.44
 42 Florian Bieber, “Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Bosnia- Herzegovina since 
Dayton: Civic and Uncivic Values, eds. Ola Listhaug and Sabrina Ramet (Bologna: Longo 
Editore Ravenna, 2013), 309– 328.
 43 As an example see Gerard Toal, “ ‘Republika Srpska Will have a Referendum’: The 
Rhetorical Politics of Milorad Dodik,” Ethnopolitics 41, no. 1 (2013): 166– 204.
 44 Valery Perry, “The Elephant in the Room – Bosnia and Herzegovina’s unmentionable 
Constitutional Disability,” Transconflict (July 2014), http:// www.transconflict.com/ 2014/ 
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What this means for federalism in Bosnia is that the very idea of federal-
ism remains contested in the country. Federalism has different meanings, 
not only for different academics as demonstrated in the introduction, but 
also for the peoples in Bosnia. This is not per se surprising, as multinational 
federations are characterised by competing versions of what the state is and 
why it is federal (and what the nature of federalism is).45 This can also be 
found in well- established Western multinational and bi- national federations 
such as Canada and Belgium, where federalism as an idea is contested and 
where the federal institutional architecture serves different purposes for the 
different groups in the country.46 Yet, where Bosnia is different to these coun-
tries is that the very nature of federalism itself is contested, as a result of the 
contestation of the whole state. Serb and Croat elites continue to flirt with 
ideas of separation and secessionism, while Bosniak elites despise the idea of 
federalism as they see it as a form of ethnic division of the country. In other 
words, rather than just having different interpretations of what federalism is 
and why it was chosen as an organisational principle for the country, elites in 
Bosnia dispute the very nature of Bosnia as a federal country.47 William Riker 
teaches us that the creation of a federal system is always based on a compro-
mise between elites representing the centre and those representing the units 
within the future federal system.48 In Bosnia, representatives of the interna-
tional community need to be added to this equation49 – as they played a key 
role in the dpa and have been a major driving force for the federal system, 
which explains why it remains so contested to this day by local elites. Despite 
the Constituent Peoples judgement of the Bosnian Constitutional Court and 
the Sejdić- Finci judgement of the echr, not much has changed in the wider 
dynamics of Bosnian federalism – it remains very much a zero- sum game 
between the elites of the three recognised constituent peoples, at the expense 
of any political progress.
 45 Michael Burgess, “Multinational Federalism in Multinational Federation,” in Multinational 
Federalism – Problems and Prospects, eds. Michel Seymour and Alain- G. Gagnon 
(Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2012), 23– 44.
 46 Raffaele Iacovino and Jan Erk, “The Constitutional Foundations of Multination 
Federalism: Canada and Belgium,” in Multinational Federalism – Problems and Prospects, 
eds. Michel Seymour and Alain- G. Gagnon (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 
2012), 205– 230.
 47 For a more detailed discussion on this see Keil, Multinational Federalism, 125– 176.
 48 William Riker, Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little Brown, 1964).
 49 Bermeo refers to federal systems which have been installed through international inter-
vention as imposed federalism. See Nancy Bermeo, “The Import of Institutions,” Journal 












This raises a number of fundamental questions about the use of federalism 
in post- conflict societies. As discussed above in the case of power- sharing, one 
must ask whether giving territorial autonomy to elites representing groups that 
have used violence to promote their case will in the long- term be rewarding, 
especially if this autonomy comes at the expense of the rights of other groups in 
these territorial units.50 There is now an established body of literature discuss-
ing the ‘paradox of federalism’, namely the fact that while federalism might be 
able to overcome demands for secession, it also provides institutional mech-
anisms which enhance minorities’ abilities to declare independence at a later 
stage.51 Yet, while we know about some of the challenges linked to the imple-
mentation of a federal political system as a tool to overcome ethnic tensions, 
overall we still know very little about the uses and dangers of federalism as a 
tool for conflict resolution in ethnically divided, war- torn societies. Having said 
this, there are some lessons that can be learnt from Bosnia in this regard. For 
example, while the complex federal system might have been a necessity in 1995 
in order to end the war and bring the warring groups to the negotiation table, 
the rigidity of the Dayton Constitution has made any changes in the post- war 
period impossible. What is more, in a contested system such as Bosnia, where 
ideas of ethnic federalism rival those of territorial conceptions of autonomy, 
ethnic federalism will prevail if the system is dominated by ethnic elites who 
see the whole political game as a continuation of the conflict over territory 
and group dominance. Finally, an important lesson to learn from the federal 
experience in Bosnia is that these post- war institutional arrangements do not 
organically change and reform themselves over time. While Bosnia’s territorial 
and institutional arrangements reflect the necessity for cooperation, compro-
mise and ethnically homogenous territories that were a precondition for the 
successful conclusion of the Dayton Peace Conference, today it can clearly 
be argued that the same arrangements have become a symbol for the perma-
nent crisis of the political system and its lack of progress, liberalisation and 
democratisation.52 Having said this, what has become obvious in the previous 
discussion is that it has become relatively easy to identify the ills in Bosnia’s 
system, but the question of how to correct them and how to prevent similar 
 50 This issue is discussed in more detail in Paul Anderson and Soeren Keil, “Federalism: A 
Tool for Conflict Resolution?,” 50 Shades of Federalism (2017), http:// 50shadesoffederal-
ism.com/ federalism- conflict/ federalism- tool- conflict- resolution/ .
 51 See for example Jan Erk and Lawrence Anderson, eds., The Paradox of Federalism – Does Self- 
Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions? (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2010).
 52 Vedran Dzihic, “Bosnien und Herzegowina in der Sackgasse? Struktur und Dynamik der 
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mistakes in other post- war countries remains largely unanswered and much 
more research is needed on this issue.
4.3 What about Equality?
In the debates about the future of federalism and power- sharing in Bosnia, the 
question of equality remains of fundamental importance. Elites of the three 
constituent peoples feel that their ethnic groups are disadvantaged and dis-
criminated by the dpa and the current institutional provisions. They therefore 
argue that reforms are necessary in order to address their perceived (more so 
than real) discrimination and unequal treatment. Likewise, the Sejdić- Finci 
judgement highlighted that beyond the three main ethnic groups that are iden-
tified as constituent peoples, there are other people(s) in Bosnia, who are con-
stitutionally excluded from certain institutions, and who have become margin-
alised in the wider political discourse. In other words, the multinational state 
that is Bosnia and Herzegovina is a good example of the multifarious dimen-
sions involved in questions about equality. Discussions in Bosnia highlight the 
importance of equality between different ethnic groups, particularly those 
that have previously been involved in fighting over inclusion and exclusion in 
the state. But the political debate in Bosnia also demonstrates the need for a 
consideration of equality beyond these ethnic groups, and the elites that repre-
sent them. The focus on the main groups might alienate other smaller groups. 
It might also discriminate against those citizens that refuse to identify with any 
group; in Bosnia there are no institutional protections and guarantees for those 
considering themselves as ‘Bosnian’ for example. Squaring the circle between 
these different understandings of equality, as well as the wider philosophical 
and theoretical implications, has been discussed in the academic literature,53 
but its application in post- war states remains highly controversial and indeed 
very difficult. While federalism, as used in BiH to accommodate different 
groups and end a violent conflict, can make a contribution to ensuring peace 
and bringing in a certain degree of democracy and equality, there is no guaran-
tee that it will fundamentally overcome ethnic rivalries and ongoing tensions, 
including feelings of discrimination. In Bosnia, however, this discrimination 
is not only one of perception; as demonstrated in the case of Sejdić- Finci, it 
 53 Ferran Requejo, “Three Theories of Liberalism for the Three Theories of Federalism: A 
Hegelian Turn,” in Multinational Federalism – Problems and Prospects, eds. Michel Seymour 
and Alain- G. Gagnon (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2012), 45– 68. See also 
Ferran Requejo, “National Pluralism, Recognition, Federalism and Secession (or Hegel 
Was a Clever Guy),” in Understanding Federalism and Federation, eds. Alain- G. Gagnon, 





is certainly very real with real political consequences for the affected groups. 
Therefore, finding a balance between giving rights and autonomy to territori-
ally organised groups (through federalism), while at the same time preventing 
discrimination against other groups remains a key challenge for any federal 
system.54 Innovative institutional mechanisms need to be employed to ensure 
that the inclusion of certain groups through power- sharing and territorial 
autonomy does not result in the exclusion of certain other groups. One of the 
key reasons why the implementation of the echr judgement in Sejdić- Finci 
has been lacking until today is the fact that its implementation allows the elites 
of the three constituent peoples to focus on their perceived discrimination and 
consequently demand wider reforms to improve their situation in the political 
system. In other words, implementation of the echr judgement would not 
only threaten the whole basis of the Dayton Agreement as a peace- building 
mechanism, but it would also open up the question of minority inclusion in 
Bosnia and undo all institutional arrangements, without any compromises and 
agreements in sight on future provisions amongst the ruling elites. Sejdić- Finci 
implementation is complex, because Bosnia’s system is complex, and Bosnia’s 
system is complex because it attempts to bridge two contradictory principles – 
the protection of group rights and power- sharing amongst ethnic elites on the 
one side, and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
Bosnian citizens on the other.
5 Conclusion
Bosnia and Herzegovina remains one of the most complicated political sys-
tems in the world. It combines a multidimensional federal system with power- 
sharing amongst the elites from the three constituent peoples. Yet, as the dis-
cussion above demonstrates, it also remains a political system that is deeply 
contested by its leading political agents. The institutional framework deployed 
at Dayton served multiple purposes, first and foremost to end the war that 
engulfed the country from 1992 to 1995. But it also laid the foundation for elite 
cooperation and federalisation, in order to provide a political and institutional 
compass for the post- conflict era, thereby contributing to both democratisa-
tion and state- building.
 54 On this issue see Ronald Watts, “Can Federal Political Systems Accommodate National 
Minorities?,” in States Falling Apart? Secessionist and Autonomy Movements in Europe, eds. 
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When looking at the question of equality in multinational states, the Bosnian 
experience teaches us a number of important lessons. It comes as no surprise that 
equality, like democracy and federalism, is a contested concept in multinational 
states, and that the different groups and their representatives are very aware of 
the dangers of exclusion and discrimination. This is particularly important in a 
post- conflict context, such as Bosnia, in which ethnic relations remain strained 
and distrust remains. Another important lesson to learn from Bosnia is that the 
inclusion of some groups (in Bosnia’s case the three constituent peoples) might 
lead to the exclusion of other groups, and thereby institutions designed to ensure 
equality and inclusion can become exclusive and discriminatory. The discussion 
on the Sejdić- Finci judgement of the echr has highlighted this point in detail. 
Thinking about institutional design in post- war societies therefore requires a 
degree of innovation and flexibility that allows the protection of major groups, 
particularly those that were involved in the fighting, while at the same time pre-
venting the exclusion of other, often smaller, groups. Mechanisms for this exist, 
such as North Macedonia’s reference to ‘majority’ and ‘non- majority’ communi-
ties rather than referring to fixed ethnic groups. A final lesson to learn from Bosnia 
is that post- conflict states need time to adapt, but also flexibility to change over 
time. Bosnia has changed substantially since 1995, but this change has mainly 
been driven externally, and has not resulted in a fundamental revision of Bosnia’s 
Constitution. The constitutional provisions that served as a tool of peace- building 
in 1995 have proven to be a straightjacket when one looks at democratisation and 
state- building. In order to address this in other post- conflict situations, constitu-
tional mechanisms need to be precise and protect certain rights, but constitu-
tional provisions must also be allowed to change and evolve over time.
In summary it can be said that Bosnia offers a fascinating case- study in 
terms of equality (and inequality) in a multinational, post- conflict coun-
try. Countries discussing federalism as a tool of conflict resolution, such as 
Ukraine, Syria and Myanmar, can learn from the Bosnian experience, both in 
terms of what worked and what did not work.
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This chapter re- examines Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a multinational 
federation and focuses on the self- rule/ shared- rule principles as tools for 
assessment of the equality of the three constituent peoples – Bosniaks, Serbs, 
Croats – and ‘Others’. The category of ‘constituency’ in the BiH Constitution 
implies full normative- statutory equality of the three constituent peoples as 
state- creating subjects. Therefore, by examining the level of symmetric distri-
bution of the two federal principles amongst them, across key institutional- 
political structures, hotspots of their inequality can be unravelled. The rele-
vant finding is that, for different reasons addressed in this chapter, there are 
factual institutional inequalities and asymmetries in place that depart from 
the normative constitutional equality. This chapter’s main claim is that these 
factual institutional inequalities and asymmetries must be dealt with in order 
to achieve the constitutionally required symmetric positioning of the constit-
uent peoples on the level of the overall political system and its executive and 
legislative bodies.1
In an introductory theoretical section, we will further elaborate on the self- 
rule and shared- rule principles, their significance, mutual interaction and gen-
eral relevance for maintaining the equality of the constituent political entities 
in multinational federal political systems. The second section consists of a 
disclosure of key constitutional and structural hallmarks of BiH as a multina-
tional federation, with and beyond standard structural and formal descriptors. 
The focus will be set on the fundamental constitutional values, i.e. the ‘her-
meneutics’ by which these values can be read and projected into the political 
 1 Institutions designed for collective representation of the constituent peoples, namely the 
House of Peoples, as an upper chamber primarily designed to account for the democratic 
political will of the constituent peoples, and tripartite Presidency composed of three mem-
bers – Croat, Serb and Bosniak.
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system. In the third section, after having established the normative criteria for 
the relational measurement of the equality of the three constituent peoples, 
correlative to the BiH constitutional and legal- political setting, the chapter 
further overviews its institutional, legislative- political system. Thus, it inspects 
and discloses the key structural, institutional and representative aspects of 
(in)equality, filtered through the self- rule/ shared- rule principles and their 
(a)symmetric distribution amongst the constituents. Such a path allows us to 
identify and unveil the case of institutional- political (in)equality in BiH’s mul-
tinational federation in terms of the relative or full deprivation of, discrimi-
nation in, or limitations of access to political participation in BiH’s political 
system. We will focus on the executive and legislative institutions on the var-
ious levels of governance in BiH as well as on the electoral provisions, which 
are the key prerequisite of a just and fair democratic representation. The elec-
toral provisions, along with the consociation contrivances, are accentuated as 
a prerequisite to a thorough equalisation of the political position of the three 
constituent peoples.
Finally, as the BiH Constitution operates both with the constituent peoples 
and the category of ‘Others’, namely minorities and citizens who do not fall in 
the ‘constituents’ category, one must refer to individual equality adjudicated 
by several subsequent rulings of the European Court for Human Rights against 
BiH.2 The rulings are then juxtaposed with the traditional provision of the BiH 
constitutional norm of ‘constituency’, which is primarily in place to safeguard 
communal political rights of the three constituent peoples, their mutual equal-
ity and symmetric statutory positioning. The intention is to indicate directions 
in which the equilibrium between individual and communal rights can be pur-
sued in line with all the specificities and given value- normative contents of the 
BiH Constitution. The interest of such an approach is to broaden the lens for 
further consideration and understanding of the two- dimensional problem of 
(in)equalities in BiH.
 2 European Court of Human Rights, Sejdić- Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (application nos. 
27996/ 06 and 34836/ 06), Strasbourg, Judgment of 22 December 2009; European Court of 
Human Rights, Pilav v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (application no. 41939/ 07), Strasbourg, judg-
ment of 9 June 2016; European Court of Human Rights, Zornic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Application no. 3681/ 06), Strasbourg, Judgment of 15 July 2014; European Court of Human 
Rights, Slaku v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Application no. 56666/ 12), Strasbourg, Judgment 
of 26 May 2016. Closer analysis of some of these cases is provided in the last section of the 
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2 The Principles of Shared- Rule and Self- Rule
2.1 Shared- Rule and Self- Rule as Key Criteria of Federal Equality
Multinational federations, unlike nation- states and national federations, con-
nect the liberal conception of justice not only to individual civic rights, but 
also to group rights.3 On the value- based level they combine both liberal and 
communitarian principles4 which are then further fine- tuned and balanced 
across the system of governance. In fact, the entire conception of multina-
tional federalism and its contrivances are bound to assure equality, harmonise 
diverse identities and create unity by regulating and balancing needs and par-
ticularities of inner federal constituencies. Whereas nation- states are willing 
and often prone to sacrifice their diversity to force unity, multinational fed-
erations do not know or practice such a trade- off. However, this entails the 
need for a much higher level of pacifism, voluntarism,5 and, foremost, gener-
alised trust in the power of political deliberation and rational action. Namely, 
it requires a specific political culture based on ‘win- win’ values of compromise 
and consensus, instead of the ‘winner takes all’ approach, which is typical for 
the classic majoritarian political reasoning.
Undoubtedly, in multinational constitutional systems designed to unite and 
accommodate diverse identities, the visibility and relevance of group equal-
ity increases. However, its implementation and assessment can be very chal-
lenging, especially because it can be relativised or manipulated via different 
political arguments or burdened by imperfections of the constitutional text, 
by a lack of consensual tradition and political culture, disparities of the real 
social, economic and political power of the constituent entities, etc. For these 
reasons, it is important to use universal criteria for the assessment of equality 
in multinational federations, composed of at least two or more identity groups 
with constitutionally equal normative status and entitlements.6
If federalism is the broadest basic form that allows for constitutional 
entrenchment and accommodation of diversity by protecting both the equality 
of the individuals and the constituent entities, it is legitimate to consider its two 
core principles, the backbones of comprehensive and systemic measurement 
 3 Soeren Keil, Multinational Federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina (London, New York: Routledge, 
2016), 45.
 4 Tomas Fleiner and Lidija Basta, Constitutional Democracy in a Multicultural and Globalized 
World (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer- Verlag, 2009), 161.
 5 Amongst others particularly emphasised in Nancy Bermeo, “The Import of Institutions,” 
Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 96– 110.












of federal equality. Self- rule and shared- rule can be deeply integrated into fed-
eral theory and, from there, into different policy and governance areas of fed-
eralism.7 It is difficult to imagine any federal or even quasi- federal system that 
would not embed these principles naturally, with variance in methods, depths, 
and extents of their application. These are systemic categories present within 
all segments of the federal system and as such they predetermine the equality 
relations therein. Thus, John McGarry wrote that ‘federal political systems is 
a descriptive catchall term for all political organizations that combine what 
Daniel Elazar called shared rule and self- rule’.8 Ronald Watts acknowledged 
that federalism ‘refers to the advocacy of multi- tiered government combining 
elements of shared- rule and regional self- rule’.9 However, the most compre-
hensive definition of federalism, which accounted for both its vertical and 
horizontal systemic dimensions and equality as its key inherent ingredient, 
expressed the idea of federal equality in the following way:
In the federal model, polities are established by equals who come 
together do so by design in such a way to protect the respective integrities 
of the founders even while they join together to form a new body politic. 
Rule is the rule of equals by equals and is designed to maintain that basic 
principle.10
Elazar’s definition reflects a deep understanding of federalism as a system 
which clearly incorporates a group dimension and equally involves both ‘shared 
governance rule’ and ‘self- governance rule’, whereby the former expands to 
all areas relevant for peace and stability, and the latter has a clear purpose to 
‘allow all parties to preserve their respective integrities’.11 Equally important 
 7 This was strongly recognised by Preston King who noticed that ‘Federalism is a normative 
political philosophy that recommends the use of federal principles i.e. combining joint action 
and self- government’; Preston King, Federalism and Federation (London: Crom Helm, 1982).
 8 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, “Federation as a Method of Ethnic Conflict 
Regulation,” forumfed.org (2004): 1, http:// www.forumfed.org/ libdocs/ Misc/ 0401- int- 
McGarry- OLeary.pdf.
 9 Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (Montreal, Kingston: McGill- Queen’s University 
Press, 2008), 8.
 10 Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987), 
10. Elazar’s definition particularly resonates with BiH’s constitutional framework and its 
fundamental ingredient, the constituent people Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, as legitimate 
primary agents of the respective federal constitutional order. As such, they are entitled 
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and necessary to sustain a federal balance of equality, they are not concur-
rent and do not meet identical goals and needs. However, they do serve the 
same purpose, which is to assure the stability of a federal order by harmonising 
internal positions and relations of constituent subjects. Balance is maintained 
by carefully tailoring, dosing and balancing the shared- rule/ self- rule binomial 
across the whole political system. Furthermore, Elazar’s definition positions 
self- and shared- rule both in their horizontal societal form and transfers them 
to a constitutional wording and vertical framework. As such, they are further 
formalised through adequate structuring of the federation and application of 
correspondent organisational principles, regulatory frameworks, and comple-
mentary institutions. In other words, only in multinational federations can 
self- rule/ shared- rule be read as systemic principles that permeate all layers 
and spheres of the federal political system, which is the reason why they can be 
identified and used as reliable criteria for a systemic assessment of the equality 
of relations. As such, they must be accounted in the design of multinational 
federations, but can also be used for their in- depth examination, including 
major equality relations.
2.2 Federal Balance and (A)Symmetric Application of Self- and 
Shared- Rule
For a thorough reading of Elazar’s all- encompassing definition, it is also nec-
essary to accentuate the organic connection between self- rule and shared- rule 
contained therein. Namely, the integrity of the constituent entities is not only 
protected by self- rule, but also through shared- rule. If we take the integrity 
primarily shielded by self- rule as the form of political subjectivity and a pre-
condition for all participatory action within the political system, then integ-
rity as subjectivity must be respected and ensured in the shared- rule segment 
as well. For example, if a dominant group attempts unilaterally to alter the 
electoral procedures and processes or to undermine consociation rules lead-
ing to a situation where the integrity of a minority nation is gravely affected, 
such actions would not only impair the rights of said minority nation, but 
also the balance of equality across the entire system of governance, therefore 
destabilising it. From the opposite side, shared- rule shields self- rule by pre-
venting unilateral decisions at the centre, which could undermine the posi-
tion of weaker federation members. Hence, shared- rule also provides space 
to build in the will of all the constituencies into overall decision- making. That 
political will is then an expression and extension of their right to autonomy 
and the constituent status, which implies that disruption of shared- rule leads 




Therefore, self- rule and shared- rule are two interdependent and comple-
mentary principles, and neither of them can work without the other. Namely, 
self- rule empowers shared- rule, whereas shared- rule, in return, guarantees the 
protection of the autonomy expressed through the self- rule competencies of 
the constituent members in a multinational federation. Such an intricate bal-
ance of the two federal principles, based on their organic interdependence, 
enables normative and factual equality of the constituent entities regulated 
through their continuous observance, management, and application. In mul-
tinational federations, both principles converge more than elsewhere, as the 
relevance and role of the shared- rule increases.12
A balanced application of the two federal principles on the level of the over-
all socio- political system helps to consolidate structural equality.13 That bal-
ance is based on the ratio of dispositions of all self- and shared- rule provisions 
across the federal system, its institutions, and regulatory framework, against 
each one of the constituent/ constitutional subjects.14 In other words, the only 
relation that matters more than the ratio of overall application of the two prin-
ciples throughout the legal- political system is their equal, i.e. symmetric, allo-
cation to all the constituents. In that sense, symmetric scale and volume of 
autonomy as well as shared access and influence on co- decision- making by all 
the constituencies represents the backbone of multinational federal equality 
and determines its objective quality.
Federal balance in the sense of symmetric disposition of the self- rule and 
shared- rule powers amongst the constituents plays an important role in the 
stability and sustainability of multinational federations. Symmetric structural 
distribution of federal principles allows both vertical and horizontal fine- 
tuning of the system, predominantly through a combination of classic fed-
eral and consociate organisational, regulative, and governance techniques.15 
However, their structural symmetric application does not always lead to 
equality. It is more often the case that asymmetry is used to empower national 
minorities in multinational federations and, in that way, to converge systems 
closer to general standards of equality. Such a form of equality then relates 
specifically to social and political realities where the liberal notion of civic 
 12 Ronald Watts, “Multinational Federations in Comparative Perspective,” in Multinational 
Federations, eds. Michael Burgess and John Pinder (London: Routledge, 2007), 232.
 13 Michael Ignatief, The Right Revolution (Toronto: House of Anansi Press Ltd, 2001), 84.
 14 Watts, “Multinational Federations,” 231– 232.
 15 Vertical in the sense of necessary alignment of the institutional and legal- political system 
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equality must be expanded with the recognition of the right to be different.16 
Multinational federations tend to recognise such realities by accommodat-
ing the constituent and constitutional status of different identity groups and 
nationalities, and try to reconcile and harmonise them.17 To that purpose, both 
symmetry and asymmetry can be used to bolster equality in multinational fed-
erations, dependent on the specifics of the social, political, and constitutional 
setting.18 Moreover, asymmetry is better seen as an efficient equaliser than as 
a means to achieve full- fledged equality.19 As such it is often considered and 
used to empower minority groups beyond their actual demographic potential 
in the face of actual power of other dominant groups. However, asymmetric 
solutions are more prone to protect differences than to establish intergroup 
equality.20 For that reason, they can never create a system of full group equal-
ity, but rather serve as an efficient ‘equalisation’ tool applied to bust self- rule 
capacities of the respective minority groups and increase the general level of 
their relative equality.21
Moreover, asymmetric arrangements are usually negotiated between the 
central government and a nation that seeks more self- rule to better protect 
its identity and economic self- sufficiency in the specific territory. This kind of 
relation requires daily compromise, but not consensus, as it is up to the centre 
in the end, namely its political establishment and institutions, to decide how 
to manage the claims of the claimant. On the other side, symmetry is a key pre-
condition for equality in multinational federations composed of at least two 
constituent entities that share an identical constitutional (constituent) status 
and where equality of the constituent entities is implicit to the constitutional 
 16 Thomas Fleiner and Lidija Basta Fleiner, Constitutional Democracy in a Multicultural and 
Globalised World (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer - Verlag, 2009), 573.
 17 Brendan O’Leary, “Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory 
Arguments,” in From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post- Conflict Institutions in Ethnically 
Divided Societies, ed. Sid Noel (Montreal, Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill- Queen’s 
University Press, 2005), 272.
 18 Some authors prize asymmetry over symmetry as an intrinsic federal value, e.g. Alain 
Gagnon, “The Moral Foundation of Asymmetrical Federalism: A Normative Exploration 
of the Case of Quebec and Canada,” in Multinational Democracies, eds. Alain Gagnon and 
James Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 319– 327.
 19 Michael Burgess, Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 221.
 20 Ibid.
 21 The reasoning outlined here is inspired by the experience of BiH multinational federal-
ism and its social, political and constitutional conditions. As such, it does not represent a 
general critique of asymmetry, but rather one of novel perspectives and understandings 














wording. Such are polities in which constituent entities are, in fact, state- 
creating subjects.22 Their constitutional equality can only be expressed if sym-
metrically transferred to the key legislative and governance institutions, as 
well as the correspondent political practices within the self- rule/ shared- rule 
segments. The basis of such polity then is a composite political community in 
which the central government is not an independent governance entity but 
shared by the constituents. For this reason, within them there cannot be a self- 
sufficient, sovereign centre independent from the will of its constituencies. In 
other words, without participation of all the constituencies there cannot be a 
centre in the sense of a central government functioning independently from 
its constituencies. Such a multinational ‘centre’ is closer to a ‘shared order of 
governance’, which operates based on thorough symmetric application of the 
will of the constituent entities through shared- rule.
Therefore, unlike multinational federations with constitutional asymmetries, 
dynamics in multinational federations with embedded constitutional symme-
try must also be regulated horizontally, in between different yet statutorily equal 
constituent entities (groups, units, peoples etc.). Though such relations can be 
read as confederate, they also tell us about how different power- sharing concepts 
(confederal, federal, consociate, etc.) can meet and intersect within the same 
constitutional- legal political system. From here, we delve into a closer examina-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitutional system that incorporates both 
symmetric and asymmetric elements.
3 Reflections on the Nature of the BiH Multinational Federation
The foundations of the current constitutional order in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
are based on two peace agreements and the constitutions derived from those 
agreements. The first peace agreement is the Washington Agreement, signed 
on 18 March 1994. It ended an intense year- long Croat- Bosniak conflict in 
Bosnia- Herzegovina, and further set military and political preconditions for 
ending hostilities in the whole country. The subsequent signing of the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, better known as 
the Dayton Peace Agreement (dpa), established the current dyadic two- entity 
federal structure (the Republika Srpska (rs) and the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (FBiH)).23 As such, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a post- conflict 
 22 Constituent peoples as constitutional/ state- creating units in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
 23 The war and said peace treaties were predeceased by a referendum which took place 
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society that requires incentives for inter- ethnic cooperation and strong guar-
antees that its political system can safeguard equal constitutional positions 
of the three constituent peoples (Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks) as well as other 
citizens, including different minority groups and individuals.
In principle, the dpa’s constitutional order of Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
already been designated by eminent scholars as a multinational federation,24 
based on its key formal and structural criteria.25 Such a specific account 
was provided by Michael Burgess who defined Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
a dyadic, multinational federation: one state, two entities and three ethno- 
national communities.26 This succinct formula informs the key elements of 
the BiH Constitution and its political organisation. However, it does not say 
anything about their individual, normative weight, namely, how they define 
the nature of the BiH constitutional order and how corporate (constituent 
peoples) and territorial (entities) components mutually correlate: which of 
them take precedence over the other and for what normative reasons? These 
questions become even more relevant if we look at the following diagnostic 
assessment:
state, followed by the abstinence of the Serb constituent people and the rejection of 
its results by their political leaders. International recognition soon followed, but the 
relations within the state were becoming increasingly tense and very soon led to a war, 
which lasted from 1992 to 1995 and resulted in a massive loss of lives and destruction. 
Diplomatic and military pressure by the international community under the leadership 
of the USA, which brokered the Dayton Peace Agreement signed on 14 December 1995 
in Paris, ended the war. The Agreement verified internationally recognised borders, 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and introduced a new territorial organisation of the 
country.
 24 Although it must be said that there are also assessments of BiH as a confederal state. 
In that sense see Sujit Choudhry, “Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative 
Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design in Divided Societies,” in Constitutional Design 
for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation?, ed. Sujit Choudhry (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 12.
 25 For such qualification with an accompanying set of supportive arguments it suffices to 
single out Soeren Keil, “Federalism as a Tool of Conflict- Resolution: The Case of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina,” L’Europe en formation, no. 1 (2012): 205– 218. Another similar definition 
of BiH as a multinational federation was provided by Michael Burgess, “Territorial and 
Non- Territorial Identities: Multinational Federalism in Multinational Federation,” Paper 
prepared for the conference ‘Multinational Federalism in Perspective: A Viable Model?’, 
Université du Quebec à Montreal (UQAM), Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 25– 27 September 
2009 (Canterbury: Centre For Federal Studies, Rutherford College, University of Kent, 
2009), https:// www.academia.edu/ 14712890/ Territorial_ and_ Non- Territorial_ Identities_ 
Multinational_ Federalism_ in_ Multinational_ Federation.








The centripetal forces for unity and integration are weaker than the cen-
trifugal interests represented by the existing entities that see very few 
incentives to support the state. Consequently, BiH is for the purposes of 
our survey a remarkable case study of a potential multinational feder-
ation without multinational federalism. In short, it exhibits federation 
without federalism.27
This argument complements the thesis that BiH, as a federation, is missing 
a nexus to its fundamental constitutional values and hence lacks supportive 
federal political culture, which would energise its federalism and internal fed-
eralisation process. The role and importance of multinational federalism as 
the internal animating force of a multinational federation has been widely 
acknowledged as such.28 Drawing further on the thought of Preston King that 
there cannot be a federation without federalism as its inner mover, Michael 
Burgess developed the idea of a federalist spirit and enumerated federal val-
ues.29 Since federal culture and its values are inseparable from federalism, 
the (in)existence of such a culture strongly influences the level of respect and 
harmonised understanding of fundamental constitutional principles amongst 
relevant political, institutional, social, and scientific authorities that could fur-
ther shape all subsequent (mis)perceptions of BiH as a multinational federa-
tion.30 Thus, for the correct reading of its constitutional values, the answer to 
the question on the nature of BiH’s constitutional order must be expanded via 
pathways of ‘constitutional hermeneutics’ to ascertain which principles con-
stitute BiH as a multinational federation.
4 Federal Principles in the BiH Constitution
The dpa Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina explicitly entitles the con-
stituent peoples Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats as titulars of state sovereignty.31 
 27 Burgess, “Territorial and Non- Territorial Identities,” 24.
 28 Burgess, Comparative Federalism, 2– 3.
 29 Michael Burgess, In Search of the Federal Spirit: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives 
in Comparative Federalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
 30 Keil, Multinational Federalism, 144– 147.
 31 A notion self- evident from the constitution but also undisputed and confirmed by 
scholars and professional authorities such as Sheri P. Rosenberg, who argued that ‘con-
stituent peoples’ essentially amounts to ‘state creating’ peoples. See Sheri P. Rosenberg, 
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Specifically, the Preamble of the Constitution provides that ‘Bosniaks, Croats, 
and Serbs, as constituent peoples (in community with others), and citizens 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina hereby ascertain Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.’ This is a fundamental constitutional premise that defines the 
constituent peoples and ‘Others’ (national minorities’ et al.) as bearers of BiH’s 
sovereignty. The top hierarchical constitutional position of the ‘constituency’ 
was also reaffirmed in the decision of the BiH Constitutional Court ref. U- 5/ 
98 delivered in the year 2000, where it was elaborated as an overarching con-
stitutional category superimposed to all constitutional principles, laws, and 
regulations.32 Moreover, even in all earlier pre- Dayton constitutions from the 
socialist period when BiH was part of the larger Yugoslav pseudo- federation, 
Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks were entrenched as primary constitutional sub-
jects and bearers of sovereignty upon which BiH statehood was founded. This 
fact informs us that BiH was a multinational country even before the dpa 
Constitution in 1995, by which its federal- like organisation and structure were 
introduced and formalised.
While some critiques question the legitimacy of the BiH federation as artifi-
cial and imposed,33 the fact remains that BiH was a quasi- federal society even 
before it acquired visible institutional, structural, and organisational hall-
marks of federation. If these facts are neglected, logical outcomes can hardly 
be other than misleading. For this reason, it is necessary to go beyond basic 
formal structural criteria and resort to constitutional hermeneutics and phe-
nomenology in search of ‘ground zero’ of a BiH constitutionalism. After doing 
so, it will be legitimate to conclude that the dyadic organisation of the country 
cannot be taken as a central argument in support of BiH’s multinational char-
acter. Rather, the hierarchy of principles outlined in the Constitution imply 
that the ‘constituent’ status of Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks is superior to the 
administrative- political organisation and as such it precedes organisational 
principles of the State.34 Namely, the case is that the substance and nature 
of BiH as a multinational federation is not of territorial, but of corporative- 
communitarian character. This is crucial for a thorough understanding of the 
BiH multinational federation.
 32 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Judgment no. U- 5/ 98, ‘On Constituency’, 
26, Sarajevo, 30 January 2000; available at http:// www.ccbh.ba/ odluke/ .
 33 The legitimacy of BiH is in fact questioned because its Federalism was considered as 
imposed by an external force and could not develop from within. See Burgess, In Search 
of the Federal Spirit, 275.
 34 As clearly outlined in the CC BiH judgment ‘On Constituency’ no. U- 5/ 98, ‘On 








It follows that the key elements of BiH’s constitutional order are in fact the 
constituent peoples, which are of utmost importance for a further accurate and 
consistent approach to the BiH constitutionalism. Clearly, neither any abstract 
citizen nor a non- existent singular political people (i.e. demos) of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, or its current two entities (FBiH and rs) constitute BiH. On the 
contrary, it is evident that BiH and its Constitution were ascertained by the 
constituent peoples Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats as the three distinctive and 
sovereign ‘demoi’. As state- creating subjects, they have agreed through their 
representatives in Dayton to uphold the dyadic organisation of the country, 
but not at the expense of their constituent status and their equality. In fact, 
they have agreed to the existent dyadic- asymmetric organisation in good faith, 
with reasonable expectations that such organisation would safeguard their 
particular and shared interests.
As such, the constituent status35 assigned to each of the three peoples in 
the dpa Constitution produces far- reaching implications beyond formal 
constitutional analysis and framing. Namely, it implies belonging to a larger 
whole, made up of equal constituent members, whose subjectivity is directly 
conditioned and determined by their belonging to a larger political commu-
nity beyond which their subjectivity is unimaginable and undeliverable.36 Is 
the ‘constituency’ specific to Bosnia and Herzegovina or a unique practical 
constitutional stronghold unknown to political sciences theory? It is neither, 
because even in countries where there is a singular political community or 
nation (demos), the constituent status is immanent to the core group, i.e. pop-
ulous or ‘Staatsvolk’. For that reason, there is no need for its explicit emphasis. 
However, in a compound state comprised of more than one people and of a 
plurality of political identities with explicit and unequivocal constitutional 
expression, the ‘constituency’ accentuates the multinational character of the 
country, as well as its related equal constitutional position and the status of all 
the constituent peoples.37
 35 The constituent status can also be interpreted as ‘cultural pluralism’, by which ethnic 
groups are designated as political units instead of individuals. See Patrick J. O’Halloran, 
“Post- Conflict Reconstruction: Constitutional and Transitional Power Sharing 
Arrangements in Bosnia and Kosovo,” in From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post- Conflict 
Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies, ed. Sid Noel (Montreal, Kingston, London, 
Ithaka: McGill- Queen’s University Press, 2005), 108.
 36 In line with the principle of ‘constituency’ as a BiH primary constitutional category that 
must be channelled through adequate power- sharing solutions which provide a friendly 
environment for unimpeded growth of both unity and diversity.
 37 Dejan Vanjek, “Predstavnici i pripadnici konstitutivnih naroda – pitanje konstitutivnosti 
i legitimiteta,” Institute for Social and Political Research (Mostar: idpi, 2014), http:// www.







Federal Equality in Multinational Bosnia and Herzegovina 373
Thus, in political terms ‘constituency’ represents a form of political sub-
jectivity and autonomy of ‘a people’. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a multi-
national compound state with more than one constituent peoples, it implies 
equality in two key federal dimensions:
 – Self- rule as autonomous decision- making on the issues relevant for preser-
vation of integrity (self- sufficiency) of the constituent peoples (cantons and 
entities) and other citizens;
 – Shared- rule in the sense of co- deciding powers in shared matters for all 
three constituent peoples.
These two dimensions basically articulate and formulate the political needs 
of the constituent peoples, met and managed through the application of self- 
rule/ shared- rule principles in the federal political system. Since the constit-
uent status belongs to each of the three peoples, it means that they should 
have identical or at least analogous capacities in both aspects of self- and 
shared- rule. Therefore, the ‘constituency’ is about equality, which means that 
without equality there can be no constituency. This further implies that any 
negation of equality equals the negation of constituency and therefore of the 
BiH Constitution, as well as of the dpa of which the current Constitution is a 
part. Without equality, the three peoples cannot be constituent, which annuls 
the dpa and its Constitution. Consequently, if equality remains unobserved 
and unassured for all the constituencies through the democratic procedures 
and laws, those procedures will themselves become undemocratic and uncon-
stitutional.38 The category of ‘constituency’ is therefore inherent to BiH’s mul-
tinational federal Constitution and supplies its underlying foundation and 
substance. It is a term deliberately used to emphasise group equality and 
assure its firm constitutional entrenchment. As such, it generates the need 
to align the entire constitutional and legal- political system with the principle 
of ‘constituency’ as the primary federal principle, which predetermines the 
multinational federal character of the country. Bosnia and Herzegovina as a 
post- conflict, compounded, multinational society is clearly in need of such an 
alignment.39
From there on, it is legitimate to consider actual institutional- regulative 
dispositions of shared- and self- rule and their overall distribution across 
 38 This primarily refers to the electoral law as the second most important act after the 
Constitution, which must assure that the electoral will of all constituent peoples meets 
fair and equal treatment.
 39 Ivan Vukoja and Milan Sitarski, eds., Bosnia and Herzegovina Federalism, Equality, 
Sustainability: A Study of BiH Redesign to Secure Institutional Equality of Constituent 






the system of governance. It is up to the constituency, which is inherent to 
shared- and self- rule, to convert constitutional equality into institutional 
equality across the political system. That said, it remains to be seen how self- 
and shared- rule are distributed within the institutional framework in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, with special emphasis on the issue of fair and equal rep-
resentation of its constituent peoples. The easiest way to approach this terrain 
is to scrutinise key branches of governance: parliamentary and executive, and 
thereto related electoral provisions that have a fundamental relevance for the 
legitimacy of shared institutions.
5 Major Institutional Dispositions of Shared- Rule/ Self- Rule in BiH
The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina gives insight into how organisational 
asymmetries can deviate from the constitutionally ordered equality and, 
moreover, how the quest for symmetry can be the impetus to enhance 
equality and its internal balance. Already on the basic organisational level, 
we encounter the first prominent problem related to collective (in)equal-
ity in BiH’s multinational federation. One of its two entities has a domi-
nant Serb population (the rs) and the other one (the Bosniak- Croat FBiH) 
a Bosniak ethnic majority, where there is an additional cantonal sublevel 
introduced to preserve balance of power amongst the two constituent 
peoples.40
Clearly, due to inherent structural deficiencies, the right to self- governance is 
unevenly allocated to the three- constituent peoples. Based on the principle of 
constituency, each people should dispose of similar administrative- territorial 
autonomy and powers in self- governance, which is currently not the case. Two 
entities provide institutional space and basis for the self- rule and autonomy of 
both Serbs (rs) and Bosniaks (FBiH), but not for the Croats who are capable 
of autonomous decision- making only in three cantons in which they are the 
majority within the FBiH. Nevertheless, cantons are positioned below entity 
level and as such have considerably narrower competences.41 While there is 
nominal balance on the federal state level, entity and cantonal levels disclose 
 40 Ten cantons, five with Bosniak majority, three with Croat majority and two mixed bi- 
ethnic cantons.
 41 Competences of all orders in Bosnia and Herzegovina are regulated by constitutions of 
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an obvious asymmetry, which is again particularly evident with respect to the 
political participation of Croats.42
The FBiH entity, which initially originated from the Washington Peace 
Agreement, had many protective mechanisms based on clear- cut consociation 
rules and procedures, such as vital national interests and veto powers, pre- 
allocation of highest positions, parity of ministers and top executive positions, 
and proportional representation.43 However, since March 1994 and until the 
end of 2008, a total of 109 amendments were enforced to its Constitution.44 It 
is highly concerning that only 36 of 109 amendments were adopted upon pro-
posal of local administration and a successful compromise in the Parliament 
of that entity. All other amendments (73) were imposed by the Office of the 
High Representative (ohr).45 Thus, most of the decisions were arbitrary, as 
many of them have never been verified in the Parliament of the FBiH entity.46
Amongst other interventions in the Government of the FBiH, the aboli-
tion of ministerial parity, as well as the imposed changes of shared decision- 
making procedures in that body through ohr47 amendments in 2002, can be 
 42 For a recent comprehensive analysis of the political position of Croats in post- Dayton 
Bosnia and Herzegovina see Valentino Grbavac, Unequal Democracy: The Political Position 
of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mostar: idpi, 2016).
 43 Some of the key changes which have affected the balance between these two groups, as 
well as its federal character – by undermining the number of power sharing instruments, 
checks and balances – concern: the abolition of vital national instruments, the abolition 
of a number of ethnic based positions (notably deputies of ministers), the introduction 
of majority voting instead of consensus, interference with the election process of the 
entire executive in the FBiH, foremost president and deputies of the FBiH, deviations 
from the principle of bicameralism whereby the upper chamber (the House of Peoples) 
saw less authority in deciding on the executive and in terms of constitutional changes. 
The judiciary was also affected. In fact, while initially the composition of the Supreme 
Court of the FBiH and the prosecution office relied on parity between judges of Croat and 
Bosniak nationality, this was later eliminated by the Office of the High Representative 
(ohr). See Borjana Krišto and Bariša Čolak, “Inequality of Croats in Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Hrvati Bosne i Hercegovine – nositelji europskih vrijednosti?, 
Interdisciplinary Conference With International Cooperation, eds. Dejan Vanjek and Ivo 
Čolak (Neum: The Cabinet of the Croat Member of the Presidency BiH, 2017), 521– 522.
 44 Krišto and Čolak, “Inequality,” 518.
 45 Ibid.
 46 Ibid.
 47 International body authorised under the dpa to overlook its implementation. In 1997, 
ohr powers were extended to pass laws, form new institutions on the state level, alter the 
constitution and even dismiss officials and politicians. These practices were abolished in 
2006 after numerous critiques of their colonial dispositions and failure to support proper 
democratic development of the country: ‘The current dependence upon the ohr means 














considered as interventions in the system which are particularly harmful for 
equality. The consequences were that Croat ministers could not participate 
nor co- decide on equal footing with their Bosniak peers. In addition, many 
other executive functions were terminated, such as powers of ministers in the 
Federal Government, which supplied overall power- sharing balance, as well as 
the role of Government ministers in the protective mechanism of vital national 
interest (vni).48 In essence, ohr impositions favoured majoritarian principles 
and thus undermined the position of Croats as significantly less numerous 
people in the FBiH. ohr also intervened in the election law and competences 
of the House of Peoples, which were initially equal to those of the House of 
Representatives based on direct civic vote and mixed electoral units.
However, the most destructive interventions for equality and constituency 
were the amendments of the High Representative (HR) Robert Barry and his 
successor Wolfgang Petritsch in their involvement with electoral provisions.49 
Their amendments to the Constitution of the FBiH, as well as the election law, 
targeted the House of Peoples (HoP), the upper chamber of the FBiH, designed 
for representation of the constituent peoples and equal power sharing amongst 
them within the FBiH entity. Barry decided that the delegates to the HoP and 
its Serb, Croat, and Bosniak representatives would be elected indirectly from 
the ten cantonal assemblies in the FBiH Federation. He also introduced the 
provision that all members of cantonal assemblies can vote for all delegates 
who are supposed to represent Croats and Bosniaks in the HoP. Due to the 
numeric dominance of Bosniaks and their clear majority in five of ten cantons, 
this broadened their influence on the decision- making process at the expense 
of Croats. Namely, under those provisions Bosniak delegates and parties in 
Cantonal Assemblies could elect Croat delegates who were also members of 
dominant Bosniak parties. Barry’s decision had such an impact that in 2000 
it enabled the formation of a new government called the ‘Alliance for Change’ 
in the FBiH, characterised by the total absence of any representatives of the 
Croat constituent people. Impositions were made under the authority of the 
osce at the time, and as such they were beyond reach of BiH’s Constitutional 
Court.50
that is not subject to any form of democratic accountability’; Burgess, “Territorial and 
Non- Territorial Identities,” 23.
 48 Krišto and Čolak, “Inequality,” 521.
 49 A detailed account of their constitutional inpositions and interventions is provided in 
Vukoja and Sitarski, Bosnia and Herzegovina Federalism, Equality, Sustainability, 242.
 50 Faults of the external approach to BiH state- building were rather well highlighted by 
Sumantra Bose who noticed that international officials very often, judging by their choice 
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Barry’s successor Wolfgang Petritsch continued in the same manner. He 
further changed the composition of the House of Peoples of the FBiH and 
devalued the constituent peoples’ representation in that body. Basically, he 
allocated quotas to the Federation cantons. Those quotas enabled parties 
voted for by Bosniaks in the cantons in which Bosniaks form a clear major-
ity to elect a two- thirds majority (12 of 17) of the Bosniak representatives, a 
two- thirds majority (12 of 17) of the Serb representatives, and five of seven 
representatives of ‘Others’. This situation enables the Bosniaks a full control 
(by a two- thirds majority) of two of the constituent nations in the House 
of Peoples of the FBiH, the Bosniak and the Serb, and 5 of 7 representatives 
of ‘Others’.51 The result of the impositions was not only to disrupt power- 
sharing, constituency and equality, but also to produce constant political 
crises in the FBiH entity.52 Those crises then radiated to the state level and 
statehood and nationhood. They have rather referred to BiH as a national federation, 
whereas the reality and recent violent history suggested that it should have been treated 
right from the outset as a multinational federation in which three constituent peoples 
represent genuine agents of the federal order, in which their ‘constituent’ constitutional 
status implies the need for their full normative and practical socio- political equality. See 
Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention 
(London: Hurst & Co., 2002), 93. The similar experience of involvement and the role of 
international community in BiH fits also into the empirical observation encapsulated by 
John McGarry and Brendan O’Learry: ‘Early consociational theory also neglected the pos-
sibilities for positive roles for outsiders both in the implementation and in the active oper-
ation of power sharing settlements’; John McGarry and Brendan O’Learry, “Consociation 
and its Critics: Norther Ireland after the Belfast Agreement,” in Constitutional Design for 
Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation?, ed. Sujit Choudhry (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 381.
 51 Croats, however, cannot influence the composition amongst the Bosniak representatives 
because the cantons with a Croat majority only elect three of seventeen Bosniaks. In addi-
tion to their control on the election of the Bosniak, Serb and ‘Others’ representatives, 
Bosniaks can influence the composition amongst the Croat representatives. In fact, six 
Croat representatives are elected from the cantons with Bosniak majority, whereas only 
five Croat delegates are elected from the cantons with a Croat majority and six from the 
‘mixed ones’. Hence, from their ‘own’ cantons Croats can elect less than one- third of the 
total number of the Croat delegates (5 of 17). Altogether, this means that through this 
method of election, Bosniaks alone can elect the Government in the FBiH, as well as the 
President and two Vice- presidents, which requires only one- third of support per each 
constituent people in HoP. See Vukoja and Sitarski, Bosnia and Herzegovina Federalism, 
Equality, Sustainability, 242.
 52 Barry’s amendments and modification of the election rules motivated the Croat politi-
cal leadership in the Croat National Council to declare self- rule on 28 October 2000, in 
Novi Travnik. The self- rule was intended as a protective mechanism to the constituent 
status of Croats. Ante Jelavić, then Croat BiH Presidency member was elected Head of 






affected overall functioning of the state. Gradual elimination of consoci-
ation contrivances, which effectively guaranteed relatively fair share of 
power and co- allocation of public resources amongst Croats and Bosniaks, 
paved the way for further centralisation that could then be unimpededly 
streamlined by majority ethno- political elites without external support.53
Another unparalleled phenomenon of violation of the principle of equal-
ity was the election, dominantly by Bosniak parties and voters, of the Croat 
member to the tripartite Presidency of BiH, designated for representatives of 
the three constituent peoples. While the Serb member is elected by Serb voters 
from the rs entity, the Croat and Bosniak members from the Croat- Bosniak 
FBiH entity are almost entirely elected by Bosniak votes.54 This was enabled by 
the fact that the FBiH entity represents a single electoral unit with a dispropor-
tionate number of Bosniak and Croat voters (approx. 75:22 %), thus allowing 
Bosniaks to elect both the Bosniak and Croat member of the Presidency, and 
thus to gain two- thirds control of that collective institution. At the time this 
was the most obvious case of institutional inequality legalised by illegitimate 
electoral provisions inconsistent with the constitutional norm of equality of 
the constituent peoples.55
5.1 On the Pathway toward Full Institutional Equality
Following key innate and imposed inequalities, the essential challenge now is 
understanding how to catalyse constitutional normative symmetry of rights 
and entitlements within such an asymmetric organisational, institutional and 
electoral setting. Should the structure be altered, or should there be changes 
to the accepted norms? The option of dismantling ‘constituency’ would imply 
that BiH no longer has a multiplicity of ‘demoi’ but one ‘demos’, in which case 
dismiss Jelavić from the Presidency on 7 March 2001. See Vukoja and Sitarski, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Federalism, Equality, Sustainability, 239– 240.
 53 Bosniak politicians pursue majoritarian politics, advocate centralisation and thus tend 
to negate federalism in BiH. The most prominent example is a resolution from March 
2017 voted by Bosniak delegates in the House of Representatives of the Parliament of the 
FBiH, by which they condemned the call for federalisation previously launched in the 
Resolution of the European parliament: See European Parliament, European Parliament 
resolution of 15 February 2017 on the 2016 Commission Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(2016/ 2313(ini)), last updated 5 April 2018, http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/ sides/ getDoc.
do?pubRef=- // EP// TEXT+TA+P8- TA- 2017- 0037+0+DOC+XML+V0// EN. These tendencies 
are well explained in Keil, Multinational Federalism, 172.
 54 Vukoja and Sitarski, Bosnia and Herzegovina Federalism, Equality, Sustainability, 258.
 55 The political dialogue between Bosniak and Croat political representatives has been 
without success for several years, which is a latent threat to the democratic functioning 
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majoritarian democracy would appear as a logical choice. The suspension of 
constituency would then unlock transformation of the country from a federal 
to a unitary setting, but also pave the way for domination of numerically dom-
inant people(s). Still, even unitarisation of the constitutional framework could 
not alter BiH’s multinational character on a societal level, nor could it alter the 
three already formed co- nations56 – Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.
In legal terms, radical transformation of the constitutional setting would 
require overwhelming support and mutual consensus of all three constituent 
peoples, which is unlikely to happen. In fact, while it could be attained through 
coercion which might then lead to violence, it is rather difficult to imagine that 
structured social groups should self- willingly accept deprivation of their polit-
ical subjectivity, constitutional status, existence and identity. Also, a thorough 
reorganisation of the country would be very complex and demanding for BiH 
as a post- conflict society. In fact, BiH is characterised by a significant lack of 
common understanding of the shared political community, as well as a lack of 
political will and culture needed to overcome the power asymmetries embed-
ded within the existent legal- constitutional and institutional framework. Such 
an agreement or consensus between the representatives of the constituent 
peoples has proven to be a hard case.57
For said reasons, it is more advisable to pursue another scenario and re- 
examine the relation of the key constitutional norms with everything that lies 
below, namely to align and harmonise the entire legal- political system with 
the Constitution and its fundamental category of the ‘constituency/ equality’. 
The previously described asymmetry in the applicative capacities of the three 
constituent peoples’ right to self- governance suggests that there should be 
an applied symmetry to support balancing a highly asymmetric system. But 
what tools are available to bolster symmetry and equality without engaging in 
a structural redefinition of the whole arrangement, which is basically a locked 
peace treaty that is extremely hard to replace by a new constitutional contract? 
The least challenging and least disturbing pathway would be to follow what is 
already implicit to the existent Constitution and its underlining peace agree-
ments – the pathway of constituency and institutional equality. This means 
 56 Term used to denominate the three constituent peoples in Mile Lasić, “Konsocijacija ne 
znači podjelu zemlje kako tvrde neuki,” Digitalna demokracija (2018), https:// digitalna-
demokracija.com/ 2018/ 06/ 22/ mile- lasic- konsocijacija- ne- znaci- podjelu- zemlje- kako- 
tvrde- neuki/ .
 57 There were several unsuccessful attempts to change the constitutional framework with 
the assistance of the international community, resulting in failed initiatives for constitu-






that it is only through the advancement of symmetry within the shared institu-
tions in which all constituencies meet, interact, cooperate and co- decide, that 
BiH’s locked structural inequality expressed through its organisational asym-
metry (two entities – three constituent peoples) could be rectified or mitigated. 
In that sense, the focus on institutional equality could efficiently compensate 
for the present structural deficiencies, which were embedded through peace 
agreements primarily designed to stop the war, but not to protect equality.
If the main purpose is to avoid reorganising the structure of the country 
and avoid interventions to the substance of the Washington and Dayton peace 
agreements, the pathway to compensate the overall asymmetry would be a 
re- enhancement of the position of ‘minorities’ through consociational con-
trivances such as targeted functions, rules, procedures and regulations. A first 
step in that respect would be to conduct a thorough analysis of the consti-
tutionally controversial international impositions, and consequently the 
revision and reversal of all those that purportedly undermine constitutional 
equality in terms of symmetric allocation of self- rule capacities between the 
constituent peoples. That would entail re- examining and reemploying the 
following protective measures in support of constitutional equality: 1. a guar-
anteed minimum representation, 2. veto power and an effective protection 
of the vital national interest,58 3. a broad and inclusive coalition, required 
 58 Vital national interest (vni) is constitutionally regulated mainly on the State level and it 
defines the role of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. More specifi-
cally, it is assigned under auspices of the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly 
of BiH and includes detailed procedures: ‘ Protection of the vital national Interest [:] A 
proposed decision of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH in the House of Peoples can be 
declared destructive to the vital national interest of the Bosniak, Croat, or Serb people 
by a majority votes from the Bosniak, Croat or Serb delegates. Such a proposed decision 
has to be approved by the House of Peoples by a majority of Bosniak, Croat, and Serb 
delegates who are present and voting. In case the majority of Bosniak, Croat or Serb del-
egates object to an invocation of the vital national interest, the Speaker of the House 
of Peoples will immediately convene a Joint Commission consisting of three delegates, 
each elected amongst Bosniak, Croat, and Serb delegates, in order to resolve the issue. 
If the Commission fails to resolve the issue within five days, the case will be transferred 
to the BiH Constitutional Court which will review the procedural correctness of the 
matter, under emergency procedure. ’ See Article iv of the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, available at http:// www.ohr.int/ ohr- dept/ legal/ laws- of- bih/ pdf/ 001%20- 
%20Constitutions/ BH/ BH%20CONSTITUTION%20.pdf.
Furthermore, under the Constitution of the FBiH entity, the issue of vni is more 
clearly specified, including: ‘ Exercise of the rights of constituent peoples to be adequately 
represented in legislative, executive and judicial authorities; identity of one constituent 
people; constitutional amendments; organization of public authorities; equal rights of 
constituent peoples in the process of decision- making; education, religion, language, 
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to maintain stability of interethnic relations and prevent conflicts, 4. a con-
sensual decision- making or decision- making through supermajorities of all 
three constituent peoples representatives (most of all in BiH Presidency and 
the House of Peoples – both in the federated entity, as well as on BiH’s fed-
eral level), 5. a proportional representation on the professional administrative 
level, 6. parity on higher administrative levels, and 7. an electoral law whose 
design protects and ensures faithful representation of each of the constituent 
peoples following the relevant decision of the BiH Constitutional Court.59 This 
would preclude potential governments deprived of democratic legitimacy, i.e. 
prevent the possible exclusion of any of the three constituents in participating 
and co- deciding in shared- rule matters.
The premise is that the synchronised application of fair electoral provi-
sions will enable the operationalisation of the shared- rule principle in line 
with ‘constituency’, creating what is colloquially known as institutional equal-
ity.60 This strategy would compensate structural- organisational asymmetries 
ascertained in the segment of self- rule, by relying on already existent consti-
tutional principles of BiH’s multinational federation. The key instrument of 
transposition of those principles into the reality of political life is electoral 
law. Electoral law must thus protect the integrity (autonomy) of each con-
stituency and assure its participation in any key decision- making process. 
While the constituent peoples are the primary agents of BiH’s multinational 
federal order, the entities and cantons have an organizational role, which is 
to provide a fair and functional system of governance capable of protecting 
equality of the three constituent peoples and ‘Other’ citizens. In order to do 
so, the state’s legal- political life and the political organisation need, however, 
to faithfully reflect their political will. It stems from this that there must be a 
promotion of culture, tradition and cultural heritage; territorial organization; public 
information system and other issues treated as of vital national interest if so claimed 
by 2/ 3rd of one of the caucuses of the constituent peoples in the House of Peoples. ’ 
Procedures are somewhat different than in the case of the State level HoP.
For detailed references, see Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Articles 17. and 18., available at http:// www.ohr.int/ laws- of- bih/ constitutions- 2/ .
 59 Democratic legitimacy by standards and merits of the BiH Constitution and Constitutional 
Court imply the right of each constituent people to elect representatives of its political 
will: ‘[T] he Election Law must follow the logic of legitimate representation of the constit-
uent peoples, in particular when it comes to the houses of peoples, i.e. that body of power 
which is intended to protect and articulate specific interests and needs of each constit-
uent peoples’; Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Judgment no. U- 23/ 14, 
‘Ljubic’, Sarajevo, 1st December 2016, http:// www.ccbh.ba/ odluke/ .






clear correlation between the Constitution, the laws, all bodies of governance 
and the ‘constituencies’. Such relations must be set forth unambiguously in 
the electoral law.
This point is best seen in the example of the still unimplemented61 decision 
of BiH’s Constitutional Court U- 23/ 14 (‘Ljubić’).62 The central issue the appeal 
tackled was the problematic provisions regulating the composition and meth-
odology of the election of the delegates representing the Bosniaks, Croats and 
Serbs of the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the FBiH. The Court ruled 
that ‘the election law violates the principle of the constituent status of peo-
ples, i.e. leads to inequality between any of the constituent peoples, thereby 
violating Article i(2) the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina’.63 There was 
an ascertained mismatch of the number of Serb, Croat and Bosniak delegates 
in the HoP, indirectly elected in ten cantonal assemblies, and the ethnic com-
position of the cantons from which they were elected. The fixed delegate quo-
tas reserved for each of the constituent peoples in the cantons caused huge 
disproportions between the size of ‘constituent peoples’ and the number of 
seats allocated to them. This resulted in cases of both overrepresentation and 
underrepresentation, which undermined the democratic legitimacy, as well as 
the federal principle of equality. Thus, the Court concluded ‘that the principle 
of the constituent status of peoples in the Federation, in the context of House 
of Peoples, may be realized only if a seat in the House of Peoples is filled based 
on precise criteria that should ensure full representation of each constituent 
people in the Federation.’64
 61 Since 2016, it has been the subject of unsuccessful interparty negotiations between the 
two largest national parties of Croats and Bosniaks in the FBiH entity, the Croatian 
Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hdz) and Bosniak Party of Democratic 
Action (sda).
 62 On 20 September 2014 Dr. Božo Ljubić, the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time of the submission of the 
request (‘the 4 applicant’), filed with the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(‘the Constitutional Court’) a request for a review of the constitutionality of Articles 10.10, 
10.12, 10.15 and 10.16 of the Subchapter B of the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Official Gazette of BiH, 23/ 01, 7/ 02, 9/ 02, 25/ 02, 4/ 04, 20/ 04, 25/ 05, 52/ 05, 65/ 05, 77/ 05, 11/ 
06, 24/ 06, 32/ 07, 33/ 08, 37/ 08, 32/ 10, 18/ 13, 7/ 14 and 31/ 16, hereinafter: ‘the Election Law’) 
and the provisions of Article 20.16A under Chapter 20 – Transitional and Final Provisions 
of the Election Law. See Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Judgment no. 
U- 23/ 14, ‘Ljubic’, 2, Sarajevo, 1st December 2016, http:// www.ccbh.ba/ odluke/ .
 63 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Judgment no. U- 23/ 14, ‘Ljubic’, 26, 
Sarajevo, 1st December 2016, http:// www.ccbh.ba/ odluke/ .
 64 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Judgment no. U- 23/ 14, ‘Ljubic’, 26, 
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Furthermore, the Court extended the principle of democratic representa-
tion of constituent peoples to all administrative- political levels,65 as a general 
requirement of the electoral process in BiH, understood as a multinational 
country. It had also related the term of ‘legitimate representation’ of constitu-
ent peoples to all institutions designed to meet the specificities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, foremost the country level HoP and the tripartite Presidency of 
BiH.66 This was entirely the opposite of the earlier considered impositions 
made by hr s Barry and Petritsch, which blatantly bypassed the principles of 
constituency, equality, and legitimacy with regard to the representation of the 
three constituent peoples.67 As a matter of fact, the Court unequivocally con-
tested and overruled Petritsch’s impositions simply by referring to the ‘con-
stituency’ and the right of each constituent people to elect its political rep-
resentatives pursuant to the democratic right to free and fair elections. This 
further implied that the electoral provisions had to be brought into line with 
the principle of ‘constituency’, the latter being understood as an overarching 
constitutional principle with primacy over all other laws and regulations.68
5.2 How to Fit the Rights of ‘Others’ into the BiH Constitution
The BiH Constitution unites both the communitarian principle of ‘constit-
uency’ and liberal human rights norms, given the fact that the European 
Convention on Human Rights is part of BiH’s constitutional framework. At 
first glance they seem to be incompatible. In fact, the norm of ‘constituency’ 
and equality appear as exclusive attributes of the three constituent peoples, 
leaving thereby all other minorities and citizens unprotected and deprived of 
their political rights. A society in which there are privileged and disadvantaged 
groups is naturally unacceptable from the point of view of the liberal notion of 
fairness and justice. Thus, it appears that ‘Others’ is the only constitutional cat-
egory of BiH’s population which is unprotected in the social- political life of the 
country. Since BiH does not fully protect the rights of ‘Others’, there is a need 
 65 ‘[T] he connection between those who are represented and their political representa-
tives at all administrative- political levels is actually the one that gives the legitimacy to 
community representatives. Therefore, only the legitimacy of representation creates a 
basis for actual participation and decision- making’; Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Judgment no. U- 23/ 14, ‘Ljubic’, 24, Sarajevo, 1st December 2016, http:// www.
ccbh.ba/ odluke/ .
 66 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Judgment no. U- 23/ 14, ‘Ljubic’, 24, 
Sarajevo, 1st December 2016, http:// www.ccbh.ba/ odluke/ .
 67 Already examined interventions in the electoral regulative by hr Wolfgang Petritsch.
 68 This has been already laid down with the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 











for stronger involvement of international authorities, such as the European 
Court of Human Rights (echr).
But who are the ‘Others’ in the BiH Constitution? Under the 2013 population 
census, ‘Others’ appears as a heterogeneous category which comprises less than 
3% of the total population.69 It incorporates minority groups and citizens unaffil-
iated to any of the constituent peoples who have declared their identity in some 
other way. It also comprises seventeen national minorities recognised under 
the existent Law on national minorities,70 as well as citizens with versatile self- 
denominations e.g. Bosnians, Herzegovinians, humans, or Martians. Although 
heterogeneous in regard to all the identities it comprises, ‘Others’ is still an explicit 
constitutional category. As such, the rights of its members must be protected both 
under BiH’s Constitution and under laws and external instruments. In that sense, 
the rights of ‘Others’ are not entirely unprotected in an administrative sense: there 
are preassigned formal quotas in civil service for them, anti- discrimination laws 
and institutions (e.g. Ombudsman) which treat them as well as any other citizen 
of BiH; there is also a Council of National Minorities within the Parliamentary 
Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reserved seats for them in cantonal 
assemblies.71
However, the neuralgic point of discrimination and inequality of ‘Others’ 
resides in the domain of political participation, especially within the specific 
consociate institutions primarily designed to represent constituent peoples 
and to assure power- balance amongst them. In this respect, there have been 
several decisions by the echr against Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which it was 
found that minorities were discriminated against and prevented from running 
for or being elected to BiH’s Presidency and country- level upper chamber, the 
House of Peoples. The echr found roots of this inconvenience in articles iv 
and v of BiH’s Constitution, which were copied to formulate the election law 
and reserved the right to candidacy only for Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks. The 
Court found that it was incompatible with Article 14 of the European Human 
Rights Convention and its Protocols 1 and 12.72
 69 See Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ”Census of Population, Households 
and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnicity/ National Affiliation, Religion and 
Mother Tongue”, Sarajevo, 2019, 23.
 70 Adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH at the session of the House of 
Representatives held on 20 June 2002 and the House of Peoples at its session held on 
12 April 2003; available in English at https:// advokat- prnjavorac.com/ legislation/ LAW_ 
ON%20RIGHTS_ OF%20NATIONAL_ %20MINORITIES_ BOSNIA.pdf.
 71 But not in all ten cantonal assemblies, and not at all in municipality councils.
 72 However, the implementation of the relevant echr judgments is still pending, mostly 
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The most prominent case adjudicated by the echr is Sejdić- Finci v. BiH. 
In this case Mr. Dervo Sejdić, as a Roma, and Mr. Jakob Finci as a Jew, both 
belonging to the constitutional category of ‘Others’, filed a complaint with the 
Constitutional Court of BiH (cc). In its reply the cc ascertained that there 
was no violation of the Constitution, justifying it with its competences in due 
relation to specificities related to BiH as a post- conflict society and its power- 
sharing arrangement. After that, the case was delegated to the echr, which 
targeted provisions of the Constitution and the election law requiring that 
candidates to country level HoP and the Presidency BiH could only be mem-
bers of the three constituent peoples who reside in the specific administrative/ 
electoral units (FBiH or rs entities). This further implied that there was, and 
still is, discrimination against ‘Others’ both on the grounds of their identity 
and place of residence.73 In yet another case, Pilav v. BiH, the same problem of 
discrimination and human rights violation was also ascertained for members 
of constituent peoples and their ‘dislocated’ minority communities.74
However, the echr’s elaboration in Sejdić- Finci contains an interesting sec-
tion, which provokes wider deliberations on general prospects of coexistence 
between human rights and power- sharing norms within the same constitu-
tional framework:
When the impugned constitutional provisions were put in place a very 
fragile ceasefire was in effect on the ground. The provisions were designed 
to end a brutal conflict marked by genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing’. The 
matters. For years they have been entrenched in opposite positions on how these deci-
sions should be implemented in conjunction with the constitutional principle of demo-
cratic representation of the constituent peoples.
 73 The place of residence as discriminatory was central in the case Pilav v. BiH because, 
under the current provisions, a member of BiH’s Presidency from the territory of the 
Republika Srpska entity must be an ethnic Serb. Since Mr. Ilijas Pilav declared himself 
as a Bosniak, his candidature was rejected by the Electoral Committee and by the Court 
with the same arguments as in the case of Sejdić- Finci. The other two prominent cases are 
Zornic v. BiH and Slaku v. BiH, but they are analogous to the Sejdić- Finci case as both Ms. 
Zornic and Slaku could not be accepted as candidates for the election in the HoP and the 
Presidency, because they are not members of the constituent peoples.
 74 ‘There is no dispute that the provision of Article v of the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as well as the provision of Article 8 of the Election Act 2001 have a restrictive 
character in a way that they restrict the rights of citizens with respect to the candidacy 
of Bosniaks and Croats from the territory of the Republika Srpska and the Serbs from 
the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to stand for election as mem-
bers of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’; Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina cited in European Court of Human Rights, Pilav v. Bosnia and Herzegovina 






nature of the conflict was such that the approval of the ‘constituent peo-
ples’ (namely, the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) was necessary to ensure 
peace. This could explain, without necessarily justifying, the absence of 
representatives of the other communities (such as local Roma and Jewish 
communities) at the peace negotiations and the participants’ preoccu-
pation with effective equality between the ‘constituent peoples’ in the 
post- conflict society.75
The general critique of ethnic power- sharing and consociation is implicit to 
this statement, which might be seen both as excessive and superfluous in 
the attempt to explain the causes of the specific problem brought before the 
echr. Such a reaction is not unexpected or surprising as it comes from a court 
designed to deal with violations of human rights. If the echr had asked for 
assistance from a neutral expert organisation such as the Council of Europe’s 
Venice Commission, this might have contributed to a better understanding of 
the specifics of BiH’s constitutional, legislative and institutional settings, and 
would have perhaps discouraged such a statement in the first place. The Venice 
Commission would have probably declared what it had previously said, which 
was to acknowledge the multinational character of the country and its spe-
cifics, e.g. by saying: ‘But, the concepts of equal voting power do not apply to 
the special parts of the BiH legislature, since they are to represent constituent 
peoples – and hence are designed to meet the unique specificities of BiH’.76 In 
fact, hardly any post- conflict arrangement with elements of consociation and 
ethnic federalism could be entirely exempted from human rights critique.77 
For those reasons, the echr’s statement is more precarious than it seems at 
first glance. If power- sharing arrangements are bound to be abandoned one 
day, then it is hard to expect that anyone would accept them in the future as 
an interim tool. This point is highlighted by Christopher McCrudden and Brian 
O’Leary who state that:
 75 European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (application nos. 27996/ 06 and 34836/ 06), judgment of 22 December 
2009, 33.
 76 European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion 862/ 
2016 on the mode of election of delegates to the House of Peoples of the Parliament of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 29 September 2016, 12.
 77 For closer reference please see subtitle ‘Consociations and Human Rights Standards’ 
in Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O’Leary, “Courts and Consociations, or How 
Human Rights Courts May De- stabilize Power- sharing Settlements,” The European Journal 
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[A] lthough the Court’s decision indicates one possible trajectory of 
human rights courts’ reactions to consociations, this would be an unfor-
tunate development because it leaves future negotiators in places riven 
by potential or manifest bloody ethnic conflicts with considerably less 
flexibility in reaching a settlement. That in turn may unintentionally con-
tribute to sustaining such conflicts and make it more likely that advisors 
to negotiators will advise.78
Both approaches need to be accounted for and neither of them discarded 
in order to avoid potentially disturbing effects, which are inevitable in cases 
where human rights authorities scrutinise power- sharing systems. Both 
the authority of Courts and internal stability of post- conflict power- sharing 
arrangements should be protected. Not doing so would jeopardise not only the 
success of conflict resolution and management, but also human rights instru-
ments. But how is it possible to reconcile two norms appearing to be incom-
patible within one single constitutional framework? To pursue either one or 
the other could lead to outcomes which could in a post conflict- riven society 
such as BiH, undermine the consolidation of its constitutional framework.79 
Thus there must be a ‘third’ way to escape this perilous liberal- communitarian 
conundrum and open the path for convergence of these two opposed norma-
tive poles. First, from a practical point of view, human rights decisions should 
be narrowed down as much as possible to a specific problem. Therefore, any 
criticism to federalism should not simplistically state that power- sharing is 
hostile to human rights, which would be redundant and counterproductive. 
Instead, a proper critique should start by acknowledging that in its decision, 
the echr processed individual requests of applicants prevented from being 
candidates – as members of minority groups – and in that way were prevented 
from exercising their human, civic and political rights. Each judicial problem 
requires concrete solutions and as such it should be treated with due sensibil-
ity, without engaging in broader ideological and political controversies. It is 
thus untenable and unforeseeable to search for ready- made solutions in past 
human rights trials, as this can affect prospects for successful accommodation 
 78 Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O’Leary, “Courts and Consociations”, 477.
 79 The difference between collectivist and individualist approaches has been well 
explained in Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 47. Kymlicka calls their fight over primacy ‘an old and 
venerable in political philosophy, but unfruitful’. Neither can individual rights be reduced 
or consumed entirely through those of the group, nor can group rights be reduced and 






of human rights within a delicate power- sharing setting. A minimum of aware-
ness about the peculiarities of each individual social- political system must be 
considered as proceeding from its own ideological construction. A context- 
insensitive approach might, though perhaps unintentionally, undermine the 
core principles upon which peace and stability are founded.80
On the other hand, power- sharing systems must be flexible and open to human 
rights but not at the expense of the core constitutional values that hold the sys-
tem together. This further implies the need for a careful reading and full respect 
of the fundamental constitutional values, also by means of constitutional her-
meneutics and teleology, if necessary. The affirmation of constitutional values 
does not only support constitutionalism as such and the rule of law, but it also 
makes way for accommodation of key echr requirements. In BiH, such consti-
tutional principles are constituency/ equality, institutional equality via symme-
try, the credible and faithful democratic representation of the three constituent 
peoples and the political inclusion of ‘Others’. Those values and principles must 
be interconnected and justifiable under the ‘constituency’ as a superimposed 
constitutional value. The traditional constitutional principle of ‘constituency’ 
as such must be kept and mirrored in all the structures of governance and insti-
tutions designed for collective representation, as we already debated for the 
HoP and the Presidency. It means that the echr rulings can be fulfilled, without 
destroying the entire power- sharing system, only under the condition that the 
‘constituency’ and the ‘democratic representation’ of the constituent peoples as 
bearers of BiH’s constitutional order are fully respected.81
Thus, in practical terms, the ‘mid- path’ between power- sharing and human 
rights in BiH would require shifting focus from an ethnic- based participation 
towards a democratic representation of the constituent peoples, as provided in 
the U- 23/ 14- ruling (‘Ljubić’). De- ethnicisation of the executive and legislative 
positions in Presidency and the HoP would eliminate the problem of identity- 
based discrimination and assure that any citizen could be a candidate and 
be elected as a member of collective institutions.82 Conversely, institutional 
 80 Questioning core constitutional principles upon which an entire legal- political order is 
based is precarious in many ways, both for that order and the involved external authority.
 81 Ivan Vukoja and Milan Sitarski, “Constitutional, Legal and Political Algorithm of the 
Electoral Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Mostariensia – Journal of Social Sciences 
and Humanities 22, no. 1 (May 2018): 519.
 82 Which is exactly what the echr requested in its key judgments v. BiH. For instance, 
amongst others, the echr judgment in the prominent Sejdić- Finci case highlights 
the obligation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a member of the Council of Europe to 
amend its constitution in view of replacing the mechanisms of ethnic representation 
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equality between the constituent peoples would also be protected by allowing 
them to connect to collective institutions through an unhindered projection of 
their political will in elections. Each of them would still retain ownership over 
preassigned positions in the collective bodies of the Presidency and the HoP, 
but unladen with any current requirement of ethnic identification as current 
mandatory criteria for entering these positions.83 It means that the Serb, Croat 
and Bosniak members of the Presidency, as well as the Serb, Croat and Bosniak 
delegates in the respective ethnic group in the HoP, could become candidates 
supported either directly by their respective constituency (for members of the 
Presidency), or indirectly by the representatives of the constituent people in 
the cantonal assemblies (for the HoP delegates). The ‘Others’ could then be 
free to be a candidate or vote for any of the said positions they chose to. Since 
there are already fully worked- out concrete solutions and proposals leading in 
this direction,84 this chapter has not focused on this option in detail.
This all points out, on the one hand, the merits of the decision of BiH’s 
Constitutional Court on the ‘legitimate representation’ of constituent peoples 
(U- 23/ 14, ‘Ljubić’) and, on the other hand, that the echr’s judgments can be 
fulfilled within the current power- sharing arrangement.85 In essence, they 
are not necessarily contradictory but complementary, and as such they can 
simultaneously coexist and develop within the existent BiH constitutional 
framework. The benefit of such a conjunctive strategy is that it retains the 
integrity of the constitutional framework by affirming its corporate- federal 
dimension (Constituency of the Constituent Peoples) at the expense of the 
explicit- consociate (ethnically preassigned public- political positions), with-
out, however, usurping the essence of power- sharing agreement as defined in 
the Constitution and preceding peace treaties. This could be a sound alter-
native to any biased or exclusivist approach pointed either against group or 
individual rights, which would then lead to an insurmountable constitutional 
deadlock. Therefore, the only requirement for the success of this strategy is a 
deep reading of BiH’s Constitution and its values in conjunction with relevant 
decisions of BiH’s Constitutional Court and vice versa. That is the prerequisite 
Sejdić- Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (application nos. 27996/ 06 and 34836/ 06), 
Strasbourg, Judgment of 22 December 2009, 16.
 83 This approach is reflected and applied in a most meaningful way to the issue of BiH’s 
electoral reform by the Institute for Social and Political Research (idpi) in the article 
“Basic Principles, Models and Proposals for BiH Election Law Reform”, Mostar – BiH, April 
5th 2018, available in English at http:// www.en.idpi.ba/ basic- principles- models- and- 
proposals- for- bih- election- law- reform/ .
 84 Vukoja and Sitarski, “Constitutional, Legal and Political Algorithm,” 505– 521.








of a non- invasive implementation of the echr’s decisions, and the path ena-
bling the reconciliation of individual and group rights in the BiH multinational 
federation.
6 Conclusion
It follows that an impasse of the asymmetric structural deficiencies, embed-
ded in BiH dyadic two- entity territorial organisation (three constituent peo-
ples – two entities), ought to be compensated through other available means 
of the soft, i.e. non- structural, power- sharing contrivances, in order to affirm 
equal political participation in the decision- making processes of all the BiH 
constituents regardless of their size, demographic positioning, or political or 
economic power. The effects and consequences of the structural inequalities 
embedded in the Dayton Peace Agreement and further developed during its 
internationally supervised implementation could be remedied via adequate 
compensational policies in the institutional- regulative sphere. This could be 
achieved by re- affirming the electoral and consociate rules for the empower-
ment of minorities and betterment of their overall institutional position under 
a given constitutional setting. To honour mandatory constitutional norms of 
equality of all the constitutional- political entities,86 optimal standards of rela-
tive symmetry and connected institutional equality must be advanced.
Two key aspects of inequality in the BiH multinational federation have 
been examined in this chapter. The first predominantly relates to equality 
between constituent peoples (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks), and the second to 
the position and equality of ‘Others’. Regarding the first aspect, the constit-
uent peoples are in fact constituent members and the backbone of the BiH 
multinational federation. They are the founding basis of BiH’s current power- 
sharing arrangement. Thus, the concept of ‘constituency’ as a key constitu-
tional principle supersedes all other constitutional provisions and laws. As 
such it presupposes the equality of the constituent peoples (Croats, Bosniaks 
and Serbs) and the corresponding symmetric application of their rights both 
in the shared- and self- rule segments. Self- and shared- rule as federal princi-
ples are implicit to ‘constituency’, and as such play a crucial role in delivering 
equality in the BiH multinational federation. After an overview of the partici-
pative and co- decision- making capacities of the three constituent peoples, it 
was ascertained that in the current situation and on multiple levels of BiH’s 
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governance apparatus, the executive and legislative powers do not faithfully 
reflect, as they should, the constitutional principle of symmetry, embedded 
in the principle of ‘constituency’. There are conspicuous asymmetries within 
the power- sharing system which deviate from the constitutional norm of ‘con-
stituency’. This essentially refers to Croats who are the least numerous com-
munity in BiH and hold significantly lower self- and shared- rule capacities 
than the other two constituent peoples. In that respect, BiH’s electoral law is 
still controversial as it does not guarantee Croats from the FBiH, or minorities 
in both entities, the election of their representatives to BiH’s Presidency and 
HoP. The examined cases of inequality require a revision of power- sharing 
mechanisms so that constitutional symmetry and equality in the segment of 
shared- rule can become an institutional reality and thus compensate embed-
ded structural asymmetries. Another aspect of inequality, related to human 
rights and the still unimplemented echr decisions against BiH, indicates 
that minorities and individuals from the category of ‘Others’ are also dis-
criminated against on the grounds of their identity and place of residence. 
To resolve those pertinent problems of inequality in both collective and indi-
vidual dimensions, it is necessary to respect both the BiH Constitution and 
the traditional value of ‘constituency’, which implies that collective equality 
and human rights norms from the European Convention on Human Rights 
are integrated into BiH’s constitutional framework. Consequently, BiH must 
implement the ‘Ljubić’ decision of the Constitutional Court on legitimate rep-
resentation of the constituent peoples and revise the asymmetric distribution 
of public positions between their political representatives. It must also imple-
ment echr decisions targeting problems of discrimination of minorities and 
‘Others’ as non- constituents. In order to do so, it must abandon ethnic iden-
tity as the criteria for candidacy in collective representation institutions – BiH 
Presidency and the House of Peoples. The key point is that both individual 
and group equality can be fixed only under the auspices of the extant consti-
tutional framework and its key value – ‘constituency’. Human rights norms 
can be accommodated without overall disruption of the power- sharing bal-
ance created under the dpa and the appertaining Constitution. This is the 
only way to avoid continued perilous and unpredictable trade- offs between 
stability and democracy.
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 chapter 14
In the Name of Diversity
The Disenfranchisement of Citizens in an African Federation
Yonatan Tesfaye Fessha
1 Introduction
The empowerment of ethnic communities is the cornerstone of the consti-
tutional arrangement of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The 
Constitution organises the state along ethnic lines by using ethnicity as the 
primary basis to demarcate its internal boundaries. Ethnically defined autono-
mous subnational units are the basis for the organisation of the federation. At 
the same time, the Constitution, like many other contemporary Constitutions, 
provides for a vast array of individual rights. It declares equal commitment to 
both individual rights and the right of ethnic communities to autonomy.
Despite the constitutional commitment to equally uphold the autonomy 
of ethnic communities and individual rights, the constitutional practice, this 
chapter argues, seems to give more weight to autonomy rights and frustrates 
claims based on the right of an individual to equal treatment. This chapter dis-
cusses the status and treatment of individuals that belong to ethnic minorities 
in a context of a case that was decided by the House of Federation (HoF), the 
body that is responsible for interpreting the Constitution. The case revolved 
around the constitutionality of the use of a mandatory language requirement 
as a condition to be eligible for election. Although the HoF, in its decision, 
affirmed the rights of individual applicants to stand for elections, a closer scru-
tiny reveals that the HoF failed to protect the individual’s right to stand for 
election regardless of their linguistic abilities. In fact, the decision of the HoF 
has the effect of disenfranchising a large number of the population in most 
urban areas of the different subnational units, undermining the constitutional 
commitment to equal respect for individual and communal rights and creating 
a feeling of exclusion among individuals that are deemed not to belong to the 
empowered group(s).
The chapter is structured in five related parts. The next section introduces 
the basic architecture of the Ethiopian federation and, particularly, the self- 
rule aspect of the federation. This is followed by a section that discusses how 
the Constitution seeks to reconcile autonomy with individual rights. It then 
The Disenfranchisement of Citizens in an African Federation 395
moves to the main business of the chapter and discusses how the Constitution 
has, in practice, attempted to reconcile autonomy with the principle of equal-
ity. It does so by focusing on the case brought before the HoF pertaining to 
the mandatory language requirement to stand for election. The decision of the 
HoF is analysed both from the perspective of equal rights as well as from the 
point of view of the autonomy of ethnic communities that the mandatory lan-
guage requirement purportedly seeks to advance. The chapter concludes that 
the decision of the HoF inflicts harm not only on the principle of equality but 
also onto the commitment of the Constitution to promote the autonomy of 
ethnic communities.
2 Autonomous Ethnic Communities: The Building Blocks of the 
Ethiopian Federation
The political map of the Ethiopian federation betrays its major foundation: 
ethnicity. Unlike other federations, where geography or administrative con-
veniences have been used to draw internal boundaries, Ethiopia has opted 
to take ethnicity as the point of departure for the remaking of the Ethiopian 
state.1 Although unusual, it was not totally unexpected. The forces that sat 
around the national table in July 1991 and negotiated the reordering of the 
Ethiopian state were ethnic based political movements and liberation fronts. 
For them, the primary question that needed to be addressed in post- Derg2 
Ethiopia was what is usually known as the nationalities question – the claim 
that the making of the Ethiopian state was predicated on the suppression 
of the cultural and political aspirations of ethnic communities that inhabit 
the country. Ethnicity, they declared, should be the basis for the reorganisa-
tion of the Ethiopian state.3 It is that consensus, often touted by its propo-
nents as ‘the bold experiment’ in Africa, which found its way into the current 
Constitution.4
 1 This is clearly stated in the Constitution: ‘States shall be delimited on the basis of the set-
tlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people concerned’; see Article 46 
of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995 (hereafter the 
Constitution).
 2 Derg was the name given to the military government that ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1991.
 3 The Transitional Charter, which served as the constitutive document of the Transitional 
Government from 1991 to 1995, created 14 regions that were explicitly based on ethnicity.
 4 Whether an experiment that is novel and bold is always a good thing is a different matter 











The ‘bold experiment’ saw the creation of nine states.5 The ethnic founda-
tion of the federation is particularly apparent in five of its nine states.6 This 
is not only because of the fact that each of them is predominantly inhabited 
by one particular ethnic group. They are also named after the dominant eth-
nic group that inhabits the territory. The ethnic trait is not completely absent 
either in the makeup of the remaining four states. Although these states are 
not predominantly inhabited by one ethnic group, the designations of some 
of the states7 and their internal organisational structure, that includes ethnic 
based local governments,8 indicates that ethnicity is taken seriously in the 
political and organisational makeup of the states.
The decision of the Ethiopian state to take ethnicity seriously, perhaps too 
seriously, in the political and geographical reconfiguration of the country has 
undeniably promoted the cultural and political status of groups that were hith-
erto marginalised in the past. The cultural upliftment is particularly palpable. 
A country that for ages used only one language as a language of communica-
tion has now given way to a federation whose constituent units use different 
languages for the purposes of government business within their respective 
boundaries.9 This has extended to the education sector where many languages 
are now used as the medium of instruction at least in the early stages of most 
primary schools. Perhaps the most visible and colourful manifestation of cul-
tural upliftment comes in the form of the reintroduction of annual traditional 
celebrations that attract thousands of peoples and are taking the form of 
‘street festivals’.10
The political upliftment may not be equally palpable. Still, as I have alluded 
somewhere else,11 the territorial structure of the federation gives ample 
 5 The nine states are Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Benshangul/ Gumuz, Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples (snnpr), Harari, Somalia and Gambela; see Article 47 of the 
Constitution.
 6 These are Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, Somalia and Afar.
 7 Take, for example, the state of Harari, which is named after the numerically small but his-
torical inhabitants of the area. The Harari account for less than 9 % of the state population.
 8 This is the case, for example, with the snnpr, which is home to numerous ethnic groups, 
but is composed of local governments that are defined along ethnic lines.
 9 The Constitution, under article 5, leaves the power to decide language policy to each state 
government.
 10 Ashenda, a cultural festival of young ladies in Tigray, Irreecha, a thanksgiving holiday in 
Oromia, and Fiche Chembelala, a new year festival for the Sidama people celebrated in 
snnpr, are very good examples of annual cultural festivals that have gained prominence 
in the last few years.
 11 Yonatan Fessha, Ethnic Diversity and Federalism: Constitution Making in South Africa and 
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opportunities for local communities to participate in the political structure of 
the state. In fact, local communities have now been able to benefit from receiv-
ing services from leaders that speak their language and share their culture even 
though the representativeness and autonomy of the leaders is often questiona-
ble. True and full empowerment of communities is yet to arrive.
The reconfiguration of the state, because it cannot and has not resulted in 
separate ethnically pure territorial units, has brought to fore new tensions. On 
the one hand, it has created a majority– minority tension at the level of the 
constituent units. Some ethnic communities have suddenly found themselves 
in a minority position in an area they have traditionally inhabited just because 
they are taken along with another group that happens to be numerically dom-
inant. Those who find themselves in a minority often complain of political 
and economic domination by the regionally empowered group. They maintain 
that they, as a group, are entitled to equal recognition and protection. To their 
credit, the Constitution as well as the federal and state governments, through 
acts of parliament and state Constitutions respectively, have put in place few 
mechanisms to address the concerns of these internal minorities.12
The reconfiguration has also created tension between individual rights and 
communal interests. Protecting and accommodating the interest of communi-
ties is not always compatible with the interest of individuals, especially with 
those that do not belong to any of the groups that traditionally inhabit the 
area. Often referred to as non- indigenous or settlers, this group of individuals 
complains of their relegation to a second- class citizen status. They often com-
plain that they are not able to access government services in their language 
and, more problematically, they are often discriminated against regarding edu-
cation, employment and other benefits offered by state governments.
The resulting tensions are at the core of this chapter. As they result from the 
remapping of the state, this situation leads us to wonder how the Constitution 
envisages the reconciliation of these competing interests. This is a question 
about how a state can go about empowering groups that were marginalised 
in the past through autonomous arrangements without undermining its 
 12 The Constitutions of state governments have provided some mechanisms to accom-
modate the concerns of these groups. Some of the state Constitutions have also intro-
duced a similar system, but at a lower level, in a form of ethnic based local government, 
to accommodate identity- related demands from intra- state minorities. Functioning as 
autonomous entities, these ethnically defined local governments provide intra- state 
minorities with the territorial space that is necessary to manage their own affairs. For 
more, see Yonatan Fessha and Christophe Van der Beken, “Ethnic Federalism and Internal 
Minorities: The Legal Protection of Internal Minorities,” African Journal of International 




commitment to respect and protect individual rights irrespective of the group 
they belong to.13 Let us start with the Constitution.
3 The Communitarian Constitution?
One can easily be tempted to classify the Ethiopian Constitution as a commu-
nitarian one. With its elaborate list of provisions that presents ethnic groups 
as the subject of rights, the Constitution might be unparalleled in the attention 
it gives to ethnic communities. It might be difficult to identify a comparator 
from its contemporaries. This is not only because it presents ethnic groups as 
the subjects of rights (which, on its own, is not necessarily common) but also 
since it defines the Constitution as a compact amongst ethnic communities. It 
proclaims that it is the coming- together of ethnic communities that has given 
birth to the federation. In as much as one can easily dismiss this as a constitu-
tional fiction, it is this constitutional premise that underlies the clauses that 
make up the Constitution. As noted by Kymlicka, ‘[t] he Ethiopian Constitution 
reads as if someone attempted simply to deduce the appropriate structure of 
the federal state from a set of first principles, in conjunctions with a census 
of ethno- linguistic groups’.14 It is this preoccupation with ethnic groups and 
the rights of ethnic groups that has made many wonder whether there is ‘a 
space for the individual’ in the Ethiopian Constitution. Even if there is a space 
for individual rights, they argue, it is of secondary importance to group rights. 
‘[T]he individual is relegated in the constitutional order.’15
Even if the unusual attention given to ethnic communities overshadows 
all other parts of the Constitution, it provides for a detailed list of individual 
rights. A whole chapter (i.e. chapter three of the Constitution) is dedicated 
to fundamental rights and freedoms. Part one of that chapter is dedicated to 
human rights. Part two focuses on what it calls democratic rights. Between 
the two parts, the Constitution provides for no less than two dozen individual 
 13 This is not a tension that is unique to the Ethiopian federation. Most multinational feder-
ations grapple with this dilemma.
 14 Will Kymlicka, “Emerging Western Multinational Federalism: Are They Relevant for 
Africa?,” in Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective, ed. 
David Turton (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 2006), 55. It has also led 
Kymlicka to observe ‘the explicitness with which the Ethiopian Constitution affirms the 
principle of ethno- national self- government and the logical consistency with which it 
attempts to institutionalize that principle’.
 15 See Berihun Adugna Gebeye, “Towards making a proper space for the individual in the 
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rights, including the universal rights that are widely recognised by national 
Constitutions and international human rights instruments. Importantly, 
Article 25 of the Constitution declares the right to equality and prohibits dis-
crimination on grounds of, amongst other things, race, nation, nationality, or 
other social origin, language, religion or other status. The Constitution man-
dates ‘all federal and state legislative, executive and judicial organs at all levels 
[…] to respect and enforce [the fundamental rights and freedoms provided in 
the Constitution]’.16
Although the emphasis on group rights overshadows all other equally impor-
tant provisions of the Constitution, respect for universal individual rights is 
given equal status, though not equal attention, to that of communal rights, or 
as the Constitution puts it, ‘the rights of nations, nationalities and people’.17 
This is clearly stated from the outset in the preamble to the Constitution which 
emphasises the ‘full respect of individual and people’s fundamental freedoms 
and rights’.18 It also declares the need to ‘live together on the basis of equality 
and without any sexual, religious or cultural discrimination’.19 The HoF, the 
body that is responsible for interpreting the Constitution, has also confirmed 
that the Constitution attaches equal weight to individual and communal 
rights. It declared that individual rights and group rights, as recognised by the 
Constitution, are ‘interdependent, indivisible and equal’.20 The right of ethnic 
communities to self- determination should not be given preference over indi-
vidual rights. Similarly, it is not permissible to limit the right of ethnic commu-
nities to self- rule to ensure the realisation of an individual right. Both groups of 
rights must be seen in harmony with each other and must be enforced accord-
ingly. The question is whether the constitutional practice reflects this equal 
commitment to communal and individual rights.
The commitment of the Constitution to respect individual and commu-
nal rights was at the centre of a case that was brought before the HoF.21 The 
case stemmed from a petition that challenged the decision of the National 
Electoral Board that, according to the claimants, interfered with the right to 
stand as a candidate. The decision dealt with the use of language requirements 
 16 Article 14 of the Constitution.
 17 Article 39 of the Constitution.
 18 Preamble of the Constitution.
 19 Preamble of the Constitution.
 20 Benshangul/ Gumuz case, House of Federation (12 March 2003) House of Federation 
(2008) 1 Journal of Constitutional Decisions 14– 34 (Hereafter Benshangul/ Gumuz case).
 21 Decision of House of the Federation on ‘Constitutional Dispute Concerning the Right to 
Elect and be Elected in Benishangul Gumuz Regional State’, 13 March 2003 (Hereinafter 














to stand for election in one of the nine states, namely the state of Benshangul/ 
Gumuz. Before analysing the case in detail, a quick account of the socio- 
political demography of the state has to be provided, which, I believe, gives 
an insight into the developments that led to the legal battle that is the focus 
of this chapter.
4 The State of Benshangul/ Gumuz and the Use of Mandatory 
Language Requirements
Unlike the five states, there is no single ethnic group that accounts for most 
of the population that inhabits the state of Benshangul/ Gumuz. The largest 
ethnic group, the Berta, account for just less than 26 % of the population of the 
state, closely followed by the Amhara and the Gumuz, each of which account 
for just above 21 % of the population of the state.22 Like the five states, how-
ever, the designation of the state gives an indication of the ethnic groups that 
are deemed to be ‘owners of the state’. This is because the designation of the 
state is not ethnically neutral. It actually refers to the two ethnic groups that 
are deemed to have historically inhabited the area, namely the Berta and the 
Gumuz. In fact, the Constitution of the state reinforces this perception by sin-
gling out the two ethnic groups, along with the Shinasha, Mao and Komo, as 
the ‘owners of the state’.23
Nearly half the population of the state does not, however, belong to the eth-
nic groups that are declared by the Constitution as the ‘owners of the state’. 
In fact, an important feature of the demographic composition of the state is 
the presence of a large population that have migrated to the area. Many have 
moved to the state because of the resettlement programs that were undertaken 
by the military government in the 1980s following the famine that ravaged the 
northern part of the country. Although these individuals belong to different 
ethnic groups, more than half of them belong to the Amhara ethnic group, the 
second largest ethnic group in the country, whose culture and language has 
been historically dominant. This segment of the population, together with the 
Oromo and members of other ethnic groups, account for no less than 40 % of 
the population of the state.
 22 The three other ethnic groups are the Shinasha (7.59 %), Mao (1.90 %) and Komo 
(0.96 %). See Population Census Commission, “Summary and statistical Report of the 
2007 Population and Housing Census Results,” accessed on 15 July 15 2018, http:// www.
ethiopianreview.com/ pdf/ 001/ Cen2007_ firstdraft(1).pdf.
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It was the decision of three individuals that belong to the so- called set-
tlers group to stand for election to the parliament of Benshangul/ Gumuz that 
ensued the legal battle that culminated in the HoF. Although the three individ-
uals belong to different ethnic groups, they share the fact that all of them speak 
Amharic and wanted to contest the 2000 state legislature election. Their deci-
sion to contest the election, however, faced a strong objection from one of the 
local political parties that was vying for the control of the state parliament. An 
ethnic based party that claims to represent members of the Berta ethnic group 
petitioned the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (nebe) for the exclusion 
of the candidates from the state election because none of the three candidates 
speak any of the ‘indigenous languages’ and, in particular, Berta, one of the five 
‘indigenous languages’ spoken in the state.
The nebe agreed with the petition and struck off the individuals from the 
list of candidates. The nebe based its decision on the electoral law that makes 
the right to stand for an election dependent on the ability to speak the work-
ing language of the region.24 The individuals appealed to the HoF, objecting 
to the decision of the nebe on the ground that the law is unconstitutional. 
The Council of Constitutional Inquiry (cci), a standing body established by 
the Constitution to provide advisory opinion to the HoF,25 concluded, on a 
majority vote, that the mandatory language requirement constitutes discrim-
ination. It accordingly advised the HoF to declare the impugned legislation 
unconstitutional and invalid. The dissenting members of the cci did not see 
incompatibility between the mandatory language requirement and the right to 
stand for election without discrimination.
The HoF reversed the decision of the neb and affirmed the right of the 
three individuals to stand for election on the ground that the impugned legis-
lation does not require the candidate to speak the ‘indigenous languages’ but 
the working language of the state government. However, the decision of the 
HoF, as we shall find shortly, fell short of entrenching the right of individuals 
to stand for an election irrespective of their linguistic ability. This is because 
the HoF held that the use of the working language of the state as a condition 
 24 Article 38 (19 (b)) of the Proclamation to make the Electoral Law of Ethiopia conform 
with the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Proc. No. 111/ 1995), 
published in Negarit Gazeta tge, 54, no. 9 (February 1995).
 25 The cci, composed of lawyers and politicians, has the powers to investigate constitu-
tional disputes and submit its recommendations to the HoF. In particular, if federal or 
state law is challenged on the ground that it is unconstitutional, the Council shall con-
sider the matter and submit its recommendations to the HoF. The HoF is not obliged to 






to stand for election is not inconsistent with the Constitution as it does not 
constitute a violation of the right of a citizen to stand for election without 
discrimination.
In what remains of this chapter, I argue that the position of the HoF is 
problematic both from the perspective of the principle of equal rights and the 
principle of autonomy. From the perspective of equal rights, the decision to 
uphold the mandatory language requirement violates the right of an individ-
ual to stand for election without any discrimination. From the perspective of 
autonomy, it fails to effectively reconcile the tension between individual and 
group right that is inherent in many federal Constitutions which are designed 
to deal with the challenges of ethnic diversity. Let us start the discussion by 
focusing on the implication of the decision on the right to stand for election 
without discrimination.
5 The Equality Argument
The right to stand for election without discrimination is one of the most 
widely recognised rights, both internationally and nationally. Article 25 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr) recognises and 
protects the right of every citizen to be elected.26 All international agreements 
ratified by Ethiopia are an integral part of the law of the land,27 making article 
25 of the iccpr a right that can be claimed by an Ethiopian citizen before local 
courts. Article 38 of the Constitution reinforces the commitment of Ethiopia 
to political rights by providing that ‘[e] very Ethiopian national, without any 
discrimination based on color, race, nation, nationality, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion or other status’ has the right ‘to be elected at periodic 
elections to any office at any level of government’.
Although not explicitly mentioned, the right to stand as a candidate can-
not be without limitations. The international covenants to which Ethiopia is a 
party, and based upon which ‘the fundamental rights and freedoms’ provided 
in the Constitution must be interpreted,28 state that the right to be elected 
 26 Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
 27 Article 9 (4) of the Constitution.
 28 The Ethiopian Constitution provides that ‘[t] he fundamental rights and freedoms speci-
fied in this Chapter shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the principles of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights and 
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can be restricted.29 But the restrictions must be reasonable; it is unreasonable 
restrictions that are prohibited. Whether a restriction is reasonable or not can-
not be determined abstractly, but only on a case- by- case basis. It requires one 
to consider the nature of the limitation and, in particular, the extent to which 
the restriction limits the right in question. The limitation must not be so exten-
sive that it negates the ‘very essence’ of the right. Furthermore, the individual 
right must be weighed against the aims that the limitation seeks to achieve. 
The aims, in turn, must be legitimate. At the end of the day, restrictions must 
always comply with the requirements of proportionality. The means used to 
achieve the ‘legitimate aim’ shall not be disproportionate.
International law has not yet determined whether mandatory language 
requirements violate the right to stand for public office. In Ignatane v Latvia, 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee (un hrc) was given an oppor-
tunity to address this specific issue.30 In that case, the applicant, Ms. Ignatane, 
a Latvian citizen of Russian origin, was denied the right to stand for local elec-
tion on the ground that she could not fluently speak Latvian, the official lan-
guage of the country. According to the Law on Elections to Town Councils and 
Municipal Councils of 13 January 1994, an individual that does not have level 3 
(higher) proficiency in the state Language cannot stand for election. All candi-
dates, except those that completed their education in schools that use Latvian 
as a medium of instruction, must submit a copy of their language proficiency 
certificate, demonstrating ‘higher level proficiency’, along with ‘the candidate’s 
application’. In February 1997, the Riga Election Commission, which is respon-
sible for organising elections in the district the applicant was contesting, 
removed her from the list based on an opinion issued by the State Language 
Board (slb). The opinion declared by the slb, which, in turn, was based on a 
report prepared by a single examiner, declared that Ms. Ignatane does not have 
the required proficiency in the official language. The applicant claimed that 
the decision to remove her from the list of candidates amounted to a violation 
of her right to stand for election without any discrimination. The State party, 
the government of Latvia, argued that the mandatory language requirement 
was consistent with article 25 iccpr as it is a restriction based on objective 
and reasonable criteria. According to the State party, ‘participation in public 
affairs requires a high level of proficiency in the State language and such a 
 29 Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that the rights 
are granted to every citizen without unreasonable restrictions, suggesting that restric-
tions are acceptable if they are reasonable.
 30 Antonina Ignatane v. Latvia (Communication no 884/ 1999), Views adopted on 31 July 2001, 






precondition is reasonable and based on objective criteria, which are set forth 
in the regulations on the certification of proficiency in the State language’.
The un hrc ruled that the action of the Latvian government violated 
Article 25 of the iccpr. It believed that the way the proficiency of the appli-
cant is determined was not based on objective and reasonable criteria. The 
decision of the Electoral Commission to remove the applicant based on a 
report issued by a single inspector and only a few days prior to the election 
is arbitrary and this is despite the fact that the applicant had been given a 
language aptitude certificate by a board of Latvian language specialists some 
years earlier. Accordingly, the Committee concluded that the decision of the 
Election Commission to strike off the applicant from the list of candidates on 
the basis of insufficient proficiency in the official language had prevented her 
from exercising her right to public participation as provided in article 25 of the 
Covenant in conjunction with article 2 of the Covenant.
Although the decision represents a victory for the applicant, it does not 
help much for those that find themselves in the same position as the appli-
cant. This is because the Committee did not conclude that a mandatory lan-
guage requirement per se violates the right to public participation without 
any discrimination. It rather ruled in favour of the applicant based on proce-
dural grounds.31 In so far as international human rights law is concerned, the 
question of whether a decision of a state to introduce a mandatory language 
requirement violates political human rights – irrespective of the way in which 
proficiency in the language in question is determined – remains unresolved.32
 31 This is different from the position of the European Court of Human rights that, in an iden-
tical case involving Latvia, ruled that the power to determine the language of Parliament 
falls within the state’s exclusive competence and legislation that requires candidates to be 
fluent in the working language of the parliament is not problematic as it is aimed at ensur-
ing ‘the proper functioning of parliament’. ‘In particular, members of parliament needed 
to be able to take an active part in the work of the institution and to defend their electors’ 
interests effectively.’ The Court considered that its mandate is only to determine whether 
the means used by the state to achieve its ‘legitimate aim’ is proportionate. The Court ruled 
that the decision to strike off the applicant from the list of candidates was unacceptable. It 
based its decision, however, on procedural fairness (i.e. the way in which the proficiency of 
the candidate was determined) and did not find it necessary to examine whether the lan-
guage requirement violates the right against non- discrimination. See European Court of 
Human Rights, Podkolzina v. Latvia (application no. 46726/ 99), judgement of 9 April 2002.
 32 It must be mentioned that Latvia, under pressure from the European Union and nato, 
amended its electoral law, in 2002, to remove the use of the use of language requirement 
to stand for election. This was welcomed by the un hrc. See United Nations, Report 
of the Human Rights Committee, Volume 1 (U.N. Doc. A/ 59/ 40), 1 October 2004, para 65 
(4), https:// tbinternet.ohchr.org/ _ layouts/ treatybodyexternal/ Download.aspx?symbol-
no=A%2F59%2F40(Vol.%20I)&Lang=en. However, it must be noted that ‘Parliament 
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Back in Ethiopia, however, the HoF, as mentioned earlier, gave a definitive 
answer to the same question. The HoF ruled that the decision of the nebe 
to strike off the three candidates from the list of candidates was inconsistent 
with the Constitution. To be precise, it did not do so because it believed that 
the mandatory language requirement is incompatible with the Constitution. 
Rather, the HoF found the decision of the NEBE unacceptable because the 
impugned legislation, despite the decision made by the nebe, does not require 
fluency in any of the local languages. What is required is the ability to converse 
in the working language of the state government, which, in the case of the state 
of Benshangul/ Gumuz, happens to be Amharic. The HoF, therefore, concluded 
that the decision of the nebe to exclude the candidates from contesting the 
state parliamentary election is erroneous as the candidates are fluent in the 
working language of the state and are not required to be proficient in any of 
the other local languages.
According to the HoF, requiring a candidate to be versed in one of the local 
languages (other than or in addition to the working language of the state) 
is problematic. To use the language other than the working language of the 
state as a requirement to stand for election, according to the HoF, is to create 
discrimination based on language. It would also limit the constitutional right 
of citizens to elect and be elected. Such language requirement, the HoF held, 
is also problematic because, in addition to infringing constitutional rights, it 
undermines the constitutional commitment to create one political and eco-
nomic community.33
More significantly, for our purpose, however, the HoF did not see a prob-
lem in the mandatory language requirement. It held that the electoral law that 
makes the right to stand for an election dependent on the working language 
of the state is not inconsistent with the Constitution. How did the HoF justify 
its position?
The HoF conceded that the Constitution prohibits the use of language 
as a ground to deny or limit the right to vote and to be elected. However, 
the mandatory language requirement, the HoF argues, does not differenti-
ate between or amongst individuals based on their association with a (lin-
guistic) group. It rather differentiates between individuals based on their 
necessary for the performance of professional duties’, thereby undermining the amend-
ment. See Jennie L. Schulze, Strategic Frames: Europe, Russia and Minority Inclusion in 
Estonia and Latvia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018), 199.
 33 The preamble to the Constitution refers to the commitment ‘to building a political com-





capacity to speak the working language of the state. The law does not, there-
fore, interfere with the right of individuals to stand as a candidate without 
discrimination.
Pursuant to the HoF’s decision, the mandatory language requirement does 
not exclude an individual from standing for political office because they belong 
to a particular group.34 Excluded are individuals who cannot speak the work-
ing language of the state, irrespective of their group membership. An individ-
ual belonging to a particular group can be allowed to stand as candidate while 
another person from the same group may be disqualified if they are not pro-
ficient in the working language of the state. In the same way that an Amhara, 
who is not proficient in Oromifa, will not be allowed to contest an election for 
Oromia state parliament, an Oromo that does not speak Oromifa will not be 
allowed to stand as candidate for the same state parliament. Membership to a 
group is not used as the basis for differentiation. There is, therefore, according 
to the HoF, no basis to conclude that the law discriminates based on language 
or ethnic group.
5.1 Direct and Indirect Discrimination
On the face of it, the impugned legislation does not seem to discriminate based 
on membership to a group. The legislation ‘lays down the same requirement 
and obligation for’ all individuals that want to contest a state election, regard-
less of the ethnic or linguistic group they belong to. It treats ‘equally all peo-
ple who seek to’ contest a state election. This may lead one to agree with the 
conclusion of the HoF that there is no discrimination. After all, discrimination 
begins when we treat two people or groups differently based on their associa-
tion with a group (or a susceptible ground).
However, discrimination can be direct or indirect. The international juris-
prudence has established that a differentiation which, on the face of it, does not 
seem to discriminate amongst groups on any susceptible ground might still be 
regarded as indirect discrimination. In Althammer v Austria, the un hrc stated 
that ‘a violation of Article 26 can also result from the discriminatory effect of a 
rule or measure that is neutral at face value or without intent to discriminate’.35 
This happens when the differentiation has discriminatory effect on a particular 
 34 The decision of the House seems to echo the advisory opinion given by the dissenting 
members of the cci that, as mentioned earlier, did not find incompatibility between the 
language requirement and the right to stand for election without discrimination.
 35 Althammer v. Austria (Communication no. 998/ 2001), Views adopted on 8 August 2003, 
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group.36 As noted by the un hrc, ‘such indirect discrimination can only be 
said to be based on the ground enumerated in Article 26 of the Covenant if 
the detrimental effects of a rule or decision exclusively or disproportionately 
affect persons having a particular race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’. In 
other words, a law or measure that is not specifically directed at a particular 
group, and which appears to be neutral, may still be considered discriminatory 
if it has ‘disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group’.
Arguably, the mandatory language requirement may have a discriminatory 
effect on individuals that do not belong to a particular ethnic group. This is 
particularly the case in the states that are dominated by a particular ethnic 
group whose language serves as the working language of the government. 
In those states, although the criterion seems to exclude all individuals that 
are not proficient in the working language of the state from contesting state 
elections irrespective of their group membership, it is clear that the criterion 
disproportionately affects individuals that do not belong to the numerically 
dominant ethnic group. In the state of Oromia, for example, where more than 
90 % of the population belongs to the Oromo ethnic group, it is the 3.2 million 
individuals that inhabit the state but do not belong to the Oromo ethnic group 
that would be largely affected by this requirement. It is candidates that do not 
belong to the Oromo ethnic group that are mostly unable to communicate in 
Oromifa, the working language of the state government, and, as a result, would 
 36 Indirect discrimination has its source in the famous decision of the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Griggs v Duke Power Company. In that case, the impugned conduct 
was an employer’s requirement that job applicants hold a high school diploma or pass an 
intelligence test for what was basically an unskilled job, for which even literacy was not 
necessary. The Court held that the requirement was discriminatory ‘because it operated 
to exclude black applicants at a higher rate than whites, and was not substantially related 
to the applicant’s ability to perform the job’. The Court, in what is perhaps the first formu-
lation of the concept of indirect discrimination, stated: ‘What is required by the Congress 
is the removal of the artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment when 
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial and other imper-
missible classification. The act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices 
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business neces-
sity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be 
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited’; US Supreme Court, Griggs v Duke 
Power Company (1971, no. 124), judgement of 8 March 1971. There are, of course, those that 
trace the origin of indirect discrimination to ‘some earlier emanations in pre- UN inter-
national law’; See Dagmar Schiek, Waddington Lisa and Mark Bell, Cases, Materials and 





be excluded from the electoral process. The same is true in other states that 
are home to large numbers of so- called ‘settlers’ but have chosen the language 
of the numerically dominant group as the language of government business. 
The end result is that the mandatory requirement benefits those that belong 
to the regionally empowered ethnic group and disadvantages those that do 
not belong to that particular ethnic group. It can therefore be argued that 
the language requirement has a detrimental effect indirectly on grounds of 
ethnicity.37
5.2 Based on Objective and Reasonable Criteria?
As alluded earlier, it is not sufficient to conclude that the law adopted or the 
conduct in question is discriminatory because it has a disproportionately det-
rimental effect on a particular group. As problematic as it may appear, such 
action, on its own, does not constitute discrimination. It is necessary to inves-
tigate if the problematic action cannot be explicated by the aim it pursues and 
the means it uses to achieve the same. According to un hrc, conducts or laws 
that have a detrimental effect exclusively or disproportionately on a particu-
lar group ‘do not amount to discrimination if they are based on objective and 
reasonable ground’.38 The remaining question is, thus, whether the mandatory 
language requirement is a restriction on the right to stand as a candidate that 
is based on objective and reasonable grounds. The HoF believes so.
The HoF argued that the ability to speak the working language of the state 
is essential if candidates are going to introduce and convince the electorate 
about the superiority of their respective political program or the program of 
the political party they represent. A command of the working language of the 
state, the HoF argued, is also crucial if a member of parliament is to engage 
fully and effectively in the debates and discussions of the state parliament. 
Speaking the working language is essential, if not indispensable, for the effec-
tive representation of the electorate in parliament, the HoF concluded.
Clearly, the mandatory language requirement is imposed to achieve a 
legitimate aim, namely the effective functioning of parliament. It is true that 
effective representation can be enhanced by the ability to speak the working 
language of the parliament. A member of parliament that does not speak the 
working language might be incapable of following the debates in parliament 
 37 See also Takele Soboka Bulto, “Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing? The Interpretation and applica-
tion of the Equality Guarantee under the Ethiopian Constitution,” Afrika Focus Journal 26, 
no.1 (2013): 11– 35.
 38 Althammer v. Austria (Communication no. 998/ 2001), Views adopted on 8 August 2003, 
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and its committees. That would not only undermine the representative capac-
ity of the members of parliament, but it might also seriously hamper the func-
tioning of parliament. But effective representation does not only depend on 
the capacity of the elected to participate in the works of parliament. It also 
depends on the capacity of the candidate to communicate with the electorate. 
Yet, the House, though it has mentioned both dimensions of what makes an 
effective representation, seems to disproportionately focus on the capacity of 
the candidate to participate in the activities of the parliament. This is evident 
from the fact that it did not consider it necessary for an individual that con-
tests a seat in the federal parliament to speak the working language of the state 
they come from. Proficiency in the working language of the state, the House 
ruled, should not be a precondition to stand as a candidate for the federal par-
liament. In consequence, a person that does not speak Oromifa can stand as 
a candidate to represent an Oromifa- speaking constituency in federal parlia-
ment. Obviously, the capacity of the candidate to communicate with the elec-
torate is not a key consideration. For the House, what matters most is that the 
elected understands the language of parliament and is able to participate in its 
activities. The House failed to emphasise the fact that effective representation, 
more than anything else, requires being able to effectively communicate with 
the electorate.39
Furthermore, the means that the law is using to achieve its objective of 
maintaining a well- functioning parliament, which is excluding candidates 
from the electoral process, is disproportionate. There are other mechanisms 
through which language constraints can be addressed. The provision of trans-
lation facilities can, for example, easily alleviate language constraints. In fact, 
the federal parliament uses translation services to facilitate the participation 
of members that do not have sufficient knowledge of Amharic, the federal 
working language.
Furthermore, the House has also not addressed the problematic nature of 
determining the proficiency of a candidate in a working language. What should 
be the procedure for assigning the proficiency of a candidate in the working 
language of the state? Who would be responsible for organising the test and 
determining whether a candidate has sufficient skills in the language of the 
state? Would the test be limited to oral examination? Or would the candidate 
be assessed also based on their writing skills, the breadth of vocabulary used 
and observance of grammatical rules? There is nothing in the electoral law or 
 39 This, at the very least, involves speaking the languages of the electorate or the constitu-




any other law, for that matter, that outlines the procedure that must be fol-
lowed in determining the proficiency of a candidate in a particular language. 
In the absence of clear procedures and guidelines, it is likely that the process 
that will be followed in determining proficiency in a working language of the 
state would in itself be arbitrary and without objective criteria and hence in 
violation of the right to stand as a candidate without discrimination.
6 The Autonomy Argument
One may argue that there are usually historical and political circumstances 
that might justify the adoption of such restrictive laws. In fact, the dissenting 
members of the cci, who, as mentioned above, did not find incompatibility 
between the mandatory language requirement and the right to stand for elec-
tion without discrimination, based their decision partly on the commitment 
of the Constitution to ‘rectify historical injustices’40 and the mode of federal 
arrangement Ethiopia has chosen. As mentioned at the beginning of this chap-
ter, the Ethiopian federalism is primarily designed to accommodate ethnic 
diversity. Self- rule of ethnic communities is a central pillar of the federal order. 
In fact, the constituent units are designed in a manner that they embody the 
empowerment of ethnic communities. Most of them are demarcated in such a 
way that each of them is home to a particular ethnic group. Each constituent 
unit is free to determine its language policy. They are basically crafted in a man-
ner that allows members of the concerned ethnic community to dominate the 
leadership structure of the state, thereby ensuring communities manage their 
own affairs. Without the language requirement, goes the argument, local insti-
tutions that are meant to empower local communities would be dominated by 
individuals from outside the group, thereby undermining the right of ethnic 
communities to manage their own affairs. This is particularly the case in areas 
where members of the dominant ethnic group have moved and settled in large 
numbers.
According to the dissenting members of the cci, the manner in which the 
mandatory language requirement is formulated represents an effective way to 
reconcile the tension between the right of ethnic groups to administer their 
own affairs and the individual right to be elected. The electoral law, it is argued, 
does not exclude an individual from contesting an election in a particular state 
because they belong to an ethnic group that does not hail from the state. In 
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other words, the law does not enforce mirror representation and does not 
require that members of a particular ethnic or linguistic group must be repre-
sented by an individual that hails from the concerned group. It simply requires 
the person to speak the working language of the state. This, according to the 
dissenting members of the cci, represents an attempt to protect the right of 
ethnic groups to administer their own affairs without infringing the right of 
the individual to stand for election without discrimination.
As argued elsewhere, the anxieties of members of ‘indigenous communi-
ties’ that were subjected to cultural and political marginalisation in the past 
must be taken seriously and addressed properly. These are legitimate concerns 
and it is particularly crucial considering that ‘[t] hey suffered as a result of 
exclusionary rules and institutions that favored members of ethnic commu-
nities to which the settlers belong to’.41 A federal system that is designed to 
accommodate diversity must ensure that other mechanisms and processes do 
not undermine the commitment of the system to empower groups that were 
marginalised in the past. Otherwise, the constitutional commitment may turn 
out to be a hollow promise. The challenge is thus to ensure respect for indi-
vidual rights without, at the same time, sabotaging the commitment of the 
Constitution for self- rule.
As it is clear by now, autonomy in the context of Ethiopian federation is 
basically about allowing members of a community to freely determine how 
and by whom they should be governed. Whether the candidate is in a position 
to effectively represent the community cannot and should not be determined 
by law, governmental authority or any other body. This should be left to mem-
bers of the community that are eligible to vote. The electorate can either accept 
or reject a candidate based, amongst other elements, on their capacity to relate 
to the concerns and wishes of the community which they seek to represent in 
parliament. If a candidate not proficient in the working language of the state is 
elected, it is ‘either because that person represents many people who are in the 
same situation or, in any event, because the electorate indicated that with their 
votes their confidence in his or her ability to represent their interests in the 
legislature’.42 This would be an exercise in self- determination as opposed to 
the mandatory language requirement that predetermines for the community.
 41 Yonatan Fessha, “Empowerment and Exclusion: The Story of Two African Federations” 
in Revisiting Unity and Diversity in Federal Countries: Changing Concepts, Reform 
Proposals and New Institutional Realities eds. Alain- G Gagnon and Michael Burgess, (Brill, 
2018), 57– 78.
 42 Fernand De Varennes, “Equality and Non- discrimination: Fundamental Principles 
of Minority Language Rights,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 6, 






Furthermore, the electoral law could have tried to allay the fears and address 
the concerns of ethnic communities without undermining individual rights. 
As the United Nations Human Rights Committee ruled in the Ballanyne et al. v 
Canada,43 it is not necessary for a state to undermine individual rights in order 
to protect the vulnerable position of a minority group. The law must endeav-
our to achieve the protection of vulnerable groups in ways that do not violate 
the individual rights of others. In this case, the law, in addition to avoiding 
mirror representation, could have found other ways of enhancing the presence 
and power of minority groups in the decision- making processes of the state. It 
could have enhanced their presence by, for example, allowing for the overrep-
resentation of minorities in major institutions of the subnational government. 
It could have reserved seats, including important offices, for members of the 
minority groups. On the other hand, it could have also enhanced the power 
of such communities by allowing them to block certain decisions that would 
threaten their interests. It could have given such minority groups veto powers 
over matters that affect them. In this way the state could have reconciled the 
fears and concerns of minority groups with the right of individuals to enjoy 
equal rights.44
Far from reconciling the tension between the right of an individual to stand 
as a candidate and the self- governance rights of ethnic communities, the legit-
imisation of the mandatory language requirement has, in fact, the effect of 
undermining the right of ethnic communities to administer their own affairs. 
In those ethnically diverse states where no one group is numerically domi-
nant and, as a result, Amharic is adopted as the language of government busi-
ness, the mandatory language requirement has the effect of excluding mem-
bers of indigenous ethnic groups that are not proficient in Amharic from the 
electoral process. This is the case in the ethnically diverse states of Gambela, 
Benshangul/ Gumuz and snnpr. In these states, the mandatory language 
requirement in fact undermines the primary commitments made by the 
Constitution to respect and promote the right of communities to manage their 
own affairs, the very same objective that the mandatory language requirement 
seeks to promote.45
 43 Ballantyne, Davidson, McIntyre v. Canada (Communication nos. 359/ 1989 and 385/ 1989), 
Views adopted on 31 March 1993, U.N. Doc. ccpr/ C/ 47/ D/ 359/ 1989 and 385/ 1989/ Rev.1 
(1993), para. 11.4.
 44 Some of these measures, some may argue, also violate individual rights and the principle 
of equality. But these deviations can often be easily justified.
 45 The good news is that the government has mitigated the damage on self- rule by intro-
ducing an electoral amendment that rectifies this problem by stating that a candidate 







The Disenfranchisement of Citizens in an African Federation 413
7 Conclusion
The decision of the HoF to legitimatise the mandatory language requirement 
and, as a result, usurp a decision- making power that belongs to the elector-
ate, inflicts a double harm to the Constitution. On the one hand, the language 
requirement, in addition to interfering with the right of an individual to stand 
as a candidate without discrimination, makes it impossible for the electorate 
to vote for persons that do not belong to the titular ethnic group who, often, 
are not proficient in the language of the state. By doing so, it undermines the 
primary purpose of the right to vote and to be elected without discrimination, 
which is to allow for ‘the expression of the will of the people in a free and fair 
election’. On the other hand, it inflicts harm on the principle of autonomy that 
the Constitution espouses. It poses a threat to the right of ethnic communities to 
self- administration by excluding individuals who are indigenous to the state but 
not proficient in the working language of the state, from the electoral process.
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Concluding Remarks
Eva Maria Belser
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, nationalism started to imprint its 
mark on the globe. When the concept of the sovereignty of the people began 
to replace the sovereignty of the monarch, the state and its people became 
interlinked in entirely new ways: the people became the new source of the 
legitimacy of the state and transformed the old empires into modern nation- 
states. Most states, however, inherited rather centralised top- down structures 
and integrated new democratic ideas into these structures. Hence the classic 
nation- state was structured around the idea of a shared homogeneous national 
identity which was more often than not constructed, orchestrated top- down 
and enforced by assimilation policies. For a long time, it seemed necessary to 
view the sovereign people as one and to look at the national community as 
homogeneous, an attitude which involved ignoring or eliminating diversity. 
The created or claimed national identity appeared to be the mainstay of an 
individual’s right to equality and a national concept of solidarity. States thus 
aimed at erecting the boundaries of their nation’s political structure on what 
they believed to be the legitimate land of their national group, a major conse-
quence of which was to render invisible the many nations and communities 
most countries contained. Other states settled with the boundaries inherited 
by history, war and peace, colonialism and decolonisation, boundaries which 
often did not match ethnic or cultural borders. As a nation able to sustain a 
nation- state within these borders did not exist, it had to be constructed – usu-
ally by making one of the numerous nations the dominant one. As a conse-
quence, nation- building was often a rather violent process implying the gen-
eralisation and ‘nationalisation’ of one of the local identities and thus came at 
the price of annihilating and oppressing other identities.
During the nineteenth and twentieth century, numerous nationalist and 
independent movements led to the creation of new nation- states in Europe, 
the Americas, Africa and Asia and put an end to land and saltwater empires. 
While in the nineteenth century, some states were still formed by the aggrega-
tion of formerly independent units, the main trend since has been the carving 
out of new (nation- )states from larger units. Between 1900 and today, the num-
ber of states quadrupled and during the twentieth century, a new state was 
born every nine months. Most of these new states claimed to be nation- states 
and frequently took it on themselves to build the new state by empowering 
one of its communities while marginalising and neglecting all others. Since, 
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the enthusiasm for new states has undoubtedly been curbed but there still are 
numerous entities identifying as nations and claiming a state of their own – 
contrary to the predictions of those who believe in the end of the nation- state 
or the state as such.
What is it that is so attractive about statehood? Amongst many other 
motives it is the quest of communities for equality and the promise to achieve 
it by forming a state. After all, the equality of all states has always been a prin-
ciple of international public law. The principle of equality of nations within 
states, in contrast, does not benefit from such a guarantee. Whether nations 
living on the territory of a larger unit are treated equally depends entirely on 
the will of each state, a fact which not only raises fears when the state is run 
by an autocratic government or captured by elites, but also when the state is 
democratic but characterised by deep cultural, ethnic, linguistic or religious 
cleavages. When the majority group in such a state freely decides the fate of 
minorities, minorities have no interest in democracy. If small (ethnic) groups 
happen to be in power in a state, for instance because they have been the elites 
cooperating with the former colonial power and been able to keep the newly 
independent states to themselves, democratising the state appears to them as 
a frightening option. The majority could turn against the ruling class, outnum-
ber it – and possibly take revenge for wrongs of the past. Ruling minorities 
hence are often spoilers of democratic processes, willing to stage regular elec-
tions but unwilling to accept free and fair ones.
While communities which are outnumbered by others feel at the mercy of 
other groups and experience or fear discrimination, communities having a 
state ‘of their own’ can rely on international guarantees of equality. The United 
Nations Charter was adopted to reaffirm faith in the equal rights ‘of nations 
large and small’ (preamble), and is led by the purpose of developing ‘friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self- determination of peoples’ (Article 1). Such a promise of equality makes 
statehood attractive to peoples, groups and regions suffering cultural oppres-
sion, economic marginalisation, and social neglect. Statehood seems the key 
to equal rights and equal respect; experiences of new states unable to use this 
key to open the door ending inequality do not seem to alter this perception.
But what about equality within states? Most federations established by 
aggregation were built on the international public law principle of equality. 
All formerly independent units – large and small – enjoy equal rights and 
obligations. They are all equally represented in the second chambers of the 
national parliaments which are reminiscent of international organisations 
in which all members have the same say. Federal and other states have ven-
tured to identify as multinational states and to overcome the legacies of the 
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dominant nation- state concept. The multinational state recognises a diversity 
of geographic and cultural constituent units brought or held together under 
the roof of one state, deals with internal diversity in various ways, in particular 
by federalising, decentralising or regionalising the state or by adapting auton-
omy regimes for specific regions or groups. With the increased attractiveness 
of multinational states to defuse tensions, came an important change of per-
ception: diversity became a factor of union between the different units and 
communities rather than one of dissention and conflict. Federalism and other 
forms of vertical power- dividing and power- sharing appeared as the solution 
to organise those multinational states facing tensions between majority and 
minority groups. Multinational systems with federal arrangements made it 
possible to solve long- lasting conflicts while bringing the state closer to the 
people and making the political structure more democratic and accountable. 
Opening up to the idea of diversity allowed recognition and accommodation 
of claims of self- determination within and not outside of the state. Often sep-
aratist movements tuned down their requests when fair eye to eye talks and 
reliable autonomy were available within the territory of the state.
Multinational states comprise two or more nations or ‘states’ and contrast 
with the nation- state where a single nation – which often, but not always 
accounts for the bulk of the population – dominates in terms of culture, lan-
guage and religion and treats communities of different culture, language or 
religion at best as protected minorities, at worst as foreigners, settlers or ene-
mies of the state. If the different nations of the same state are to be guaran-
teed equal rights, features of federal systems occur. Autonomy allows smaller 
groups to be shielded from domination by the larger groups and to operate 
democratically, within the sphere of self- rule, without the fear of ending up 
as permanent losers, a fear which is exacerbated by ethnic cleavages. Shared 
rule guarantees that all nations equally participate in decision- making at the 
multinational level, and that majority rule is balanced by mechanisms of coor-
dination and compromise.
However, as in international law and international relations, formal equality 
or input- equality does not necessarily lead to substantive or output- equality. 
Just like states, some nations or units within states are more populous, more 
prosperous, and more powerful than others, some enjoy an advantageous geo-
graphic location, host a wealthy capital or a profitable harbour, own or admin-
ister natural resources or are home to the (formerly) privileged group. Others 
are remote, landlocked, underdeveloped and populated by minorities or other 
disadvantaged groups and therefore are or feel ‘less equal than others’. In addi-
tion, some units are well administered and effective when it comes to imple-
menting the right to self- rule and impacting on shared rule, others struggle to 
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position themselves or are plagued by governance deficits, a crucial difference 
which aggravates other de facto inequalities.
Most federal systems, in particular those established by devolution, have 
inbuilt formal inequalities or asymmetries which relate to one or more aspects 
of the power- sharing arrangement. These asymmetries are either the result of 
unequal bargaining powers and mirror de facto inequalities or power relations, 
or are an attempt to overcome such inequalities and to create fair power rela-
tions where they did not previously exist. Most often, asymmetric federal sys-
tems are composed of elements of both and their respective relevance often 
changes over time. As Maja Sahadžić reminds us, such unequal relationships 
among regional units are not unproblematic. As she explains, constitutional 
asymmetry affects the principle of equality and can be seen – and often is 
seen – as a threat to the legitimacy and stability of a state. This link between 
asymmetry and equality is however not straightforward. The formal equal-
ity of subnational units often proves unable to cope with the complexity of 
social reality, fundamentally diverse. Managing diversity can lead to constitu-
tional asymmetry, especially in multinational states in which different nations, 
large and small, powerful and weak, claim a right to self- determination. 
Constitutional asymmetry resulting from the implementation of such claims 
can have numerous and complex implications for the principle for equality. It 
can serve the principle of equality by allowing all nations, not just the majority 
group, to determine their fate autonomously and to have an equal say in the 
making of shared rule. Constitutional asymmetry can then help in implement-
ing the principle of equality by equalising existing power relations and give all 
the nations a fair chance for effective self- governance and participation. At the 
same time, constitutional asymmetry can harm the principle of equality. Such 
is the case when it allows communities and regions, which enjoy a high level 
of bargaining power thanks to economic or political power, natural resources, 
military strength or support by neighbouring or kin nations, to negotiate rights 
and privileges other communities and regions do not have and cannot bar-
gain for. Constitutional asymmetry then does not (only) compensate exist-
ing (cultural) inequalities on the ground, but has the potential to exacerbate 
(political, economic, and social) inequalities. Thus, constitutional asymmetry 
can enable a fine and often dynamic balance between equality and diversity. 
It can provide for just the right amount of different treatment to allow every 
nation within the federal system to be equal when it comes to autonomously 
determining local matters and contributing to the future of the country. When 
constitutional asymmetry is used to implement the right of self- determination 
of nations or national minorities, it can strengthen the coherence of the state 
and protect its territorial integrity. It can, however, degenerate into a system in 
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which solidarity no longer functions and in which one or several communities 
or regions use their bargaining power to obtain extra rights which are not com-
pensated by extra duties and in which asymmetry does not equalise but rather 
increases inequalities.
But why do unitary states federalise in the first place or guarantee auton-
omy to units in order to respond to claims to self- determination? And why are 
these claims for (more) autonomy so vocal in numerous countries around the 
world? Federal systems, be they symmetric or – more often – asymmetric, are 
often implemented in order to allow for the accommodation of groups or terri-
tories with distinct identities, needs or priorities, designed to protect national 
minorities, and to enable diversity to coexist with unity. What drives trends to 
autonomy is usually a claim to be or to remain different or to revive and cele-
brate a cultural difference which has been supressed in the past. But just as in 
the international sphere, the quest for autonomy is often also one for equality. 
Like independence, autonomy not only holds the promise of distinctiveness, 
but is also seen as a key to equality. Separatist movements, whether they aspire 
to outright independence or internal autonomy, are generally characterised by 
complaints about inequality and unfair treatment which have to be overcome 
by more and better self- rule. Their supporters are usually inspired by the hope 
that real or perceived disadvantages, past or current injustices and discrimina-
tion and lack of chances and opportunities will end when one’s own region or 
community is in charge.
Nico Steytler recalls that the quest for autonomy in many developing coun-
tries is driven mainly by the objectives of accommodating minority groups, 
limiting abusive centralised rule, and guaranteeing equitable development. 
Such quests are born out of practices and perceptions of racial, ethnic, linguis-
tic and cultural discrimination, marginalisation and unequal development of 
different groups and regions within one country. He reminds us that strong 
centralised governments, often seen as guarantors of coherence, equality and 
solidarity within a country, in fact often serve a narrow partisan group. They 
centralise resources and redistribute them to themselves and those holding 
and keeping them in power. In this kind of system, even regions rich in natural 
resources and economic potential end up being deprived of fair development 
chances. Communities and regions experience material inequality with regard 
to access to basic state services, government jobs, and overall development. 
Such experiences and perceptions of inequality can become explosive when 
the frontiers between the privileged and the disenfranchised follow ethnic, 
cultural, religious and linguistic lines. Ostensible material inequality can even 
lead to new constructions or the strengthening of existing ethnic, cultural, 
religious and linguistic identities of little previous relevance. Once there is a 
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common conviction that one’s personal disadvantaged positions and those of 
one’s friends and family are not or not only the result of the actions and omis-
sions of an ineffective or failed central government, of corruption or state cap-
ture, but a policy directed against a group or region, separatism is just around 
the corner.
Jayampathy Wickramaratne offers an imposing illustration of these mecha-
nisms. For decades, successive governments have negotiated power and com-
promised with ethnic groups but later defied the constitutional vertical distri-
bution of powers and taken back devolved powers thereby pouring oil on the 
fire of looming ethnic conflict. According to Jayampathy Wickramaratne, only 
the forging of a settlement which guarantees equality for the numerous ethnic 
minorities, most importantly the Tamil minorities, and the Singhalese major-
ity – by way of guaranteeing all regions a right to local self- government and fair 
participation – would ensure the sustainable cohesion of the conflict- ridden 
state. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka’s history, including direct foreign involvement, 
has made its population afraid of power- sharing, in particular when it carries 
the label of federalism. Nonetheless, devolution when enforced symmetrically 
served all of the nine provinces of the country, ensured their equal treatment 
and offered a chance for autonomous development, chances and opportuni-
ties which the central government now seems to be crushing without itself 
being able to mobilise the country’s resources and serve its entire population.
Unfortunately, as Nico Steytler shows by drawing on the examples of the 
Solomon Islands as well as Trinidad and Tobago, the objective to end mate-
rial inequality is not necessarily the only objective of marginalised groups. 
In both of the island states, constitutional proposals aiming at introducing 
federal systems are currently being debated. For the marginalised and under-
developed islands – or at least their elites negotiating in the capital – the 
promise of greater autonomy is linked with the hope that this will improve 
the management of non- renewable natural resources, ensure a fairer distri-
bution of wealth and increase equality between the different regions. In both 
of the islands, like in many other parts of the world, these demands for more 
autonomy are particularly salient because the regions claiming autonomy as a 
means to end economic neglect differ from the dominating group in the cap-
ital in terms of culture, language, religion and ethnicity. Such a situation eas-
ily allows for political mobilisation along these lines and can turn economic 
equalisation into a potentially explosive matter in which failure can lead to 
outbreaks of violence or threats thereof.
By sharing power, remote or marginalised regions or groups often hope to 
turn around history and implement a system which is not necessarily based 
on equality and solidarity throughout the country but allows them to take 
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their turn. There is sometimes a willingness to pay back for old injustice by 
holding back, for instance, all the natural resources the regions have access 
to or to retain preferential access to them. As a rule, regions calling natural 
resources their own are more prone to secessionist movements, a fact which 
often leads opponents to qualify these movements as egoist as they are less 
based on claims of (cultural) self- determination or seen as a remedy to oppres-
sion but are rather viewed as a way of calling off solidarity. Old inequalities 
are then fought by an attempt to create new ones. The claim to autonomy, as 
often expressed in recent constitution- making processes, is then not one for 
autonomy but one that allows role reversal. When implemented, such a sys-
tem may for a time serve as a tool to overcome wrongs of the past but then 
runs the risk of marginalising others. The proposed move to autonomy, even 
when combined with fiscal equalisation, also risks never being implemented 
in the first place, because those in power refuse to share power, due – rightly or 
wrongly – to a fear of payback.
As a conflict resolution mechanism, federal arrangements are then con-
fronted with two objectives which can be contradictory: they must guarantee 
self- government for minority groups while at the same time ensuring solidar-
ity between subnational governments and their citizens. If the unity of the 
country is to be upheld, the very idea of equality of citizenship cannot be 
questioned. While there is a guarantee of autonomy, there must also be one of 
equivalent public services, irrespective of location and group belonging. But 
how can this be provided? If the central tier enforces equitable distribution 
and solidarity throughout the country, the very purpose of having a decentral-
ised system risks evaporation.
As Yonatan Tesfaye Fessha shows, Ethiopia perfectly illustrates this dilemma. 
By empowering all ethnic communities, the dominance of one group over all 
the other groups of the multi- ethnic nation has been ended and the aim of 
constitutional equality for all peoples, nations and nationalities, which was 
crucial to guarantee peace after a long civil war along ethnic lines, has been 
fulfilled. But the equality of citizens has taken a serious blow. Despite a con-
stitutional commitment to uphold both individual and collective rights, the 
constitutional practice gives more weight to collective rights and frustrates 
claims based on the right of an individual to equal treatment. When self- 
governing units implement a mandatory language requirement to stand for 
election or to work for the government, this requirement is discriminatory 
when it is adopted to exclude members of non- dominant groups from par-
ticipating in self- governance. Constitutional norms or practices which do not 
prevent such practice, and which cannot effectively prevent minorities within 
minorities from suffering from the autonomy of the other people’s right to 
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self- determination question the legitimacy as well as the stability of the sys-
tem and the overall state. A constitution thus cannot be committed primar-
ily to upholding the autonomy of ethnic communities but must leave enough 
room for individual rights as well – and provide effective constitutional mech-
anisms to enforce both. As at the federal level, federal systems must deal with 
majority- minority tensions at the level of constituent units and protect inter-
nal minorities, irrespective of where they live.
Very similar lessons can be drawn from multinational Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. As Dejan Vanjek recalls, federalism was introduced to guarantee 
the equality of the three constituent peoples – Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats – but 
created discriminatory effects for member of other groups. Whereas nation- 
states are willing and often prone to sacrifice their diversity to force unity, 
multinational federations do not know or practice such a trade- off. Instead 
of a ‘winner takes all’ approach, which is typical for the classic majoritarian 
political reasoning, multinational federations opt for a culture of compromise 
and consensus between the major groups. Such institutional arrangements, 
however, require a high level of pacifism, voluntarism, and, first and foremost, 
generalised trust in the power of political deliberation and rational action for 
‘win- win’ values of compromise and consensus to operate effectively. The char-
acter of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multinational federation is not territorial, 
but rather corporative- communitarian; however, because the federation has 
no strong and resilient commitment to its fundamental constitutional values 
and lacks a supportive federal political culture, which would energise its fed-
eralism and internal federalisation process, the constitutional promises have 
yet to be fulfilled. Due to inherent structural deficiencies, the constitutional 
right to self- governance guaranteeing all three constituent peoples equal 
administrative- territorial autonomy and self- governing powers is currently 
still unevenly allocated and the federal executive and legislative powers still 
do not faithfully reflect the constitutional principle of symmetry of the three 
nations.
While constitutional practice still struggles to fulfil the promise of equal-
ity of groups, its very design creates formal and substantial inequalities ques-
tioning the principle of individual equality for all. Soeren Keil makes this 
clear by discussing the 2009 Sejdić- Finci judgement of the European Court 
of Human Rights which has not yet resulted in fundamental constitutional 
change but perfectly illustrates the tension between collective and individual 
equality. The amendments which the echr wishes to see adopted question 
one of the key constitutional elements introduced to ensure peace in post- 
war Bosnia, namely the power balance it installed between the three major 
groups. The constitutional peace treaty guarantees equal representation to the 
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three most important groups at the price of excluding other groups and raises 
the fundamental question of whether institutional mechanisms in post- war 
countries might exclude some communities from certain institutions when 
these arrangements serve the purpose of uniting and bringing together for-
mer enemies and therefore contribute to peace- building. Is it allowed – and 
if so, for how long – to give preference to the protection of group rights and 
power- sharing amongst ethnic elites at the price of the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all Bosnian citizens? For countries dis-
cussing federalism as a tool of conflict resolution, such as Ukraine, Syria and 
Myanmar, one of the lessons that can be learnt from the Bosnian experience 
is that finding a balance between giving rights and autonomy to territorially 
organised groups and preventing discrimination against other groups remains 
a key challenge for any federal system. It is also evident that post- war institu-
tional arrangements do not always organically change and reform themselves 
over time. While Bosnia’s territorial and institutional arrangements reflect the 
necessity for cooperation and compromise between ethnically divided terri-
tories which were a precondition for the successful conclusion of the Dayton 
Peace Conference, today it can clearly be argued that the same arrangements 
have become a symbol for the permanent crisis of the political system and 
its lack of progress in the field of human rights and democratisation. Both 
authors investigating equality in the highly complex federation Bosnia and 
Herzegovina hence conclude that innovative and unconventional institu-
tional mechanisms need to be employed to ensure that the inclusion of certain 
groups through power- sharing and territorial autonomy does not result in the 
exclusion of other groups.
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the Brazilian experience where the 
tension between autonomy and equality is most controversial when it comes 
to the political representation of the citizens from the different units in the 
first, rather than the second chamber of parliament. While second chambers 
typically aim at balancing the equality of the subnational units with the major-
itarian mechanisms of the first chamber, both chambers operate in the federal 
logic of equalising regions in the Brazilian system. Sérgio Ferrari claims that 
such a system distorts individual voting rights, undermines political equality 
among the country’s citizens, and allows federalism to supersede democracy 
and the political equality for which it stands. He demonstrates that the divi-
sion of federal states into electoral districts along the borders of the constit-
uent units may not be the only or best solution and runs the risk of unduly 
compromising equal political representation, especially when the number of 
representatives assigned to each constituent unit is not re- evaluated regularly 
and adjusted if needed. If not, the elegant federal compromise of having one 
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chamber representing the equality of regions, and another one guarantee-
ing the equality of citizens is undermined and the inextricable link between 
democracy and equality overstretched.
The acceptance of self- rule of regions or communities is either the result of 
necessity or of a voluntary restraint by the majority, which views diversity pos-
itively, accepts the principle of subsidiarity or simply wants peace. Accepting 
the overrepresentation of smaller regions or groups is also a compromise, 
which usually does not come into being by a simple majority vote but through 
negotiations in which federal actors negotiate as equal partners. But what of 
the principle of solidarity in all this? As a fundamental constitutional value, 
solidarity affects both interpersonal as well as interregional and intergovern-
mental relations. Solidarity and equality are twinned; one cannot exist without 
the other.
By using the example of Italy, Erika Arban recalls that demands for federal-
ism are often seen as comprising the unity of the state and opposing the prin-
ciple of solidarity – and hence equality. This is in particular the case when 
these demands are raised in the wealthier parts of the country. Federalism can 
then be seen as or blamed for being a mechanism of limiting solidarity and 
accepting the risk that the inequality of regions further increases over time. 
Such fears can only be overcome when the constitution legally protects sol-
idarity and establishes public service and social welfare systems which are 
equally accessible to all. Federal systems are therefore bound to find a fine bal-
ance between autonomy and solidarity and adapt it over time. Such balancing 
obliges wealthier regions, in the name of solidarity, to allocate a part of their 
income to other regions or to the central government which then has the duty 
of coordinating equalisation payments. While this kind of equalisation scheme 
is necessary to reconcile regional autonomy with solidarity, it must respect the 
right to self- rule and abstain from interfering excessively in regional autonomy.
Peter Hänni draws similar conclusions from an analysis of the Swiss fiscal 
federal system and the mechanisms of equalisation of financial resources and 
burdens provided for by the Swiss Federal Constitution. The far- reaching fis-
cal autonomy of cantons and communes, which includes the right to deter-
mine tax rates, leads to very diverse tax legislations and unequal tax burdens 
of Swiss citizens depending on where they live. At first sight, such a system 
has negative effects on equality. However, these effects are mitigated on the 
one hand by individual rights protecting taxpayers and by duties of equal 
treatment enforced by the Federal Supreme Court. On the other hand, there 
is a federal system of tax harmonisation and a financial equalisation scheme, 
both of which help to reconcile autonomy with equality. While the first limits 
the negative effects of tax competition, the second prevents a vicious cycle of 
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cantons, disadvantaged by geographical- topographical or sociodemographic 
conditions, becoming even less attractive for citizens and investors because 
of their need to levy higher tax taxes. The financial equalisation scheme thus 
does not only equalise the financial resources of cantons but also compen-
sates extra burdens with which some cantons are confronted. Such a system, 
combining both horizontal and vertical equalisation, permanently navigates 
between a merely symbolic equalisation and full equalisation, seeking com-
promises between solidarity, autonomy and competition which is welcome 
when fair.
Giulia Maria Napolitano and Gabriella Saputelli illustrate the challenge of 
reducing tensions between centralisation and autonomy by examining the 
Italian social care policy, a policy field which is particularly relevant for social 
equality. They demonstrate that ongoing conflicts between the central govern-
ment and the autonomous regions and the absence of a nationwide standard 
of essential social care services threatens unity and the principles of equality 
and solidarity within Italy. They also show that it is a dynamic but contradic-
tory process of power- sharing and a lack of regional fiscal powers, coupled by 
the absence of adequate financial transfers, which prevents regions from pro-
viding essential services. Such a situation, harming equality in a central mat-
ter, also has the potential of undermining regionalism as such. Hence, the lack 
of solidarity potentially endangers the diversity the regional systems aims at 
protecting.
By analysing the Argentinian approach to ‘equivalent development’ Miguel 
Angel Asensio raises similar challenges. In fact, federalism in Argentina has 
failed to overcome uneven development of regions and to provide socio- 
economic equality to its citizens. By highlighting the challenges and limits 
faced by the federal fiscal system in Argentina, he demonstrates that the com-
plex problem of adopting a unified concept of ‘development’ has not yet been 
solved. Reliable data and new and innovative mechanisms at the national 
level would urgently be needed and would ideally be sourced by inputs, best- 
practices and knowledge gathered by regional authorities through locally 
implemented development mechanisms. Such a reformed system could pro-
vide for more even development changes for all regions and citizens with-
out crushing the potential of bottom- up initiatives – and the right to self- 
government as such.
In fact, there are good reasons to insist on regional powers in the field of 
development and basic services despite the challenges such powers hold for 
equality. Based on a large comparison of European countries, Andrea Filippetti 
is able to show that citizens’ satisfaction with local public services in heteroge-
neous populations increases when these services are provided by autonomous 
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regional and local actors. From the point of view of citizens living in diverse 
regions, access to public services is generally more satisfactory when these ser-
vices are provided in a decentralised manner. The tendency of most EU states 
with increasingly heterogeneous population to bring the government and the 
people closer together and provide regions with more autonomy, in particular 
in the field of taxation, thus has the potential of providing better services in all 
the regions. Decentralisation is no panacea to poor service delivery and bears, 
amongst other things, the risk of decentralising corruption to regional govern-
ments. However, (re)centralisation is not the answer to such a problem as it is 
likely to reduce citizens’ satisfaction. The presence of strong and independent 
regional media and a vibrant civil society are much more promising when it 
comes to dealing with the issue of regional and local state failures.
The fact that decentralisation allows for diversity in services and creates 
tensions with equal citizenship does not necessarily affect access to public ser-
vices in negative ways. The fact that citizens’ satisfaction with local services 
increases in heterogenous societies might hint at the fact that it is a value in 
itself that services are delivered by local actors seen as belonging to the region 
and one’s own community; people then feel empowered to impact on service 
delivery. The common view that human rights and federalism associated with 
unequal human rights standards are incompatible is often equally erroneous. 
Diversity even in the sensitive field of human rights is not per se a problem 
to overcome but a situation to handle within the framework of national and 
international human rights obligations, as Eva Maria Belser claims. Autonomy 
and equality are just as much friends as they are foes. In fact, both federalism 
and human rights aim at improving governance and protecting diversity by 
constraining power. More importantly, both federalism and human rights seek 
to respect, protect and fulfil equality and self- determination. While the for-
mer strives to implement the principle of equality by empowering smaller or 
weaker regions or communities and by guaranteeing equality between major-
ities and minorities and amongst minorities, the latter focuses on the enforce-
ment of equality amongst individuals. Human rights protect the equal dignity 
and value of each person by guaranteeing all humans a right to self- determine 
their lives by making their own choices in all relevant fields – speech, beliefs, 
family, profession – and rely on the constitution to entrench these rights and on 
courts to enforce them, even against the will of the majority. In federal systems, 
the same underlying logic can be found. The aim of the system is to protect the 
equal dignity and value of the diverse regions and communities of the country 
and to provide them with a right to self- determination in relevant fields – cul-
ture, religion, language, development. Federal systems also rely on the consti-
tution to safeguard these competences and on a neutral umpire adjudicating 
Concluding Remarks 427
conflicts based on the constitutional power sharing system – even against an 
act approved by the majority.
Equality is at the core of liberal democracies, and it is often used to mea-
sure, evaluate and monitor the relation between the state and the individuals 
that constitute it. While equality was linked in classical nationalism to the 
existence of one nation and one national identity, acknowledging the fact that 
countries are often home to many nations and numerous national identities, 
and that each of these nations has a right to its own local political structure, 
challenges this concept of equality by giving the impression that the country 
is fragmented and equality thus impossible. While unitary states find it easier, 
at least in theory, to guarantee the equality of all their citizens, to effectively 
redistribute resources and to provide equal resources to all, they often fail in 
practice. When pondering the difficulties of federal systems to enforce equali-
ties, one should thus not forget that factual differences between communities 
and regions of one and the same country challenge the cohesion of all states, 
be they unitary, regional or federal. In fact, unitary states do not seem to have a 
better record when it comes to equalising disadvantaging differences and guar-
anteeing equal chances to all. While it has been shown that centralised unitary 
states have empirically the most salient asymmetries, the predominance, even 
today, of classical national beliefs produces a perception among both people 
and political leaders that giving autonomy to some national groups leads to 
a fragmentation of equality and an increase in unfair inequalities. This per-
ception, combined with other political considerations such as a strong fear of 
secession, often leads the majority to refuse any consequential devolution of 
power in favour of regional and local governments. However, reliable and well- 
implemented devolution of power in favour of regional and local actors has 
the potential of improving service delivery and ensuring a peaceful balance 
between majorities and minorities, and of weakening secessionist claims as 
regional and local governments find themselves enabled to address major local 
issues without depending on the central government or on the rest of the pop-
ulation. Such an arrangement does not hinder solidarity but can be a condi-
tion for it to function effectively. Federalism after all is not only about yielding 
autonomy, but also about fostering collaboration and solidarity between the 
different units that constitute the state.
The granting of autonomy does not by itself further fragment equality, 
increase inequalities or lead to new ones, neither does it necessarily question 
solidarity or threaten the unity of the state. Anna Gamper convincingly coun-
ters this predominant belief and demonstrates that federalism and equality 
are not principles which oppose each other. Quite the contrary, both princi-
ples, in fact, share a common narrative, namely suum cuique tribuere – to give 
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each their own. While federalism aims at guaranteeing diversity, and equal-
ity is mobilised to ensure homogeneity, the principle of suum cuique tribuere 
unites the two. In order to ensure justice, it considers the situation of each 
actor and attributes goods according to needs and priorities. This common 
principle of justice is essential to understanding the way federalism legiti-
mises equal and unequal treatment of regions and persons living in different 
regions. While human rights organisations might regard the relation of feder-
alism towards equality as flawed, asymmetries in federal states exist because 
federal systems consider everyone’s situation, including their needs, aims and 
aspirations, in order to better guarantee justice – and to ensure not only formal 
but also substantive equality before the law and by the law. This objective can 
only be reached when factual differences – whether demographic, geographic, 
ethnic, cultural, social, political and economic – existing between different 
groups, regions or individuals are considered and used to justify, depending 
on the circumstances, either equality of treatment or compensatory inequality 
of treatment. Equality can then be carried out, as justice can be carried out, 
by balancing the rights and obligations of the one vis- à- vis the other and by 
respecting, protecting and fulfilling the potential of each – be it a state, nation, 
region, minority or individual.
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